[PATCH 0/4] LSM checkpoint/restart: introduction

[PATCH 0/4] LSM checkpoint/restart: introduction

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Following is a respin of the LSM checkpoint/restart patchset,
hopefully addressing most of the feedback I've gotten.

The patchset includes one (1/4) patch which is not directly
LSM-related, one (2/4) which implements the generic LSM c/r
support, one (3/4) implementing support for Smack, one
(4/4) implementing support for SELinux, and one (1/1)
updating the userspace program which initiates restart.

At this point I'm hoping to get some acks and get them pushed
to the c/r kernel tree, which is branch ckpt-v17-dev in
git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git/.  Comments
are of course appreciated.  Once they sit in the tree for a bit,
I'll tackle the socket related LSM c/r.

thanks,
-serge

[PATCH 0/4] LSM checkpoint/restart: introduction

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Following is a respin of the LSM checkpoint/restart patchset,
hopefully addressing most of the feedback I've gotten.

The patchset includes one (1/4) patch which is not directly
LSM-related, one (2/4) which implements the generic LSM c/r
support, one (3/4) implementing support for Smack, one
(4/4) implementing support for SELinux, and one (1/1)
updating the userspace program which initiates restart.

At this point I'm hoping to get some acks and get them pushed
to the c/r kernel tree, which is branch ckpt-v17-dev in
git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git/.  Comments
are of course appreciated.  Once they sit in the tree for a bit,
I'll tackle the socket related LSM c/r.

thanks,
-serge

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[PATCH 1/4] cr: define ckpt_debug if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT=n

[Serge E. Hallyn]

So not all c/r code has to be ifdefed...

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/checkpoint.h |    3 +++
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint.h b/include/linux/checkpoint.h
index 761cad5..06e3eb0 100644
--- a/include/linux/checkpoint.h
+++ b/include/linux/checkpoint.h
@@ -337,6 +337,9 @@ extern unsigned long ckpt_debug_level;
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_DEBUG */
 
+#else /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
+#define _ckpt_debug(level, fmt, args...)	do { } while (0)
+#define ckpt_debug(fmt, args...)		do { } while (0)
 #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 
-- 
1.6.1

[PATCH 1/4] cr: define ckpt_debug if CONFIG_CHECKPOINT=n

[Serge E. Hallyn]

So not all c/r code has to be ifdefed...

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 include/linux/checkpoint.h |    3 +++
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint.h b/include/linux/checkpoint.h
index 761cad5..06e3eb0 100644
--- a/include/linux/checkpoint.h
+++ b/include/linux/checkpoint.h
@@ -337,6 +337,9 @@ extern unsigned long ckpt_debug_level;
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_DEBUG */
 
+#else /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
+#define _ckpt_debug(level, fmt, args...)	do { } while (0)
+#define ckpt_debug(fmt, args...)		do { } while (0)
 #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 
-- 
1.6.1


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[PATCH 2/4] cr: add generic LSM c/r support

[Serge E. Hallyn]

[ This patch is against branch ckpt-v17-dev of the checkpoint/restart
kernel tree at git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git/ ]

Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt begins:
"""
Application checkpoint/restart is the ability to save the state
of a running application so that it can later resume its execution
from the time at which it was checkpointed.
"""

This patch adds generic support for c/r of LSM credentials.  Support
for Smack and SELinux (and TOMOYO if appropriate) will be added later.
Capabilities is already supported through generic creds code.

This patch supports ipc_perm, msg_msg, cred (task) and file ->security
fields.  Inodes, superblocks, netif, and xfrm currently are restored
not through sys_restart() but through container creation, and so the
security fields should be done then as well.  Network should be added
when network c/r is added.

Briefly, all security fields must be exported by the LSM as a simple
null-terminated string.  They are checkpointed through the
security_checkpoint_obj() helper, because we must pass it an extra
sectype field.  Splitting SECURITY_OBJ_SEC into one type per object
type would not work because, in Smack, one void* security is used for
all object types.  But we must pass the sectype field because in
SELinux a different type of structure is stashed in each object type.

The RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag indicates that the LSM should
attempt to reuse checkpointed security labels.  It is always
invalid when the LSM at restart differs from that at checkpoint.
It is currently only usable for capabilities.

(For capabilities, restart without RESTART_KEEP_LSM is technically
not implemented.  There actually might be a use case for that,
but the safety of it is dubious so for now we always re-create
checkpointed capability sets whether RESTART_KEEP_LSM is
specified or not)

Changelog:
	sep 3: fix memory leak on LSM restore error path
	Sep 3: provide 2 hooks, may_restart and checkpoint_header, to facilitate
		an LSM tracking policy changes.
	sep 10: merge RESTART_KEEP_LSM patch with basic LSM c/r
		support patches.
	sep 10: rename security_xyz_get_ctx() to security_xyz_checkpoint(),
		in order to avoid confusing with the various other 'context'
		helpers in the security_ namespace, relating to secids and
		sysfs xattrs.
	sep 10: pass context file to security_cred_restore.  SELinux will
		want the file's security context to authorize it as an
		entrypoint for the new process context.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt |   25 +++++
 checkpoint/checkpoint.c             |   11 ++
 checkpoint/files.c                  |   30 ++++++
 checkpoint/objhash.c                |   93 +++++++++++++++++
 checkpoint/restart.c                |   25 +++++
 checkpoint/sys.c                    |   22 ++++
 include/linux/checkpoint.h          |    9 ++-
 include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h      |   24 +++++-
 include/linux/checkpoint_types.h    |    9 ++
 include/linux/security.h            |  188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 ipc/checkpoint.c                    |   34 +++++--
 ipc/checkpoint_msg.c                |   26 +++++-
 ipc/checkpoint_sem.c                |    4 +-
 ipc/checkpoint_shm.c                |    4 +-
 ipc/util.h                          |    6 +-
 kernel/cred.c                       |   20 ++++-
 security/capability.c               |   74 ++++++++++++++
 security/security.c                 |  124 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 18 files changed, 705 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt b/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt
index e84dc39..a60e001 100644
--- a/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt
+++ b/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt
@@ -328,6 +328,31 @@ So that's why we don't want CAP_SYS_ADMIN required up-front. That way
 we will be forced to more carefully review each of those features.
 However, this can be controlled with a sysctl-variable.
 
+LSM
+===
+
+Security modules use custom labels on subjects and objects to
+further mediate access decisions beyond DAC controls.  When
+checkpoint applications, these labels are [ work in progress ]
+checkpointed along with the objects.  At restart, the
+RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag tells the kernel whether re-created objects
+whould keep their checkpointed labels, or get automatically
+recalculated labels.  Since checkpointed labels will only make
+sense to the same LSM which was active at checkpoint time,
+sys_restart() with the RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag will fail with
+-EINVAL if the LSM active at restart is not the same as that
+active at checkpoint.  If RESTART_KEEP_LSM is not specified,
+then objects will be given whatever default labels the LSM and
+their optional policy decide.  Of course, when RESTART_KEEP_LSM
+is specified, the LSM may choose a different label than the
+checkpointed one, or fail the entire restart if the caller
+does not have permission to create objects with the checkpointed
+label.
+
+It should always be safe to take a checkpoint of an application
+under LSM_1, and restart it without the RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag
+under LSM_2.
+
 
 Kernel interfaces
 =================
diff --git a/checkpoint/checkpoint.c b/checkpoint/checkpoint.c
index c19f812..a8e7483 100644
--- a/checkpoint/checkpoint.c
+++ b/checkpoint/checkpoint.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/checkpoint.h>
 #include <linux/checkpoint_hdr.h>
 
@@ -250,6 +251,16 @@ static int checkpoint_write_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
+	memset(ctx->lsm_name, 0, SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1);
+	strlcpy(ctx->lsm_name, security_get_lsm_name(), SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1);
+	ret = ckpt_write_buffer(ctx, ctx->lsm_name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = security_checkpoint_header(ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
 	return checkpoint_write_header_arch(ctx);
 }
 
diff --git a/checkpoint/files.c b/checkpoint/files.c
index 204055b..a26951a 100644
--- a/checkpoint/files.c
+++ b/checkpoint/files.c
@@ -143,6 +143,19 @@ static int scan_fds(struct files_struct *files, int **fdtable)
 	return n;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+int checkpoint_file_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct file *file)
+{
+	return security_checkpoint_obj(ctx, file->f_security,
+					CKPT_SECURITY_FILE);
+}
+#else
+int checkpoint_file_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct file *file)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
 int checkpoint_file_common(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct file *file,
 			   struct ckpt_hdr_file *h)
 {
@@ -155,6 +168,12 @@ int checkpoint_file_common(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct file *file,
 	if (h->f_credref < 0)
 		return h->f_credref;
 
+	h->f_secref = checkpoint_file_security(ctx, file);
+	if (h->f_secref == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		h->f_secref = -1;
+	else if (h->f_secref < 0)
+		return h->f_secref;
+
 	/* FIX: need also file->f_owner, etc */
 
 	return 0;
@@ -481,6 +500,17 @@ int restore_file_common(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct file *file,
 	put_cred(file->f_cred);
 	file->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
 
+	if ((ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM) && (h->f_secref != -1)) {
+		struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l = ckpt_obj_fetch(ctx, h->f_secref,
+					CKPT_OBJ_SEC);
+		if (IS_ERR(l))
+			return PTR_ERR(l);
+
+		ret = security_file_restore(file, l->string);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
 	/* safe to set 1st arg (fd) to 0, as command is F_SETFL */
 	ret = vfs_fcntl(0, F_SETFL, h->f_flags & CKPT_SETFL_MASK, file);
 	if (ret < 0)
diff --git a/checkpoint/objhash.c b/checkpoint/objhash.c
index a9a10d1..2b0ead4 100644
--- a/checkpoint/objhash.c
+++ b/checkpoint/objhash.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
 #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/checkpoint.h>
@@ -246,6 +247,89 @@ static void obj_sock_drop(void *ptr)
 	sock_put((struct sock *) ptr);
 }
 
+static void obj_free_sec(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct ckpt_stored_lsm *s = container_of(kref, struct ckpt_stored_lsm,
+					kref);
+	kfree(s->string);
+	kfree(s);
+}
+
+static int obj_sec_grab(void *ptr)
+{
+	struct ckpt_stored_lsm *s = ptr;
+	kref_get(&s->kref);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void obj_sec_drop(void *ptr)
+{
+	struct ckpt_stored_lsm *s = ptr;
+	kref_put(&s->kref, obj_free_sec);
+}
+
+static int do_checkpoint_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
+				const struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l)
+{
+	int ret, len;
+	struct ckpt_hdr_lsm *h;
+
+	len = strlen(l->string);
+	if (len > PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*h))
+		return -E2BIG;
+	h = ckpt_hdr_get_type(ctx, sizeof(*h)+len+1, CKPT_HDR_SEC);
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	h->len = len;
+	h->sectype = l->sectype;
+	strncpy(h->string, l->string, len);
+	h->string[len] = '\0';
+	ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, &h->h);
+	ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int checkpoint_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *ptr)
+{
+	return do_checkpoint_security(ctx, (struct ckpt_stored_lsm *) ptr);
+}
+
+static struct ckpt_stored_lsm *do_restore_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct ckpt_hdr_lsm *h;
+	struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l;
+
+	h = ckpt_read_buf_type(ctx, PAGE_SIZE, CKPT_HDR_SEC);
+	if (IS_ERR(h))
+		return (struct ckpt_stored_lsm *)h;
+	if (h->len > h->h.len - sizeof(struct ckpt_hdr) ||
+				h->len > PAGE_SIZE) {
+		ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+	l = kzalloc(sizeof(*l), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!l) {
+		ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+	l->string = kzalloc(h->len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!l->string) {
+		kfree(l);
+		ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+	kref_init(&l->kref);
+	l->sectype = h->sectype;
+	strncpy(l->string, h->string, h->len);
+	ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+	return l;
+}
+
+static void *restore_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return (void *) do_restore_security(ctx);
+}
+
 static struct ckpt_obj_ops ckpt_obj_ops[] = {
 	/* ignored object */
 	{
@@ -382,6 +466,15 @@ static struct ckpt_obj_ops ckpt_obj_ops[] = {
 		.ref_drop = obj_sock_drop,
 		.ref_grab = obj_sock_grab,
 	},
+	/* LSM security labels */
+	{
+		.obj_name = "LSM",
+		.obj_type = CKPT_OBJ_SEC,
+		.ref_drop = obj_sec_drop,
+		.ref_grab = obj_sec_grab,
+		.checkpoint = checkpoint_security,
+		.restore = restore_security,
+	},
 };
 
 
diff --git a/checkpoint/restart.c b/checkpoint/restart.c
index ed42b4b..4703ff8 100644
--- a/checkpoint/restart.c
+++ b/checkpoint/restart.c
@@ -423,6 +423,31 @@ static int restore_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	ret = _ckpt_read_buffer(ctx, ctx->lsm_name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM) {
+		char *cur = security_get_lsm_name();
+		if (strncmp(cur, ctx->lsm_name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1) != 0) {
+			pr_warning("c/r: checkpointed LSM %s, current is %s.\n",
+				ctx->lsm_name, cur);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* to be implemented later, per-lsm */
+		if (strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "lsm_none") != 0 &&
+				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "default") != 0) {
+			pr_warning("c/r: RESTART_KEEP_LSM unsupported for %s\n",
+					ctx->lsm_name);
+			ret = -ENOSYS;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = security_may_restart(ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
 	ret = restore_read_header_arch(ctx);
  out:
 	kfree(uts);
diff --git a/checkpoint/sys.c b/checkpoint/sys.c
index 525182a..a510138 100644
--- a/checkpoint/sys.c
+++ b/checkpoint/sys.c
@@ -169,6 +169,28 @@ void *ckpt_hdr_get_type(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int len, int type)
 	return h;
 }
 
+#define DUMMY_LSM_INFO "dummy"
+
+int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return ckpt_write_obj_type(ctx, DUMMY_LSM_INFO,
+			strlen(DUMMY_LSM_INFO), CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ckpt_snarf_lsm_info
+ * If there is a CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO field, toss it.
+ * Used when the current LSM doesn't care about this field.
+ */
+void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct ckpt_hdr *h;
+
+	h = ckpt_read_buf_type(ctx, CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN, CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+	if (!IS_ERR(h))
+		ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+}
+
 
 /*
  * Helpers to manage c/r contexts: allocated for each checkpoint and/or
diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint.h b/include/linux/checkpoint.h
index 06e3eb0..bc96fcd 100644
--- a/include/linux/checkpoint.h
+++ b/include/linux/checkpoint.h
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  *  distribution for more details.
  */
 
-#define CHECKPOINT_VERSION  1
+#define CHECKPOINT_VERSION  2
 
 /* checkpoint user flags */
 #define CHECKPOINT_SUBTREE	0x1
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 /* restart user flags */
 #define RESTART_TASKSELF	0x1
 #define RESTART_FROZEN		0x2
+#define RESTART_KEEP_LSM	0x4
 
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
 #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
@@ -44,7 +45,9 @@
 
 /* ckpt_ctx: uflags */
 #define CHECKPOINT_USER_FLAGS		CHECKPOINT_SUBTREE
-#define RESTART_USER_FLAGS		(RESTART_TASKSELF | RESTART_FROZEN)
+#define RESTART_USER_FLAGS		(RESTART_TASKSELF | RESTART_FROZEN | \
+					 RESTART_KEEP_LSM)
+#define CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN 200
 
 extern void exit_checkpoint(struct task_struct *tsk);
 
@@ -55,6 +58,8 @@ extern void _ckpt_hdr_put(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *ptr, int n);
 extern void ckpt_hdr_put(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *ptr);
 extern void *ckpt_hdr_get(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int n);
 extern void *ckpt_hdr_get_type(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int n, int type);
+extern int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+extern void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
 
 extern int ckpt_write_obj(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct ckpt_hdr *h);
 extern int ckpt_write_obj_type(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h b/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
index 06bc6e2..78afcec 100644
--- a/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
+++ b/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ enum {
 	CKPT_HDR_BUFFER,
 	CKPT_HDR_STRING,
 	CKPT_HDR_OBJREF,
+	CKPT_HDR_SEC,
+	CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO,
 
 	CKPT_HDR_TREE = 101,
 	CKPT_HDR_TASK,
@@ -136,6 +138,7 @@ enum obj_type {
 	CKPT_OBJ_USER,
 	CKPT_OBJ_GROUPINFO,
 	CKPT_OBJ_SOCK,
+	CKPT_OBJ_SEC,
 	CKPT_OBJ_MAX
 };
 
@@ -176,10 +179,11 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_header {
 	__u64 uflags;	/* uflags from checkpoint */
 
