* [PATCH-v2 -mm 0/9] LSM-neutral Audit (SELinux audit separation)
@ 2008-03-01 19:47 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 19:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Hi everybody,
A series of 9 patches to let Audit be LSM netural. This is done
for proper future audit<->SMACK integration which will also be
useful for any future LSM.
Basically, patches add below new LSM hooks:
1- secid extraction:
inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid)
2- LSM-specific Audit rules manipulation:
audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule)
audit_rule_known(krule)
audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx)
audit_rule_free(rule)
and remove ,now redundant, equivalent SELinux exported interfaces.
Initial work and idea by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Thanks to Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> for his deep review of first
version.
include/linux/audit.h | 29 ++++++++
include/linux/security.h | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/selinux.h | 134 ---------------------------------------
kernel/audit.c | 24 ++----
kernel/audit.h | 25 -------
kernel/auditfilter.c | 99 ++++++++++------------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 74 +++++++++++----------
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 3 +-
security/dummy.c | 47 +++++++++++++
security/security.c | 35 ++++++++++
security/selinux/exports.c | 42 ------------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 27 +++++++
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 65 ++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 45 +++++++++----
14 files changed, 420 insertions(+), 331 deletions(-)
Regards,
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 1/9] LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
2008-03-01 19:47 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
@ 2008-03-01 19:51 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 19:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid)
LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported
SELinux interfaces.
Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default
if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to
NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid
secid exists.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/dummy.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
security/security.c | 10 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a33fd03..205a053 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -449,6 +449,11 @@ struct request_sock;
* @dentry is the dentry being changed.
* Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation
* causing setuid bit removal is failed.
+ * @inode_getsecid:
+ * Get the secid associated with the node.
+ * @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
+ * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* Security hooks for file operations
*
@@ -617,6 +622,8 @@ struct request_sock;
* @task_getsecid:
* Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
* @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
* @task_setgroups:
* Check permission before setting the supplementary group set of the
* current process.
@@ -989,6 +996,11 @@ struct request_sock;
* @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
* @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ipc_getsecid:
+ * Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
+ * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
+ * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
* @msg_msg_alloc_security:
@@ -1310,6 +1322,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
+ void (*inode_getsecid)(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
int (*file_permission) (struct file * file, int mask);
int (*file_alloc_security) (struct file * file);
@@ -1362,6 +1375,7 @@ struct security_operations {
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag);
+ void (*ipc_getsecid) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
@@ -1571,6 +1585,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
+void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
void security_file_free(struct file *file);
@@ -1615,6 +1630,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq);
@@ -1985,6 +2001,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
@@ -2100,7 +2121,9 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p)
}
static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
-{ }
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
static inline int security_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info)
{
@@ -2179,6 +2202,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 6a0056b..f5e5f95 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -422,6 +422,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu
return 0;
}
+static void dummy_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
@@ -540,7 +545,9 @@ static int dummy_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p)
}
static void dummy_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
-{ }
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
static int dummy_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info)
{
@@ -614,6 +621,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return 0;
}
+static void dummy_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return 0;
@@ -1062,6 +1074,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_permission);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
@@ -1098,6 +1111,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3e75b90..1748329 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
return security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size);
}
+void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid);
+}
+
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
return security_ops->file_permission(file, mask);
@@ -705,6 +710,11 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
}
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid);
+}
+
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* [PATCH 1/9] LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
@ 2008-03-01 19:51 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 19:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid)
LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported
SELinux interfaces.
Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default
if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to
NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid
secid exists.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/dummy.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
security/security.c | 10 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a33fd03..205a053 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -449,6 +449,11 @@ struct request_sock;
* @dentry is the dentry being changed.
* Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation
* causing setuid bit removal is failed.
+ * @inode_getsecid:
+ * Get the secid associated with the node.
+ * @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
+ * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* Security hooks for file operations
*
@@ -617,6 +622,8 @@ struct request_sock;
* @task_getsecid:
* Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
* @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
* @task_setgroups:
* Check permission before setting the supplementary group set of the
* current process.
@@ -989,6 +996,11 @@ struct request_sock;
* @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
* @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ipc_getsecid:
+ * Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
+ * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
+ * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
*
* Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
* @msg_msg_alloc_security:
@@ -1310,6 +1322,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
+ void (*inode_getsecid)(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
int (*file_permission) (struct file * file, int mask);
int (*file_alloc_security) (struct file * file);
@@ -1362,6 +1375,7 @@ struct security_operations {
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag);
+ void (*ipc_getsecid) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
@@ -1571,6 +1585,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
+void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
void security_file_free(struct file *file);
@@ -1615,6 +1630,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
void security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p);
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq);
@@ -1985,6 +2001,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
@@ -2100,7 +2121,9 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p)
}
static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
-{ }
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
static inline int security_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info)
{
@@ -2179,6 +2202,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 6a0056b..f5e5f95 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -422,6 +422,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu
return 0;
}
+static void dummy_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
@@ -540,7 +545,9 @@ static int dummy_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p)
}
static void dummy_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
-{ }
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
static int dummy_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info)
{
@@ -614,6 +621,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return 0;
}
+static void dummy_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ *secid = 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return 0;
@@ -1062,6 +1074,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_permission);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
@@ -1098,6 +1111,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3e75b90..1748329 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
return security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size);
}
+void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid);
+}
+
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
return security_ops->file_permission(file, mask);
@@ -705,6 +710,11 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
}
+void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid);
+}
+
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 1/9] LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
2008-03-01 19:51 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 21:18 ` James Morris
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-03 21:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Sat, 1 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid)
> LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported
> SELinux interfaces.
>
> Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default
> if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to
> NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid
> secid exists.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 1/9] LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
2008-03-01 19:51 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 23:26 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2008-03-03 23:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Saturday 01 March 2008 2:51:09 pm Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid)
> LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported
> SELinux interfaces.
>
> Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default
> if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to
> NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid
> secid exists.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> ---
>
> include/linux/security.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> security/dummy.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
> security/security.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index a33fd03..205a053 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -449,6 +449,11 @@ struct request_sock;
> * @dentry is the dentry being changed.
> * Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation
> * causing setuid bit removal is failed.
> + * @inode_getsecid:
> + * Get the secid associated with the node.
> + * @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
> + * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be
> saved. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
> *
> * Security hooks for file operations
> *
> @@ -617,6 +622,8 @@ struct request_sock;
> * @task_getsecid:
> * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
> * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into
> @secid. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
> + *
> * @task_setgroups:
> * Check permission before setting the supplementary group set of
> the * current process.
> @@ -989,6 +996,11 @@ struct request_sock;
> * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
> * @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
> * Return 0 if permission is granted.
