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From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Joel Becker <joel.becker@oracle.com>,
	Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@suse.com>, Alex Elder <aelder@sgi.com>,
	Chris Mason <chris.mason@oracle.com>,
	a.gruenbacher@computer.org
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Correct behavior for listxattr and 'trusted' xattrs
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2010 12:48:48 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <201003101248.48385.agruen@suse.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1267621378.3436.15.camel@moss-pluto.epoch.ncsc.mil>

On Wednesday 03 March 2010 14:02:58 Stephen Smalley wrote:
> Should it be using has_capability_noaudit() rather than capable() so
> that merely calling listxattr() on a file that happens to have trusted
> xattrs does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task and does not trigger an
> audit message?

Yes, makes sense.  A version of has_capability_noaudit() without an explicit 
task parameter, like security_capable(), would be better still.

Thanks,
Andreas

  reply	other threads:[~2010-03-10 11:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-03-02  8:01 [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Correct behavior for listxattr and 'trusted' xattrs James Morris
2010-03-02  8:01 ` [PATCH 1/2] jffs2: ensure trusted xattrs are not returned to unprivileged users via listxattr James Morris
2010-03-02  8:02 ` [PATCH 2/2] ocfs2: " James Morris
2010-03-02  9:29   ` Joel Becker
2010-03-02 22:01     ` James Morris
2010-03-02 23:15     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-03-02 23:15       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2010-03-02  8:28 ` [RFC][PATCH 0/2] Correct behavior for listxattr and 'trusted' xattrs Andreas Dilger
2010-03-03 13:02 ` Stephen Smalley
2010-03-10 11:48   ` Andreas Gruenbacher [this message]
2010-03-03 14:09 ` Christoph Hellwig
2010-03-10 11:26   ` Andreas Gruenbacher
2010-03-10 11:40 ` Christoph Hellwig
2010-03-10 14:04   ` James Morris

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