 	/*
-	 * the header is followed by three strings:
+	 * the header is followed by four strings:
 	 *   char release[const.uts_release_len];
 	 *   char version[const.uts_version_len];
 	 *   char machine[const.uts_machine_len];
+	 *   char lsm_name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]
 	 */
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
@@ -249,6 +253,8 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_cred {
 	__u32 gid, sgid, egid, fsgid;
 	__s32 user_ref;
 	__s32 groupinfo_ref;
+	__s32 sec_ref;
+	__u32 padding;
 	struct ckpt_capabilities cap_s;
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
@@ -261,6 +267,16 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_groupinfo {
 	__u32 groups[0];
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
+struct ckpt_hdr_lsm {
+	struct ckpt_hdr h;
+	__u8 sectype;
+	__u16 len;
+	/*
+	 * This is followed by a string of size len+1,
+	 * null-terminated
+	 */
+	__u8 string[0];
+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 /*
  * todo - keyrings and LSM
  * These may be better done with userspace help though
@@ -356,6 +372,8 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_file {
 	__s32 f_credref;
 	__u64 f_pos;
 	__u64 f_version;
+	__s32 f_secref;
+	__u32 f_padding;
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
 struct ckpt_hdr_file_generic {
@@ -594,6 +612,8 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms {
 	__u32 mode;
 	__u32 _padding;
 	__u64 seq;
+	__s32 sec_ref;
+	__u32 padding;
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
 struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_shm {
@@ -627,6 +647,8 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_msg_msg {
 	struct ckpt_hdr h;
 	__s32 m_type;
 	__u32 m_ts;
+	__s32 sec_ref;
+	__u32 padding;
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
 struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_sem {
diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h b/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h
index a18846f..182878b 100644
--- a/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/ktime.h>
 #include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 struct ckpt_stats {
 	int uts_ns;
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ struct ckpt_ctx {
 	struct task_struct *root_task;		/* [container] root task */
 	struct nsproxy *root_nsproxy;		/* [container] root nsproxy */
 	struct task_struct *root_freezer;	/* [container] root task */
+	char lsm_name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];   /* security module at ckpt */
 
 	unsigned long kflags;	/* kerenl flags */
 	unsigned long uflags;	/* user flags */
@@ -71,6 +73,13 @@ struct ckpt_ctx {
 	struct ckpt_stats stats;	/* statistics */
 };
 
+/* stored on hashtable */
+struct ckpt_stored_lsm {
+	struct kref kref;
+	int sectype;
+	char *string;
+};
+
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_CHECKPOINT_TYPES_H_ */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5eff459..8d88cec 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@
 struct ctl_table;
 struct audit_krule;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+struct ckpt_ctx;
+#endif
+
 /*
  * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
  * as the default capabilities functions
@@ -554,6 +558,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	created.
  *	@file contains the file structure to secure.
  *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @file_checkpoint:
+ *	Return a string representing the security context on a file.
+ *	@security contains the security field.
+ *	Returns a char* which the caller will free, or -error on error.
+ * @file_restore:
+ *	Set a security context on a file according to the checkpointed context.
+ *	@file contains the file.
+ *	@ctx contains a string representation of the checkpointed context.
+ *	Returns 0 on success, -error on failure.
  * @file_free_security:
  *	Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security.
  *	@file contains the file structure being modified.
@@ -633,6 +646,17 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
  *	@clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @cred_checkpoint:
+ *	Return a string representing the security context on the task cred.
+ *	@security contains the security field.
+ *	Returns a char* which the caller will free, or -error on error.
+ * @cred_restore:
+ *	Set a security context on a task cred according to the checkpointed
+ *	context.
+ *	@file contains the checkpoint file
+ *	@cred contains the cred.
+ *	@ctx contains a string representation of the checkpointed context.
+ *	Returns 0 on success, -error on failure.
  * @cred_free:
  *	@cred points to the credentials.
  *	Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
@@ -1081,6 +1105,19 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
  *	@secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
  *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * @ipc_checkpoint:
+ *	Return a string representing the security context on the IPC
+ *	permission structure.
+ *	@security contains the security field.
+ *	Returns a char* which the caller will free, or -error on error.
+ * @ipc_restore:
+ *	Set a security context on a IPC permission structure according to
+ *	the checkpointed context.
+ *	@ipcp contains the IPC permission structure, which will have
+ *	already been allocated and initialized when the IPC structure was
+ *	created.
+ *	@ctx contains a string representation of the checkpointed context.
+ *	Returns 0 on success, -error on failure.
  *
  * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
  * @msg_msg_alloc_security:
@@ -1089,6 +1126,16 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	created.
  *	@msg contains the message structure to be modified.
  *	Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @msg_msg_checkpoint:
+ *	Return a string representing the security context on an msg_msg
+ *	struct.
+ *	@security contains the security field
+ *	Returns a char* which the caller will free, or -error on error.
+ * @msg_msg_restore:
+ *	Set msg_msg->security according to the checkpointed context.
+ *	@msg contains the message structure to be modified.
+ *	@ctx contains a string representation of the checkpointed context.
+ *	Return 0 on success, -error on failure.
  * @msg_msg_free_security:
  *	Deallocate the security structure for this message.
  *	@msg contains the message structure to be modified.
@@ -1300,6 +1347,28 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@secdata contains the security context.
  *	@seclen contains the length of the security context.
  *
+ * Security hooks for Checkpoint/restart
+ * (In addition to *_checkpoint and *_restore)
+ *
+ * @may_restart:
+ *	Authorize sys_restart().
+ *	Note that all construction of kernel resources, credentials,
+ *	etc is already authorized per the caller's credentials.  This
+ *	hook is intended for the LSM to make further decisions about
+ *	a task not being allowed to restart at all, for instance if
+ *	the policy has changed since checkpoint.
+ *	@ctx is the checkpoint/restart context (see <linux/checkpoint_types.h>)
+ *	Return 0 if allowed, <0 on error.
+ *
+ * @checkpoint_header:
+ *	Optionally write out a LSM-specific checkpoint header.  This is
+ *	a chance to write out policy information, for instance.  The same
+ *	LSM on restart can then use the info in security_may_restart() to
+ * 	refuse restart (for instance) across policy changes.
+ *	The info is to be written as a an object of type CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO.
+ *	@ctx is the checkpoint/restart context (see <linux/checkpoint_types.h>)
+ *	Return 0 on success, <0 on error.
+ *
  * Security hooks for Audit
  *
  * @audit_rule_init:
@@ -1443,6 +1512,8 @@ struct security_operations {
 
 	int (*file_permission) (struct file *file, int mask);
 	int (*file_alloc_security) (struct file *file);
+	char *(*file_checkpoint) (void *security);
+	int (*file_restore) (struct file *file, char *ctx);
 	void (*file_free_security) (struct file *file);
 	int (*file_ioctl) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			   unsigned long arg);
@@ -1463,6 +1534,8 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
 
 	int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
+	char *(*cred_checkpoint) (void *security);
+	int (*cred_restore) (struct file *file, struct cred *cred, char *ctx);
 	void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred);
 	int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			    gfp_t gfp);
@@ -1496,8 +1569,12 @@ struct security_operations {
 
 	int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
 	void (*ipc_getsecid) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+	char *(*ipc_checkpoint) (void *security);
+	int (*ipc_restore) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx);
 
 	int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg *msg);
+	char *(*msg_msg_checkpoint) (void *security);
+	int (*msg_msg_restore) (struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx);
 	void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg *msg);
 
 	int (*msg_queue_alloc_security) (struct msg_queue *msq);
@@ -1536,6 +1613,11 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 	void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+	int (*may_restart) (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+	int (*checkpoint_header) (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct socket *sock,
 				    struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1701,6 +1783,8 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
 void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
+char *security_file_checkpoint(void *security);
+int security_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx);
 void security_file_free(struct file *file);
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
@@ -1716,6 +1800,8 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
 int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
 int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
+char *security_cred_checkpoint(void *security);
+int security_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred, char *ctx);
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
@@ -1746,7 +1832,11 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+char *security_ipc_checkpoint(void *security);
+int security_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx);
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
+char *security_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security);
+int security_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx);
 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq);
 void security_msg_queue_free(struct msg_queue *msq);
@@ -1775,6 +1865,12 @@ int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+int security_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+int security_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
+
+char *security_get_lsm_name(void);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 struct security_mnt_opts {
@@ -1798,6 +1894,12 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#define DEFAULT_LSM_NAME "lsm_none"
+static inline char *security_get_lsm_name(void)
+{
+	return DEFAULT_LSM_NAME;
+}
+
 static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
 					     unsigned int mode)
 {
@@ -2182,6 +2284,19 @@ static inline int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *security_file_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	/* this shouldn't ever get called if SECURITY=n */
+	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx)
+{
+	/* we're asked to recreate security contexts for an LSM which had
+	 * contexts, but CONFIG_SECURITY=n now! */
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static inline void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 { }
 
@@ -2248,6 +2363,20 @@ static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *security_cred_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	/* this shouldn't ever get called if SECURITY=n */
+	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+
+static inline int security_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred,
+					char *ctx)
+{
+	/* we're asked to recreate security contexts for an LSM which had
+	 * contexts, but CONFIG_SECURITY=n now! */
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static inline void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 { }
 
@@ -2390,11 +2519,37 @@ static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *security_ipc_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	/* this shouldn't ever get called if SECURITY=n */
+	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+
+static inline int security_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx)
+{
+	/* we're asked to recreate security contexts for an LSM which had
+	 * contexts, but CONFIG_SECURITY=n now! */
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *security_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	/* this shouldn't ever get called if SECURITY=n */
+	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+
+static inline int security_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx)
+{
+	/* we're asked to recreate security contexts for an LSM which had
+	 * contexts, but CONFIG_SECURITY=n now! */
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static inline void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
 { }
 
@@ -2519,6 +2674,21 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
 static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+
+static inline int security_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int security_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
@@ -2979,5 +3149,23 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
 { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+#define CKPT_SECURITY_MSG_MSG	1
+#define CKPT_SECURITY_IPC	2
+#define CKPT_SECURITY_FILE	3
+#define CKPT_SECURITY_CRED	4
+#define CKPT_SECURITY_MAX	4
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+int security_checkpoint_obj(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *security,
+				unsigned sectype);
+#else
+static inline int security_checkpoint_obj(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *security,
+				unsigned sectype)
+{ return -1; }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
+
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
 
diff --git a/ipc/checkpoint.c b/ipc/checkpoint.c
index 8e6e9ba..c0d3f13 100644
--- a/ipc/checkpoint.c
+++ b/ipc/checkpoint.c
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ static char *ipc_ind_to_str[] = { "sem", "msg", "shm" };
  * Checkpoint
  */
 
-int checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
+int checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
+			      struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 			      struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
 {
 	if (ipcperms(perm, S_IROTH))
@@ -45,6 +46,15 @@ int checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 	h->cgid = perm->cgid;
 	h->mode = perm->mode & S_IRWXUGO;
 	h->seq = perm->seq;
+	if (perm->security) {
+		h->sec_ref = security_checkpoint_obj(ctx, perm->security,
+					CKPT_SECURITY_IPC);
+		if (h->sec_ref == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+			h->sec_ref = -1;
+		else if (h->sec_ref < 0)
+			return h->sec_ref;
+	} else
+		h->sec_ref = -1;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -176,7 +186,8 @@ static int validate_created_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-int restore_load_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
+int restore_load_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
+			   struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 			   struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
 {
 	if (h->id < 0)
@@ -205,14 +216,17 @@ int restore_load_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 	perm->cgid = h->cgid;
 	perm->mode = h->mode;
 	perm->seq = h->seq;
-	/*
-	 * Todo: restore perm->security.
-	 * At the moment it gets set by security_x_alloc() called through
-	 * ipcget()->ipcget_public()->ops-.getnew (->nequeue for instance)
-	 * We will want to ask the LSM to consider resetting the
-	 * checkpointed ->security, based on current_security(),
-	 * the checkpointed ->security, and the checkpoint file context.
-	 */
+
+	if ((ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM) && (h->sec_ref != -1)) {
+		int ret;
+		struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l = ckpt_obj_fetch(ctx, h->sec_ref,
+					CKPT_OBJ_SEC);
+		if (IS_ERR(l))
+			return PTR_ERR(l);
+		ret = security_ipc_restore(perm, l->string);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/ipc/checkpoint_msg.c b/ipc/checkpoint_msg.c
index b933c19..24f4097 100644
--- a/ipc/checkpoint_msg.c
+++ b/ipc/checkpoint_msg.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int fill_ipc_msg_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 
 	ipc_lock_by_ptr(&msq->q_perm);
 
-	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &msq->q_perm);
+	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &msq->q_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto unlock;
 
@@ -64,13 +64,23 @@ static int checkpoint_msg_contents(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct msg_msg *msg)
 	struct msg_msgseg *seg;
 	int total, len;
 	int ret;
-
+	int sec_ref = -1;
+
+	if (msg->security) {
+		sec_ref = security_checkpoint_obj(ctx, msg->security,
+						CKPT_SECURITY_MSG_MSG);
+		if (sec_ref == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+			sec_ref = -1;
+		else if (sec_ref < 0)
+			return sec_ref;
+	}
 	h = ckpt_hdr_get_type(ctx, sizeof(*h), CKPT_HDR_IPC_MSG_MSG);
 	if (!h)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	h->m_type = msg->m_type;
 	h->m_ts = msg->m_ts;
+	h->sec_ref = sec_ref;
 
 	ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, &h->h);
 	ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
@@ -177,7 +187,7 @@ static int load_ipc_msg_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &msq->q_perm);
+	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &msq->q_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -224,6 +234,16 @@ static struct msg_msg *restore_msg_contents_one(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int *clen)
 	msg->next = NULL;
 	pseg = &msg->next;
 
+	if ((ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM) && (h->sec_ref != -1)) {
+		struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l = ckpt_obj_fetch(ctx, h->sec_ref,
+					CKPT_OBJ_SEC);
+		if (IS_ERR(l))
+			return (struct msg_msg *)l;
+		ret = security_msg_msg_restore(msg, l->string);
+		if (ret)
+			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
+
 	ret = _ckpt_read_buffer(ctx, (msg + 1), len);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
diff --git a/ipc/checkpoint_sem.c b/ipc/checkpoint_sem.c
index 76eb2b9..53a19ed 100644
--- a/ipc/checkpoint_sem.c
+++ b/ipc/checkpoint_sem.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int fill_ipc_sem_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 
 	ipc_lock_by_ptr(&sem->sem_perm);
 
-	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &sem->sem_perm);
+	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &sem->sem_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto unlock;
 
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int load_ipc_sem_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &sem->sem_perm);
+	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &sem->sem_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/ipc/checkpoint_shm.c b/ipc/checkpoint_shm.c
index ad78aa3..571d9bb 100644
--- a/ipc/checkpoint_shm.c
+++ b/ipc/checkpoint_shm.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static int fill_ipc_shm_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 
 	ipc_lock_by_ptr(&shp->shm_perm);
 
-	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &shp->shm_perm);
+	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &shp->shm_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto unlock;
 
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static int load_ipc_shm_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &shp->shm_perm);
+	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &shp->shm_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/ipc/util.h b/ipc/util.h
index aa35aaa..93a1ba3 100644
--- a/ipc/util.h
+++ b/ipc/util.h
@@ -199,9 +199,11 @@ void freeary(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
 
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
-extern int checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
+extern int checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
+				     struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 				     struct kern_ipc_perm *perm);
-extern int restore_load_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
+extern int restore_load_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
+				  struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 				  struct kern_ipc_perm *perm);
 
 extern int checkpoint_ipc_shm(int id, void *p, void *data);
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 27e02ca..8e4d2a2 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ int cred_setfsgid(struct cred *new, gid_t gid, gid_t *old_fsgid)
 static int do_checkpoint_cred(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	int ret;
-	int groupinfo_ref, user_ref;
+	int groupinfo_ref, user_ref, sec_ref = -1;
 	struct ckpt_hdr_cred *h;
 
 	groupinfo_ref = checkpoint_obj(ctx, cred->group_info,
@@ -719,6 +719,14 @@ static int do_checkpoint_cred(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, const struct cred *cred)
 	user_ref = checkpoint_obj(ctx, cred->user, CKPT_OBJ_USER);
 	if (user_ref < 0)
 		return user_ref;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+	sec_ref = security_checkpoint_obj(ctx, cred->security,
+					CKPT_SECURITY_CRED);
+	if (sec_ref == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		sec_ref = -1;
+	else if (sec_ref < 0)
+		return sec_ref;
+#endif  /* else cred->security doesn't exist and sec_ref = -1 */
 
 	h = ckpt_hdr_get_type(ctx, sizeof(*h), CKPT_HDR_CRED);
 	if (!h)
@@ -733,6 +741,7 @@ static int do_checkpoint_cred(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, const struct cred *cred)
 	h->sgid = cred->sgid;
 	h->egid = cred->egid;
 	h->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
+	h->sec_ref = sec_ref;
 
 	checkpoint_capabilities(&h->cap_s, cred);
 