> + * @ipc_getsecid:
> + * Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
> + * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
> + * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be
> saved. + * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
> *
> * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC
> message queues * @msg_msg_alloc_security:
> @@ -1310,6 +1322,7 @@ struct security_operations {
> int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char
> *name, void **buffer, bool alloc); int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct
> inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int
> flags); int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
> size_t buffer_size); + void (*inode_getsecid)(const struct inode
> *inode, u32 *secid);
>
> int (*file_permission) (struct file * file, int mask);
> int (*file_alloc_security) (struct file * file);
> @@ -1362,6 +1375,7 @@ struct security_operations {
> void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
>
> int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag);
> + void (*ipc_getsecid) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
>
> int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
> void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
> @@ -1571,6 +1585,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry
> *dentry); int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
> const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc); int
> security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
> const void *value, size_t size, int flags); int
> security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
> buffer_size); +void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
> *inode, u32 *secid); int security_file_permission(struct file *file,
> int mask);
> int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
> void security_file_free(struct file *file);
> @@ -1615,6 +1630,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned
> long arg2, unsigned long arg3, void
> security_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p); void
> security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
> int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
> +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
> int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
> void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
> int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq);
> @@ -1985,6 +2001,11 @@ static inline int
> security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, return
> 0;
> }
>
> +static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode
> *inode, u32 *secid) +{
> + *secid = 0;
> +}
> +
> static inline int security_file_permission (struct file *file, int
> mask) {
> return 0;
> @@ -2100,7 +2121,9 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid (struct
> task_struct *p) }
>
> static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,
> u32 *secid) -{ }
> +{
> + *secid = 0;
> +}
>
> static inline int security_task_setgroups (struct group_info
> *group_info) {
> @@ -2179,6 +2202,11 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission
> (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, return 0;
> }
>
> +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
> u32 *secid) +{
> + *secid = 0;
> +}
> +
> static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
> {
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
> index 6a0056b..f5e5f95 100644
> --- a/security/dummy.c
> +++ b/security/dummy.c
> @@ -422,6 +422,11 @@ static int dummy_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
> *inode, char *buffer, size_t bu return 0;
> }
>
> +static void dummy_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32
> *secid) +{
> + *secid = 0;
> +}
> +
> static int dummy_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
> {
> return 0;
> @@ -540,7 +545,9 @@ static int dummy_task_getsid (struct task_struct
> *p) }
>
> static void dummy_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> -{ }
> +{
> + *secid = 0;
> +}
>
> static int dummy_task_setgroups (struct group_info *group_info)
> {
> @@ -614,6 +621,11 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct
> kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return 0;
> }
>
> +static void dummy_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32
> *secid) +{
> + *secid = 0;
> +}
> +
> static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
> {
> return 0;
> @@ -1062,6 +1074,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct
> security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops,
> inode_getsecurity);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
> + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_permission);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
> @@ -1098,6 +1111,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct
> security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops,
> task_reparent_to_init);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
> + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 3e75b90..1748329 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -516,6 +516,11 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
> *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer return
> security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size); }
>
> +void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
> +{
> + security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid);
> +}
> +
> int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
> {
> return security_ops->file_permission(file, mask);
> @@ -705,6 +710,11 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm
> *ipcp, short flag) return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
> }
>
> +void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
> +{
> + security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid);
> +}
> +
> int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
> {
> return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/9] SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks
2008-03-01 19:47 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
@ 2008-03-01 19:52 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 19:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Setup the new inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid() LSM hooks
for SELinux.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
hooks.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f42ebfc..06597d7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2724,6 +2724,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
}
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ *secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
/* file security operations */
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -3120,7 +3126,8 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
+ *secid = tsec->sid;
}
static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
@@ -4090,7 +4097,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
goto out;
if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
- selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
+ selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
else if (skb)
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
@@ -4970,6 +4977,12 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
}
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+ *secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
/* module stacking operations */
static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
@@ -5292,6 +5305,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
.inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
.inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
+ .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
.file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
.file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
@@ -5332,6 +5346,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
+ .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
.msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
.msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* [PATCH 2/9] SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks
@ 2008-03-01 19:52 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 19:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Setup the new inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid() LSM hooks
for SELinux.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
hooks.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f42ebfc..06597d7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2724,6 +2724,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
}
+static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ *secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
/* file security operations */
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -3120,7 +3126,8 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
+ *secid = tsec->sid;
}
static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
@@ -4090,7 +4097,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
goto out;
if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
- selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
+ selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
else if (skb)
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
@@ -4970,6 +4977,12 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
}
+static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+ *secid = isec->sid;
+}
+
/* module stacking operations */
static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
@@ -5292,6 +5305,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
.inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
.inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
+ .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
.file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
.file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
@@ -5332,6 +5346,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
+ .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
.msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
.msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 2/9] SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks
2008-03-01 19:52 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 21:19 ` James Morris
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-03 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Sat, 1 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Setup the new inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid() LSM hooks
> for SELinux.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/9] SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks
2008-03-01 19:52 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 23:25 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2008-03-03 23:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Saturday 01 March 2008 2:52:30 pm Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Setup the new inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid() LSM hooks
> for SELinux.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> ---
>
> hooks.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index f42ebfc..06597d7 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2724,6 +2724,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct
> dentry *dentry) return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
> }
>
> +static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32
> *secid) +{
> + struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
> + *secid = isec->sid;
> +}
> +
> /* file security operations */
>
> static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int
> mask) @@ -3120,7 +3126,8 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct
> task_struct *p)
>
> static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> {
> - selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
> + struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
> + *secid = tsec->sid;
> }
>
> static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
> @@ -4090,7 +4097,7 @@ static int
> selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *
> goto out;
>
> if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
> - selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
> + selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
> else if (skb)
> selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
>
> @@ -4970,6 +4977,12 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct
> kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
> }
>
> +static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32
> *secid) +{
> + struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
> + *secid = isec->sid;
> +}
> +
> /* module stacking operations */
> static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct
> security_operations *ops) {
> @@ -5292,6 +5305,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops =
> { .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
> .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
> .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
> + .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
>
> .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
> .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
> @@ -5332,6 +5346,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops =
> { .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
>
> .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
> + .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
>
> .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
> .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3/9] Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
2008-03-01 19:47 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
@ 2008-03-01 19:54 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 19:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Stop using the following exported SELinux interfaces:
selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
kfree(ctx)
and use following generic LSM equivalents respectively:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
security_ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
security_task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
security_sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
security_release_secctx(ctx, len)
Call security_release_secctx only if security_secid_to_secctx
succeeded.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
auditfilter.c | 8 +++++---
auditsc.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 8316a88..d79f866 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -259,13 +259,13 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, int new, int old,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
if (rc) {
audit_log_format(ab, " sid=%u", sid);
allow_changes = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", allow_changes);
@@ -543,12 +543,13 @@ static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type,
audit_log_format(*ab, "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
pid, uid, auid);
if (sid) {
- rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
if (rc)
audit_log_format(*ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else
+ else {
audit_log_format(*ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
return rc;
@@ -750,18 +751,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
break;
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- err = selinux_sid_to_string(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = audit_sig_uid;
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO,
0, 0, sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
kfree(sig_data);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 2f2914b..35e58a1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include "audit.h"
@@ -1515,11 +1516,12 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sid, char *action,
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else
+ else {
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s rule key=", action);
if (rule->filterkey)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d07fc4a..a9fc9dd 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
logged upon error */
if (f->se_rule) {
if (need_sid) {
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
@@ -885,11 +885,11 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
int error;
u32 sid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return;
- error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return;
error_path:
@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
u32 sid, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- char *s = NULL;
+ char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
@@ -951,15 +951,16 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
uid, sessionid);
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", s);
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
- kfree(s);
return rc;
}
@@ -1268,14 +1269,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
if (axi->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
axi->osid);
call_panic = 1;
- } else
+ } else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
break; }
@@ -1389,13 +1391,14 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
call_panic = 2;
- } else
+ } else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1772,7 +1775,7 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
}
/**
@@ -2187,8 +2190,7 @@ int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
- selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
-
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
@@ -2340,7 +2342,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = t->uid;
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2368,7 +2370,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
else
audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
}
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2381,7 +2383,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t->uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2402,7 +2404,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
@@ -2432,16 +2434,17 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid);
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else
+ else {
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3/9] Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
@ 2008-03-01 19:54 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 19:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Stop using the following exported SELinux interfaces:
selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
kfree(ctx)
and use following generic LSM equivalents respectively:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
security_ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
security_task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
security_sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
security_release_secctx(ctx, len)
Call security_release_secctx only if security_secid_to_secctx
succeeded.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
auditfilter.c | 8 +++++---
auditsc.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 8316a88..d79f866 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -259,13 +259,13 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, int new, int old,
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
if (rc) {
audit_log_format(ab, " sid=%u", sid);
allow_changes = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
} else {
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
}
audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", allow_changes);
@@ -543,12 +543,13 @@ static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type,
audit_log_format(*ab, "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
pid, uid, auid);
if (sid) {
- rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
if (rc)
audit_log_format(*ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else
+ else {
audit_log_format(*ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
return rc;
@@ -750,18 +751,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
break;
}
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- err = selinux_sid_to_string(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = audit_sig_uid;
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO,
0, 0, sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
kfree(sig_data);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 2f2914b..35e58a1 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include "audit.h"
@@ -1515,11 +1516,12 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t loginuid, u32 sid, char *action,
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else
+ else {
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s rule key=", action);
if (rule->filterkey)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d07fc4a..a9fc9dd 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
logged upon error */
if (f->se_rule) {
if (need_sid) {
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
@@ -885,11 +885,11 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
int error;
u32 sid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return;
- error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
@@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
}
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return;
error_path:
@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
u32 sid, char *comm)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- char *s = NULL;
+ char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
int rc = 0;
@@ -951,15 +951,16 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
uid, sessionid);
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
rc = 1;
- } else
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", s);
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
audit_log_end(ab);
- kfree(s);
return rc;
}
@@ -1268,14 +1269,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
if (axi->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
axi->osid);
call_panic = 1;
- } else
+ } else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
break; }
@@ -1389,13 +1391,14 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
call_panic = 2;
- } else
+ } else {
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1772,7 +1775,7 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct inode *inode
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
}
/**
@@ -2187,8 +2190,7 @@ int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
- selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
-
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
@@ -2340,7 +2342,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
context->target_uid = t->uid;
context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
}
@@ -2368,7 +2370,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
else
audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
}
if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
return 0;
@@ -2381,7 +2383,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
ctx->target_uid = t->uid;
ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
return 0;
}
@@ -2402,7 +2404,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid;
axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
axp->pid_count++;
@@ -2432,16 +2434,17 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid);
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
- else
+ else {
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
+ }
}
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 3/9] Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
2008-03-01 19:54 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 21:19 ` James Morris
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-03 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Sat, 1 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Stop using the following exported SELinux interfaces:
> selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
> selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
> selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
> selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
> kfree(ctx)
>
> and use following generic LSM equivalents respectively:
> security_inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
> security_ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
> security_task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
> security_sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
> security_release_secctx(ctx, len)
>
> Call security_release_secctx only if security_secid_to_secctx
> succeeded.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 3/9] Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
2008-03-01 19:54 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 23:31 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2008-03-03 23:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Saturday 01 March 2008 2:54:38 pm Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Stop using the following exported SELinux interfaces:
> selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
> selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
> selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
> selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
> kfree(ctx)
>
> and use following generic LSM equivalents respectively:
> security_inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
> security_ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
> security_task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
> security_sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
> security_release_secctx(ctx, len)
>
> Call security_release_secctx only if security_secid_to_secctx
> succeeded.
