* [PATCH] New XEN_DOMCTL_set_target and IS_PRIV_FOR
@ 2008-01-23 11:55 ` Samuel Thibault
2008-01-23 14:28 ` John Levon
0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Samuel Thibault @ 2008-01-23 11:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
New XEN_DOMCTL_set_target
Stubdomains (and probably other domain disagregation elements too) need
to be able to tinker with another domain. This adds IS_PRIV_FOR that
extends IS_PRIV by allowing domains to have privileges over a given
"target" domain. XEN_DOMCTL_set_target permits to set this "target". A
new 'target' configuration option makes the domain builder use it.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@eu.citrix.com>
diff -r bcae9d2cc2f8 tools/libxc/xc_domain.c
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_domain.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -875,6 +875,20 @@
return do_domctl(xc_handle, &domctl);
}
+int xc_domain_set_target(
+ int xc_handle,
+ uint32_t domid,
+ uint32_t target)
+{
+ DECLARE_DOMCTL;
+
+ domctl.cmd = XEN_DOMCTL_set_target;
+ domctl.domain = domid;
+ domctl.u.set_target.target = target;
+
+ return do_domctl(xc_handle, &domctl);
+}
+
/*
* Local variables:
* mode: C
--- a/tools/libxc/xenctrl.h Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/libxc/xenctrl.h Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -952,4 +952,9 @@
uint32_t domid,
uint8_t machine_irq);
+/* Set the target domain */
+int xc_domain_set_target(int xc_handle,
+ uint32_t domid,
+ uint32_t target);
+
#endif /* XENCTRL_H */
--- a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -96,17 +96,17 @@
PyObject *args,
PyObject *kwds)
{
- uint32_t dom = 0, ssidref = 0, flags = 0;
+ uint32_t dom = 0, ssidref = 0, flags = 0, target = 0;
int ret, i, hvm = 0;
PyObject *pyhandle = NULL;
xen_domain_handle_t handle = {
0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef,
0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef };
- static char *kwd_list[] = { "domid", "ssidref", "handle", "hvm", NULL };
+ static char *kwd_list[] = { "domid", "ssidref", "handle", "hvm", "target", NULL };
- if ( !PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords(args, kwds, "|iiOi", kwd_list,
- &dom, &ssidref, &pyhandle, &hvm))
+ if ( !PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords(args, kwds, "|iiOii", kwd_list,
+ &dom, &ssidref, &pyhandle, &hvm, &target))
return NULL;
if ( pyhandle != NULL )
@@ -130,6 +130,11 @@
if ( (ret = xc_domain_create(self->xc_handle, ssidref,
handle, flags, &dom)) < 0 )
return pyxc_error_to_exception();
+
+ if ( target )
+ if ( (ret = xc_domain_set_target(self->xc_handle, dom, target)) < 0 )
+ return pyxc_error_to_exception();
+
return PyInt_FromLong(dom);
--- a/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/XendConfig.py Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@
'platform': dict,
'tools_version': dict,
'other_config': dict,
+ 'target': int,
'security_label': str,
'pci': str,
}
@@ -336,7 +337,8 @@
'vbd_refs': [],
'vtpm_refs': [],
'other_config': {},
- 'platform': {}
+ 'platform': {},
+ 'target': 0,
}
return defaults
@@ -1585,6 +1587,9 @@
def is_hvm(self):
return self['HVM_boot_policy'] != ''
+ def target(self):
+ return self['target']
+
def image_type(self):
stored_type = self['platform'].get('image_type')
return stored_type or (self.is_hvm() and 'hvm' or 'linux')
--- a/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -1640,7 +1640,8 @@
domid = 0,
ssidref = ssidref,
handle = uuid.fromString(self.info['uuid']),
- hvm = int(hvm))
+ hvm = int(hvm),
+ target = self.info.target())
except Exception, e:
# may get here if due to ACM the operation is not permitted
if security.on():
--- a/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/python/xen/xm/create.py Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -521,6 +521,10 @@
- suspend: Domain is suspended;
""")
+gopts.var('target', val='TARGET',
+ fn=set_int, default=0,
+ use="Set domain target.")
+
def err(msg):
"""Print an error to stderr and exit.