@@ -806,6 +815,15 @@ static struct cred *do_restore_cred(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 	ret = cred_setfsgid(cred, h->fsgid, &oldgid);
 	if (oldgid != h->fsgid && ret < 0)
 		goto err_putcred;
+	if ((ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM) && (h->sec_ref != -1)) {
+		struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l = ckpt_obj_fetch(ctx, h->sec_ref,
+					CKPT_OBJ_SEC);
+		if (IS_ERR(l))
+			return (struct cred *)l;
+		ret = security_cred_restore(ctx->file, cred, l->string);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_putcred;
+	}
 	ret = restore_capabilities(&h->cap_s, cred);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_putcred;
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 21b6cea..c415a2d 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -315,6 +315,16 @@ static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *cap_file_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+
+static int cap_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static int cap_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -382,6 +392,16 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static char *cap_cred_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+
+static int cap_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred, char *ctx)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 }
@@ -485,11 +505,31 @@ static void cap_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = 0;
 }
 
+static char *cap_ipc_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+
+static int cap_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static int cap_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *cap_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+
+static int cap_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static void cap_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 }
@@ -801,6 +841,28 @@ static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+static int cap_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note that all construction of kernel resources, credentials,
+	 * etc is already authorized per the caller's credentials.  This
+	 * hook is intended for the LSM to make further decisions about
+	 * a task not being allowed to restart at all, for instance if
+	 * the policy has changed since checkpoint.
+	 */
+	ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
 			 unsigned long flags)
@@ -937,6 +999,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
 #endif
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_checkpoint);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_restore);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl);
@@ -949,6 +1013,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_checkpoint);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_restore);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
@@ -975,7 +1041,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_checkpoint);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_restore);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_checkpoint);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_restore);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_free_security);
@@ -1001,6 +1071,10 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, may_restart);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, checkpoint_header);
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dc7674f..7b9055c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -122,6 +122,11 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+char *security_get_lsm_name(void)
+{
+	return security_ops->name;
+}
+
 /* Security operations */
 
 int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
@@ -625,6 +630,16 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 	return security_ops->file_alloc_security(file);
 }
 
+char *security_file_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return security_ops->file_checkpoint(security);
+}
+
+int security_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->file_restore(file, ctx);
+}
+
 void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	security_ops->file_free_security(file);
@@ -684,6 +699,16 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
 }
 
+char *security_cred_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return security_ops->cred_checkpoint(security);
+}
+
+int security_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred, char *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->cred_restore(file, cred, ctx);
+}
+
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 	security_ops->cred_free(cred);
@@ -819,11 +844,31 @@ void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 	security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid);
 }
 
+char *security_ipc_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return security_ops->ipc_checkpoint(security);
+}
+
+int security_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->ipc_restore(ipcp, ctx);
+}
+
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
 }
 
+char *security_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return security_ops->msg_msg_checkpoint(security);
+}
+
+int security_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->msg_msg_restore(msg, ctx);
+}
+
 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	security_ops->msg_msg_free_security(msg);
@@ -959,6 +1004,20 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+int security_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->may_restart(ctx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_may_restart);
+
+int security_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->checkpoint_header(ctx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_checkpoint_header);
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other,
@@ -1244,3 +1303,68 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
 }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+
+#include <linux/checkpoint.h>
+
+/**
+ * security_checkpoint_obj - if first checkpoint of this void* security,
+ * then 1. ask the LSM for a string representing the context, 2. checkpoint
+ * that string
+ * @ctx: the checkpoint context
+ * @security: the void* security being checkpointed
+ * @sectype: indicates the type of object, because LSMs can (and do) store
+ * different types of data for different types of objects.
+ *
+ * Returns the objref of the checkpointed ckpt_stored_lsm representing the
+ * context, or -error on error.
+ *
+ * This is only used at checkpoint of course.
+ */
+int security_checkpoint_obj(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *security,
+				unsigned sectype)
+{
+	int strref;
+	struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l;
+	char *str;
+	int len;
+
+	switch (sectype) {
+	case CKPT_SECURITY_MSG_MSG:
+		str = security_msg_msg_checkpoint(security);
+		break;
+	case CKPT_SECURITY_IPC:
+		str = security_ipc_checkpoint(security);
+		break;
+	case CKPT_SECURITY_FILE:
+		str = security_file_checkpoint(security);
+		break;
+	case CKPT_SECURITY_CRED:
+		str = security_cred_checkpoint(security);
+		break;
+	default:
+		str = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		break;
+	}
+	/* str will be alloc'ed for us by the LSM.  We will free it when
+	 * we clear out our hashtable */
+	if (IS_ERR(str))
+		return PTR_ERR(str);
+
+	len = strlen(str);
+	l = kzalloc(sizeof(*l) + len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!l) {
+		kfree(str);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	kref_init(&l->kref);
+	l->sectype = sectype;
+	l->string = str;
+
+	strref = checkpoint_obj(ctx, l, CKPT_OBJ_SEC);
+	/* do we need to free l if strref was err? */
+	return strref;
+}
+
+#endif
-- 
1.6.1

[PATCH 2/4] cr: add generic LSM c/r support

[Serge E. Hallyn]

[ This patch is against branch ckpt-v17-dev of the checkpoint/restart
kernel tree at git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git/ ]

Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt begins:
"""
Application checkpoint/restart is the ability to save the state
of a running application so that it can later resume its execution
from the time at which it was checkpointed.
"""

This patch adds generic support for c/r of LSM credentials.  Support
for Smack and SELinux (and TOMOYO if appropriate) will be added later.
Capabilities is already supported through generic creds code.

This patch supports ipc_perm, msg_msg, cred (task) and file ->security
fields.  Inodes, superblocks, netif, and xfrm currently are restored
not through sys_restart() but through container creation, and so the
security fields should be done then as well.  Network should be added
when network c/r is added.

Briefly, all security fields must be exported by the LSM as a simple
null-terminated string.  They are checkpointed through the
security_checkpoint_obj() helper, because we must pass it an extra
sectype field.  Splitting SECURITY_OBJ_SEC into one type per object
type would not work because, in Smack, one void* security is used for
all object types.  But we must pass the sectype field because in
SELinux a different type of structure is stashed in each object type.

The RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag indicates that the LSM should
attempt to reuse checkpointed security labels.  It is always
invalid when the LSM at restart differs from that at checkpoint.
It is currently only usable for capabilities.

(For capabilities, restart without RESTART_KEEP_LSM is technically
not implemented.  There actually might be a use case for that,
but the safety of it is dubious so for now we always re-create
checkpointed capability sets whether RESTART_KEEP_LSM is
specified or not)

Changelog:
	sep 3: fix memory leak on LSM restore error path
	Sep 3: provide 2 hooks, may_restart and checkpoint_header, to facilitate
		an LSM tracking policy changes.
	sep 10: merge RESTART_KEEP_LSM patch with basic LSM c/r
		support patches.
	sep 10: rename security_xyz_get_ctx() to security_xyz_checkpoint(),
		in order to avoid confusing with the various other 'context'
		helpers in the security_ namespace, relating to secids and
		sysfs xattrs.
	sep 10: pass context file to security_cred_restore.  SELinux will
		want the file's security context to authorize it as an
		entrypoint for the new process context.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt |   25 +++++
 checkpoint/checkpoint.c             |   11 ++
 checkpoint/files.c                  |   30 ++++++
 checkpoint/objhash.c                |   93 +++++++++++++++++
 checkpoint/restart.c                |   25 +++++
 checkpoint/sys.c                    |   22 ++++
 include/linux/checkpoint.h          |    9 ++-
 include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h      |   24 +++++-
 include/linux/checkpoint_types.h    |    9 ++
 include/linux/security.h            |  188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 ipc/checkpoint.c                    |   34 +++++--
 ipc/checkpoint_msg.c                |   26 +++++-
 ipc/checkpoint_sem.c                |    4 +-
 ipc/checkpoint_shm.c                |    4 +-
 ipc/util.h                          |    6 +-
 kernel/cred.c                       |   20 ++++-
 security/capability.c               |   74 ++++++++++++++
 security/security.c                 |  124 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 18 files changed, 705 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt b/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt
index e84dc39..a60e001 100644
--- a/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt
+++ b/Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt
@@ -328,6 +328,31 @@ So that's why we don't want CAP_SYS_ADMIN required up-front. That way
 we will be forced to more carefully review each of those features.
 However, this can be controlled with a sysctl-variable.
 
+LSM
+===
+
+Security modules use custom labels on subjects and objects to
+further mediate access decisions beyond DAC controls.  When
+checkpoint applications, these labels are [ work in progress ]
+checkpointed along with the objects.  At restart, the
+RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag tells the kernel whether re-created objects
+whould keep their checkpointed labels, or get automatically
+recalculated labels.  Since checkpointed labels will only make
+sense to the same LSM which was active at checkpoint time,
+sys_restart() with the RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag will fail with
+-EINVAL if the LSM active at restart is not the same as that
+active at checkpoint.  If RESTART_KEEP_LSM is not specified,
+then objects will be given whatever default labels the LSM and
+their optional policy decide.  Of course, when RESTART_KEEP_LSM
+is specified, the LSM may choose a different label than the
+checkpointed one, or fail the entire restart if the caller
+does not have permission to create objects with the checkpointed
+label.
+
+It should always be safe to take a checkpoint of an application
+under LSM_1, and restart it without the RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag
+under LSM_2.
+
 
 Kernel interfaces
 =================
diff --git a/checkpoint/checkpoint.c b/checkpoint/checkpoint.c
index c19f812..a8e7483 100644
--- a/checkpoint/checkpoint.c
+++ b/checkpoint/checkpoint.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/hrtimer.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/checkpoint.h>
 #include <linux/checkpoint_hdr.h>
 
@@ -250,6 +251,16 @@ static int checkpoint_write_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
+	memset(ctx->lsm_name, 0, SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1);
+	strlcpy(ctx->lsm_name, security_get_lsm_name(), SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1);
+	ret = ckpt_write_buffer(ctx, ctx->lsm_name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = security_checkpoint_header(ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
 	return checkpoint_write_header_arch(ctx);
 }
 
diff --git a/checkpoint/files.c b/checkpoint/files.c
index 204055b..a26951a 100644
--- a/checkpoint/files.c
+++ b/checkpoint/files.c
@@ -143,6 +143,19 @@ static int scan_fds(struct files_struct *files, int **fdtable)
 	return n;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+int checkpoint_file_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct file *file)
+{
+	return security_checkpoint_obj(ctx, file->f_security,
+					CKPT_SECURITY_FILE);
+}
+#else
+int checkpoint_file_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct file *file)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+#endif
+
 int checkpoint_file_common(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct file *file,
 			   struct ckpt_hdr_file *h)
 {
@@ -155,6 +168,12 @@ int checkpoint_file_common(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct file *file,
 	if (h->f_credref < 0)
 		return h->f_credref;
 
+	h->f_secref = checkpoint_file_security(ctx, file);
+	if (h->f_secref == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		h->f_secref = -1;
+	else if (h->f_secref < 0)
+		return h->f_secref;
+
 	/* FIX: need also file->f_owner, etc */
 
 	return 0;
@@ -481,6 +500,17 @@ int restore_file_common(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct file *file,
 	put_cred(file->f_cred);
 	file->f_cred = get_cred(cred);
 
+	if ((ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM) && (h->f_secref != -1)) {
+		struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l = ckpt_obj_fetch(ctx, h->f_secref,
+					CKPT_OBJ_SEC);
+		if (IS_ERR(l))
+			return PTR_ERR(l);
+
+		ret = security_file_restore(file, l->string);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
+
 	/* safe to set 1st arg (fd) to 0, as command is F_SETFL */
 	ret = vfs_fcntl(0, F_SETFL, h->f_flags & CKPT_SETFL_MASK, file);
 	if (ret < 0)
diff --git a/checkpoint/objhash.c b/checkpoint/objhash.c
index a9a10d1..2b0ead4 100644
--- a/checkpoint/objhash.c
+++ b/checkpoint/objhash.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
 #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/checkpoint.h>
@@ -246,6 +247,89 @@ static void obj_sock_drop(void *ptr)
 	sock_put((struct sock *) ptr);
 }
 
+static void obj_free_sec(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct ckpt_stored_lsm *s = container_of(kref, struct ckpt_stored_lsm,
+					kref);
+	kfree(s->string);
+	kfree(s);
+}
+
+static int obj_sec_grab(void *ptr)
+{
+	struct ckpt_stored_lsm *s = ptr;
+	kref_get(&s->kref);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void obj_sec_drop(void *ptr)
+{
+	struct ckpt_stored_lsm *s = ptr;
+	kref_put(&s->kref, obj_free_sec);
+}
+
+static int do_checkpoint_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
+				const struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l)
+{
+	int ret, len;
+	struct ckpt_hdr_lsm *h;
+
+	len = strlen(l->string);
+	if (len > PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(*h))
+		return -E2BIG;
+	h = ckpt_hdr_get_type(ctx, sizeof(*h)+len+1, CKPT_HDR_SEC);
+	if (!h)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	h->len = len;
+	h->sectype = l->sectype;
+	strncpy(h->string, l->string, len);
+	h->string[len] = '\0';
+	ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, &h->h);
+	ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int checkpoint_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *ptr)
+{
+	return do_checkpoint_security(ctx, (struct ckpt_stored_lsm *) ptr);
+}
+
+static struct ckpt_stored_lsm *do_restore_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct ckpt_hdr_lsm *h;
+	struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l;
+
+	h = ckpt_read_buf_type(ctx, PAGE_SIZE, CKPT_HDR_SEC);
+	if (IS_ERR(h))
+		return (struct ckpt_stored_lsm *)h;
+	if (h->len > h->h.len - sizeof(struct ckpt_hdr) ||
+				h->len > PAGE_SIZE) {
+		ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+	l = kzalloc(sizeof(*l), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!l) {
+		ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+	l->string = kzalloc(h->len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!l->string) {
+		kfree(l);
+		ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+	kref_init(&l->kref);
+	l->sectype = h->sectype;
+	strncpy(l->string, h->string, h->len);
+	ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+	return l;
+}
+
+static void *restore_security(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return (void *) do_restore_security(ctx);
+}
+
 static struct ckpt_obj_ops ckpt_obj_ops[] = {
 	/* ignored object */
 	{
@@ -382,6 +466,15 @@ static struct ckpt_obj_ops ckpt_obj_ops[] = {
 		.ref_drop = obj_sock_drop,
 		.ref_grab = obj_sock_grab,
 	},
+	/* LSM security labels */
+	{
+		.obj_name = "LSM",
+		.obj_type = CKPT_OBJ_SEC,
+		.ref_drop = obj_sec_drop,
+		.ref_grab = obj_sec_grab,
+		.checkpoint = checkpoint_security,
+		.restore = restore_security,
+	},
 };
 
 
diff --git a/checkpoint/restart.c b/checkpoint/restart.c
index ed42b4b..4703ff8 100644
--- a/checkpoint/restart.c
+++ b/checkpoint/restart.c
@@ -423,6 +423,31 @@ static int restore_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	ret = _ckpt_read_buffer(ctx, ctx->lsm_name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM) {
+		char *cur = security_get_lsm_name();
+		if (strncmp(cur, ctx->lsm_name, SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1) != 0) {
+			pr_warning("c/r: checkpointed LSM %s, current is %s.\n",
+				ctx->lsm_name, cur);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* to be implemented later, per-lsm */
+		if (strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "lsm_none") != 0 &&
+				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "default") != 0) {
+			pr_warning("c/r: RESTART_KEEP_LSM unsupported for %s\n",
+					ctx->lsm_name);
+			ret = -ENOSYS;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = security_may_restart(ctx);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
 	ret = restore_read_header_arch(ctx);
  out:
 	kfree(uts);
diff --git a/checkpoint/sys.c b/checkpoint/sys.c
index 525182a..a510138 100644
--- a/checkpoint/sys.c
+++ b/checkpoint/sys.c
@@ -169,6 +169,28 @@ void *ckpt_hdr_get_type(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int len, int type)
 	return h;
 }
 
+#define DUMMY_LSM_INFO "dummy"
+
+int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return ckpt_write_obj_type(ctx, DUMMY_LSM_INFO,
+			strlen(DUMMY_LSM_INFO), CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ckpt_snarf_lsm_info
+ * If there is a CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO field, toss it.
+ * Used when the current LSM doesn't care about this field.
+ */
+void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct ckpt_hdr *h;
+
+	h = ckpt_read_buf_type(ctx, CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN, CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+	if (!IS_ERR(h))
+		ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
+}
+
 