Thanks for fixing this while you were making your changes.
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> ---
>
> audit.c | 17 +++++++++--------
> auditfilter.c | 8 +++++---
> auditsc.c | 55
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 3 files
> changed, 43 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 8316a88..d79f866 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -259,13 +259,13 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char
> *function_name, int new, int old, char *ctx = NULL;
> u32 len;
>
> - rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
> + rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
> if (rc) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " sid=%u", sid);
> allow_changes = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
> } else {
> audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> - kfree(ctx);
> + security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> }
> }
> audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", allow_changes);
> @@ -543,12 +543,13 @@ static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct
> audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type, audit_log_format(*ab, "user pid=%d
> uid=%u auid=%u",
> pid, uid, auid);
> if (sid) {
> - rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
> + rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
> if (rc)
> audit_log_format(*ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
> - else
> + else {
> audit_log_format(*ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> - kfree(ctx);
> + security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> + }
> }
>
> return rc;
> @@ -750,18 +751,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff
> *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) break;
> }
> case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
> - err = selinux_sid_to_string(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
> + err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
> if (err)
> return err;
> sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!sig_data) {
> - kfree(ctx);
> + security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> return -ENOMEM;
> }
> sig_data->uid = audit_sig_uid;
> sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
> memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
> - kfree(ctx);
> + security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO,
> 0, 0, sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
> kfree(sig_data);
> diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> index 2f2914b..35e58a1 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
> @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
> #include <linux/netlink.h>
> #include <linux/sched.h>
> #include <linux/inotify.h>
> +#include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/selinux.h>
> #include "audit.h"
>
> @@ -1515,11 +1516,12 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t
> loginuid, u32 sid, char *action, if (sid) {
> char *ctx = NULL;
> u32 len;
> - if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
> audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
> - else
> + else {
> audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> - kfree(ctx);
> + security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> + }
> }
> audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s rule key=", action);
> if (rule->filterkey)
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index d07fc4a..a9fc9dd 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct
> *tsk, logged upon error */
> if (f->se_rule) {
> if (need_sid) {
> - selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
> + security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> need_sid = 0;
> }
> result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
> @@ -885,11 +885,11 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer
> *ab) int error;
> u32 sid;
>
> - selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> if (!sid)
> return;
>
> - error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
> + error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
> if (error) {
> if (error != -EINVAL)
> goto error_path;
> @@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer
> *ab) }
>
> audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> - kfree(ctx);
> + security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> return;
>
> error_path:
> @@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct
> audit_context *context, pid_t pid, u32 sid, char *comm)
> {
> struct audit_buffer *ab;
> - char *s = NULL;
> + char *ctx = NULL;
> u32 len;
> int rc = 0;
>
> @@ -951,15 +951,16 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct
> audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
>
> audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
> uid, sessionid);
> - if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) {
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
> rc = 1;
> - } else
> - audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", s);
> + } else {
> + audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> + security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> + }
> audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
> audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
> audit_log_end(ab);
> - kfree(s);
>
> return rc;
> }
> @@ -1268,14 +1269,15 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct
> audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts if (axi->osid != 0) {
> char *ctx = NULL;
> u32 len;
> - if (selinux_sid_to_string(
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(
> axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
> axi->osid);
> call_panic = 1;
> - } else
> + } else {
> audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> - kfree(ctx);
> + security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> + }
> }
> break; }
>
> @@ -1389,13 +1391,14 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct
> audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts if (n->osid != 0) {
> char *ctx = NULL;
> u32 len;
> - if (selinux_sid_to_string(
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(
> n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
> audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
> call_panic = 2;
> - } else
> + } else {
> audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
> - kfree(ctx);
> + security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> + }
> }
>
> audit_log_end(ab);
> @@ -1772,7 +1775,7 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names
> *name, const struct inode *inode name->uid = inode->i_uid;
> name->gid = inode->i_gid;
> name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
> - selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
> + security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -2187,8 +2190,7 @@ int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
> ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
> ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
> ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
> - selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
> -
> + security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
> ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
> ax->d.next = context->aux;
> context->aux = (void *)ax;
> @@ -2340,7 +2342,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
> context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
> context->target_uid = t->uid;
> context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> - selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid);
> + security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
> memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
> }
>
> @@ -2368,7 +2370,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct
> task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
> else
> audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
> - selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
> + security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
> }
> if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
> return 0;
> @@ -2381,7 +2383,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct
> task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
> ctx->target_uid = t->uid;
> ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> - selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
> + security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
> memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -2402,7 +2404,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct
> task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] =
> audit_get_loginuid(t);
> axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t->uid;
> axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
> - selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
> + security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
> memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
> axp->pid_count++;
>
> @@ -2432,16 +2434,17 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
> ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
> audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
> auid, current->uid, current->gid, sessionid);
> - selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
> if (sid) {
> char *ctx = NULL;
> u32 len;
>
> - if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
> + if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
> audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
> - else
> + else {
> audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
> - kfree(ctx);
> + security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
> + }
> }
> audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
> audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4/9] Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
2008-03-01 19:47 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
@ 2008-03-01 19:56 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Don't use SELinux exported selinux_get_task_sid symbol.
Use the generic LSM equivalent instead.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 1ab0da2..61fd277 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
@@ -1239,7 +1238,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
NETLINK_CB(skb).pid = nlk->pid;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
memcpy(NETLINK_CREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred));
/* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4/9] Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
@ 2008-03-01 19:56 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Don't use SELinux exported selinux_get_task_sid symbol.
Use the generic LSM equivalent instead.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index 1ab0da2..61fd277 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
@@ -1239,7 +1238,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
NETLINK_CB(skb).pid = nlk->pid;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
memcpy(NETLINK_CREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred));
/* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4/9] Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
2008-03-01 19:56 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 21:19 ` James Morris
2008-03-03 21:30 ` David Miller
-1 siblings, 1 reply; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-03 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Sat, 1 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Don't use SELinux exported selinux_get_task_sid symbol.
> Use the generic LSM equivalent instead.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4/9] Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
2008-03-03 21:19 ` James Morris
@ 2008-03-03 21:30 ` David Miller
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: David Miller @ 2008-03-03 21:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jmorris
Cc: darwish.07, chrisw, sds, eparis, casey, dwmw2, paul.moore, akpm,
linux-kernel, linux-audit, linux-security-module
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2008 08:19:50 +1100 (EST)
> On Sat, 1 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
>
> > Don't use SELinux exported selinux_get_task_sid symbol.
> > Use the generic LSM equivalent instead.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
>
> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
I'll let the security folks merge this in.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 4/9] Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
2008-03-01 19:56 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 23:33 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2008-03-03 23:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Saturday 01 March 2008 2:56:22 pm Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Don't use SELinux exported selinux_get_task_sid symbol.