"""
@@ -748,7 +752,7 @@
map(add_conf, ['name', 'memory', 'maxmem', 'shadow_memory',
'restart', 'on_poweroff',
'on_reboot', 'on_crash', 'vcpus', 'vcpu_avail', 'features',
- 'on_xend_start', 'on_xend_stop'])
+ 'on_xend_start', 'on_xend_stop', 'target'])
if vals.uuid is not None:
config.append(['uuid', vals.uuid])
--- a/xen/arch/ia64/vmx/vmx_hypercall.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/ia64/vmx/vmx_hypercall.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -47,15 +47,16 @@
if ( copy_from_guest(&op, uop, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
-
if ( op.isa_irq > 15 )
return -EINVAL;
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op.domid);
if ( d == NULL )
return -ESRCH;
+
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
@@ -79,15 +80,16 @@
if ( copy_from_guest(&op, uop, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
-
if ( (op.domain > 0) || (op.bus > 0) || (op.device > 31) || (op.intx > 3) )
return -EINVAL;
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op.domid);
if ( d == NULL )
return -ESRCH;
+
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
@@ -124,13 +126,15 @@
if (a.domid == DOMID_SELF) {
d = rcu_lock_current_domain();
}
- else if (IS_PRIV(current->domain)) {
+ else {
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(a.domid);
if (d == NULL)
return -ESRCH;
+ if (!IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d)) {
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
}
- else
- return -EPERM;
if (op == HVMOP_set_param) {
struct vmx_ioreq_page *iorp;
--- a/xen/arch/ia64/xen/dom0_ops.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/ia64/xen/dom0_ops.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@
{
long ret = 0;
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
-
switch ( op->cmd )
{
case XEN_DOMCTL_getmemlist:
@@ -54,6 +51,13 @@
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
+
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ break;
+ }
+
for (i = 0 ; i < nr_pages ; i++) {
pte_t *pte;
@@ -84,6 +88,12 @@
if ( d == NULL) {
ret = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
break;
}
@@ -153,6 +163,12 @@
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain);
if ( d != NULL )
{
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ break;
+ }
+
ret = shadow_mode_control(d, &op->u.shadow_op);
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
if (copy_to_guest(u_domctl, op, 1))
@@ -172,6 +188,12 @@
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain);
if (unlikely(d == NULL))
break;
+
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ break;
+ }
if (np == 0)
ret = 0;
@@ -195,6 +217,11 @@
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain);
if ( d == NULL )
break;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ goto sendtrigger_out;
+ }
ret = -EINVAL;
if ( op->u.sendtrigger.vcpu >= MAX_VIRT_CPUS )
@@ -239,6 +266,10 @@
if (d == NULL)
break;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto sethvmcontext_out;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
ret = xsm_hvmcontext(d, op->cmd);
if (ret)
@@ -279,6 +310,10 @@
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain);
if (d == NULL)
break;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto gethvmcontext_out;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
ret = xsm_hvmcontext(d, op->cmd);
@@ -341,7 +376,10 @@
break;
}
- ret = domain_opt_feature(d, optf);
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ ret = domain_opt_feature(d, optf);
+
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
}
break;
--- a/xen/arch/ia64/xen/hypercall.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/ia64/xen/hypercall.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -500,13 +500,15 @@
struct domain *d;
long ret = 0;
- if (!IS_PRIV(current->domain))
- return -EPERM;
if (copy_from_guest(op, u_debug_op, 1))
return -EFAULT;
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domain);
if (d == NULL)
return -ESRCH;
+ if (!IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
switch (cmd) {
case XEN_IA64_DEBUG_OP_SET_FLAGS:
@@ -520,6 +522,7 @@
default:
ret = -ENOSYS;
}
+out:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
return ret;
}
--- a/xen/arch/ia64/xen/mm.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/ia64/xen/mm.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -2787,10 +2787,14 @@
if (xatp.domid == DOMID_SELF)
d = rcu_lock_current_domain();
- else if (!IS_PRIV(current->domain))
- return -EPERM;
- else if ((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(xatp.domid)) == NULL)
- return -ESRCH;
+ else {
+ if ((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(xatp.domid)) == NULL)
+ return -ESRCH;
+ if (!IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain,d)) {
+ rcu_lock_domain(d);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
/* This hypercall is used for VT-i domain only */
if (!VMX_DOMAIN(d->vcpu[0])) {
--- a/xen/arch/ia64/xen/xensetup.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/ia64/xen/xensetup.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@
panic("Cannot allocate dom0 vcpu 0\n");
dom0->is_privileged = 1;
+ dom0->target = NULL;
/*
* We're going to setup domain0 using the module(s) that we stashed safely
--- a/xen/arch/powerpc/setup.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/powerpc/setup.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@
dom0->vcpu[0]->cpu_affinity = cpumask_of_cpu(0);
dom0->is_privileged = 1;
+ dom0->target = NULL;
/* scrub_heap_pages() requires IRQs enabled, and we're post IRQ setup... */
local_irq_enable();
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -1740,15 +1740,16 @@
if ( copy_from_guest(&op, uop, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
-
if ( (op.domain > 0) || (op.bus > 0) || (op.device > 31) || (op.intx > 3) )
return -EINVAL;
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op.domid);
if ( d == NULL )
return -ESRCH;
+
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
@@ -1787,15 +1788,16 @@
if ( copy_from_guest(&op, uop, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
-
if ( op.isa_irq > 15 )
return -EINVAL;
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op.domid);
if ( d == NULL )
return -ESRCH;
+
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
@@ -1834,15 +1836,16 @@
if ( copy_from_guest(&op, uop, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
-
if ( (op.link > 3) || (op.isa_irq > 15) )
return -EINVAL;
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op.domid);
if ( d == NULL )
return -ESRCH;
+
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto out;
rc = -EINVAL;
if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
@@ -1921,13 +1924,16 @@
if ( a.domid == DOMID_SELF )
d = rcu_lock_current_domain();
- else if ( IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
+ else {
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(a.domid);
- else
- return -EPERM;
+ if ( d == NULL )
+ return -ESRCH;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ goto param_fail;
+ }
+ }
- if ( d == NULL )
- return -ESRCH;
rc = -EINVAL;
if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -2056,38 +2056,35 @@
MEM_LOG("Cannot mix foreign mappings with translated domains");
okay = 0;
}
- else if ( !IS_PRIV(d) )
+ else switch ( domid )
{
- switch ( domid )
- {
- case DOMID_IO:
- info->foreign = rcu_lock_domain(dom_io);
- break;
- default:
+ case DOMID_IO:
+ info->foreign = rcu_lock_domain(dom_io);
+ break;
+ case DOMID_XEN:
+ if (!IS_PRIV(d)) {
MEM_LOG("Cannot set foreign dom");
okay = 0;
break;
}
- }
- else
- {
- info->foreign = e = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domid);
+ info->foreign = rcu_lock_domain(dom_xen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ e = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domid);
if ( e == NULL )
{
- switch ( domid )
- {
- case DOMID_XEN:
- info->foreign = rcu_lock_domain(dom_xen);
- break;
- case DOMID_IO:
- info->foreign = rcu_lock_domain(dom_io);
- break;
- default:
- MEM_LOG("Unknown domain '%u'", domid);
- okay = 0;
- break;
- }
+ MEM_LOG("Unknown domain '%u'", domid);
+ okay = 0;
+ break;
}
+ if (!IS_PRIV_FOR(d, e)) {
+ MEM_LOG("Cannot set foreign dom");
+ okay = 0;
+ rcu_unlock_domain(e);
+ break;
+ }
+ info->foreign = e;
+ break;
}
out:
@@ -3043,9 +3040,6 @@
{
int rc;
- if ( unlikely(!IS_PRIV(current->domain)) )
- return -EPERM;
-
if ( !set_foreigndom(domid) )
return -ESRCH;
@@ -3222,10 +3216,15 @@
if ( xatp.domid == DOMID_SELF )
d = rcu_lock_current_domain();
- else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
- else if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(xatp.domid)) == NULL )
- return -ESRCH;
+ else {
+ d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(xatp.domid);
+ if ( d == NULL )
+ return -ESRCH;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
if ( xsm_add_to_physmap(current->domain, d) )
{
@@ -3313,10 +3312,15 @@
if ( fmap.domid == DOMID_SELF )
d = rcu_lock_current_domain();
- else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
- else if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(fmap.domid)) == NULL )
- return -ESRCH;
+ else {
+ d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(fmap.domid);
+ if ( d == NULL )
+ return -ESRCH;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
rc = xsm_domain_memory_map(d);
if ( rc )
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/multi.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -993,11 +993,11 @@
// not own, we let it succeed anyway.