 /*
  * Helpers to manage c/r contexts: allocated for each checkpoint and/or
diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint.h b/include/linux/checkpoint.h
index 06e3eb0..bc96fcd 100644
--- a/include/linux/checkpoint.h
+++ b/include/linux/checkpoint.h
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  *  distribution for more details.
  */
 
-#define CHECKPOINT_VERSION  1
+#define CHECKPOINT_VERSION  2
 
 /* checkpoint user flags */
 #define CHECKPOINT_SUBTREE	0x1
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 /* restart user flags */
 #define RESTART_TASKSELF	0x1
 #define RESTART_FROZEN		0x2
+#define RESTART_KEEP_LSM	0x4
 
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
 #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
@@ -44,7 +45,9 @@
 
 /* ckpt_ctx: uflags */
 #define CHECKPOINT_USER_FLAGS		CHECKPOINT_SUBTREE
-#define RESTART_USER_FLAGS		(RESTART_TASKSELF | RESTART_FROZEN)
+#define RESTART_USER_FLAGS		(RESTART_TASKSELF | RESTART_FROZEN | \
+					 RESTART_KEEP_LSM)
+#define CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN 200
 
 extern void exit_checkpoint(struct task_struct *tsk);
 
@@ -55,6 +58,8 @@ extern void _ckpt_hdr_put(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *ptr, int n);
 extern void ckpt_hdr_put(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *ptr);
 extern void *ckpt_hdr_get(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int n);
 extern void *ckpt_hdr_get_type(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int n, int type);
+extern int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+extern void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
 
 extern int ckpt_write_obj(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct ckpt_hdr *h);
 extern int ckpt_write_obj_type(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h b/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
index 06bc6e2..78afcec 100644
--- a/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
+++ b/include/linux/checkpoint_hdr.h
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ enum {
 	CKPT_HDR_BUFFER,
 	CKPT_HDR_STRING,
 	CKPT_HDR_OBJREF,
+	CKPT_HDR_SEC,
+	CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO,
 
 	CKPT_HDR_TREE = 101,
 	CKPT_HDR_TASK,
@@ -136,6 +138,7 @@ enum obj_type {
 	CKPT_OBJ_USER,
 	CKPT_OBJ_GROUPINFO,
 	CKPT_OBJ_SOCK,
+	CKPT_OBJ_SEC,
 	CKPT_OBJ_MAX
 };
 
@@ -176,10 +179,11 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_header {
 	__u64 uflags;	/* uflags from checkpoint */
 
 	/*
-	 * the header is followed by three strings:
+	 * the header is followed by four strings:
 	 *   char release[const.uts_release_len];
 	 *   char version[const.uts_version_len];
 	 *   char machine[const.uts_machine_len];
+	 *   char lsm_name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1]
 	 */
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
@@ -249,6 +253,8 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_cred {
 	__u32 gid, sgid, egid, fsgid;
 	__s32 user_ref;
 	__s32 groupinfo_ref;
+	__s32 sec_ref;
+	__u32 padding;
 	struct ckpt_capabilities cap_s;
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
@@ -261,6 +267,16 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_groupinfo {
 	__u32 groups[0];
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
+struct ckpt_hdr_lsm {
+	struct ckpt_hdr h;
+	__u8 sectype;
+	__u16 len;
+	/*
+	 * This is followed by a string of size len+1,
+	 * null-terminated
+	 */
+	__u8 string[0];
+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 /*
  * todo - keyrings and LSM
  * These may be better done with userspace help though
@@ -356,6 +372,8 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_file {
 	__s32 f_credref;
 	__u64 f_pos;
 	__u64 f_version;
+	__s32 f_secref;
+	__u32 f_padding;
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
 struct ckpt_hdr_file_generic {
@@ -594,6 +612,8 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms {
 	__u32 mode;
 	__u32 _padding;
 	__u64 seq;
+	__s32 sec_ref;
+	__u32 padding;
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
 struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_shm {
@@ -627,6 +647,8 @@ struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_msg_msg {
 	struct ckpt_hdr h;
 	__s32 m_type;
 	__u32 m_ts;
+	__s32 sec_ref;
+	__u32 padding;
 } __attribute__((aligned(8)));
 
 struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_sem {
diff --git a/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h b/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h
index a18846f..182878b 100644
--- a/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/checkpoint_types.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/ktime.h>
 #include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 struct ckpt_stats {
 	int uts_ns;
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ struct ckpt_ctx {
 	struct task_struct *root_task;		/* [container] root task */
 	struct nsproxy *root_nsproxy;		/* [container] root nsproxy */
 	struct task_struct *root_freezer;	/* [container] root task */
+	char lsm_name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];   /* security module at ckpt */
 
 	unsigned long kflags;	/* kerenl flags */
 	unsigned long uflags;	/* user flags */
@@ -71,6 +73,13 @@ struct ckpt_ctx {
 	struct ckpt_stats stats;	/* statistics */
 };
 
+/* stored on hashtable */
+struct ckpt_stored_lsm {
+	struct kref kref;
+	int sectype;
+	char *string;
+};
+
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_CHECKPOINT_TYPES_H_ */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5eff459..8d88cec 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@
 struct ctl_table;
 struct audit_krule;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+struct ckpt_ctx;
+#endif
+
 /*
  * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
  * as the default capabilities functions
@@ -554,6 +558,15 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	created.
  *	@file contains the file structure to secure.
  *	Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @file_checkpoint:
+ *	Return a string representing the security context on a file.
+ *	@security contains the security field.
+ *	Returns a char* which the caller will free, or -error on error.
+ * @file_restore:
+ *	Set a security context on a file according to the checkpointed context.
+ *	@file contains the file.
+ *	@ctx contains a string representation of the checkpointed context.
+ *	Returns 0 on success, -error on failure.
  * @file_free_security:
  *	Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security.
  *	@file contains the file structure being modified.
@@ -633,6 +646,17 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
  *	@clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @cred_checkpoint:
+ *	Return a string representing the security context on the task cred.
+ *	@security contains the security field.
+ *	Returns a char* which the caller will free, or -error on error.
+ * @cred_restore:
+ *	Set a security context on a task cred according to the checkpointed
+ *	context.
+ *	@file contains the checkpoint file
+ *	@cred contains the cred.
+ *	@ctx contains a string representation of the checkpointed context.
+ *	Returns 0 on success, -error on failure.
  * @cred_free:
  *	@cred points to the credentials.
  *	Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
@@ -1081,6 +1105,19 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
  *	@secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
  *	In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * @ipc_checkpoint:
+ *	Return a string representing the security context on the IPC
+ *	permission structure.
+ *	@security contains the security field.
+ *	Returns a char* which the caller will free, or -error on error.
+ * @ipc_restore:
+ *	Set a security context on a IPC permission structure according to
+ *	the checkpointed context.
+ *	@ipcp contains the IPC permission structure, which will have
+ *	already been allocated and initialized when the IPC structure was
+ *	created.
+ *	@ctx contains a string representation of the checkpointed context.
+ *	Returns 0 on success, -error on failure.
  *
  * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
  * @msg_msg_alloc_security:
@@ -1089,6 +1126,16 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	created.
  *	@msg contains the message structure to be modified.
  *	Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @msg_msg_checkpoint:
+ *	Return a string representing the security context on an msg_msg
+ *	struct.
+ *	@security contains the security field
+ *	Returns a char* which the caller will free, or -error on error.
+ * @msg_msg_restore:
+ *	Set msg_msg->security according to the checkpointed context.
+ *	@msg contains the message structure to be modified.
+ *	@ctx contains a string representation of the checkpointed context.
+ *	Return 0 on success, -error on failure.
  * @msg_msg_free_security:
  *	Deallocate the security structure for this message.
  *	@msg contains the message structure to be modified.
@@ -1300,6 +1347,28 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@secdata contains the security context.
  *	@seclen contains the length of the security context.
  *
+ * Security hooks for Checkpoint/restart
+ * (In addition to *_checkpoint and *_restore)
+ *
+ * @may_restart:
+ *	Authorize sys_restart().
+ *	Note that all construction of kernel resources, credentials,
+ *	etc is already authorized per the caller's credentials.  This
+ *	hook is intended for the LSM to make further decisions about
+ *	a task not being allowed to restart at all, for instance if
+ *	the policy has changed since checkpoint.
+ *	@ctx is the checkpoint/restart context (see <linux/checkpoint_types.h>)
+ *	Return 0 if allowed, <0 on error.
+ *
+ * @checkpoint_header:
+ *	Optionally write out a LSM-specific checkpoint header.  This is
+ *	a chance to write out policy information, for instance.  The same
+ *	LSM on restart can then use the info in security_may_restart() to
+ * 	refuse restart (for instance) across policy changes.
+ *	The info is to be written as a an object of type CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO.
+ *	@ctx is the checkpoint/restart context (see <linux/checkpoint_types.h>)
+ *	Return 0 on success, <0 on error.
+ *
  * Security hooks for Audit
  *
  * @audit_rule_init:
@@ -1443,6 +1512,8 @@ struct security_operations {
 
 	int (*file_permission) (struct file *file, int mask);
 	int (*file_alloc_security) (struct file *file);
+	char *(*file_checkpoint) (void *security);
+	int (*file_restore) (struct file *file, char *ctx);
 	void (*file_free_security) (struct file *file);
 	int (*file_ioctl) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 			   unsigned long arg);
@@ -1463,6 +1534,8 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
 
 	int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
+	char *(*cred_checkpoint) (void *security);
+	int (*cred_restore) (struct file *file, struct cred *cred, char *ctx);
 	void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred);
 	int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			    gfp_t gfp);
@@ -1496,8 +1569,12 @@ struct security_operations {
 
 	int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
 	void (*ipc_getsecid) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+	char *(*ipc_checkpoint) (void *security);
+	int (*ipc_restore) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx);
 
 	int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg *msg);
+	char *(*msg_msg_checkpoint) (void *security);
+	int (*msg_msg_restore) (struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx);
 	void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg *msg);
 
 	int (*msg_queue_alloc_security) (struct msg_queue *msq);
@@ -1536,6 +1613,11 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 	void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+	int (*may_restart) (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+	int (*checkpoint_header) (struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct socket *sock,
 				    struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1701,6 +1783,8 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
 void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
 int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
 int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
+char *security_file_checkpoint(void *security);
+int security_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx);
 void security_file_free(struct file *file);
 int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
 int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
@@ -1716,6 +1800,8 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
 int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
 int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
+char *security_cred_checkpoint(void *security);
+int security_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred, char *ctx);
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
 int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
@@ -1746,7 +1832,11 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
 int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
 void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+char *security_ipc_checkpoint(void *security);
+int security_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx);
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg);
+char *security_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security);
+int security_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx);
 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg);
 int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq);
 void security_msg_queue_free(struct msg_queue *msq);
@@ -1775,6 +1865,12 @@ int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+int security_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+int security_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
+
+char *security_get_lsm_name(void);
 
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 struct security_mnt_opts {
@@ -1798,6 +1894,12 @@ static inline int security_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#define DEFAULT_LSM_NAME "lsm_none"
+static inline char *security_get_lsm_name(void)
+{
+	return DEFAULT_LSM_NAME;
+}
+
 static inline int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
 					     unsigned int mode)
 {
@@ -2182,6 +2284,19 @@ static inline int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *security_file_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	/* this shouldn't ever get called if SECURITY=n */
+	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+
+static inline int security_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx)
+{
+	/* we're asked to recreate security contexts for an LSM which had
+	 * contexts, but CONFIG_SECURITY=n now! */
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static inline void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 { }
 
@@ -2248,6 +2363,20 @@ static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *security_cred_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	/* this shouldn't ever get called if SECURITY=n */
+	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+
+static inline int security_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred,
+					char *ctx)
+{
+	/* we're asked to recreate security contexts for an LSM which had
+	 * contexts, but CONFIG_SECURITY=n now! */
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static inline void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 { }
 
@@ -2390,11 +2519,37 @@ static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *security_ipc_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	/* this shouldn't ever get called if SECURITY=n */
+	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+
+static inline int security_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx)
+{
+	/* we're asked to recreate security contexts for an LSM which had
+	 * contexts, but CONFIG_SECURITY=n now! */
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *security_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	/* this shouldn't ever get called if SECURITY=n */
+	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+
+static inline int security_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx)
+{
+	/* we're asked to recreate security contexts for an LSM which had
+	 * contexts, but CONFIG_SECURITY=n now! */
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
 static inline void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
 { }
 
@@ -2519,6 +2674,21 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,
 static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+
+static inline int security_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+static inline int security_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
@@ -2979,5 +3149,23 @@ static inline void free_secdata(void *secdata)
 { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+#define CKPT_SECURITY_MSG_MSG	1
+#define CKPT_SECURITY_IPC	2
+#define CKPT_SECURITY_FILE	3
+#define CKPT_SECURITY_CRED	4
+#define CKPT_SECURITY_MAX	4
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+int security_checkpoint_obj(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *security,
+				unsigned sectype);
+#else
+static inline int security_checkpoint_obj(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *security,
+				unsigned sectype)
+{ return -1; }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT */
+
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
 
diff --git a/ipc/checkpoint.c b/ipc/checkpoint.c
index 8e6e9ba..c0d3f13 100644
--- a/ipc/checkpoint.c
+++ b/ipc/checkpoint.c
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ static char *ipc_ind_to_str[] = { "sem", "msg", "shm" };
  * Checkpoint
  */
 
-int checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
+int checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
+			      struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 			      struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
 {
 	if (ipcperms(perm, S_IROTH))
@@ -45,6 +46,15 @@ int checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 	h->cgid = perm->cgid;
 	h->mode = perm->mode & S_IRWXUGO;
 	h->seq = perm->seq;
+	if (perm->security) {
+		h->sec_ref = security_checkpoint_obj(ctx, perm->security,
+					CKPT_SECURITY_IPC);
+		if (h->sec_ref == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+			h->sec_ref = -1;
+		else if (h->sec_ref < 0)
+			return h->sec_ref;
+	} else
+		h->sec_ref = -1;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -176,7 +186,8 @@ static int validate_created_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h)
 	return 1;
 }
 
-int restore_load_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
+int restore_load_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
+			   struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 			   struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
 {
 	if (h->id < 0)
@@ -205,14 +216,17 @@ int restore_load_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 	perm->cgid = h->cgid;
 	perm->mode = h->mode;
 	perm->seq = h->seq;
-	/*
-	 * Todo: restore perm->security.
-	 * At the moment it gets set by security_x_alloc() called through
-	 * ipcget()->ipcget_public()->ops-.getnew (->nequeue for instance)
-	 * We will want to ask the LSM to consider resetting the
-	 * checkpointed ->security, based on current_security(),
-	 * the checkpointed ->security, and the checkpoint file context.
-	 */
+
+	if ((ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM) && (h->sec_ref != -1)) {
+		int ret;
+		struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l = ckpt_obj_fetch(ctx, h->sec_ref,
+					CKPT_OBJ_SEC);
+		if (IS_ERR(l))
+			return PTR_ERR(l);
+		ret = security_ipc_restore(perm, l->string);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/ipc/checkpoint_msg.c b/ipc/checkpoint_msg.c
index b933c19..24f4097 100644
--- a/ipc/checkpoint_msg.c
+++ b/ipc/checkpoint_msg.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int fill_ipc_msg_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 
 	ipc_lock_by_ptr(&msq->q_perm);
 
-	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &msq->q_perm);
+	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &msq->q_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto unlock;
 
@@ -64,13 +64,23 @@ static int checkpoint_msg_contents(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct msg_msg *msg)
 	struct msg_msgseg *seg;
 	int total, len;
 	int ret;
-
+	int sec_ref = -1;
+
+	if (msg->security) {
+		sec_ref = security_checkpoint_obj(ctx, msg->security,
+						CKPT_SECURITY_MSG_MSG);
+		if (sec_ref == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+			sec_ref = -1;
+		else if (sec_ref < 0)
+			return sec_ref;
+	}
 	h = ckpt_hdr_get_type(ctx, sizeof(*h), CKPT_HDR_IPC_MSG_MSG);
 	if (!h)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	h->m_type = msg->m_type;
 	h->m_ts = msg->m_ts;
+	h->sec_ref = sec_ref;
 
 	ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, &h->h);
 	ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, h);
@@ -177,7 +187,7 @@ static int load_ipc_msg_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &msq->q_perm);
+	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &msq->q_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -224,6 +234,16 @@ static struct msg_msg *restore_msg_contents_one(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, int *clen)
 	msg->next = NULL;
 	pseg = &msg->next;
 