> Use the generic LSM equivalent instead.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> ---
>
> diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
> index 1ab0da2..61fd277 100644
> --- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
> +++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
> @@ -54,7 +54,6 @@
> #include <linux/mm.h>
> #include <linux/types.h>
> #include <linux/audit.h>
> -#include <linux/selinux.h>
> #include <linux/mutex.h>
>
> #include <net/net_namespace.h>
> @@ -1239,7 +1238,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb,
> struct socket *sock, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid = nlk->pid;
> NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
> NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
> - selinux_get_task_sid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
> + security_task_getsecid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
> memcpy(NETLINK_CREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct
> ucred));
>
> /* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 5/9] SELinux: remove redundant exports
2008-03-01 19:47 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
@ 2008-03-01 19:58 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Remove the following exported SELinux interfaces:
selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
They can be substitued with the following generic equivalents
respectively:
new LSM hook, inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
new LSM hook, ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
LSM hook, task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
LSM hook, sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/selinux.h | 62 ---------------------------------------------
security/selinux/exports.c | 42 ------------------------------
2 files changed, 104 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
index 8c2cc4c..24b0af1 100644
--- a/include/linux/selinux.h
+++ b/include/linux/selinux.h
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
struct selinux_audit_rule;
struct audit_context;
-struct inode;
struct kern_ipc_perm;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
@@ -70,45 +69,6 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void));
/**
- * selinux_sid_to_string - map a security context ID to a string
- * @sid: security context ID to be converted.
- * @ctx: address of context string to be returned
- * @ctxlen: length of returned context string.
- *
- * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the context
- * string will be allocated internally, and the caller must call
- * kfree() on it after use.
- */
-int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_inode_sid - get the inode's security context ID
- * @inode: inode structure to get the sid from.
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_ipc_sid - get the ipc security context ID
- * @ipcp: ipc structure to get the sid from.
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_task_sid - return the SID of task
- * @tsk: the task whose SID will be returned
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
* selinux_string_to_sid - map a security context string to a security ID
* @str: the security context string to be mapped
* @sid: ID value returned via this.
@@ -175,28 +135,6 @@ static inline void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
return;
}
-static inline int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-{
- *ctx = NULL;
- *ctxlen = 0;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid)
{
*sid = 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index 87d2bb3..64af2d3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -25,48 +25,6 @@
/* SECMARK reference count */
extern atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount;
-int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled)
- return security_sid_to_context(sid, ctx, ctxlen);
- else {
- *ctx = NULL;
- *ctxlen = 0;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
- *sid = isec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
- *sid = isec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
- *sid = tsec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid)
{
if (selinux_enabled)
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5/9] SELinux: remove redundant exports
@ 2008-03-01 19:58 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 19:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Remove the following exported SELinux interfaces:
selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
They can be substitued with the following generic equivalents
respectively:
new LSM hook, inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
new LSM hook, ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
LSM hook, task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
LSM hook, sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/selinux.h | 62 ---------------------------------------------
security/selinux/exports.c | 42 ------------------------------
2 files changed, 104 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
index 8c2cc4c..24b0af1 100644
--- a/include/linux/selinux.h
+++ b/include/linux/selinux.h
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
struct selinux_audit_rule;
struct audit_context;
-struct inode;
struct kern_ipc_perm;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
@@ -70,45 +69,6 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void));
/**
- * selinux_sid_to_string - map a security context ID to a string
- * @sid: security context ID to be converted.
- * @ctx: address of context string to be returned
- * @ctxlen: length of returned context string.
- *
- * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the context
- * string will be allocated internally, and the caller must call
- * kfree() on it after use.
- */
-int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_inode_sid - get the inode's security context ID
- * @inode: inode structure to get the sid from.
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_ipc_sid - get the ipc security context ID
- * @ipcp: ipc structure to get the sid from.
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_task_sid - return the SID of task
- * @tsk: the task whose SID will be returned
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
* selinux_string_to_sid - map a security context string to a security ID
* @str: the security context string to be mapped
* @sid: ID value returned via this.
@@ -175,28 +135,6 @@ static inline void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
return;
}
-static inline int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-{
- *ctx = NULL;
- *ctxlen = 0;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid)
{
*sid = 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index 87d2bb3..64af2d3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -25,48 +25,6 @@
/* SECMARK reference count */
extern atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount;
-int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled)
- return security_sid_to_context(sid, ctx, ctxlen);
- else {
- *ctx = NULL;
- *ctxlen = 0;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
- *sid = isec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
- *sid = isec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
- *sid = tsec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid)
{
if (selinux_enabled)
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 5/9] SELinux: remove redundant exports
2008-03-01 19:58 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 21:20 ` James Morris
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-03 21:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Sat, 1 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Remove the following exported SELinux interfaces:
> selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
> selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
> selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
> selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
>
> They can be substitued with the following generic equivalents
> respectively:
> new LSM hook, inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
> new LSM hook, ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
> LSM hook, task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
> LSM hook, sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 5/9] SELinux: remove redundant exports
2008-03-01 19:58 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 23:41 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2008-03-03 23:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Saturday 01 March 2008 2:58:32 pm Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Remove the following exported SELinux interfaces:
> selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
> selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
> selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
> selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
>
> They can be substitued with the following generic equivalents
> respectively:
> new LSM hook, inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
> new LSM hook, ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
> LSM hook, task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
> LSM hook, sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> ---
>
> include/linux/selinux.h | 62
> ---------------------------------------------
> security/selinux/exports.c | 42 ------------------------------ 2
> files changed, 104 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
> index 8c2cc4c..24b0af1 100644
> --- a/include/linux/selinux.h
> +++ b/include/linux/selinux.h
> @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
>
> struct selinux_audit_rule;
> struct audit_context;
> -struct inode;
> struct kern_ipc_perm;
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
> @@ -70,45 +69,6 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field,
> u32 op, void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void));
>
> /**
> - * selinux_sid_to_string - map a security context ID to a string
> - * @sid: security context ID to be converted.
> - * @ctx: address of context string to be returned
> - * @ctxlen: length of returned context string.
> - *
> - * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the
> context - * string will be allocated internally, and the caller
> must call - * kfree() on it after use.
> - */
> -int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
> -
> -/**
> - * selinux_get_inode_sid - get the inode's security context ID
> - * @inode: inode structure to get the sid from.
> - * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
> - *
> - * Returns nothing
> - */
> -void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid);
> -
> -/**
> - * selinux_get_ipc_sid - get the ipc security context ID
> - * @ipcp: ipc structure to get the sid from.
> - * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
> - *
> - * Returns nothing
> - */
> -void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32
> *sid); -
> -/**
> - * selinux_get_task_sid - return the SID of task
> - * @tsk: the task whose SID will be returned
> - * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
> - *
> - * Returns nothing
> - */
> -void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid);
> -
> -/**
> * selinux_string_to_sid - map a security context string to a
> security ID * @str: the security context string to be mapped
> * @sid: ID value returned via this.
> @@ -175,28 +135,6 @@ static inline void
> selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void)) return;
> }
>
> -static inline int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32
> *ctxlen) -{
> - *ctx = NULL;
> - *ctxlen = 0;
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode,
> u32 *sid) -{
> - *sid = 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm
> *ipcp, u32 *sid) -{
> - *sid = 0;
> -}
> -
> -static inline void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32
> *sid) -{
> - *sid = 0;
> -}
> -
> static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid)
> {
> *sid = 0;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
> index 87d2bb3..64af2d3 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/exports.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
> @@ -25,48 +25,6 @@
> /* SECMARK reference count */
> extern atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount;
>
> -int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> -{
> - if (selinux_enabled)
> - return security_sid_to_context(sid, ctx, ctxlen);
> - else {
> - *ctx = NULL;
> - *ctxlen = 0;
> - }
> -
> - return 0;
> -}
> -
> -void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
> -{
> - if (selinux_enabled) {
> - struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
> - *sid = isec->sid;
> - return;
> - }
> - *sid = 0;
> -}
> -
> -void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
> -{
> - if (selinux_enabled) {
> - struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
> - *sid = isec->sid;
> - return;
> - }
> - *sid = 0;
> -}
> -
> -void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
> -{
> - if (selinux_enabled) {
> - struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
> - *sid = tsec->sid;
> - return;
> - }
> - *sid = 0;
> -}
> -
> int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid)
> {
> if (selinux_enabled)
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 6/9] LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
2008-03-01 19:47 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
@ 2008-03-01 20:00 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 20:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules
by adding the following new LSM hooks:
audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule)
audit_rule_known(krule)
audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx)
audit_rule_free(rule)
Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/dummy.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++-
security/security.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b5d1ad7..eb663e5 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
extern unsigned securebits;
struct ctl_table;
+struct audit_krule;
/*
* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
@@ -1227,6 +1228,37 @@ struct request_sock;
* @secdata contains the security context.
