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From: Kevin Easton <caf@guarana.org>
To: Henrique de Moraes Holschuh <hmh@hmh.eng.br>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Walls <andy@silverblocksystems.net>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, sarah.a.sharp@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: make /proc/kallsyms mode 400 to reduce ease of attacking
Date: Tue, 30 Nov 2010 09:58:09 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20101129225809.GA18106@guarana.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20101120194723.GH12640@khazad-dum.debian.net>

On Sat, Nov 20, 2010 at 05:47:23PM -0200, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> On Fri, 19 Nov 2010, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 03:22:00PM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > > In this case, the upside just wasn't big enough to accept _any_
> > > breakage, especially since people and distributions can just do the
> > > "chmod" themselves if they want to. There was a lot of discussion
> > > whether the patch should even go in in the first place. So this time,
> > > the "let's just revert it" was a very easy decision for me.
> > 
> > The downside is that /proc can be remounted multiple times for different
> > containers, etc. Having to patch everything that mounts /proc to do the
> > chmod seems much more painful that fixing a simple userspace bug in an old
> > klog daemon.
> > 
> 
> As an user and sysadmin, I'd rather not have to find out every place that
> mounts /proc in a chroot to chmod all relevant files :(  That's fighting a
> loosing battle, unlike fixing broken tools (which at least will stay fixed).

There's only one set of "kallsyms" permissions.  If you chmod it in one
mount of proc, the permissions apply in *all* mounts of proc, current
or future.

So you don't have to find every place that mounts /proc - you can just
chmod it once at startup and be done.

    - Kevin


  reply	other threads:[~2010-11-29 23:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-11-19 21:12 [PATCH] kernel: make /proc/kallsyms mode 400 to reduce ease of attacking Andy Walls
2010-11-19 23:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2010-11-20  2:40   ` Kees Cook
2010-11-20 19:47     ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2010-11-29 22:58       ` Kevin Easton [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2010-11-16 10:46 Marcus Meissner
2010-11-17  5:07 ` Kyle McMartin
2010-11-18  7:48   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-20  3:18     ` Kees Cook
2010-11-26  7:51       ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-17  5:40 ` Kyle Moffett
2010-11-17  5:41   ` Kyle Moffett
2010-11-17  5:58   ` Linus Torvalds
2010-11-17  6:19     ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-18  7:31   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-23 17:24     ` Pavel Machek
2010-11-26  7:38       ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-29 19:03         ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-20 11:32   ` Avi Kivity
2010-11-19 19:19 ` Sarah Sharp
2010-11-19 19:54   ` Linus Torvalds
2010-11-19 19:58     ` david
2010-11-19 20:04       ` Linus Torvalds
2010-11-19 20:16         ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-19 20:55           ` david
2010-11-26  7:48     ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-29 16:33       ` Sarah Sharp
2010-11-29 18:04         ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-29 19:05           ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-29 19:21             ` Eric Paris
2010-11-29 19:38               ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-29 21:49             ` Willy Tarreau
2010-11-29 23:31         ` Alan Cox
2010-11-30 11:58           ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-20 11:05 ` Richard W.M. Jones
2010-11-04 10:09 Marcus Meissner
2010-11-04 10:11 ` Tejun Heo
2010-11-04 11:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 12:29   ` Marcus Meissner
2010-11-04 13:58     ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 14:11       ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-04 14:33         ` Marcus Meissner
2010-11-04 14:38           ` Tejun Heo
2010-11-04 14:43             ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-04 14:48               ` Tejun Heo
2010-11-04 19:08           ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-07 18:02           ` Andi Kleen
2010-11-07 18:32             ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-10  8:53               ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-11  2:51                 ` H. Peter Anvin
2010-11-11  7:05                   ` Ingo Molnar
2010-11-05  2:38     ` Frank Rowand
2010-11-10 20:58       ` Jesper Juhl
2010-11-05  0:20 ` Jesper Juhl

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