+	if ((ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM) && (h->sec_ref != -1)) {
+		struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l = ckpt_obj_fetch(ctx, h->sec_ref,
+					CKPT_OBJ_SEC);
+		if (IS_ERR(l))
+			return (struct msg_msg *)l;
+		ret = security_msg_msg_restore(msg, l->string);
+		if (ret)
+			return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
+
 	ret = _ckpt_read_buffer(ctx, (msg + 1), len);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
diff --git a/ipc/checkpoint_sem.c b/ipc/checkpoint_sem.c
index 76eb2b9..53a19ed 100644
--- a/ipc/checkpoint_sem.c
+++ b/ipc/checkpoint_sem.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int fill_ipc_sem_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 
 	ipc_lock_by_ptr(&sem->sem_perm);
 
-	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &sem->sem_perm);
+	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &sem->sem_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto unlock;
 
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int load_ipc_sem_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &sem->sem_perm);
+	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &sem->sem_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/ipc/checkpoint_shm.c b/ipc/checkpoint_shm.c
index ad78aa3..571d9bb 100644
--- a/ipc/checkpoint_shm.c
+++ b/ipc/checkpoint_shm.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static int fill_ipc_shm_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 
 	ipc_lock_by_ptr(&shp->shm_perm);
 
-	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &shp->shm_perm);
+	ret = checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &shp->shm_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto unlock;
 
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ static int load_ipc_shm_hdr(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(&h->perms, &shp->shm_perm);
+	ret = restore_load_ipc_perms(ctx, &h->perms, &shp->shm_perm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/ipc/util.h b/ipc/util.h
index aa35aaa..93a1ba3 100644
--- a/ipc/util.h
+++ b/ipc/util.h
@@ -199,9 +199,11 @@ void freeary(struct ipc_namespace *ns, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
 
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
-extern int checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
+extern int checkpoint_fill_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
+				     struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 				     struct kern_ipc_perm *perm);
-extern int restore_load_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
+extern int restore_load_ipc_perms(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx,
+				  struct ckpt_hdr_ipc_perms *h,
 				  struct kern_ipc_perm *perm);
 
 extern int checkpoint_ipc_shm(int id, void *p, void *data);
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 27e02ca..8e4d2a2 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ int cred_setfsgid(struct cred *new, gid_t gid, gid_t *old_fsgid)
 static int do_checkpoint_cred(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, const struct cred *cred)
 {
 	int ret;
-	int groupinfo_ref, user_ref;
+	int groupinfo_ref, user_ref, sec_ref = -1;
 	struct ckpt_hdr_cred *h;
 
 	groupinfo_ref = checkpoint_obj(ctx, cred->group_info,
@@ -719,6 +719,14 @@ static int do_checkpoint_cred(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, const struct cred *cred)
 	user_ref = checkpoint_obj(ctx, cred->user, CKPT_OBJ_USER);
 	if (user_ref < 0)
 		return user_ref;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+	sec_ref = security_checkpoint_obj(ctx, cred->security,
+					CKPT_SECURITY_CRED);
+	if (sec_ref == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		sec_ref = -1;
+	else if (sec_ref < 0)
+		return sec_ref;
+#endif  /* else cred->security doesn't exist and sec_ref = -1 */
 
 	h = ckpt_hdr_get_type(ctx, sizeof(*h), CKPT_HDR_CRED);
 	if (!h)
@@ -733,6 +741,7 @@ static int do_checkpoint_cred(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, const struct cred *cred)
 	h->sgid = cred->sgid;
 	h->egid = cred->egid;
 	h->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
+	h->sec_ref = sec_ref;
 
 	checkpoint_capabilities(&h->cap_s, cred);
 
@@ -806,6 +815,15 @@ static struct cred *do_restore_cred(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 	ret = cred_setfsgid(cred, h->fsgid, &oldgid);
 	if (oldgid != h->fsgid && ret < 0)
 		goto err_putcred;
+	if ((ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM) && (h->sec_ref != -1)) {
+		struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l = ckpt_obj_fetch(ctx, h->sec_ref,
+					CKPT_OBJ_SEC);
+		if (IS_ERR(l))
+			return (struct cred *)l;
+		ret = security_cred_restore(ctx->file, cred, l->string);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_putcred;
+	}
 	ret = restore_capabilities(&h->cap_s, cred);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_putcred;
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 21b6cea..c415a2d 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -315,6 +315,16 @@ static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *cap_file_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+
+static int cap_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static int cap_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 {
 	return 0;
@@ -382,6 +392,16 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static char *cap_cred_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+
+static int cap_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred, char *ctx)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 }
@@ -485,11 +505,31 @@ static void cap_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = 0;
 }
 
+static char *cap_ipc_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+
+static int cap_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static int cap_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *cap_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+}
+
+static int cap_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx)
+{
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
 static void cap_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 }
@@ -801,6 +841,28 @@ static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+void ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+int ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx);
+static int cap_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note that all construction of kernel resources, credentials,
+	 * etc is already authorized per the caller's credentials.  This
+	 * hook is intended for the LSM to make further decisions about
+	 * a task not being allowed to restart at all, for instance if
+	 * the policy has changed since checkpoint.
+	 */
+	ckpt_snarf_lsm_info(ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return ckpt_write_dummy_lsm_info(ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
 			 unsigned long flags)
@@ -937,6 +999,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
 #endif
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_checkpoint);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_restore);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl);
@@ -949,6 +1013,8 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_checkpoint);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_restore);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
@@ -975,7 +1041,11 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_checkpoint);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_restore);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_checkpoint);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_restore);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_free_security);
@@ -1001,6 +1071,10 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, may_restart);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, checkpoint_header);
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dc7674f..7b9055c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -122,6 +122,11 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+char *security_get_lsm_name(void)
+{
+	return security_ops->name;
+}
+
 /* Security operations */
 
 int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
@@ -625,6 +630,16 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
 	return security_ops->file_alloc_security(file);
 }
 
+char *security_file_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return security_ops->file_checkpoint(security);
+}
+
+int security_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->file_restore(file, ctx);
+}
+
 void security_file_free(struct file *file)
 {
 	security_ops->file_free_security(file);
@@ -684,6 +699,16 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
 }
 
+char *security_cred_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return security_ops->cred_checkpoint(security);
+}
+
+int security_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred, char *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->cred_restore(file, cred, ctx);
+}
+
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 	security_ops->cred_free(cred);
@@ -819,11 +844,31 @@ void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 	security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid);
 }
 
+char *security_ipc_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return security_ops->ipc_checkpoint(security);
+}
+
+int security_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->ipc_restore(ipcp, ctx);
+}
+
 int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
 }
 
+char *security_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return security_ops->msg_msg_checkpoint(security);
+}
+
+int security_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->msg_msg_restore(msg, ctx);
+}
+
 void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	security_ops->msg_msg_free_security(msg);
@@ -959,6 +1004,20 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+int security_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->may_restart(ctx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_may_restart);
+
+int security_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return security_ops->checkpoint_header(ctx);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_checkpoint_header);
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other,
@@ -1244,3 +1303,68 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
 }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+
+#include <linux/checkpoint.h>
+
+/**
+ * security_checkpoint_obj - if first checkpoint of this void* security,
+ * then 1. ask the LSM for a string representing the context, 2. checkpoint
+ * that string
+ * @ctx: the checkpoint context
+ * @security: the void* security being checkpointed
+ * @sectype: indicates the type of object, because LSMs can (and do) store
+ * different types of data for different types of objects.
+ *
+ * Returns the objref of the checkpointed ckpt_stored_lsm representing the
+ * context, or -error on error.
+ *
+ * This is only used at checkpoint of course.
+ */
+int security_checkpoint_obj(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *security,
+				unsigned sectype)
+{
+	int strref;
+	struct ckpt_stored_lsm *l;
+	char *str;
+	int len;
+
+	switch (sectype) {
+	case CKPT_SECURITY_MSG_MSG:
+		str = security_msg_msg_checkpoint(security);
+		break;
+	case CKPT_SECURITY_IPC:
+		str = security_ipc_checkpoint(security);
+		break;
+	case CKPT_SECURITY_FILE:
+		str = security_file_checkpoint(security);
+		break;
+	case CKPT_SECURITY_CRED:
+		str = security_cred_checkpoint(security);
+		break;
+	default:
+		str = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		break;
+	}
+	/* str will be alloc'ed for us by the LSM.  We will free it when
+	 * we clear out our hashtable */
+	if (IS_ERR(str))
+		return PTR_ERR(str);
+
+	len = strlen(str);
+	l = kzalloc(sizeof(*l) + len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!l) {
+		kfree(str);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	kref_init(&l->kref);
+	l->sectype = sectype;
+	l->string = str;
+
+	strref = checkpoint_obj(ctx, l, CKPT_OBJ_SEC);
+	/* do we need to free l if strref was err? */
+	return strref;
+}
+
+#endif
-- 
1.6.1


--
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[PATCH 3/4] cr: add smack support to lsm c/r

[Serge E. Hallyn]

[ This patch is against branch ckpt-v17-dev of the checkpoint/restart
kernel tree at git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git/ ]

Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt begins:
"""
Application checkpoint/restart is the ability to save the state
of a running application so that it can later resume its execution
from the time at which it was checkpointed.
"""

[ Note - switching to not having to kmalloc/kfree for smack
labels is not yet addressed.  I want to first handle the
socket LSM label c/r, after which I'll be able to better
judge what makes sense and what doesn't. ]

This patch implements checkpoint and restore of Smack security
labels.  The rules are the same as in previous versions:

	1. when objects are created during restore() they are
	   automatically labeled with current_security().
	2. if there was a label checkpointed with the object,
	   and that label != current_security() (which is the
	   same as obj->security), then the object is relabeled
	   if the sys_restart() caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN.
	   Otherwise we return -EPERM.

This has been tested by checkpointing tasks under labels
_, vs1, and vs2, and restarting from tasks under _, vs1,
and vs2, with and without CAP_MAC_ADMIN in the bounding
set, and with and without the '-k' (keep_lsm) flag to mktree.
Expected results:

	#shell 1:
	echo vs1 > /proc/self/attr/current
	ckpt > out
	echo vs2 > /proc/self/attr/current
	mktree -F /cgroup/2 < out
		(frozen)
	# shell 2:
	cat /proc/`pidof ckpt`/attr/current
		vs2
	echo THAWED > /cgroup/2/freezer.state
	# shell 1:
	mktree -k -F /cgroup/2 < out
		(frozen)
	# shell 2:
	cat /proc/`pidof ckpt`/attr/current
		vs1
	echo THAWED > /cgroup/2/freezer.state
	# shell 1:
	capsh --drop=cap_mac_admin --
	mktree -k -F /cgroup/2 < out
		(permission denied)

There are testcases in git://git.sr71.net/~hallyn/cr_tests.git
under cr_tests/smack, which automate the above (and pass).

Changelog:
	sep 3: add a version to smack lsm, accessible through
		/smack/version  (Casey and Serge)
	sep 10: rename xyz_get_ctx() to xyz_checkpoint()

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 checkpoint/restart.c       |    1 +
 security/security.c        |    8 +++
 security/smack/smack.h     |    1 +
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/smack/smackfs.c   |   83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/checkpoint/restart.c b/checkpoint/restart.c
index 4703ff8..a498983 100644
--- a/checkpoint/restart.c
+++ b/checkpoint/restart.c
@@ -436,6 +436,7 @@ static int restore_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 		}
 		/* to be implemented later, per-lsm */
 		if (strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "lsm_none") != 0 &&
+				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "smack") != 0 &&
 				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "default") != 0) {
 			pr_warning("c/r: RESTART_KEEP_LSM unsupported for %s\n",
 					ctx->lsm_name);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7b9055c..dba57b0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1330,6 +1330,14 @@ int security_checkpoint_obj(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *security,
 	char *str;
 	int len;
 
+	/*
+	 * to simplify the LSM code, short-cut a null security
+	 * here - hopefully not actually needed; test without
+	 * this one day.
+	 */
+	if (!security)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	switch (sectype) {
 	case CKPT_SECURITY_MSG_MSG:
 		str = security_msg_msg_checkpoint(security);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 243bec1..b5c1ce6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
 extern char *smack_net_ambient;
 extern char *smack_onlycap;
+extern char *smack_version;
 extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
 
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0023182..1058de4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/udp.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
+#include <linux/checkpoint.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -892,6 +893,28 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *smack_file_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return kstrdup((char *)security, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static inline int smack_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx)
+{
+	char *newsmack = smk_import(ctx, 0);
+
+	if (newsmack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* I think by definition, file->f_security == current_security
+	 * right now, but let's assume somehow it might not be */
+	if (newsmack == file->f_security)
+		return 0;
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	file->f_security = newsmack;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
  * @file: the object
@@ -1079,6 +1102,27 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
  * Task hooks
  */
 
+static inline char *smack_cred_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return kstrdup((char *)security, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static inline int smack_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred,
+					char *ctx)
+{
+	char *newsmack = smk_import(ctx, 0);
+
+	if (newsmack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (newsmack == cred->security)
+		return 0;
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	cred->security = newsmack;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
  * @cred: the credentials in question
@@ -1742,6 +1786,26 @@ static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *smack_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return kstrdup((char *)security, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static inline int smack_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx)
+{
+	char *newsmack = smk_import(ctx, 0);
+
+	if (newsmack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (newsmack == msg->security)
+		return 0;
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	msg->security = newsmack;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
  * @msg: the object
@@ -2175,6 +2239,26 @@ static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
 }
 
+static inline char *smack_ipc_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return kstrdup((char *)security, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static inline int smack_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx)
+{
+	char *newsmack = smk_import(ctx, 0);
+
+	if (newsmack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (newsmack == ipcp->security)
+		return 0;
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	ipcp->security = newsmack;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
  * @opt_dentry: unused
@@ -3029,6 +3113,51 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+
+static int smack_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct ckpt_hdr *chp;
+	char *saved_version;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	chp = ckpt_read_buf_type(ctx, CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN, CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+	if (IS_ERR(chp))
+		return PTR_ERR(chp);
+
+	/*
+	 * After the checkpoint header comes the null terminated
+	 * Smack "policy" version. This will usually be the
+	 * floor label "_".
+	 */
+	saved_version = (char *)(chp + 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Of course, it is possible that a "policy" version mismatch
+	 * is not considered threatening.
+	 */
+	if (!(ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM))
+		goto skip;
+
+	if (strcmp(saved_version, smack_version) != 0) {
+		ckpt_debug("Smack version at checkpoint was"
+			   "\"%s\", now is \"%s\".\n",
+				saved_version, smack_version);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+skip:
+	ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, chp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int smack_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return ckpt_write_obj_type(ctx, smack_version,
+					strlen(smack_version) + 1,
+					CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+}
+#endif
+
 struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.name =				"smack",
 
@@ -3064,6 +3193,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.inode_getsecid =		smack_inode_getsecid,
 
 	.file_permission = 		smack_file_permission,
+	.file_checkpoint = 		smack_file_checkpoint,
+	.file_restore = 		smack_file_restore,
 	.file_alloc_security = 		smack_file_alloc_security,
 	.file_free_security = 		smack_file_free_security,
 	.file_ioctl = 			smack_file_ioctl,
@@ -3073,6 +3204,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
 	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,
 
+	.cred_checkpoint =		smack_cred_checkpoint,
+	.cred_restore =			smack_cred_restore,
 	.cred_free =			smack_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			smack_cred_prepare,
 	.cred_commit =			smack_cred_commit,
@@ -3094,8 +3227,12 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 
 	.ipc_permission = 		smack_ipc_permission,
 	.ipc_getsecid =			smack_ipc_getsecid,
+	.ipc_checkpoint =		smack_ipc_checkpoint,
+	.ipc_restore =			smack_ipc_restore,
 
 	.msg_msg_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_msg_alloc_security,
+	.msg_msg_checkpoint =		smack_msg_msg_checkpoint,
+	.msg_msg_restore =		smack_msg_msg_restore,
 	.msg_msg_free_security = 	smack_msg_msg_free_security,
 
 	.msg_queue_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_queue_alloc_security,
@@ -3155,6 +3292,10 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.secid_to_secctx = 		smack_secid_to_secctx,
 	.secctx_to_secid = 		smack_secctx_to_secid,
 	.release_secctx = 		smack_release_secctx,
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+	.may_restart =			smack_may_restart,
+	.checkpoint_header =		smack_checkpoint_header,
+#endif
 };
 
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index f83a809..0f0d5aa 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
 	SMK_NETLBLADDR	= 8,	/* single label hosts */
 	SMK_ONLYCAP	= 9,	/* the only "capable" label */
 	SMK_LOGGING	= 10,	/* logging */
+	SMK_VERSION	= 11,	/* logging */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_list_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_version_lock);
 
 /*
  * This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
@@ -60,6 +62,16 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
 char *smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
 
 /*
+ * This is the policy version. In the interest of simplicity the
+ * policy version is a string that meets all of the requirements
+ * of a Smack label. This is enforced by the expedient of
+ * importing it like a label. The policy version is thus always
+ * also a valid label on the system. This may prove useful under
+ * some as yet undiscovered circumstance.
+ */
+char *smack_version = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+
+/*
  * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
  * smack label is contained directly in the category set.
  * It can be reset via smackfs/direct
@@ -1255,6 +1267,75 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
 	.read		= smk_read_logging,
 	.write		= smk_write_logging,
 };
+
+#define SMK_VERSIONLEN 12
+/**
+ * smk_read_version - read() for /smack/version
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_version(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_version_lock);
+
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, smack_version,
+					strlen(smack_version) + 1);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_version_lock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_version - write() for /smack/version
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_version(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *smack;
+	char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= SMK_LABELLEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(in, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	smack = smk_import(in, count);
+	if (smack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_version_lock);
+	smack_version = smack;
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_version_lock);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_version_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_version,
+	.write		= smk_write_version,
+};
+
 /**
  * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
  * @sb: the empty superblock
@@ -1287,6 +1368,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 			{"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_LOGGING]	=
 			{"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_VERSION]	=
+			{"version", &smk_version_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		/* last one */ {""}
 	};
 
-- 
1.6.1

[PATCH 3/4] cr: add smack support to lsm c/r

[Serge E. Hallyn]

[ This patch is against branch ckpt-v17-dev of the checkpoint/restart
kernel tree at git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git/ ]

Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt begins:
"""
Application checkpoint/restart is the ability to save the state
of a running application so that it can later resume its execution
from the time at which it was checkpointed.
"""

[ Note - switching to not having to kmalloc/kfree for smack
labels is not yet addressed.  I want to first handle the
socket LSM label c/r, after which I'll be able to better
judge what makes sense and what doesn't. ]

This patch implements checkpoint and restore of Smack security
labels.  The rules are the same as in previous versions:

	1. when objects are created during restore() they are
	   automatically labeled with current_security().
	2. if there was a label checkpointed with the object,
	   and that label != current_security() (which is the
	   same as obj->security), then the object is relabeled
	   if the sys_restart() caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN.
	   Otherwise we return -EPERM.