//
if ( unlikely(!res) &&
- IS_PRIV(d) &&
!shadow_mode_translate(d) &&
mfn_valid(mfn = shadow_l1e_get_mfn(sl1e)) &&
(owner = page_get_owner(mfn_to_page(mfn))) &&
- (d != owner) )
+ (d != owner) &&
+ IS_PRIV_FOR(d, owner))
{
res = get_page_from_l1e(sl1e, owner);
SHADOW_PRINTK("privileged domain %d installs map of mfn %05lx "
--- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -959,6 +959,7 @@
panic("Error creating domain 0\n");
dom0->is_privileged = 1;
+ dom0->target = NULL;
/* Grab the DOM0 command line. */
cmdline = (char *)(mod[0].string ? __va(mod[0].string) : NULL);
--- a/xen/common/domain.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -502,6 +502,9 @@
if ( (v = d->vcpu[i]) != NULL )
free_vcpu_struct(v);
+ if (d->target)
+ put_domain(d->target);
+
free_domain(d);
send_guest_global_virq(dom0, VIRQ_DOM_EXC);
--- a/xen/common/domctl.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/common/domctl.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -182,9 +182,6 @@
struct xen_domctl curop, *op = &curop;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(domctl_lock);
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
-
if ( copy_from_guest(op, u_domctl, 1) )
return -EFAULT;
@@ -206,6 +203,10 @@
ret = -ESRCH;
if ( d == NULL )
break;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto svc_out;
ret = xsm_setvcpucontext(d);
if ( ret )
@@ -258,6 +259,10 @@
ret = -ESRCH;
if ( d != NULL )
{
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto pausedomain_out;
+
ret = xsm_pausedomain(d);
if ( ret )
goto pausedomain_out;
@@ -282,16 +287,18 @@
if ( d == NULL )
break;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto unpausedomain_out;
+
ret = xsm_unpausedomain(d);
if ( ret )
- {
- rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- break;
- }
+ goto unpausedomain_out;
domain_unpause_by_systemcontroller(d);
+ ret = 0;
+unpausedomain_out:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- ret = 0;
}
break;
@@ -303,16 +310,18 @@
if ( d == NULL )
break;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto resumedomain_out;
+
ret = xsm_resumedomain(d);
if ( ret )
- {
- rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- break;
- }
+ goto resumedomain_out;
domain_resume(d);
+ ret = 0;
+resumedomain_out:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- ret = 0;
}
break;
@@ -322,6 +331,10 @@
domid_t dom;
static domid_t rover = 0;
unsigned int domcr_flags;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
+ break;
ret = -EINVAL;
if ( supervisor_mode_kernel ||
@@ -385,12 +398,13 @@
if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain)) == NULL )
break;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto maxvcpu_out2;
+
ret = xsm_max_vcpus(d);
if ( ret )
- {
- rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- break;
- }
+ goto maxvcpu_out2;
/* Needed, for example, to ensure writable p.t. state is synced. */
domain_pause(d);
@@ -418,6 +432,7 @@
maxvcpu_out:
domain_unpause(d);
+ maxvcpu_out2:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
}
break;
@@ -428,7 +443,9 @@
ret = -ESRCH;
if ( d != NULL )
{
- ret = xsm_destroydomain(d) ? : domain_kill(d);
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ ret = xsm_destroydomain(d) ? : domain_kill(d);
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
}
}
@@ -445,6 +462,10 @@
ret = -ESRCH;
if ( d == NULL )
break;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto vcpuaffinity_out;
ret = xsm_vcpuaffinity(op->cmd, d);
if ( ret )
@@ -484,6 +505,10 @@
if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain)) == NULL )
break;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto scheduler_op_out;
+
ret = xsm_scheduler(d);
if ( ret )
goto scheduler_op_out;
@@ -505,7 +530,7 @@
rcu_read_lock(&domlist_read_lock);
for_each_domain ( d )
- if ( d->domain_id >= dom )
+ if ( d->domain_id >= dom && IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d))
break;
if ( d == NULL )
@@ -539,6 +564,10 @@
ret = -ESRCH;
if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain)) == NULL )
break;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto getvcpucontext_out;
ret = xsm_getvcpucontext(d);
if ( ret )
@@ -600,6 +629,10 @@
if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain)) == NULL )
break;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto getvcpuinfo_out;
+
ret = xsm_getvcpuinfo(d);
if ( ret )
goto getvcpuinfo_out;
@@ -639,6 +672,10 @@
if ( d == NULL )
break;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto max_mem_out;
+
ret = xsm_setdomainmaxmem(d);
if ( ret )
goto max_mem_out;
@@ -655,6 +692,8 @@
d->max_pages = new_max;
ret = 0;
}
+ else
+ printk("new max %ld, tot pages %d\n", new_max, d->tot_pages);
spin_unlock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
max_mem_out:
@@ -671,17 +710,19 @@
if ( d == NULL )
break;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto setdomainhandle_out;
+
ret = xsm_setdomainhandle(d);
if ( ret )
- {
- rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- break;
- }
+ goto setdomainhandle_out;
memcpy(d->handle, op->u.setdomainhandle.handle,
sizeof(xen_domain_handle_t));
+ ret = 0;
+setdomainhandle_out:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- ret = 0;
}
break;
@@ -694,18 +735,20 @@
if ( d == NULL )
break;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto setdebugging_out;
+
ret = xsm_setdebugging(d);
if ( ret )
- {
- rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- break;
- }
+ goto setdebugging_out;
domain_pause(d);
d->debugger_attached = !!op->u.setdebugging.enable;
domain_unpause(d); /* causes guest to latch new status */
+ ret = 0;
+setdebugging_out:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- ret = 0;
}
break;
@@ -722,6 +765,10 @@
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain);
if ( d == NULL )
break;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto irq_permission_out;
ret = xsm_irq_permission(d, pirq, op->u.irq_permission.allow_access);
if ( ret )
@@ -752,6 +799,10 @@
if ( d == NULL )
break;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto iomem_permission_out;