* @seclen contains the length of the security context.
*
+ * Security hooks for Audit
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_init:
+ * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
+ * @field contains the required Audit action. Fields flags are defined in include/linux/audit.h
+ * @op contains the operator the rule uses.
+ * @rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to.
+ * @lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result.
+ * Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set,
+ * -EINVAL in case of an invalid rule.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_known:
+ * Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to current LSM.
+ * @rule contains the audit rule of interest.
+ * Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_match:
+ * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
+ * by @audit_rule_known.
+ * @secid contains the security id in question.
+ * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
+ * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
+ * @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
+ * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
+ * Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_free:
+ * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by
+ * audit_rule_init.
+ * @rule contains the allocated rule
+ *
* This is the main security structure.
*/
struct security_operations {
@@ -1487,6 +1519,13 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+ int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
+ int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+ void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
};
/* prototypes */
@@ -2670,5 +2709,38 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index b4967f4..241ab20 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -998,6 +998,30 @@ static int dummy_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void dummy_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
#define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \
@@ -1187,6 +1211,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_permission);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free);
+#endif
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1748329..1bf2ee4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1118,3 +1118,28 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_known(krule);
+}
+
+void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+ security_ops->audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+}
+
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, lsmrule, actx);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6/9] LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
@ 2008-03-01 20:00 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 20:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules
by adding the following new LSM hooks:
audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule)
audit_rule_known(krule)
audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx)
audit_rule_free(rule)
Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/dummy.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++-
security/security.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index b5d1ad7..eb663e5 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
extern unsigned securebits;
struct ctl_table;
+struct audit_krule;
/*
* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
@@ -1227,6 +1228,37 @@ struct request_sock;
* @secdata contains the security context.
* @seclen contains the length of the security context.
*
+ * Security hooks for Audit
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_init:
+ * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
+ * @field contains the required Audit action. Fields flags are defined in include/linux/audit.h
+ * @op contains the operator the rule uses.
+ * @rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to.
+ * @lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result.
+ * Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set,
+ * -EINVAL in case of an invalid rule.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_known:
+ * Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to current LSM.
+ * @rule contains the audit rule of interest.
+ * Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_match:
+ * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
+ * by @audit_rule_known.
+ * @secid contains the security id in question.
+ * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
+ * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
+ * @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
+ * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
+ * Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_free:
+ * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by
+ * audit_rule_init.
+ * @rule contains the allocated rule
+ *
* This is the main security structure.
*/
struct security_operations {
@@ -1487,6 +1519,13 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+ int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
+ int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+ void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
};
/* prototypes */
@@ -2670,5 +2709,38 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+
+#else
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index b4967f4..241ab20 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -998,6 +998,30 @@ static int dummy_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int dummy_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void dummy_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{ }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
#define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \
@@ -1187,6 +1211,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_permission);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free);
+#endif
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1748329..1bf2ee4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1118,3 +1118,28 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+}
+
+int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_known(krule);
+}
+
+void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+{
+ security_ops->audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+}
+
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, lsmrule, actx);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 6/9] LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
2008-03-01 20:00 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 21:20 ` James Morris
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-03 21:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Sat, 1 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules
> by adding the following new LSM hooks:
>
> audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule)
> audit_rule_known(krule)
> audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx)
> audit_rule_free(rule)
>
> Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/9] LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
2008-03-01 20:00 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 23:36 ` Paul Moore
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2008-03-03 23:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Saturday 01 March 2008 3:00:05 pm Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules
> by adding the following new LSM hooks:
>
> audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule)
> audit_rule_known(krule)
> audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx)
> audit_rule_free(rule)
>
> Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
> ---
>
> include/linux/security.h | 72
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/dummy.c
> | 31 +++++++++++++++++++-
> security/security.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index b5d1ad7..eb663e5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
> extern unsigned securebits;
>
> struct ctl_table;
> +struct audit_krule;
>
> /*
> * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
> @@ -1227,6 +1228,37 @@ struct request_sock;
> * @secdata contains the security context.
> * @seclen contains the length of the security context.
> *
> + * Security hooks for Audit
> + *
> + * @audit_rule_init:
> + * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
> + * @field contains the required Audit action. Fields flags are
> defined in include/linux/audit.h + * @op contains the operator the
> rule uses.
> + * @rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to.
> + * @lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result.
> + * Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set,
> + * -EINVAL in case of an invalid rule.
> + *
> + * @audit_rule_known:
> + * Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to
> current LSM. + * @rule contains the audit rule of interest.
> + * Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise.
> + *
> + * @audit_rule_match:
> + * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
> + * by @audit_rule_known.
> + * @secid contains the security id in question.
> + * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
> + * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
> + * @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
> + * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
> + * Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on
> failure. + *
> + * @audit_rule_free:
> + * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by
> + * audit_rule_init.
> + * @rule contains the allocated rule
> + *
> * This is the main security structure.
> */
> struct security_operations {
> @@ -1487,6 +1519,13 @@ struct security_operations {
> int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
> #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> + int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void
> **lsmrule); + int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
> + int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void
> *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx);
> + void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
> +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> };
>
> /* prototypes */
> @@ -2670,5 +2709,38 @@ static inline int
> security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #endif
> #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void
> **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule
> *krule);
> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void
> *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx);
> +void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
> +
> +#else
> +
> +static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char
> *rulestr, + void **lsmrule)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule
> *krule) +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field,
> u32 op, + void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +{ }
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> +
> #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
>
> diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
> index b4967f4..241ab20 100644
> --- a/security/dummy.c
> +++ b/security/dummy.c
> @@ -998,6 +998,30 @@ static int dummy_key_getsecurity(struct key
> *key, char **_buffer)
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> +static inline int dummy_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char
> *rulestr, + void **lsmrule)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int dummy_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline int dummy_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32
> op, + void *lsmrule,
> + struct audit_context *actx)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void dummy_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +{ }
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
> +
> struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
>
> #define set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, function) \
> @@ -1187,6 +1211,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct
> security_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_permission);
> set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
> #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
> -
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
> + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known);
> + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match);
> + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free);
> +#endif
> }
>
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 1748329..1bf2ee4 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -1118,3 +1118,28 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key,
> char **_buffer) }
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
> +
> +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void
> **lsmrule) +{
> + return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
> +}
> +
> +int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
> +{
> + return security_ops->audit_rule_known(krule);
> +}
> +
> +void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
> +{
> + security_ops->audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
> +}
> +
> +int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void
> *lsmrule, + struct audit_context *actx)
> +{
> + return security_ops->audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, lsmrule,
> actx); +}
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 7/9] Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
2008-03-01 19:47 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
@ 2008-03-01 20:01 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Convert Audit to use the new LSM Audit hooks instead of
the exported SELinux interface.
Basically, use:
security_audit_rule_init
secuirty_audit_rule_free
security_audit_rule_known
security_audit_rule_match
instad of (respectively) :
selinux_audit_rule_init
selinux_audit_rule_free
audit_rule_has_selinux
selinux_audit_rule_match
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
audit.c | 7 ------
auditfilter.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++------------------------------------------
auditsc.c | 9 +++-----
3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
Andrew, please atomically merge patch #7 and patch #8. Although
a system with patch7 and without patch8 will be compiled fine,
the SELinux Audit hooks are not set up yet. This means below
audit hooks will point to the dummy hooks instead of SELinux
ones even if SELinux is enabled.
I could not setup the SELinux hooks first cause they have
the same name of the old exported SELinux interface with a
difference of one parameter.
Thanks!
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index d79f866..40c3507 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
*
* Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
*
- * Goals: 1) Integrate fully with SELinux.
+ * Goals: 1) Integrate fully with Security Modules.
* 2) Minimal run-time overhead:
* a) Minimal when syscall auditing is disabled (audit_enable=0).
