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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de>,
	security@kernel.org, mort@sgi.com,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	fweisbec@gmail.com, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, jason.wessel@windriver.com,
	tj@kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [Security] [PATCH] kernel: make /proc/kallsyms mode 400 to reduce ease of attacking
Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2010 07:29:16 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20101108062916.GA31133@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20101107152720.7e2c472e@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>


* Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> wrote:

> > This makes it _unsafe_ (for many types of attackers) to run an exploit locally.
> 
> They don't care.

Sure, script kiddies and botnet builders wont care - i.e. attacks where the 
individual target is low value, or where either the attacker or the attacked is 
stupid.

But it's different when a skilled attacker meets a skilled defense: all the 
exploits/attacks against high-value targets i've seen showed a great deal of care 
taken to avoid detection.

Future trends are also clear: eventually, as more and more of our lives are lived on 
the network, home boxes are becoming more and more valuable. So i think 
concentrating on the psychology of the skilled attacker would not be unwise. YMMV.

Thanks,

	Ingo

  reply	other threads:[~2010-11-08  6:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-11-04 10:09 [PATCH] kernel: make /proc/kallsyms mode 400 to reduce ease of attacking Marcus Meissner
2010-11-04 10:11 ` Tejun Heo
2010-11-05  0:11   ` [Security] " Eugene Teo
2010-11-04 11:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 12:29   ` Marcus Meissner
2010-11-04 13:58     ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 14:11       ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 14:33         ` Marcus Meissner
2010-11-04 14:38           ` Tejun Heo
2010-11-04 14:43             ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-04 14:48               ` Tejun Heo
2010-11-04 19:08           ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 21:29             ` [Security] " Willy Tarreau
2010-11-04 21:51               ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 22:35                 ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-04 23:46                   ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07  8:50                   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07  9:08                     ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07  9:49                     ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 11:27                       ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 11:41                         ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 11:47                           ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 11:56                             ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 12:12                               ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 12:22                                 ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 12:25                                   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 12:39                                     ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 12:32                                   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 12:51                                     ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 15:27                                     ` Alan Cox
2010-11-08  6:29                                       ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2010-11-07 11:42                       ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 11:51                         ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07 12:37                           ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 12:55                             ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-07  8:56                   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07  9:03                   ` Ingo Molnar
     [not found]               ` <20101104215157.GA25128@ <20101107090805.GA27983@elte.hu>
2010-11-13 13:06                 ` Gilles Espinasse
2010-11-07 18:02           ` Andi Kleen
2010-11-07 18:32             ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-10  8:53               ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-11  2:51                 ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-11  7:05                   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-05  2:38     ` Frank Rowand
2010-11-10 20:58       ` Jesper Juhl
2010-11-05  0:20 ` Jesper Juhl

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