+
ret = xsm_iomem_permission(d, mfn, op->u.iomem_permission.allow_access);
if ( ret )
goto iomem_permission_out;
@@ -772,19 +823,61 @@
ret = -ESRCH;
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain);
- if ( d != NULL )
- {
- ret = xsm_domain_settime(d);
- if ( ret )
- {
- rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- break;
- }
+ if ( d == NULL )
+ break;
- d->time_offset_seconds = op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds;
- rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- ret = 0;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ goto settimeoffset_out;
+
+ ret = xsm_domain_settime(d);
+ if ( ret )
+ goto settimeoffset_out;
+
+ d->time_offset_seconds = op->u.settimeoffset.time_offset_seconds;
+
+ ret = 0;
+settimeoffset_out:
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case XEN_DOMCTL_set_target:
+ {
+ struct domain *d, *e;
+
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op->domain);
+ if ( d == NULL )
+ break;
+
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ if (!IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d))
+ goto set_target_out;
+
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ e = get_domain_by_id(op->u.set_target.target);
+ if ( e == NULL )
+ goto set_target_out;
+
+ if ( d == e ) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ put_domain(e);
+ goto set_target_out;
}
+
+ if (!IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, e)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ put_domain(e);
+ goto set_target_out;
+ }
+
+ d->target = e;
+ /* and we keep the reference on e, released when destroying d */
+ ret = 0;
+
+set_target_out:
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
}
break;
--- a/xen/common/event_channel.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/common/event_channel.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -130,12 +130,15 @@
long rc;
if ( dom == DOMID_SELF )
- dom = current->domain->domain_id;
- else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
-
- if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL )
- return -ESRCH;
+ d = current->domain;
+ else {
+ if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL )
+ return -ESRCH;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ goto out2;
+ }
+ }
spin_lock(&d->evtchn_lock);
@@ -156,6 +159,7 @@
out:
spin_unlock(&d->evtchn_lock);
+ out2:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
return rc;
@@ -197,7 +201,7 @@
ERROR_EXIT_DOM(-EINVAL, rd);
rchn = evtchn_from_port(rd, rport);
if ( (rchn->state != ECS_UNBOUND) ||
- (rchn->u.unbound.remote_domid != ld->domain_id) )
+ (rchn->u.unbound.remote_domid != ld->domain_id && !IS_PRIV_FOR(ld, rd)))
ERROR_EXIT_DOM(-EINVAL, rd);
rc = xsm_evtchn_interdomain(ld, lchn, rd, rchn);
@@ -628,12 +632,15 @@
long rc = 0;
if ( dom == DOMID_SELF )
- dom = current->domain->domain_id;
- else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
-
- if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL )
- return -ESRCH;
+ d = current->domain;
+ else {
+ if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL )
+ return -ESRCH;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ goto out2;
+ }
+ }
spin_lock(&d->evtchn_lock);
@@ -684,6 +691,7 @@
out:
spin_unlock(&d->evtchn_lock);
+ out2:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
return rc;
}
@@ -782,26 +790,28 @@
int rc;
if ( dom == DOMID_SELF )
- dom = current->domain->domain_id;
- else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
-
- if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL )
- return -ESRCH;
+ d = current->domain;
+ else {
+ if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL )
+ return -ESRCH;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
rc = xsm_evtchn_reset(current->domain, d);
if ( rc )
- {
- rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- return rc;
- }
+ goto out;
for ( i = 0; port_is_valid(d, i); i++ )
(void)__evtchn_close(d, i);
+ rc = 0;
+out:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
- return 0;
+ return rc;
}
--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -834,19 +834,19 @@
dom = op.dom;
if ( dom == DOMID_SELF )
{
- dom = current->domain->domain_id;
+ d = current->domain;
}
- else if ( unlikely(!IS_PRIV(current->domain)) )
- {
- op.status = GNTST_permission_denied;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if ( unlikely((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL) )
- {
- gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Bad domid %d.\n", dom);
- op.status = GNTST_bad_domain;
- goto out;
+ else {
+ if ( unlikely((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL) )
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Bad domid %d.\n", dom);
+ op.status = GNTST_bad_domain;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ( unlikely(!IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d)) ) {
+ op.status = GNTST_permission_denied;
+ goto setup_unlock_out2;
+ }
}
if ( xsm_grant_setup(current->domain, d) )
@@ -880,6 +880,7 @@
setup_unlock_out:
spin_unlock(&d->grant_table->lock);
+ setup_unlock_out2:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
out:
@@ -910,27 +911,26 @@
dom = op.dom;
if ( dom == DOMID_SELF )
{
- dom = current->domain->domain_id;
+ d = current->domain;
}
- else if ( unlikely(!IS_PRIV(current->domain)) )
- {
- op.status = GNTST_permission_denied;
- goto query_out;
- }
-
- if ( unlikely((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL) )
- {
- gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Bad domid %d.\n", dom);
- op.status = GNTST_bad_domain;
- goto query_out;
+ else {
+ if ( unlikely((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(dom)) == NULL) )
+ {
+ gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Bad domid %d.\n", dom);
+ op.status = GNTST_bad_domain;
+ goto query_out;
+ }
+ if ( unlikely(!IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d)) ) {
+ op.status = GNTST_permission_denied;
+ goto query_out_unlock;
+ }
}
rc = xsm_grant_query_size(current->domain, d);