* b) Small when syscall auditing is enabled and no audit record
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -874,10 +873,6 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
audit_enabled = audit_default;
audit_ever_enabled |= !!audit_default;
- /* Register the callback with selinux. This callback will be invoked
- * when a new policy is loaded. */
- selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update);
-
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 35e58a1..7c69cb5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include "audit.h"
/*
@@ -39,7 +38,7 @@
* Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
* data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
* contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
- * selinux rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
+ * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
* must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
* An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
* be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
@@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
kfree(f->se_str);
- selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
@@ -598,12 +597,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
goto exit_free;
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
- err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- &f->se_rule);
+ err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+ (void **)&f->se_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM "
"\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
err = 0;
}
@@ -863,9 +862,9 @@ out:
return new;
}
-/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
-static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
+static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -878,12 +877,12 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
df->se_str = se_str;
/* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
- ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
- &df->se_rule);
+ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
+ (void **)&df->se_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
"invalid\n", df->se_str);
ret = 0;
}
@@ -892,7 +891,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
}
/* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
- * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The selinux specific fields
+ * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
* will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
* rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
* The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
@@ -945,7 +944,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
+ err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
@@ -1763,38 +1762,12 @@ unlock_and_return:
return result;
}
-/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there
- are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
-static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
- switch (f->type) {
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
- * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
+ * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
- * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
+ * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
* updated rule. */
-int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
+int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
{
struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
struct audit_watch *watch;
@@ -1806,7 +1779,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
- if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
+ if (!security_audit_rule_known(&entry->rule))
continue;
watch = entry->rule.watch;
@@ -1817,7 +1790,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
* return value */
if (!err)
err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
- audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
+ audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
if (watch)
list_del(&entry->rule.rlist);
list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index a9fc9dd..8afd349 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -533,7 +532,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
f->op,
f->se_rule,
ctx);
@@ -549,12 +548,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->se_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid, f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(
ctx->names[j].osid,
f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx)) {
@@ -570,7 +569,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
aux = aux->next) {
if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* [PATCH 7/9] Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
@ 2008-03-01 20:01 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 20:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Convert Audit to use the new LSM Audit hooks instead of
the exported SELinux interface.
Basically, use:
security_audit_rule_init
secuirty_audit_rule_free
security_audit_rule_known
security_audit_rule_match
instad of (respectively) :
selinux_audit_rule_init
selinux_audit_rule_free
audit_rule_has_selinux
selinux_audit_rule_match
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
audit.c | 7 ------
auditfilter.c | 61 ++++++++++++++++------------------------------------------
auditsc.c | 9 +++-----
3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
Andrew, please atomically merge patch #7 and patch #8. Although
a system with patch7 and without patch8 will be compiled fine,
the SELinux Audit hooks are not set up yet. This means below
audit hooks will point to the dummy hooks instead of SELinux
ones even if SELinux is enabled.
I could not setup the SELinux hooks first cause they have
the same name of the old exported SELinux interface with a
difference of one parameter.
Thanks!
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index d79f866..40c3507 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
*
* Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
*
- * Goals: 1) Integrate fully with SELinux.
+ * Goals: 1) Integrate fully with Security Modules.
* 2) Minimal run-time overhead:
* a) Minimal when syscall auditing is disabled (audit_enable=0).
* b) Small when syscall auditing is enabled and no audit record
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -874,10 +873,6 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
audit_enabled = audit_default;
audit_ever_enabled |= !!audit_default;
- /* Register the callback with selinux. This callback will be invoked
- * when a new policy is loaded. */
- selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update);
-
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 35e58a1..7c69cb5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include "audit.h"
/*
@@ -39,7 +38,7 @@
* Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
* data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
* contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
- * selinux rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
+ * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
* must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
* An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
* be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
@@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
kfree(f->se_str);
- selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
@@ -598,12 +597,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
goto exit_free;
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
- err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- &f->se_rule);
+ err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+ (void **)&f->se_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM "
"\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
err = 0;
}
@@ -863,9 +862,9 @@ out:
return new;
}
-/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
-static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
+static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -878,12 +877,12 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
df->se_str = se_str;
/* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
- ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
- &df->se_rule);
+ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
+ (void **)&df->se_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
"invalid\n", df->se_str);
ret = 0;
}
@@ -892,7 +891,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
}
/* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
- * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The selinux specific fields
+ * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
* will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
* rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
* The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
@@ -945,7 +944,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
+ err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
@@ -1763,38 +1762,12 @@ unlock_and_return:
return result;
}
-/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there
- are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
-static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
- switch (f->type) {
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
- * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
+ * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
- * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
+ * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
* updated rule. */
-int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
+int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
{
struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
struct audit_watch *watch;
@@ -1806,7 +1779,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
- if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
+ if (!security_audit_rule_known(&entry->rule))
continue;
watch = entry->rule.watch;
@@ -1817,7 +1790,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
* return value */
if (!err)
err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
- audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
+ audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
if (watch)
list_del(&entry->rule.rlist);
list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index a9fc9dd..8afd349 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -533,7 +532,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
f->op,
f->se_rule,
ctx);
@@ -549,12 +548,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->se_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid, f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(
ctx->names[j].osid,
f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx)) {
@@ -570,7 +569,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
aux = aux->next) {
if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 7/9] Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
2008-03-01 20:01 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 21:20 ` James Morris
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-03 21:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Sat, 1 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Convert Audit to use the new LSM Audit hooks instead of
> the exported SELinux interface.
>
> Basically, use:
> security_audit_rule_init
> secuirty_audit_rule_free
> security_audit_rule_known
> security_audit_rule_match
>
> instad of (respectively) :
> selinux_audit_rule_init
> selinux_audit_rule_free
> audit_rule_has_selinux
> selinux_audit_rule_match
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 7/9] Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
2008-03-01 20:01 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 23:51 ` Paul Moore
2008-03-04 3:31 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-04 4:15 ` James Morris
-1 siblings, 2 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Paul Moore @ 2008-03-03 23:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Saturday 01 March 2008 3:01:11 pm Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Convert Audit to use the new LSM Audit hooks instead of
> the exported SELinux interface.
>
> Basically, use:
> security_audit_rule_init
> secuirty_audit_rule_free
> security_audit_rule_known
> security_audit_rule_match
>
> instad of (respectively) :
> selinux_audit_rule_init
> selinux_audit_rule_free
> audit_rule_has_selinux
> selinux_audit_rule_match
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
> ---
>
> audit.c | 7 ------
> auditfilter.c | 61
> ++++++++++++++++------------------------------------------ auditsc.c
> | 9 +++-----
> 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
For some reason some of your patches are not coming through with correct
diffstats (notice the lack of a path relative to the kernel base?).
Don't worry too much about it as it's not grounds to reject the patch
(at least in my mind) but it's worth looking into on your end for the
next time you submit patches.
> Andrew, please atomically merge patch #7 and patch #8. Although
> a system with patch7 and without patch8 will be compiled fine,
> the SELinux Audit hooks are not set up yet. This means below
> audit hooks will point to the dummy hooks instead of SELinux
> ones even if SELinux is enabled.
>
> I could not setup the SELinux hooks first cause they have
> the same name of the old exported SELinux interface with a
> difference of one parameter.
In cases like this where you need patches applied atomically to ensure
correct operation you can always combine the two patches into one
(assuming they are still small enough to be posted, which shouldn't be
a problem here). Small patches are nice and easy to review, but that
doesn't mean you have to break everything up if it is awkward.
I've looked over patches #7, #8, and #9 and they look okay to me, but
I'm not tagging them 'Reviewed-by' because they go beyond areas of the
kernel that I feel comfortable reviewing at this point. Rest assured
there are other on the To/CC line that can help you out (I see James
Morris already Ack'd your entire patch set).
Thanks for all your work on this, it's a nice improvement.
--
paul moore
linux security @ hp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 7/9] Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
2008-03-03 23:51 ` Paul Moore
@ 2008-03-04 3:31 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
2008-03-04 4:09 ` James Morris
2008-03-04 4:15 ` James Morris
1 sibling, 1 reply; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-04 3:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Mon, Mar 03, 2008 at 06:51:41PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Saturday 01 March 2008 3:01:11 pm Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
...
> >
> > audit.c | 7 ------
> > auditfilter.c | 61
> > ++++++++++++++++------------------------------------------ auditsc.c
> > | 9 +++-----
> > 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
>
> For some reason some of your patches are not coming through with correct
> diffstats (notice the lack of a path relative to the kernel base?).
> Don't worry too much about it as it's not grounds to reject the patch
> (at least in my mind) but it's worth looking into on your end for the
> next time you submit patches.
>
Yes, it's something weird. I've generated all of those diffstats (including
the right ones) in the same way. Luckily the problem is reproduceable,
I'll check the latest upstream diffstat version and see what happens.
> > Andrew, please atomically merge patch #7 and patch #8. Although
> > a system with patch7 and without patch8 will be compiled fine,
> > the SELinux Audit hooks are not set up yet. This means below
> > audit hooks will point to the dummy hooks instead of SELinux
> > ones even if SELinux is enabled.
> >
> > I could not setup the SELinux hooks first cause they have
> > the same name of the old exported SELinux interface with a
> > difference of one parameter.