This has been tested by checkpointing tasks under labels
_, vs1, and vs2, and restarting from tasks under _, vs1,
and vs2, with and without CAP_MAC_ADMIN in the bounding
set, and with and without the '-k' (keep_lsm) flag to mktree.
Expected results:

	#shell 1:
	echo vs1 > /proc/self/attr/current
	ckpt > out
	echo vs2 > /proc/self/attr/current
	mktree -F /cgroup/2 < out
		(frozen)
	# shell 2:
	cat /proc/`pidof ckpt`/attr/current
		vs2
	echo THAWED > /cgroup/2/freezer.state
	# shell 1:
	mktree -k -F /cgroup/2 < out
		(frozen)
	# shell 2:
	cat /proc/`pidof ckpt`/attr/current
		vs1
	echo THAWED > /cgroup/2/freezer.state
	# shell 1:
	capsh --drop=cap_mac_admin --
	mktree -k -F /cgroup/2 < out
		(permission denied)

There are testcases in git://git.sr71.net/~hallyn/cr_tests.git
under cr_tests/smack, which automate the above (and pass).

Changelog:
	sep 3: add a version to smack lsm, accessible through
		/smack/version  (Casey and Serge)
	sep 10: rename xyz_get_ctx() to xyz_checkpoint()

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 checkpoint/restart.c       |    1 +
 security/security.c        |    8 +++
 security/smack/smack.h     |    1 +
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |  141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/smack/smackfs.c   |   83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/checkpoint/restart.c b/checkpoint/restart.c
index 4703ff8..a498983 100644
--- a/checkpoint/restart.c
+++ b/checkpoint/restart.c
@@ -436,6 +436,7 @@ static int restore_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 		}
 		/* to be implemented later, per-lsm */
 		if (strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "lsm_none") != 0 &&
+				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "smack") != 0 &&
 				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "default") != 0) {
 			pr_warning("c/r: RESTART_KEEP_LSM unsupported for %s\n",
 					ctx->lsm_name);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7b9055c..dba57b0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1330,6 +1330,14 @@ int security_checkpoint_obj(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *security,
 	char *str;
 	int len;
 
+	/*
+	 * to simplify the LSM code, short-cut a null security
+	 * here - hopefully not actually needed; test without
+	 * this one day.
+	 */
+	if (!security)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	switch (sectype) {
 	case CKPT_SECURITY_MSG_MSG:
 		str = security_msg_msg_checkpoint(security);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 243bec1..b5c1ce6 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
 extern char *smack_net_ambient;
 extern char *smack_onlycap;
+extern char *smack_version;
 extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
 
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0023182..1058de4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/udp.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
+#include <linux/checkpoint.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -892,6 +893,28 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *smack_file_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return kstrdup((char *)security, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static inline int smack_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx)
+{
+	char *newsmack = smk_import(ctx, 0);
+
+	if (newsmack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/* I think by definition, file->f_security == current_security
+	 * right now, but let's assume somehow it might not be */
+	if (newsmack == file->f_security)
+		return 0;
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	file->f_security = newsmack;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
  * @file: the object
@@ -1079,6 +1102,27 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
  * Task hooks
  */
 
+static inline char *smack_cred_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return kstrdup((char *)security, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static inline int smack_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred,
+					char *ctx)
+{
+	char *newsmack = smk_import(ctx, 0);
+
+	if (newsmack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (newsmack == cred->security)
+		return 0;
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	cred->security = newsmack;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
  * @cred: the credentials in question
@@ -1742,6 +1786,26 @@ static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline char *smack_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return kstrdup((char *)security, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static inline int smack_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx)
+{
+	char *newsmack = smk_import(ctx, 0);
+
+	if (newsmack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (newsmack == msg->security)
+		return 0;
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	msg->security = newsmack;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
  * @msg: the object
@@ -2175,6 +2239,26 @@ static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
 }
 
+static inline char *smack_ipc_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	return kstrdup((char *)security, GFP_KERNEL);
+}
+
+static inline int smack_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx)
+{
+	char *newsmack = smk_import(ctx, 0);
+
+	if (newsmack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (newsmack == ipcp->security)
+		return 0;
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	ipcp->security = newsmack;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
  * @opt_dentry: unused
@@ -3029,6 +3113,51 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+
+static int smack_may_restart(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct ckpt_hdr *chp;
+	char *saved_version;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	chp = ckpt_read_buf_type(ctx, CKPT_LSM_INFO_LEN, CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+	if (IS_ERR(chp))
+		return PTR_ERR(chp);
+
+	/*
+	 * After the checkpoint header comes the null terminated
+	 * Smack "policy" version. This will usually be the
+	 * floor label "_".
+	 */
+	saved_version = (char *)(chp + 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Of course, it is possible that a "policy" version mismatch
+	 * is not considered threatening.
+	 */
+	if (!(ctx->uflags & RESTART_KEEP_LSM))
+		goto skip;
+
+	if (strcmp(saved_version, smack_version) != 0) {
+		ckpt_debug("Smack version at checkpoint was"
+			   "\"%s\", now is \"%s\".\n",
+				saved_version, smack_version);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+	}
+skip:
+	ckpt_hdr_put(ctx, chp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int smack_checkpoint_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return ckpt_write_obj_type(ctx, smack_version,
+					strlen(smack_version) + 1,
+					CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+}
+#endif
+
 struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.name =				"smack",
 
@@ -3064,6 +3193,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.inode_getsecid =		smack_inode_getsecid,
 
 	.file_permission = 		smack_file_permission,
+	.file_checkpoint = 		smack_file_checkpoint,
+	.file_restore = 		smack_file_restore,
 	.file_alloc_security = 		smack_file_alloc_security,
 	.file_free_security = 		smack_file_free_security,
 	.file_ioctl = 			smack_file_ioctl,
@@ -3073,6 +3204,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
 	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,
 
+	.cred_checkpoint =		smack_cred_checkpoint,
+	.cred_restore =			smack_cred_restore,
 	.cred_free =			smack_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			smack_cred_prepare,
 	.cred_commit =			smack_cred_commit,
@@ -3094,8 +3227,12 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 
 	.ipc_permission = 		smack_ipc_permission,
 	.ipc_getsecid =			smack_ipc_getsecid,
+	.ipc_checkpoint =		smack_ipc_checkpoint,
+	.ipc_restore =			smack_ipc_restore,
 
 	.msg_msg_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_msg_alloc_security,
+	.msg_msg_checkpoint =		smack_msg_msg_checkpoint,
+	.msg_msg_restore =		smack_msg_msg_restore,
 	.msg_msg_free_security = 	smack_msg_msg_free_security,
 
 	.msg_queue_alloc_security = 	smack_msg_queue_alloc_security,
@@ -3155,6 +3292,10 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.secid_to_secctx = 		smack_secid_to_secctx,
 	.secctx_to_secid = 		smack_secctx_to_secid,
 	.release_secctx = 		smack_release_secctx,
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT
+	.may_restart =			smack_may_restart,
+	.checkpoint_header =		smack_checkpoint_header,
+#endif
 };
 
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index f83a809..0f0d5aa 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
 	SMK_NETLBLADDR	= 8,	/* single label hosts */
 	SMK_ONLYCAP	= 9,	/* the only "capable" label */
 	SMK_LOGGING	= 10,	/* logging */
+	SMK_VERSION	= 11,	/* logging */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_list_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_version_lock);
 
 /*
  * This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
@@ -60,6 +62,16 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
 char *smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
 
 /*
+ * This is the policy version. In the interest of simplicity the
+ * policy version is a string that meets all of the requirements
+ * of a Smack label. This is enforced by the expedient of
+ * importing it like a label. The policy version is thus always
+ * also a valid label on the system. This may prove useful under
+ * some as yet undiscovered circumstance.
+ */
+char *smack_version = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+
+/*
  * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
  * smack label is contained directly in the category set.
  * It can be reset via smackfs/direct
@@ -1255,6 +1267,75 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
 	.read		= smk_read_logging,
 	.write		= smk_write_logging,
 };
+
+#define SMK_VERSIONLEN 12
+/**
+ * smk_read_version - read() for /smack/version
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_version(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_version_lock);
+
+	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, smack_version,
+					strlen(smack_version) + 1);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_version_lock);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_version - write() for /smack/version
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_version(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	char *smack;
+	char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
+
+	if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (count >= SMK_LABELLEN)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(in, buf, count) != 0)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	smack = smk_import(in, count);
+	if (smack == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_version_lock);
+	smack_version = smack;
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_version_lock);
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_version_ops = {
+	.read		= smk_read_version,
+	.write		= smk_write_version,
+};
+
 /**
  * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
  * @sb: the empty superblock
@@ -1287,6 +1368,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 			{"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		[SMK_LOGGING]	=
 			{"logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+		[SMK_VERSION]	=
+			{"version", &smk_version_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
 		/* last one */ {""}
 	};
 
-- 
1.6.1


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[PATCH 4/4] cr: add selinux support

[Serge E. Hallyn]

[ This patch is against branch ckpt-v17-dev of the checkpoint/restart
kernel tree at git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git/ ]

Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt begins:
"""
Application checkpoint/restart is the ability to save the state
of a running application so that it can later resume its execution
from the time at which it was checkpointed.
"""

This patch adds the ability to checkpoint and restore selinux
contexts for tasks, open files, and sysvipc objects.  Contexts
are checkpointed as strings.  For tasks and files, where a security
struct actually points to several contexts, all contexts are
written out in one string, separated by ':::'.

The default behaviors are to checkpoint contexts, but not to
restore them.  To attempt to restore them, sys_restart() must
be given the RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag.  If this is given then
the caller of sys_restart() must have the new 'restore' permission
to the target objclass, or for instance PROCESS__SETFSCREATE to
itself to specify a create_sid.

A corresponding simple refpolicy patch is needed.  I'm also working
on a little testsuite to add to git://git.sr71.net/~hallyn/cr_tests.git,
which should test the restoration with and without permission of the
various sids.  (more general rhel5.4 refpolicy problems are standing
in the way)   For now I've tested simply by creating checkpoint
images using cr_tests/simple/ckpt > out from both staff_t and
sysyadm_t, and doing

	shell 1:
	mktree -F /freezer/1 < out
	shell 2:
	cat /proc/`pidof ckpt`/attr/current
		(same as context of shell 1)
	echo THAWED > /freezer/1/freezer.state

	shell 1:
	mktree -k -F /freezer/1 < out
		(fails if enforcing and not permitted to restore
		the original labels)
	shell 2:
	cat /proc/`pidof ckpt`/attr/current
		(same as context of the shell which had done the
		original ckpt)
	echo THAWED > /freezer/1/freezer.state

Mktree comes from git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/user-cr.git,
This patch applies against the checkpoint/restart-enabled kernel
tree at git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git/.

Changelog:
	sep 10: (Most addressing suggestions by Stephen Smalley)
		1. change xyz_get_ctx() to xyz_checkpoint().
		2. check entrypoint permission on cred_restore
		3. always dec context length by 1
		4. don't allow SECSID_NULL when that's not valid
		5. when SECSID_NULL is valid, restore it
		6. c/r task->osid
		7. Just print nothing instead of 'null' for SECSID_NULL
		8. sids are __u32, as are lenghts passed to sid_to_context.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 checkpoint/restart.c                         |    1 +
 security/selinux/hooks.c                     |  383 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |    4 +
 security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h    |    4 +
 4 files changed, 392 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/checkpoint/restart.c b/checkpoint/restart.c
index a498983..3c248c4 100644
--- a/checkpoint/restart.c
+++ b/checkpoint/restart.c
@@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ static int restore_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 		/* to be implemented later, per-lsm */
 		if (strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "lsm_none") != 0 &&
 				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "smack") != 0 &&
+				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "selinux") != 0 &&
 				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "default") != 0) {
 			pr_warning("c/r: RESTART_KEEP_LSM unsupported for %s\n",
 					ctx->lsm_name);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 15c2a08..f9d24e7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
 #include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
+#include <linux/checkpoint.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
@@ -2960,6 +2961,112 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
 }
 
+/*
+ * for file context, we print both the fsec->sid and fsec->fown_sid
+ * as string representations, separated by ':::'
+ * We don't touch isid - if you wanted that set you shoulda set up the
+ * fs correctly.
+ */
+static inline char *selinux_file_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = security;
+	char *s1 = NULL, *s2 = NULL, *sfull;
+	__u32 len1, len2, lenfull;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (fsec->sid == 0 || fsec->fown_sid == 0) {
+		ckpt_debug("invalid NULL sid\n");
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(fsec->sid, &s1, &len1);
+	if (ret)
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	len1--;
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(fsec->fown_sid, &s2, &len2);
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(s1);
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
+	len2--;
+	lenfull = len1+len2+3;
+	sfull = kmalloc(lenfull+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sfull) {
+		sfull = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	sfull[lenfull] = '\0';
+	sprintf(sfull, "%s:::%s", s1, s2);
+
+out:
+	kfree(s1);
+	kfree(s2);
+	ckpt_debug("returning %s\n", IS_ERR(sfull) ? "error" : sfull);
+	return sfull;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx)
+{
+	char *s1, *s2;
+	__u32 sid1 = 0, sid2 = 0;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+
+	/*
+	 * Objhash made sure the string is null-terminated.
+	 * We make a copy so we can mangle it.
+	 */
+	s1 = kstrdup(ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!s1)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	s2 = strstr(s1, ":::");
+	if (!s2)
+		goto out;
+
+	*s2 = '\0';
+	s2 += 3;
+	if (*s2 == '\0')
+		goto out;
+
+	/* SECSID_NULL is not valid for file sids */
+	if (strlen(s1) == 0 || strlen(s2) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = security_context_to_sid(s1, strlen(s1), &sid1);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+	ret = security_context_to_sid(s2, strlen(s2), &sid2);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (sid1 && fsec->sid != sid1) {
+		ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid1, SECCLASS_FILE,
+					FILE__RESTORE, NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+		fsec->sid = sid1;
+	}
+
+#if 0
+	/* The following must wait - bc we don't yet support
+	 * c/r of fowners. */
+	if (sid2 && fsec->fown_sid != sid2) {
+		ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid2, SECCLASS_FILE,
+				FILE__FOWN_RESTORE, NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+	       fsec->fown_sid = sid2;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	kfree(s1);
+	ckpt_debug("returning %d for context %s\n", ret, ctx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 {
 	return file_alloc_security(file);
@@ -3206,6 +3313,189 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
 }
 