if ( rc )
{
- rcu_unlock_domain(d);
op.status = GNTST_permission_denied;
- goto query_out;
+ goto query_out_unlock;
}
spin_lock(&d->grant_table->lock);
@@ -941,6 +941,8 @@
spin_unlock(&d->grant_table->lock);
+
+ query_out_unlock:
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
query_out:
--- a/xen/common/memory.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/common/memory.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -232,12 +232,17 @@
return -EFAULT;
if ( op.domid == DOMID_SELF )
- op.domid = current->domain->domain_id;
- else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
+ d = current->domain;
+ else {
+ d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op.domid);
+ if ( d == NULL )
+ return -ESRCH;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
- if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(op.domid)) == NULL )
- return -ESRCH;
if ( !paging_mode_translate(d) )
{
@@ -535,9 +540,15 @@
if ( likely(reservation.domid == DOMID_SELF) )
d = current->domain;
- else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) ||
- ((d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(reservation.domid)) == NULL) )
- return start_extent;
+ else {
+ d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(reservation.domid);
+ if ( d == NULL)
+ return start_extent;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ return start_extent;
+ }
+ }
args.domain = d;
rc = xsm_memory_adjust_reservation(current->domain, d);
@@ -589,10 +600,15 @@
if ( likely(domid == DOMID_SELF) )
d = current->domain;
- else if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
- else if ( (d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domid)) == NULL )
- return -ESRCH;
+ else {
+ d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domid);
+ if ( d == NULL )
+ return -ESRCH;
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) {
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
rc = xsm_memory_stat_reservation(current->domain, d);
if ( rc )
--- a/xen/common/schedule.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/common/schedule.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -461,9 +461,6 @@
struct domain *d;
struct sched_remote_shutdown sched_remote_shutdown;
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
- return -EPERM;
-
ret = -EFAULT;
if ( copy_from_guest(&sched_remote_shutdown, arg, 1) )
break;
@@ -472,6 +469,12 @@
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(sched_remote_shutdown.domain_id);
if ( d == NULL )
break;
+
+ if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) )
+ {
+ rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
ret = xsm_schedop_shutdown(current->domain, d);
if ( ret )
--- a/xen/include/public/domctl.h Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/include/public/domctl.h Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -554,6 +554,17 @@
typedef struct xen_domctl_set_opt_feature xen_domctl_set_opt_feature_t;
DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domctl_set_opt_feature_t);
+/*
+ * Set the target domain for a domain
+ */
+#define XEN_DOMCTL_set_target 46
+struct xen_domctl_set_target {
+ domid_t target;
+};
+typedef struct xen_domctl_set_target xen_domctl_set_target_t;
+DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(xen_domctl_set_target_t);
+
+
struct xen_domctl {
uint32_t cmd;
uint32_t interface_version; /* XEN_DOMCTL_INTERFACE_VERSION */
@@ -590,6 +601,7 @@
struct xen_domctl_pin_mem_cacheattr pin_mem_cacheattr;
struct xen_domctl_ext_vcpucontext ext_vcpucontext;
struct xen_domctl_set_opt_feature set_opt_feature;
+ struct xen_domctl_set_target set_target;
uint8_t pad[128];
} u;
};
--- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -187,6 +187,8 @@
bool_t is_hvm;
/* Is this guest fully privileged (aka dom0)? */
bool_t is_privileged;
+ /* Which guest this guest has privileges on */
+ struct domain *target;
/* Is this guest being debugged by dom0? */
bool_t debugger_attached;
/* Are any VCPUs polling event channels (SCHEDOP_poll)? */
@@ -493,6 +495,7 @@
}
#define IS_PRIV(_d) ((_d)->is_privileged)
+#define IS_PRIV_FOR(_d, _t) (IS_PRIV(_d) || ((_d)->target && (_d)->target == (_t)))
#ifndef IS_COMPAT
#define IS_COMPAT(d) 0
--- a/xen/xsm/acm/acm_simple_type_enforcement_hooks.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/xsm/acm/acm_simple_type_enforcement_hooks.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -817,17 +817,19 @@
return ACM_ACCESS_PERMITTED;
}
atomic_inc(&ste_bin_pol.gt_eval_count);
+ subj = current->domain;
+ obj = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(id);
+
/* a) check authorization (eventually use specific capabilities) */
- if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
+ if ( obj && !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, obj) )
{
printk("%s: Grant table management authorization denied ERROR!\n",
__func__);
+ rcu_unlock_domain(obj);
return ACM_ACCESS_DENIED;
}
+
/* b) check types */
- subj = current->domain;
- obj = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(id);
-
if ( share_common_type(subj, obj) )
{
cache_result(subj, obj);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* [PATCH] New XS_SET_TARGET
@ 2008-01-23 12:06 Samuel Thibault
2008-01-23 11:55 ` [PATCH] New XEN_DOMCTL_set_target and IS_PRIV_FOR Samuel Thibault
2008-01-23 14:29 ` [PATCH] New XS_SET_TARGET John Levon
0 siblings, 2 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Samuel Thibault @ 2008-01-23 12:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
New XS_SET_TARGET
Stubdomains (and probably other domain disagregation elements too) need
to be able to tinker with another domain. This adds XS_SET_TARGET so
that XenStore allows domains to have permissions on files on which the
"target" has permissions. This also adds xs_set_target, called by the
domain builder when the 'target' option is used in the configuration.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@eu.citrix.com>
---
This patch depends on the previous "New XEN_DOMCTL_set_target and
IS_PRIV_FOR" patch.