>
> In cases like this where you need patches applied atomically to ensure
> correct operation you can always combine the two patches into one
> (assuming they are still small enough to be posted, which shouldn't be
> a problem here). Small patches are nice and easy to review, but that
> doesn't mean you have to break everything up if it is awkward.
>
I'll keep that in mind.
> I've looked over patches #7, #8, and #9 and they look okay to me, but
> I'm not tagging them 'Reviewed-by' because they go beyond areas of the
> kernel that I feel comfortable reviewing at this point. Rest assured
> there are other on the To/CC line that can help you out (I see James
> Morris already Ack'd your entire patch set).
>
> Thanks for all your work on this, it's a nice improvement.
>
I'm also very thankful for such a nice review and caring explanations!.
Best,
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 7/9] Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
2008-03-04 3:31 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
@ 2008-03-04 4:09 ` James Morris
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-04 4:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Paul Moore, Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Tue, 4 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Yes, it's something weird. I've generated all of those diffstats (including
> the right ones) in the same way. Luckily the problem is reproduceable,
> I'll check the latest upstream diffstat version and see what happens.
git-format-patch should "just work".
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 7/9] Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
2008-03-03 23:51 ` Paul Moore
2008-03-04 3:31 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
@ 2008-03-04 4:15 ` James Morris
1 sibling, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-04 4:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paul Moore
Cc: Ahmed S. Darwish, Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
Al Viro, LSM-ML
On Mon, 3 Mar 2008, Paul Moore wrote:
> I've looked over patches #7, #8, and #9 and they look okay to me, but
> I'm not tagging them 'Reviewed-by' because they go beyond areas of the
> kernel that I feel comfortable reviewing at this point.
Indeed, deep audit patches need to be acked by the likes of Al Viro (cc'd,
who possibly should also be added to the MAINTAINERS entry for audit).
- James
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 8/9] SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports
2008-03-01 19:47 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
@ 2008-03-01 20:03 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 20:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Setup the new Audit LSM hooks for SELinux.
Remove the now redundant exported SELinux Audit interface.
Audit: Export 'audit_krule' and 'audit_field' to the public
since their internals are needed by the implementation of the
new LSM hook 'audit_rule_known'.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 29 +++++++++++++++
include/linux/selinux.h | 72 ---------------------------------------
kernel/audit.h | 25 -------------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++------
6 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
index 24b0af1..20f965d 100644
--- a/include/linux/selinux.h
+++ b/include/linux/selinux.h
@@ -21,54 +21,6 @@ struct kern_ipc_perm;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
- * @field: the field this rule refers to
- * @op: the operater the rule uses
- * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
- * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
- *
- * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
- * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
- * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
- */
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
- * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
- *
- * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
- * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
- */
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
- * @sid: the context ID to check
- * @field: the field this rule refers to
- * @op: the operater the rule uses
- * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
- * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
- *
- * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
- * -errno on failure.
- */
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_set_callback - set the callback for policy reloads.
- * @callback: the function to call when the policy is reloaded
- *
- * This sets the function callback function that will update the rules
- * upon policy reloads. This callback should rebuild all existing rules
- * using selinux_audit_rule_init().
- */
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void));
-
-/**
* selinux_string_to_sid - map a security context string to a security ID
* @str: the security context string to be mapped
* @sid: ID value returned via this.
@@ -111,30 +63,6 @@ void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
#else
-static inline int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op,
- char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
-{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- return;
-}
-
static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid)
{
*sid = 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c8b9ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks
+ *
+ * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which
+ * is released under below copyrights:
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+#define _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
+ * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
+ * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
+ *
+ * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
+ * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
+ */
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
+ * @sid: the context ID to check
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
+ * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
+ * -errno on failure.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
+ * @rule: rule to be checked
+ * Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AUDIT_H */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 06597d7..bef1834 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
#include "netnode.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
@@ -5429,6 +5430,13 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
.key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
+ .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
+ .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
+ .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
+#endif
};
static __init int selinux_init(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index f374186..7094623 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include "netlabel.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
@@ -2271,21 +2272,23 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule {
struct context au_ctxt;
};
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
if (rule) {
context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
kfree(rule);
}
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
{
struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
struct role_datum *roledatum;
struct type_datum *typedatum;
struct user_datum *userdatum;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
int rc = 0;
*rule = NULL;
@@ -2372,12 +2375,37 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return rc;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
struct context *ctxt;
struct mls_level *level;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
int match = 0;
if (!rule) {
@@ -2484,7 +2512,7 @@ out:
return match;
}
-static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL;
+static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
@@ -2509,11 +2537,6 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void)
}
__initcall(aurule_init);
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- aurule_callback = callback;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
/**
* security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 2554bd5..3cfc54e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -65,34 +65,9 @@ struct audit_watch {
struct list_head rules; /* associated rules */
};
-struct audit_field {
- u32 type;
- u32 val;
- u32 op;
- char *se_str;
- struct selinux_audit_rule *se_rule;
-};
-
struct audit_tree;
struct audit_chunk;
-struct audit_krule {
- int vers_ops;
- u32 flags;
- u32 listnr;
- u32 action;
- u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
- u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
- u32 field_count;
- char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
- struct audit_field *fields;
- struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
- struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
- struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
- struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */
- struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */
-};
-
struct audit_entry {
struct list_head list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 2af9ec0..3367c80 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -353,6 +353,33 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms;
struct linux_binprm;
struct mq_attr;
struct mqstat;
+struct audit_watch;
+struct audit_tree;
+
+struct audit_krule {
+ int vers_ops;
+ u32 flags;
+ u32 listnr;
+ u32 action;
+ u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
+ u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
+ u32 field_count;
+ char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
+ struct audit_field *fields;
+ struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
+ struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
+ struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
+ struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */
+ struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */
+};
+
+struct audit_field {
+ u32 type;
+ u32 val;
+ u32 op;
+ char *se_str;
+ void *se_rule;
+};
#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
@@ -536,6 +563,8 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
const char *prefix,
struct path *path);
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
+extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
+
/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
extern int audit_filter_type(int type);
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* [PATCH 8/9] SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports
@ 2008-03-01 20:03 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 20:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Setup the new Audit LSM hooks for SELinux.
Remove the now redundant exported SELinux Audit interface.
Audit: Export 'audit_krule' and 'audit_field' to the public
since their internals are needed by the implementation of the
new LSM hook 'audit_rule_known'.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 29 +++++++++++++++
include/linux/selinux.h | 72 ---------------------------------------
kernel/audit.h | 25 -------------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 ++++
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++------
6 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
index 24b0af1..20f965d 100644
--- a/include/linux/selinux.h
+++ b/include/linux/selinux.h
@@ -21,54 +21,6 @@ struct kern_ipc_perm;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
- * @field: the field this rule refers to
- * @op: the operater the rule uses
- * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
- * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
- *
- * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
- * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
- * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
- */
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
- * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
- *
- * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
- * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
- */
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
- * @sid: the context ID to check
- * @field: the field this rule refers to
- * @op: the operater the rule uses
- * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
- * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
- *
- * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
- * -errno on failure.
- */
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_set_callback - set the callback for policy reloads.
- * @callback: the function to call when the policy is reloaded
- *
- * This sets the function callback function that will update the rules
- * upon policy reloads. This callback should rebuild all existing rules
- * using selinux_audit_rule_init().
- */
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void));
-
-/**
* selinux_string_to_sid - map a security context string to a security ID
* @str: the security context string to be mapped
* @sid: ID value returned via this.
