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From: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
Cc: Parisc List <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Filesystem Mailing List <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Subject: Re: xfs failure on parisc (and presumably other VI cache systems) caused by I/O to vmalloc/vmap areas
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2009 21:16:19 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090908201619.GG6538@flint.arm.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1252437112.13003.39.camel@mulgrave.site>

On Tue, Sep 08, 2009 at 07:11:52PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2009-09-08 at 20:00 +0100, Russell King wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 08, 2009 at 01:27:49PM -0500, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > This bug was observed on parisc, but I would expect it to affect all
> > > architectures with virtually indexed caches.
> > 
> > I don't think your proposed solution will work for ARM with speculative
> > prefetching (iow, the latest ARM CPUs.)  If there is a mapping present,
> > it can be speculatively prefetched from at any time - the CPU designers
> > have placed no bounds on the amount of speculative prefetching which
> > may be present in a design.
> 
> The architecturally prescribed fix for this on parisc is to purge the
> TLB entry as well.  Without a TLB entry, the CPU is forbidden from doing
> speculative reads.  This obviously works only as long as the kernel
> never touches the page during DMA, of course ...
> 
> Isn't this also true for arm?

There appears to be nothing architected along those lines for ARM.
From the architectural point of view, any "normal memory" mapping is
a candidate for speculative accesses provided access is permitted via
the page permissions.

In other words, if the CPU is permitted to access a memory page, it
is a candidate for speculative accesses.

-- 
Russell King
 Linux kernel    2.6 ARM Linux   - http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/
 maintainer of:

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@suse.de>
Cc: Parisc List <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Filesystem Mailing List <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Subject: Re: xfs failure on parisc (and presumably other VI cache systems) caused by I/O to vmalloc/vmap areas
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2009 21:16:19 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090908201619.GG6538@flint.arm.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1252437112.13003.39.camel@mulgrave.site>

On Tue, Sep 08, 2009 at 07:11:52PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2009-09-08 at 20:00 +0100, Russell King wrote:
> > On Tue, Sep 08, 2009 at 01:27:49PM -0500, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > This bug was observed on parisc, but I would expect it to affect all
> > > architectures with virtually indexed caches.
> > 
> > I don't think your proposed solution will work for ARM with speculative
> > prefetching (iow, the latest ARM CPUs.)  If there is a mapping present,
> > it can be speculatively prefetched from at any time - the CPU designers
> > have placed no bounds on the amount of speculative prefetching which
> > may be present in a design.
> 
> The architecturally prescribed fix for this on parisc is to purge the
> TLB entry as well.  Without a TLB entry, the CPU is forbidden from doing
> speculative reads.  This obviously works only as long as the kernel
> never touches the page during DMA, of course ...
> 
> Isn't this also true for arm?

There appears to be nothing architected along those lines for ARM.
>From the architectural point of view, any "normal memory" mapping is
a candidate for speculative accesses provided access is permitted via
the page permissions.

In other words, if the CPU is permitted to access a memory page, it
is a candidate for speculative accesses.

-- 
Russell King
 Linux kernel    2.6 ARM Linux   - http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/
 maintainer of:

  reply	other threads:[~2009-09-08 20:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-09-08 18:27 xfs failure on parisc (and presumably other VI cache systems) caused by I/O to vmalloc/vmap areas James Bottomley
2009-09-08 19:00 ` Russell King
2009-09-08 19:11   ` James Bottomley
2009-09-08 20:16     ` Russell King [this message]
2009-09-08 20:16       ` Russell King
2009-09-08 20:39       ` James Bottomley
2009-09-08 21:39         ` Russell King
2009-09-09  3:14           ` James Bottomley
2009-09-09  3:17             ` [PATCH 1/5] mm: add coherence API for DMA " James Bottomley
2009-09-09  3:23               ` James Bottomley
2009-09-09  3:35                 ` Paul Mundt
2009-09-09 14:34                   ` James Bottomley
2009-09-10  0:24                     ` Paul Mundt
2009-09-10  0:30                       ` James Bottomley
2009-09-09  3:18             ` [PATCH 2/5] parisc: add mm " James Bottomley
2009-09-09  3:20             ` [PATCH 3/5] arm: " James Bottomley
2009-09-09  3:21             ` [PATCH 4/5] block: permit I/O to vmalloc/vmap kernel pages James Bottomley
2009-09-09  3:21             ` [PATCH 5/5] xfs: fix xfs to work with Virtually Indexed architectures James Bottomley
2009-10-13  1:40 ` xfs failure on parisc (and presumably other VI cache systems) caused by I/O to vmalloc/vmap areas Christoph Hellwig
2009-10-13  4:13   ` James Bottomley

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