diff -u b/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py b/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py
--- b/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
from xen.xend.XendDevices import XendDevices
from xen.xend.XendTask import XendTask
from xen.xend.xenstore.xstransact import xstransact, complete
-from xen.xend.xenstore.xsutil import GetDomainPath, IntroduceDomain, ResumeDomain
+from xen.xend.xenstore.xsutil import GetDomainPath, IntroduceDomain, SetTarget, ResumeDomain
from xen.xend.xenstore.xswatch import xswatch
from xen.xend.XendConstants import *
from xen.xend.XendAPIConstants import *
@@ -883,6 +883,9 @@
def storeVm(self, *args):
return xstransact.Store(self.vmpath, *args)
+ def permissionsVm(self, *args):
+ return xstransact.SetPermissions(self.vmpath, *args)
+
def _readVmTxn(self, transaction, *args):
paths = map(lambda x: self.vmpath + "/" + x, args)
@@ -905,4 +908,8 @@
return transaction.store(*paths)
+ def permissionsVmTxn(self, transaction, *args):
+ paths = map(lambda x: self.vmpath + "/" + x, args)
+ return transaction.set_permissions(*paths)
+
#
# Function to update xenstore /dom/*
@@ -1694,0 +1702,9 @@
+ def _setTarget(self, target):
+ assert self.domid is not None
+
+ try:
+ SetTarget(self.domid, target)
+ self.storeDom('target', target)
+ except RuntimeError, exn:
+ raise XendError(str(exn))
+
@@ -1756,6 +1772,8 @@
self.native_protocol = channel_details['native_protocol'];
self._introduceDomain()
+ if self.info.target():
+ self._setTarget(self.info.target())
self._createDevices()
--- a/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xs/xs.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xs/xs.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -619,6 +619,36 @@
return none(result);
}
+#define xspy_set_target_doc "\n" \
+ "Tell xenstore that a domain is targetting another one so it\n" \
+ "should let it tinker with it.\n" \
+ " dom [int] : domain id\n" \
+ " target [int] : domain id of the target\n" \
+ "\n" \
+ "Returns None on success.\n" \
+ "Raises xen.lowlevel.xs.Error on error.\n" \
+ "\n"
+
+static PyObject *xspy_set_target(XsHandle *self, PyObject *args)
+{
+ uint32_t dom;
+ uint32_t target;
+
+ struct xs_handle *xh = xshandle(self);
+ bool result = 0;
+
+ if (!xh)
+ return NULL;
+ if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "ii", &dom, &target))
+ return NULL;
+
+ Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
+ result = xs_set_target(xh, dom, target);
+ Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
+
+ return none(result);
+}
+
#define xspy_resume_domain_doc "\n" \
"Tell xenstore to clear its shutdown flag for a domain.\n" \
"This ensures that a subsequent shutdown will fire the\n" \
@@ -817,6 +847,7 @@
XSPY_METH(transaction_start, METH_NOARGS),
XSPY_METH(transaction_end, METH_VARARGS | METH_KEYWORDS),
XSPY_METH(introduce_domain, METH_VARARGS),
+ XSPY_METH(set_target, METH_VARARGS),
XSPY_METH(resume_domain, METH_VARARGS),
XSPY_METH(release_domain, METH_VARARGS),
XSPY_METH(close, METH_NOARGS),
--- a/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/image.py Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@
vncopts = ""
if passwd:
self.vm.storeVm("vncpasswd", passwd)
+ self.vm.permissionsVm("vncpasswd", { 'dom': self.vm.getDomid(), 'read': True } )
vncopts = vncopts + ",password"
log.debug("Stored a VNC password for vfb access")
else:
@@ -280,6 +281,9 @@
env['XAUTHORITY'] = self.xauthority
if self.vncconsole:
args = args + ([ "-vncviewer" ])
+ xstransact.Mkdir("/local/domain/0/device-model/%i" % self.vm.getDomid())
+ xstransact.SetPermissions("/local/domain/0/device-model/%i" % self.vm.getDomid(),
+ { 'dom': self.vm.getDomid(), 'read': True, 'write': True })
log.info("spawning device models: %s %s", self.device_model, args)
# keep track of pid and spawned options to kill it later
self.pid = os.spawnve(os.P_NOWAIT, self.device_model, args, env)
@@ -422,7 +426,9 @@
self.vm.storeVm(("image/dmargs", " ".join(self.dmargs)),
("image/device-model", self.device_model),
("image/display", self.display))
+ self.vm.permissionsVm("image/dmargs", { 'dom': self.vm.getDomid(), 'read': True } )
self.vm.storeVm(("rtc/timeoffset", rtc_timeoffset))
+ self.vm.permissionsVm("rtc/timeoffset", { 'dom': self.vm.getDomid(), 'read': True } )
self.apic = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('apic', 0))
self.acpi = int(vmConfig['platform'].get('acpi', 0))
only in patch2:
--- a/tools/python/xen/xend/xenstore/xsutil.py Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/python/xen/xend/xenstore/xsutil.py Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