@@ -111,30 +63,6 @@ void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void);
void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void);
#else
-static inline int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op,
- char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
-{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- return;
-}
-
static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid)
{
*sid = 0;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c8b9ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux support for the Audit LSM hooks
+ *
+ * Most of below header was moved from include/linux/selinux.h which
+ * is released under below copyrights:
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+#define _SELINUX_AUDIT_H
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
+ * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
+ * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
+ *
+ * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
+ * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
+ */
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
+ * @sid: the context ID to check
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
+ * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
+ * -errno on failure.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
+ * @rule: rule to be checked
+ * Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
+
+#endif /* _SELINUX_AUDIT_H */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 06597d7..bef1834 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
#include "netnode.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
@@ -5429,6 +5430,13 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
.key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
+ .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
+ .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
+ .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
+#endif
};
static __init int selinux_init(void)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index f374186..7094623 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include "netlabel.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
@@ -2271,21 +2272,23 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule {
struct context au_ctxt;
};
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
if (rule) {
context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
kfree(rule);
}
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
{
struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
struct role_datum *roledatum;
struct type_datum *typedatum;
struct user_datum *userdatum;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
int rc = 0;
*rule = NULL;
@@ -2372,12 +2375,37 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
return rc;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
struct context *ctxt;
struct mls_level *level;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
int match = 0;
if (!rule) {
@@ -2484,7 +2512,7 @@ out:
return match;
}
-static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL;
+static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
@@ -2509,11 +2537,6 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void)
}
__initcall(aurule_init);
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- aurule_callback = callback;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
/**
* security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 2554bd5..3cfc54e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -65,34 +65,9 @@ struct audit_watch {
struct list_head rules; /* associated rules */
};
-struct audit_field {
- u32 type;
- u32 val;
- u32 op;
- char *se_str;
- struct selinux_audit_rule *se_rule;
-};
-
struct audit_tree;
struct audit_chunk;
-struct audit_krule {
- int vers_ops;
- u32 flags;
- u32 listnr;
- u32 action;
- u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
- u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
- u32 field_count;
- char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
- struct audit_field *fields;
- struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
- struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
- struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
- struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */
- struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */
-};
-
struct audit_entry {
struct list_head list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 2af9ec0..3367c80 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -353,6 +353,33 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms;
struct linux_binprm;
struct mq_attr;
struct mqstat;
+struct audit_watch;
+struct audit_tree;
+
+struct audit_krule {
+ int vers_ops;
+ u32 flags;
+ u32 listnr;
+ u32 action;
+ u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
+ u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
+ u32 field_count;
+ char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
+ struct audit_field *fields;
+ struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
+ struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
+ struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
+ struct audit_tree *tree; /* associated watched tree */
+ struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_{watch,tree}.rules list */
+};
+
+struct audit_field {
+ u32 type;
+ u32 val;
+ u32 op;
+ char *se_str;
+ void *se_rule;
+};
#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
@@ -536,6 +563,8 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
const char *prefix,
struct path *path);
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
+extern int audit_update_lsm_rules(void);
+
/* Private API (for audit.c only) */
extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
extern int audit_filter_type(int type);
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 8/9] SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports
2008-03-01 20:03 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 21:20 ` James Morris
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-03 21:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Sat, 1 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Setup the new Audit LSM hooks for SELinux.
> Remove the now redundant exported SELinux Audit interface.
>
> Audit: Export 'audit_krule' and 'audit_field' to the public
> since their internals are needed by the implementation of the
> new LSM hook 'audit_rule_known'.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 9/9] Audit: Final renamings and cleanup
2008-03-01 19:47 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
@ 2008-03-01 20:05 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 20:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to
lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 4 ++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++------
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
Woo, hooo .. That was fun ;)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 3367c80..a35678e 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -377,8 +377,8 @@ struct audit_field {
u32 type;
u32 val;
u32 op;
- char *se_str;
- void *se_rule;
+ char *lsm_str;
+ void *lsm_rule;
};
#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 7c69cb5..28fef6b 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
if (e->rule.fields)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
- kfree(f->se_str);
- security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+ kfree(f->lsm_str);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
@@ -554,8 +554,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
f->type = data->fields[i];
f->val = data->values[i];
- f->se_str = NULL;
- f->se_rule = NULL;
+ f->lsm_str = NULL;
+ f->lsm_rule = NULL;
switch(f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
case AUDIT_UID:
@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- (void **)&f->se_rule);
+ (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
kfree(str);
goto exit_free;
} else
- f->se_str = str;
+ f->lsm_str = str;
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
- audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
+ audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
+ if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
return 1;
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
@@ -862,28 +862,28 @@ out:
return new;
}
-/* Duplicate LSM field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
{
int ret = 0;
- char *se_str;
+ char *lsm_str;
- /* our own copy of se_str */
- se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!se_str))
+ /* our own copy of lsm_str */
+ lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
return -ENOMEM;
- df->se_str = se_str;
+ df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
- ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
- (void **)&df->se_rule);
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
+ (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
- "invalid\n", df->se_str);
+ "invalid\n", df->lsm_str);
ret = 0;
}
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1762,7 +1762,7 @@ unlock_and_return:
return result;
}
-/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 8afd349..6ac71bb 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -527,14 +527,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
match for now to avoid losing information that
may be wanted. An error message will also be
logged upon error */
- if (f->se_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_rule) {
if (need_sid) {
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
f->op,
- f->se_rule,
+ f->lsm_rule,
ctx);
}
break;
@@ -545,18 +545,18 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
- if (f->se_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid, f->type, f->op,
- f->se_rule, ctx);
+ f->lsm_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
if (security_audit_rule_match(
ctx->names[j].osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
aux = aux->next) {
if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* [PATCH 9/9] Audit: Final renamings and cleanup
@ 2008-03-01 20:05 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
0 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: Ahmed S. Darwish @ 2008-03-01 20:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Eric Paris,
Casey Schaufler, David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton
Cc: LKML, Audit-ML, LSM-ML
Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to
lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 4 ++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++------
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
Woo, hooo .. That was fun ;)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 3367c80..a35678e 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -377,8 +377,8 @@ struct audit_field {
u32 type;
u32 val;
u32 op;
- char *se_str;
- void *se_rule;
+ char *lsm_str;
+ void *lsm_rule;
};
#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 7c69cb5..28fef6b 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
if (e->rule.fields)
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
- kfree(f->se_str);
- security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+ kfree(f->lsm_str);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
@@ -554,8 +554,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
f->type = data->fields[i];
f->val = data->values[i];
- f->se_str = NULL;
- f->se_rule = NULL;
+ f->lsm_str = NULL;
+ f->lsm_rule = NULL;
switch(f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
case AUDIT_UID:
@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- (void **)&f->se_rule);
+ (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
kfree(str);
goto exit_free;
} else
- f->se_str = str;
+ f->lsm_str = str;
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
- audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
+ audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
data->buflen += data->values[i] =
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
+ if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
return 1;
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
@@ -862,28 +862,28 @@ out:
return new;
}
-/* Duplicate LSM field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
{
int ret = 0;
- char *se_str;
+ char *lsm_str;
- /* our own copy of se_str */
- se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!se_str))
+ /* our own copy of lsm_str */
+ lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
return -ENOMEM;
- df->se_str = se_str;
+ df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
- ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
- (void **)&df->se_rule);
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
+ (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
- "invalid\n", df->se_str);
+ "invalid\n", df->lsm_str);
ret = 0;
}
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1762,7 +1762,7 @@ unlock_and_return:
return result;
}
-/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 8afd349..6ac71bb 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -527,14 +527,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
match for now to avoid losing information that
may be wanted. An error message will also be
logged upon error */
- if (f->se_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_rule) {
if (need_sid) {
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
f->op,
- f->se_rule,
+ f->lsm_rule,
ctx);
}
break;
@@ -545,18 +545,18 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
- if (f->se_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid, f->type, f->op,
- f->se_rule, ctx);
+ f->lsm_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
if (security_audit_rule_match(
ctx->names[j].osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
aux = aux->next) {
if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule, ctx)) {
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
--
"Better to light a candle, than curse the darkness"
Ahmed S. Darwish
Homepage: http://darwish.07.googlepages.com
Blog: http://darwish-07.blogspot.com
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 9/9] Audit: Final renamings and cleanup
2008-03-01 20:05 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
(?)
@ 2008-03-03 21:21 ` James Morris
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-03 21:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML
On Sat, 1 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to
> lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion.
>
> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH-v2 -mm 0/9] LSM-neutral Audit (SELinux audit separation)
2008-03-01 19:47 ` Ahmed S. Darwish
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
(?)
@ 2008-03-05 5:29 ` James Morris
-1 siblings, 0 replies; 41+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2008-03-05 5:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ahmed S. Darwish
Cc: Chris Wright, Stephen Smalley, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
David Woodhouse, Paul Moore, Andrew Morton, LKML, Audit-ML,
LSM-ML, Al Viro
On Sat, 1 Mar 2008, Ahmed S. Darwish wrote:
> A series of 9 patches to let Audit be LSM netural. This is done
> for proper future audit<->SMACK integration which will also be
> useful for any future LSM.
I've set up a new tree and added these patches with acks etc. collected
so far. See
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6.git#next
(note that we still need Audit folk to ack patches 7,8 & 9).
This tree is intended for security patches which are not specific to an
LSM, to ensure that security patches are being tested & managed together.
- James
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 41+ messages in thread