Re: [PATCH -v3 1/3] Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c

["Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>]

Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@redhat.com):
> Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in
> security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY.  This patch moves cap_file_mmap
> into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from
> security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability
> checks are done.

It also

	1. changes the return value in error case from -EACCES to
	   -EPERM
	2. no onger sets PF_SUPERPRIV in t->flags if the capability
	   is used.

Do we care about these?

-serge

> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> ---
> 
>  include/linux/security.h |    7 ++++---
>  security/capability.c    |    9 ---------
>  security/commoncap.c     |   24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 1459091..963a48f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
>  extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
>  extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
>  extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> +extern int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> +			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
> +			 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only);
>  extern int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags);
>  extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
>  			  unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
> @@ -2197,9 +2200,7 @@ static inline int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
>  				     unsigned long addr,
>  				     unsigned long addr_only)
>  {
> -	if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
> -		return -EACCES;
> -	return 0;
> +	return cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
>  }
> 
>  static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
> index f218dd3..ec05730 100644
> --- a/security/capability.c
> +++ b/security/capability.c
> @@ -330,15 +330,6 @@ static int cap_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int command,
>  	return 0;
>  }
> 
> -static int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> -			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
> -			 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
> -{
> -	if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO))
> -		return -EACCES;
> -	return 0;
> -}
> -
>  static int cap_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
>  			     unsigned long prot)
>  {
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index aa97704..9a731d7 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -984,3 +984,27 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
>  		cap_sys_admin = 1;
>  	return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
>  }
> +
> +/*
> + * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
> + * @file: unused
> + * @reqprot: unused
> + * @prot: unused
> + * @flags: unused
> + * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
> + * @addr_only: unused
> + *
> + * If the process is attempting to map memory below mmap_min_addr they need
> + * CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  The other parameters to this function are unused by the
> + * capability security module.  Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
> + * -EPERM if not.
> + */
> +int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> +		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
> +		  unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
> +{
> +	if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
> +		return cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
> +				   SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
> +	return 0;
> +}
> 
> --
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