def IntroduceDomain(domid, page, port):
return xshandle().introduce_domain(domid, page, port)
+def SetTarget(domid, target):
+ return xshandle().set_target(domid, target)
+
def GetDomainPath(domid):
return xshandle().get_domain_path(domid)
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@
case XS_ERROR: return "ERROR";
case XS_IS_DOMAIN_INTRODUCED: return "XS_IS_DOMAIN_INTRODUCED";
case XS_RESUME: return "RESUME";
+ case XS_SET_TARGET: return "SET_TARGET";
default:
return "**UNKNOWN**";
}
@@ -283,6 +284,8 @@
break;
close(conn->fd);
}
+ if (conn->target)
+ talloc_unlink(conn, conn->target);
list_del(&conn->list);
trace_destroy(conn, "connection");
return 0;
@@ -472,11 +475,13 @@
mask &= ~XS_PERM_WRITE;
/* Owners and tools get it all... */
- if (!conn->id || perms[0].id == conn->id)
+ if (!conn->id || perms[0].id == conn->id
+ || (conn->target && perms[0].id == conn->target->id))
return (XS_PERM_READ|XS_PERM_WRITE|XS_PERM_OWNER) & mask;
for (i = 1; i < num; i++)
- if (perms[i].id == conn->id)
+ if (perms[i].id == conn->id
+ || (conn->target && perms[i].id == conn->target->id))
return perms[i].perms & mask;
return perms[0].perms & mask;
@@ -1245,6 +1250,10 @@
do_resume(conn, onearg(in));
break;
+ case XS_SET_TARGET:
+ do_set_target(conn, in);
+ break;
+
default:
eprintf("Client unknown operation %i", in->hdr.msg.type);
send_error(conn, ENOSYS);
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -84,6 +84,9 @@
/* The domain I'm associated with, if any. */
struct domain *domain;
+ /* The target of the domain I'm associated with. */
+ struct connection *target;
+
/* My watches. */
struct list_head watches;
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -379,6 +379,51 @@
domain_conn_reset(domain);
send_ack(conn, XS_INTRODUCE);
+}
+
+void do_set_target(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
+{
+ char *vec[2];
+ unsigned int domid, tdomid;
+ struct domain *domain, *tdomain;
+ if (get_strings(in, vec, ARRAY_SIZE(vec)) < ARRAY_SIZE(vec)) {
+ send_error(conn, EINVAL);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->id != 0 || !conn->can_write) {
+ send_error(conn, EACCES);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ domid = atoi(vec[0]);
+ tdomid = atoi(vec[1]);
+
+ domain = find_domain_by_domid(domid);
+ if (!domain) {
+ send_error(conn, ENOENT);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (!domain->conn) {
+ send_error(conn, EINVAL);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ tdomain = find_domain_by_domid(tdomid);
+ if (!tdomain) {
+ send_error(conn, ENOENT);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!tdomain->conn) {
+ send_error(conn, EINVAL);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ talloc_reference(domain->conn, tdomain->conn);
+ domain->conn->target = tdomain->conn;
+
+ send_ack(conn, XS_SET_TARGET);
}
/* domid */
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.h Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
/* domid */
void do_resume(struct connection *conn, const char *domid_str);
+/* domid, target */
+void do_set_target(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in);
+
/* domid */
void do_get_domain_path(struct connection *conn, const char *domid_str);
--- a/tools/xenstore/xs.c Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xs.c Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -708,6 +708,25 @@
ARRAY_SIZE(iov), NULL));
}
+bool xs_set_target(struct xs_handle *h,
+ unsigned int domid, unsigned int target)
+{
+ char domid_str[MAX_STRLEN(domid)];
+ char target_str[MAX_STRLEN(target)];
+ struct iovec iov[2];
+
+ snprintf(domid_str, sizeof(domid_str), "%u", domid);
+ snprintf(target_str, sizeof(target_str), "%u", target);
+
+ iov[0].iov_base = domid_str;
+ iov[0].iov_len = strlen(domid_str) + 1;
+ iov[1].iov_base = target_str;
+ iov[1].iov_len = strlen(target_str) + 1;
+
+ return xs_bool(xs_talkv(h, XBT_NULL, XS_SET_TARGET, iov,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(iov), NULL));
+}
+
static void * single_with_domid(struct xs_handle *h,
enum xsd_sockmsg_type type,
unsigned int domid)
--- a/tools/xenstore/xs.h Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xs.h Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -132,6 +132,15 @@
unsigned int domid,
unsigned long mfn,
unsigned int eventchn);
+
+/* Set the target of a domain
+ * This tells the store daemon that a domain is targetting another one, so
+ * it should let it tinker with it.