+#define NUMTASKSIDS 6
+/*
+ * for cred context, we print:
+ *   osid, sid, exec_sid, create_sid, keycreate_sid, sockcreate_sid;
+ * as string representations, separated by ':::'
+ */
+static inline char *selinux_cred_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = security;
+	char *stmp, *sfull = NULL;
+	__u32 slen, runlen;
+	int i, ret;
+	__u32 sids[NUMTASKSIDS] = { tsec->osid, tsec->sid, tsec->exec_sid,
+		tsec->create_sid, tsec->keycreate_sid, tsec->sockcreate_sid };
+
+	if (sids[0] == 0 || sids[1] == 0) {
+		/* SECSID_NULL is not valid for osid or sid */
+		ckpt_debug("invalid NULL for sid or osid\n");
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(sids[0], &sfull, &runlen);
+	if (ret)
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	runlen--;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < NUMTASKSIDS; i++) {
+		if (sids[i] == 0) {
+			stmp = NULL;
+			slen = 0;
+		} else {
+			ret = security_sid_to_context(sids[i], &stmp, &slen);
+			if (ret) {
+				kfree(sfull);
+				return ERR_PTR(ret);
+			}
+			slen--;
+		}
+		/* slen + runlen + ':::' + \0 */
+		if (slen) {
+			sfull = krealloc(sfull, slen + runlen + 3 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!sfull) {
+				kfree(stmp);
+				return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+			}
+		}
+		sprintf(sfull+runlen, ":::%s", stmp ? stmp : "");
+		runlen += slen + 3;
+		kfree(stmp);
+	}
+
+	ckpt_debug("returning %s\n", IS_ERR(sfull) ? "error" : sfull);
+	return sfull;
+}
+
+static inline int credrestore_nullvalid(int which)
+{
+	int valid_array[NUMTASKSIDS] = {
+		0, /* task osid */
+		0, /* task sid */
+		1, /* exec sid */
+		1, /* create sid */
+		1, /* keycreate_sid */
+		1, /* sockcreate_sid */
+	};
+
+	return valid_array[which];
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred,
+					char *ctx)
+{
+	char *s, *s1, *s2 = NULL;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+	int i;
+	__u32 sids[NUMTASKSIDS];
+	struct inode *ctx_inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+
+	/*
+	 * objhash made sure the string is null-terminated
+	 * now we want our own copy so we can chop it up with \0's
+	 */
+	s = kstrdup(ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	s1 = s;
+	for (i = 0; i < NUMTASKSIDS; i++) {
+		if (i < NUMTASKSIDS-1) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			s2 = strstr(s1, ":::");
+			if (!s2)
+				goto out;
+			*s2 = '\0';
+			s2 += 3;
+		}
+		if (strlen(s1) == 0) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			if (credrestore_nullvalid(i))
+				sids[i] = 0;
+			else
+				goto out;
+		} else {
+			ret = security_context_to_sid(s1, strlen(s1), &sids[i]);
+			if (ret)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		ckpt_debug("got sid %d ret %d for ctx %s (%d)\n",
+			sids[i], ret, s1, i);
+		s1 = s2;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that these transitions are allowed, and effect them.
+	 * XXX: Do these checks suffice?
+	 */
+	if (tsec->osid != sids[0]) {
+		/*
+		 * Are any security decisions made based on osid?
+		 * Is it worth adding a PROCESS_RESTORE_OSID permission
+		 * for this?
+		 */
+		 tsec->osid = sids[0];
+	}
+
+	if (tsec->sid != sids[1]) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+		ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sids[1], SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					PROCESS__RESTORE, NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+		/* check whether checkpoint file type is a valid entry
+		 * point to the new domain:  we may want a specific
+		 * 'restore_entrypoint' permission for this, but let's
+		 * see if just entrypoint is deemed sufficient
+		 */
+
+		isec = ctx_inode->i_security;
+		ret = avc_has_perm(sids[1], isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE,
+				FILE__ENTRYPOINT, NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+		/* TODO: do we need to check for shared state? */
+		tsec->sid = sids[1];
+	}
+
+	ret = -EPERM;
+	if (sids[2] != tsec->exec_sid) {
+		if (!current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETEXEC))
+			goto out;
+		tsec->exec_sid = sids[2];
+	}
+
+	if (sids[3] != tsec->create_sid) {
+		if (!current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE))
+			goto out;
+		tsec->create_sid = sids[3];
+	}
+
+	if (tsec->keycreate_sid != sids[4]) {
+		if (!current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE))
+			goto out;
+		if (!may_create_key(sids[4], current))
+			goto out;
+		tsec->keycreate_sid = sids[4];
+	}
+
+	if (tsec->sockcreate_sid != sids[5]) {
+		if (!current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE))
+			goto out;
+		tsec->sockcreate_sid = sids[5];
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	ckpt_debug("returning %d (for context %s)\n", ret, ctx);
+	kfree(s);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
 /*
  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
  */
@@ -4645,6 +4935,47 @@ static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
 	kfree(isec);
 }
 
+static inline char *selinux_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec = security;
+	char *s;
+	__u32 len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (msec->sid == 0) {
+		ckpt_debug("invalid SECSID_NULL\n");
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(msec->sid, &s, &len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	return s;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx)
+{
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
+	int ret;
+	__u32 sid = 0;
+
+	ret = security_context_to_sid(ctx, strlen(ctx), &sid);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (msec->sid == sid)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
+				MSG__RESTORE, NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	msec->sid = sid;
+	ckpt_debug("returning success, set msg sid to %d\n", sid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
@@ -5048,6 +5379,50 @@ static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = isec->sid;
 }
 
+static inline char *selinux_ipc_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = security;
+	char *s;
+	__u32 len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (isec->sid == 0) {
+		ckpt_debug("invalid SECSID_NULL\n");
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &s, &len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	return s;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+	int ret;
+	__u32 sid = 0;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	ret = security_context_to_sid(ctx, strlen(ctx), &sid);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (isec->sid == sid)
+		return 0;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.u.ipc_id = ipcp->key;
+	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid, SECCLASS_IPC,
+				IPC__RESTORE, &ad);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	isec->sid = sid;
+	ckpt_debug("returning success, set ipc perm sid to %d\n", sid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 {
 	if (inode)
@@ -5369,6 +5744,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inode_getsecid =		selinux_inode_getsecid,
 
 	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
+	.file_checkpoint =		selinux_file_checkpoint,
+	.file_restore =			selinux_file_restore,
 	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,
 	.file_free_security =		selinux_file_free_security,
 	.file_ioctl =			selinux_file_ioctl,
@@ -5383,6 +5760,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.dentry_open =			selinux_dentry_open,
 
 	.task_create =			selinux_task_create,
+	.cred_checkpoint =		selinux_cred_checkpoint,
+	.cred_restore =			selinux_cred_restore,
 	.cred_free =			selinux_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			selinux_cred_prepare,
 	.kernel_act_as =		selinux_kernel_act_as,
@@ -5404,8 +5783,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 
 	.ipc_permission =		selinux_ipc_permission,
 	.ipc_getsecid =			selinux_ipc_getsecid,
+	.ipc_checkpoint =		selinux_ipc_checkpoint,
+	.ipc_restore =			selinux_ipc_restore,
 
 	.msg_msg_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
+	.msg_msg_checkpoint =		selinux_msg_msg_checkpoint,
+	.msg_msg_restore =		selinux_msg_msg_restore,
 	.msg_msg_free_security =	selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
 
 	.msg_queue_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 31df1d7..78945e7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
    S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
    S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__OPEN, "open")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__RESTORE, "restore")
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans")
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
@@ -88,9 +89,11 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, "execheap")
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, "setkeycreate")
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, "setsockcreate")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RESTORE, "restore")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, "enqueue")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, "send")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, "receive")
+   S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RESTORE, "restore")
    S_(SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__LOCK, "lock")
    S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, "compute_av")
    S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE, "compute_create")
@@ -107,6 +110,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, "syslog_read")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, "syslog_mod")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, "syslog_console")
+   S_(SECCLASS_IPC, IPC__RESTORE, "restore")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__CHOWN, "chown")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE, "dac_override")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH, "dac_read_search")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index d645192..8e066ac 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
 #define FILE__ENTRYPOINT                          0x00040000UL
 #define FILE__EXECMOD                             0x00080000UL
 #define FILE__OPEN                                0x00100000UL
+#define FILE__RESTORE                             0x00200000UL
 #define LNK_FILE__IOCTL                           0x00000001UL
 #define LNK_FILE__READ                            0x00000002UL
 #define LNK_FILE__WRITE                           0x00000004UL
@@ -453,6 +454,7 @@
 #define PROCESS__EXECHEAP                         0x08000000UL
 #define PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE                     0x10000000UL
 #define PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE                    0x20000000UL
+#define PROCESS__RESTORE	                  0x40000000UL
 #define IPC__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
 #define IPC__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
 #define IPC__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
@@ -462,6 +464,7 @@
 #define IPC__ASSOCIATE                            0x00000040UL
 #define IPC__UNIX_READ                            0x00000080UL
 #define IPC__UNIX_WRITE                           0x00000100UL
+#define IPC__RESTORE                              0x00000200UL
 #define SEM__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
 #define SEM__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
 #define SEM__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
@@ -483,6 +486,7 @@
 #define MSGQ__ENQUEUE                             0x00000200UL
 #define MSG__SEND                                 0x00000001UL
 #define MSG__RECEIVE                              0x00000002UL
+#define MSG__RESTORE                              0x00000004UL
 #define SHM__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
 #define SHM__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
 #define SHM__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
-- 
1.6.1

[PATCH 4/4] cr: add selinux support

[Serge E. Hallyn]

[ This patch is against branch ckpt-v17-dev of the checkpoint/restart
kernel tree at git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git/ ]

Documentation/checkpoint/readme.txt begins:
"""
Application checkpoint/restart is the ability to save the state
of a running application so that it can later resume its execution
from the time at which it was checkpointed.
"""

This patch adds the ability to checkpoint and restore selinux
contexts for tasks, open files, and sysvipc objects.  Contexts
are checkpointed as strings.  For tasks and files, where a security
struct actually points to several contexts, all contexts are
written out in one string, separated by ':::'.

The default behaviors are to checkpoint contexts, but not to
restore them.  To attempt to restore them, sys_restart() must
be given the RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag.  If this is given then
the caller of sys_restart() must have the new 'restore' permission
to the target objclass, or for instance PROCESS__SETFSCREATE to
itself to specify a create_sid.

A corresponding simple refpolicy patch is needed.  I'm also working
on a little testsuite to add to git://git.sr71.net/~hallyn/cr_tests.git,
which should test the restoration with and without permission of the
various sids.  (more general rhel5.4 refpolicy problems are standing
in the way)   For now I've tested simply by creating checkpoint
images using cr_tests/simple/ckpt > out from both staff_t and
sysyadm_t, and doing

	shell 1:
	mktree -F /freezer/1 < out
	shell 2:
	cat /proc/`pidof ckpt`/attr/current
		(same as context of shell 1)
	echo THAWED > /freezer/1/freezer.state

	shell 1:
	mktree -k -F /freezer/1 < out
		(fails if enforcing and not permitted to restore
		the original labels)
	shell 2:
	cat /proc/`pidof ckpt`/attr/current
		(same as context of the shell which had done the
		original ckpt)
	echo THAWED > /freezer/1/freezer.state

Mktree comes from git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/user-cr.git,
This patch applies against the checkpoint/restart-enabled kernel
tree at git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/linux-cr.git/.

Changelog:
	sep 10: (Most addressing suggestions by Stephen Smalley)
		1. change xyz_get_ctx() to xyz_checkpoint().
		2. check entrypoint permission on cred_restore
		3. always dec context length by 1
		4. don't allow SECSID_NULL when that's not valid
		5. when SECSID_NULL is valid, restore it
		6. c/r task->osid
		7. Just print nothing instead of 'null' for SECSID_NULL
		8. sids are __u32, as are lenghts passed to sid_to_context.

Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 checkpoint/restart.c                         |    1 +
 security/selinux/hooks.c                     |  383 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h |    4 +
 security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h    |    4 +
 4 files changed, 392 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/checkpoint/restart.c b/checkpoint/restart.c
index a498983..3c248c4 100644
--- a/checkpoint/restart.c
+++ b/checkpoint/restart.c
@@ -437,6 +437,7 @@ static int restore_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 		/* to be implemented later, per-lsm */
 		if (strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "lsm_none") != 0 &&
 				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "smack") != 0 &&
+				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "selinux") != 0 &&
 				strcmp(ctx->lsm_name, "default") != 0) {
 			pr_warning("c/r: RESTART_KEEP_LSM unsupported for %s\n",
 					ctx->lsm_name);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 15c2a08..f9d24e7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
 #include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
+#include <linux/checkpoint.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
@@ -2960,6 +2961,112 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 	return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
 }
 
+/*
+ * for file context, we print both the fsec->sid and fsec->fown_sid
+ * as string representations, separated by ':::'
+ * We don't touch isid - if you wanted that set you shoulda set up the
+ * fs correctly.
+ */
+static inline char *selinux_file_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = security;
+	char *s1 = NULL, *s2 = NULL, *sfull;
+	__u32 len1, len2, lenfull;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (fsec->sid == 0 || fsec->fown_sid == 0) {
+		ckpt_debug("invalid NULL sid\n");
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(fsec->sid, &s1, &len1);
+	if (ret)
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	len1--;
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(fsec->fown_sid, &s2, &len2);
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(s1);
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	}
+	len2--;
+	lenfull = len1+len2+3;
+	sfull = kmalloc(lenfull+1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sfull) {
+		sfull = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	sfull[lenfull] = '\0';
+	sprintf(sfull, "%s:::%s", s1, s2);
+
+out:
+	kfree(s1);
+	kfree(s2);
+	ckpt_debug("returning %s\n", IS_ERR(sfull) ? "error" : sfull);
+	return sfull;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_file_restore(struct file *file, char *ctx)
+{
+	char *s1, *s2;
+	__u32 sid1 = 0, sid2 = 0;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+
+	/*
+	 * Objhash made sure the string is null-terminated.
+	 * We make a copy so we can mangle it.
+	 */
+	s1 = kstrdup(ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!s1)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	s2 = strstr(s1, ":::");
+	if (!s2)
+		goto out;
+
+	*s2 = '\0';
+	s2 += 3;
+	if (*s2 == '\0')
+		goto out;
+
+	/* SECSID_NULL is not valid for file sids */
+	if (strlen(s1) == 0 || strlen(s2) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = security_context_to_sid(s1, strlen(s1), &sid1);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+	ret = security_context_to_sid(s2, strlen(s2), &sid2);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (sid1 && fsec->sid != sid1) {
+		ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid1, SECCLASS_FILE,
+					FILE__RESTORE, NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+		fsec->sid = sid1;
+	}
+
+#if 0
+	/* The following must wait - bc we don't yet support
+	 * c/r of fowners. */
+	if (sid2 && fsec->fown_sid != sid2) {
+		ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid2, SECCLASS_FILE,
+				FILE__FOWN_RESTORE, NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+	       fsec->fown_sid = sid2;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	kfree(s1);
+	ckpt_debug("returning %d for context %s\n", ret, ctx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 {
 	return file_alloc_security(file);
@@ -3206,6 +3313,189 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 	return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
 }
 