+ */
+bool xs_set_target(struct xs_handle *h,
+ unsigned int domid,
+ unsigned int target);
+
/* Resume a domain.
* Clear the shutdown flag for this domain in the store.
*/
--- a/xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h Wed Jan 23 11:21:35 2008 +0000
+++ b/xen/include/public/io/xs_wire.h Wed Jan 23 11:36:15 2008 +0000
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@
XS_WATCH_EVENT,
XS_ERROR,
XS_IS_DOMAIN_INTRODUCED,
- XS_RESUME
+ XS_RESUME,
+ XS_SET_TARGET
};
#define XS_WRITE_NONE "NONE"
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] New XEN_DOMCTL_set_target and IS_PRIV_FOR
2008-01-23 11:55 ` [PATCH] New XEN_DOMCTL_set_target and IS_PRIV_FOR Samuel Thibault
@ 2008-01-23 14:28 ` John Levon
2008-01-23 14:36 ` Samuel Thibault
0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: John Levon @ 2008-01-23 14:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Samuel Thibault, xen-devel
On Wed, Jan 23, 2008 at 11:55:29AM +0000, Samuel Thibault wrote:
> New XEN_DOMCTL_set_target
This is missing a change to docs/ChangeLog
regards
john
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] New XS_SET_TARGET
2008-01-23 12:06 [PATCH] New XS_SET_TARGET Samuel Thibault
2008-01-23 11:55 ` [PATCH] New XEN_DOMCTL_set_target and IS_PRIV_FOR Samuel Thibault
@ 2008-01-23 14:29 ` John Levon
2008-01-23 14:36 ` Keir Fraser
1 sibling, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: John Levon @ 2008-01-23 14:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Samuel Thibault, xen-devel
On Wed, Jan 23, 2008 at 12:06:12PM +0000, Samuel Thibault wrote:
> New XS_SET_TARGET
> Stubdomains (and probably other domain disagregation elements too) need
This is missing a ChangeLog entry too
regards
john
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] New XEN_DOMCTL_set_target and IS_PRIV_FOR
2008-01-23 14:28 ` John Levon
@ 2008-01-23 14:36 ` Samuel Thibault
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Samuel Thibault @ 2008-01-23 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Levon; +Cc: xen-devel
John Levon, le Wed 23 Jan 2008 14:28:19 +0000, a écrit :
> On Wed, Jan 23, 2008 at 11:55:29AM +0000, Samuel Thibault wrote:
>
> > New XEN_DOMCTL_set_target
>
> This is missing a change to docs/ChangeLog
>
> > New XS_SET_TARGET
> > Stubdomains (and probably other domain disagregation elements too) need
>
> This is missing a ChangeLog entry too
Keir kindly did it for me.
Thanks for the reminder anyway,
Samuel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] New XS_SET_TARGET
2008-01-23 14:29 ` [PATCH] New XS_SET_TARGET John Levon
@ 2008-01-23 14:36 ` Keir Fraser
2008-01-23 14:42 ` John Levon
0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: Keir Fraser @ 2008-01-23 14:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Levon, Samuel Thibault, xen-devel
I've taken to documenting in a later changeset as that lets me put in a link
to the xenbits web page. I did this already for these two interface changes.
-- Keir
On 23/1/08 14:29, "John Levon" <levon@movementarian.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 23, 2008 at 12:06:12PM +0000, Samuel Thibault wrote:
>
>> New XS_SET_TARGET
>> Stubdomains (and probably other domain disagregation elements too) need
>
> This is missing a ChangeLog entry too
>
> regards
> john
>
> _______________________________________________
> Xen-devel mailing list
> Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com
> http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] New XS_SET_TARGET
2008-01-23 14:36 ` Keir Fraser
@ 2008-01-23 14:42 ` John Levon
2008-01-23 14:46 ` Keir Fraser
0 siblings, 1 reply; 8+ messages in thread
From: John Levon @ 2008-01-23 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Keir Fraser; +Cc: xen-devel, Samuel Thibault
On Wed, Jan 23, 2008 at 02:36:32PM +0000, Keir Fraser wrote:
> I've taken to documenting in a later changeset as that lets me put in a link
> to the xenbits web page. I did this already for these two interface changes.
OK. So what should people submitting patches do? Put the changelog entry
as part of the email message?
cheers,
john
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] New XS_SET_TARGET
2008-01-23 14:42 ` John Levon
@ 2008-01-23 14:46 ` Keir Fraser
0 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Keir Fraser @ 2008-01-23 14:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: John Levon; +Cc: xen-devel, Samuel Thibault
On 23/1/08 14:42, "John Levon" <levon@movementarian.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 23, 2008 at 02:36:32PM +0000, Keir Fraser wrote:
>
>> I've taken to documenting in a later changeset as that lets me put in a link
>> to the xenbits web page. I did this already for these two interface changes.
>
> OK. So what should people submitting patches do? Put the changelog entry
> as part of the email message?
It's helpful to at least point out that a changelog entry is needed. If they
want to provide text that's great, otherwise it's not really hard to
synthesize something appropriate from the patch comment.
-- Keir
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2008-01-23 14:46 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2008-01-23 12:06 [PATCH] New XS_SET_TARGET Samuel Thibault
2008-01-23 11:55 ` [PATCH] New XEN_DOMCTL_set_target and IS_PRIV_FOR Samuel Thibault
2008-01-23 14:28 ` John Levon
2008-01-23 14:36 ` Samuel Thibault
2008-01-23 14:29 ` [PATCH] New XS_SET_TARGET John Levon
2008-01-23 14:36 ` Keir Fraser
2008-01-23 14:42 ` John Levon
2008-01-23 14:46 ` Keir Fraser
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.