+#define NUMTASKSIDS 6
+/*
+ * for cred context, we print:
+ *   osid, sid, exec_sid, create_sid, keycreate_sid, sockcreate_sid;
+ * as string representations, separated by ':::'
+ */
+static inline char *selinux_cred_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = security;
+	char *stmp, *sfull = NULL;
+	__u32 slen, runlen;
+	int i, ret;
+	__u32 sids[NUMTASKSIDS] = { tsec->osid, tsec->sid, tsec->exec_sid,
+		tsec->create_sid, tsec->keycreate_sid, tsec->sockcreate_sid };
+
+	if (sids[0] == 0 || sids[1] == 0) {
+		/* SECSID_NULL is not valid for osid or sid */
+		ckpt_debug("invalid NULL for sid or osid\n");
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(sids[0], &sfull, &runlen);
+	if (ret)
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	runlen--;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < NUMTASKSIDS; i++) {
+		if (sids[i] == 0) {
+			stmp = NULL;
+			slen = 0;
+		} else {
+			ret = security_sid_to_context(sids[i], &stmp, &slen);
+			if (ret) {
+				kfree(sfull);
+				return ERR_PTR(ret);
+			}
+			slen--;
+		}
+		/* slen + runlen + ':::' + \0 */
+		if (slen) {
+			sfull = krealloc(sfull, slen + runlen + 3 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!sfull) {
+				kfree(stmp);
+				return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+			}
+		}
+		sprintf(sfull+runlen, ":::%s", stmp ? stmp : "");
+		runlen += slen + 3;
+		kfree(stmp);
+	}
+
+	ckpt_debug("returning %s\n", IS_ERR(sfull) ? "error" : sfull);
+	return sfull;
+}
+
+static inline int credrestore_nullvalid(int which)
+{
+	int valid_array[NUMTASKSIDS] = {
+		0, /* task osid */
+		0, /* task sid */
+		1, /* exec sid */
+		1, /* create sid */
+		1, /* keycreate_sid */
+		1, /* sockcreate_sid */
+	};
+
+	return valid_array[which];
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_cred_restore(struct file *file, struct cred *cred,
+					char *ctx)
+{
+	char *s, *s1, *s2 = NULL;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+	int i;
+	__u32 sids[NUMTASKSIDS];
+	struct inode *ctx_inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+
+	/*
+	 * objhash made sure the string is null-terminated
+	 * now we want our own copy so we can chop it up with \0's
+	 */
+	s = kstrdup(ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	s1 = s;
+	for (i = 0; i < NUMTASKSIDS; i++) {
+		if (i < NUMTASKSIDS-1) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			s2 = strstr(s1, ":::");
+			if (!s2)
+				goto out;
+			*s2 = '\0';
+			s2 += 3;
+		}
+		if (strlen(s1) == 0) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			if (credrestore_nullvalid(i))
+				sids[i] = 0;
+			else
+				goto out;
+		} else {
+			ret = security_context_to_sid(s1, strlen(s1), &sids[i]);
+			if (ret)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		ckpt_debug("got sid %d ret %d for ctx %s (%d)\n",
+			sids[i], ret, s1, i);
+		s1 = s2;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that these transitions are allowed, and effect them.
+	 * XXX: Do these checks suffice?
+	 */
+	if (tsec->osid != sids[0]) {
+		/*
+		 * Are any security decisions made based on osid?
+		 * Is it worth adding a PROCESS_RESTORE_OSID permission
+		 * for this?
+		 */
+		 tsec->osid = sids[0];
+	}
+
+	if (tsec->sid != sids[1]) {
+		struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+		ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sids[1], SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+					PROCESS__RESTORE, NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+		/* check whether checkpoint file type is a valid entry
+		 * point to the new domain:  we may want a specific
+		 * 'restore_entrypoint' permission for this, but let's
+		 * see if just entrypoint is deemed sufficient
+		 */
+
+		isec = ctx_inode->i_security;
+		ret = avc_has_perm(sids[1], isec->sid, SECCLASS_FILE,
+				FILE__ENTRYPOINT, NULL);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+		/* TODO: do we need to check for shared state? */
+		tsec->sid = sids[1];
+	}
+
+	ret = -EPERM;
+	if (sids[2] != tsec->exec_sid) {
+		if (!current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETEXEC))
+			goto out;
+		tsec->exec_sid = sids[2];
+	}
+
+	if (sids[3] != tsec->create_sid) {
+		if (!current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE))
+			goto out;
+		tsec->create_sid = sids[3];
+	}
+
+	if (tsec->keycreate_sid != sids[4]) {
+		if (!current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE))
+			goto out;
+		if (!may_create_key(sids[4], current))
+			goto out;
+		tsec->keycreate_sid = sids[4];
+	}
+
+	if (tsec->sockcreate_sid != sids[5]) {
+		if (!current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE))
+			goto out;
+		tsec->sockcreate_sid = sids[5];
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	ckpt_debug("returning %d (for context %s)\n", ret, ctx);
+	kfree(s);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
 /*
  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
  */
@@ -4645,6 +4935,47 @@ static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
 	kfree(isec);
 }
 
+static inline char *selinux_msg_msg_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec = security;
+	char *s;
+	__u32 len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (msec->sid == 0) {
+		ckpt_debug("invalid SECSID_NULL\n");
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(msec->sid, &s, &len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	return s;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_msg_msg_restore(struct msg_msg *msg, char *ctx)
+{
+	struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
+	int ret;
+	__u32 sid = 0;
+
+	ret = security_context_to_sid(ctx, strlen(ctx), &sid);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (msec->sid == sid)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
+				MSG__RESTORE, NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	msec->sid = sid;
+	ckpt_debug("returning success, set msg sid to %d\n", sid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
 	struct msg_security_struct *msec;
@@ -5048,6 +5379,50 @@ static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
 	*secid = isec->sid;
 }
 
+static inline char *selinux_ipc_checkpoint(void *security)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = security;
+	char *s;
+	__u32 len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (isec->sid == 0) {
+		ckpt_debug("invalid SECSID_NULL\n");
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &s, &len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	return s;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_ipc_restore(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, char *ctx)
+{
+	struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+	int ret;
+	__u32 sid = 0;
+	struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+	ret = security_context_to_sid(ctx, strlen(ctx), &sid);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (isec->sid == sid)
+		return 0;
+
+	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+	ad.u.ipc_id = ipcp->key;
+	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sid, SECCLASS_IPC,
+				IPC__RESTORE, &ad);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	isec->sid = sid;
+	ckpt_debug("returning success, set ipc perm sid to %d\n", sid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
 {
 	if (inode)
@@ -5369,6 +5744,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.inode_getsecid =		selinux_inode_getsecid,
 
 	.file_permission =		selinux_file_permission,
+	.file_checkpoint =		selinux_file_checkpoint,
+	.file_restore =			selinux_file_restore,
 	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,
 	.file_free_security =		selinux_file_free_security,
 	.file_ioctl =			selinux_file_ioctl,
@@ -5383,6 +5760,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.dentry_open =			selinux_dentry_open,
 
 	.task_create =			selinux_task_create,
+	.cred_checkpoint =		selinux_cred_checkpoint,
+	.cred_restore =			selinux_cred_restore,
 	.cred_free =			selinux_cred_free,
 	.cred_prepare =			selinux_cred_prepare,
 	.kernel_act_as =		selinux_kernel_act_as,
@@ -5404,8 +5783,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 
 	.ipc_permission =		selinux_ipc_permission,
 	.ipc_getsecid =			selinux_ipc_getsecid,
+	.ipc_checkpoint =		selinux_ipc_checkpoint,
+	.ipc_restore =			selinux_ipc_restore,
 
 	.msg_msg_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
+	.msg_msg_checkpoint =		selinux_msg_msg_checkpoint,
+	.msg_msg_restore =		selinux_msg_msg_restore,
 	.msg_msg_free_security =	selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
 
 	.msg_queue_alloc_security =	selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 31df1d7..78945e7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
    S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
    S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__OPEN, "open")
+   S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__RESTORE, "restore")
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans")
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint")
    S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
@@ -88,9 +89,11 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECHEAP, "execheap")
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, "setkeycreate")
    S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, "setsockcreate")
+   S_(SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__RESTORE, "restore")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, "enqueue")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, "send")
    S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, "receive")
+   S_(SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RESTORE, "restore")
    S_(SECCLASS_SHM, SHM__LOCK, "lock")
    S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, "compute_av")
    S_(SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE, "compute_create")
@@ -107,6 +110,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, "syslog_read")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, "syslog_mod")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, "syslog_console")
+   S_(SECCLASS_IPC, IPC__RESTORE, "restore")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__CHOWN, "chown")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE, "dac_override")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH, "dac_read_search")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index d645192..8e066ac 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
 #define FILE__ENTRYPOINT                          0x00040000UL
 #define FILE__EXECMOD                             0x00080000UL
 #define FILE__OPEN                                0x00100000UL
+#define FILE__RESTORE                             0x00200000UL
 #define LNK_FILE__IOCTL                           0x00000001UL
 #define LNK_FILE__READ                            0x00000002UL
 #define LNK_FILE__WRITE                           0x00000004UL
@@ -453,6 +454,7 @@
 #define PROCESS__EXECHEAP                         0x08000000UL
 #define PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE                     0x10000000UL
 #define PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE                    0x20000000UL
+#define PROCESS__RESTORE	                  0x40000000UL
 #define IPC__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
 #define IPC__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
 #define IPC__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
@@ -462,6 +464,7 @@
 #define IPC__ASSOCIATE                            0x00000040UL
 #define IPC__UNIX_READ                            0x00000080UL
 #define IPC__UNIX_WRITE                           0x00000100UL
+#define IPC__RESTORE                              0x00000200UL
 #define SEM__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
 #define SEM__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
 #define SEM__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
@@ -483,6 +486,7 @@
 #define MSGQ__ENQUEUE                             0x00000200UL
 #define MSG__SEND                                 0x00000001UL
 #define MSG__RECEIVE                              0x00000002UL
+#define MSG__RESTORE                              0x00000004UL
 #define SHM__CREATE                               0x00000001UL
 #define SHM__DESTROY                              0x00000002UL
 #define SHM__GETATTR                              0x00000004UL
-- 
1.6.1


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[PATCH 1/1] mktree: accept the lsm_name field in header and add -k flag

[Serge E. Hallyn]

[ This patch is against the userspace checkpoint/restart code,
available at git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/user-cr.git ]

The checkpoint file header now has an 11-character string
containing the name of the active LSM, following the uts
info, and a variable length buffer type conaining LSM-specific
version information (for instance a sha1sum of policy).
Handle these.

Also add a -k (--keeplsm) flag to tell mktree to set the
RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag to sys_restart().

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 mktree.c |   32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mktree.c b/mktree.c
index 2d8d796..3785ebc 100644
--- a/mktree.c
+++ b/mktree.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static char usage_str[] =
 "\t -P,--no-pidns         do not create a new pid namspace (default)\n"
 "\t    --pids             restore original pids (default with --pidns)\n"
 "\t -w,--wait             wait for (root) task to termiate (default)\n"
+"\t -k,--keeplsm          Try to recreate original LSM labels on all objects\n"
 "\t    --show-status      show exit status of (root) task (implies -w)\n"
 "\t    --copy-status      imitate exit status of (root) task (implies -w)\n"
 "\t -W,--no-wait          do not wait for (root) task to terminate\n"
@@ -259,6 +260,8 @@ struct args {
 	char *freezer;
 };
 
+int keep_lsm;
+
 static void usage(char *str)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s", str);
@@ -273,6 +276,7 @@ static void parse_args(struct args *args, int argc, char *argv[])
 		{ "pidns-signal",	required_argument,	NULL, '4' },
 		{ "no-pidns",	no_argument,		NULL, 'P' },
 		{ "pids",	no_argument,		NULL, 3 },
+		{ "keeplsm",	no_argument,		NULL, 'k' },
 		{ "wait",	no_argument,		NULL, 'w' },
 		{ "show-status",	no_argument,	NULL, 1 },
 		{ "copy-status",	no_argument,	NULL, 2 },
@@ -282,7 +286,7 @@ static void parse_args(struct args *args, int argc, char *argv[])
 		{ "debug",	no_argument,		NULL, 'd' },
 		{ NULL,		0,			NULL, 0 }
 	};
-	static char optc[] = "hdvpPwWF:";
+	static char optc[] = "hdvpPkwWF:";
 
 	int sig;
 
@@ -320,6 +324,9 @@ static void parse_args(struct args *args, int argc, char *argv[])
 			args->pids = 1;
 			args->pidns = 1;  /* implied */
 			break;
+		case 'k':
+			keep_lsm = RESTART_KEEP_LSM;
+			break;
 		case 'w':
 			args->wait = 1;
 			break;
@@ -750,6 +757,7 @@ static int ckpt_coordinator(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 	if (ctx->args->freezer)
 		flags |= RESTART_FROZEN;
 
+	flags |= keep_lsm;
 	ret = restart(root_pid, STDIN_FILENO, flags);
 
 	if (ret < 0) {
@@ -1309,7 +1317,7 @@ static int ckpt_make_tree(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct task *task)
 
 	/* on success this doesn't return */
 	ckpt_dbg("about to call sys_restart()\n");
-	ret = restart(0, STDIN_FILENO, 0);
+	ret = restart(0, STDIN_FILENO, keep_lsm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		perror("task restore failed");
 	return ret;
@@ -1704,6 +1712,7 @@ static int ckpt_read_obj_buffer(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *buf, int n)
  * read/write the checkpoint image: similar to in-kernel code
  */
 
+#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
 static int ckpt_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct ckpt_hdr_header *h;
@@ -1737,6 +1746,16 @@ static int ckpt_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
+	ptr += ((struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr)->len;
+	ret = ckpt_read_obj_buffer(ctx, ptr, SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ptr += ((struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr)->len;
+	ret = ckpt_read_obj_type(ctx, ptr, 200, CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
 	/* FIXME: skip version validation for now */
 
 	return 0;
@@ -1815,6 +1834,15 @@ static int ckpt_write_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 		return ret;
 	ptr += ((struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr)->len;
 	ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, (struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	ptr += ((struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr)->len;
+	ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, (struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ptr += ((struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr)->len;
+	ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, (struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr);
 
 	return ret;
 }
-- 
1.6.1.1

[PATCH 1/1] mktree: accept the lsm_name field in header and add -k flag

[Serge E. Hallyn]

[ This patch is against the userspace checkpoint/restart code,
available at git://git.ncl.cs.columbia.edu/pub/git/user-cr.git ]

The checkpoint file header now has an 11-character string
containing the name of the active LSM, following the uts
info, and a variable length buffer type conaining LSM-specific
version information (for instance a sha1sum of policy).
Handle these.

Also add a -k (--keeplsm) flag to tell mktree to set the
RESTART_KEEP_LSM flag to sys_restart().

Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
---
 mktree.c |   32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mktree.c b/mktree.c
index 2d8d796..3785ebc 100644
--- a/mktree.c
+++ b/mktree.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static char usage_str[] =
 "\t -P,--no-pidns         do not create a new pid namspace (default)\n"
 "\t    --pids             restore original pids (default with --pidns)\n"
 "\t -w,--wait             wait for (root) task to termiate (default)\n"
+"\t -k,--keeplsm          Try to recreate original LSM labels on all objects\n"
 "\t    --show-status      show exit status of (root) task (implies -w)\n"
 "\t    --copy-status      imitate exit status of (root) task (implies -w)\n"
 "\t -W,--no-wait          do not wait for (root) task to terminate\n"
@@ -259,6 +260,8 @@ struct args {
 	char *freezer;
 };
 
+int keep_lsm;
+
 static void usage(char *str)
 {
 	fprintf(stderr, "%s", str);
@@ -273,6 +276,7 @@ static void parse_args(struct args *args, int argc, char *argv[])
 		{ "pidns-signal",	required_argument,	NULL, '4' },
 		{ "no-pidns",	no_argument,		NULL, 'P' },
 		{ "pids",	no_argument,		NULL, 3 },
+		{ "keeplsm",	no_argument,		NULL, 'k' },
 		{ "wait",	no_argument,		NULL, 'w' },
 		{ "show-status",	no_argument,	NULL, 1 },
 		{ "copy-status",	no_argument,	NULL, 2 },
@@ -282,7 +286,7 @@ static void parse_args(struct args *args, int argc, char *argv[])
 		{ "debug",	no_argument,		NULL, 'd' },
 		{ NULL,		0,			NULL, 0 }
 	};
-	static char optc[] = "hdvpPwWF:";
+	static char optc[] = "hdvpPkwWF:";
 
 	int sig;
 
@@ -320,6 +324,9 @@ static void parse_args(struct args *args, int argc, char *argv[])
 			args->pids = 1;
 			args->pidns = 1;  /* implied */
 			break;
+		case 'k':
+			keep_lsm = RESTART_KEEP_LSM;
+			break;
 		case 'w':
 			args->wait = 1;
 			break;
@@ -750,6 +757,7 @@ static int ckpt_coordinator(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 	if (ctx->args->freezer)
 		flags |= RESTART_FROZEN;
 
+	flags |= keep_lsm;
 	ret = restart(root_pid, STDIN_FILENO, flags);
 
 	if (ret < 0) {
@@ -1309,7 +1317,7 @@ static int ckpt_make_tree(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, struct task *task)
 
 	/* on success this doesn't return */
 	ckpt_dbg("about to call sys_restart()\n");
-	ret = restart(0, STDIN_FILENO, 0);
+	ret = restart(0, STDIN_FILENO, keep_lsm);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		perror("task restore failed");
 	return ret;
@@ -1704,6 +1712,7 @@ static int ckpt_read_obj_buffer(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx, void *buf, int n)
  * read/write the checkpoint image: similar to in-kernel code
  */
 
+#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
 static int ckpt_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 {
 	struct ckpt_hdr_header *h;
@@ -1737,6 +1746,16 @@ static int ckpt_read_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
+	ptr += ((struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr)->len;
+	ret = ckpt_read_obj_buffer(ctx, ptr, SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ptr += ((struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr)->len;
+	ret = ckpt_read_obj_type(ctx, ptr, 200, CKPT_HDR_LSM_INFO);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
 	/* FIXME: skip version validation for now */
 
 	return 0;
@@ -1815,6 +1834,15 @@ static int ckpt_write_header(struct ckpt_ctx *ctx)
 		return ret;
 	ptr += ((struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr)->len;
 	ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, (struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	ptr += ((struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr)->len;
+	ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, (struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ptr += ((struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr)->len;
+	ret = ckpt_write_obj(ctx, (struct ckpt_hdr *) ptr);
 
 	return ret;
 }
-- 
1.6.1.1


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