[refpolicy] [PATCH 1/1] LVM uses systemwide semaphores for activities such as vgchange -ay

[refpolicy] [PATCH 1/1] LVM uses systemwide semaphores for activities such as vgchange -ay

[Sven Vermeulen]

The LVM subsystem uses system-wide semaphores for various activities.

Although the system boots properly without these (apart from the AVC denials
of course), I would assume that they are here to ensure no corruption of any 
kind happens in case of concurrent execution / race conditions.

As such, I rather enable it explicitly in the security policy.

Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
---
 policy/modules/system/lvm.te |    2 ++
 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
index 74e38b4..5e8e5aa 100644
--- a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
+++ b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ allow lvm_t self:file rw_file_perms;
 allow lvm_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
 allow lvm_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
 allow lvm_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
+allow lvm_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
 
 allow lvm_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
 allow lvm_t clvmd_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms };
@@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ filetrans_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_etc_t, lvm_metadata_t, file)
 files_etc_filetrans(lvm_t, lvm_metadata_t, file)
 files_search_mnt(lvm_t)
 
+kernel_get_sysvipc_info(lvm_t)
 kernel_read_system_state(lvm_t)
 # Read system variables in /proc/sys
 kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(lvm_t)
-- 
1.7.3.4

[refpolicy] [PATCH 1/1] LVM uses systemwide semaphores for activities such as vgchange -ay

[Christopher J. PeBenito]

On 2/6/2011 9:36 AM, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
> The LVM subsystem uses system-wide semaphores for various activities.
>
> Although the system boots properly without these (apart from the AVC denials
> of course), I would assume that they are here to ensure no corruption of any
> kind happens in case of concurrent execution / race conditions.
>
> As such, I rather enable it explicitly in the security policy.

Merged.

> Signed-off-by: Sven Vermeulen<sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
> ---
>   policy/modules/system/lvm.te |    2 ++
>   1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> index 74e38b4..5e8e5aa 100644
> --- a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> +++ b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te
> @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ allow lvm_t self:file rw_file_perms;
>   allow lvm_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms;
>   allow lvm_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
>   allow lvm_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
> +allow lvm_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
>
>   allow lvm_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
>   allow lvm_t clvmd_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms };
> @@ -210,6 +211,7 @@ filetrans_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_etc_t, lvm_metadata_t, file)
>   files_etc_filetrans(lvm_t, lvm_metadata_t, file)
>   files_search_mnt(lvm_t)
>
> +kernel_get_sysvipc_info(lvm_t)
>   kernel_read_system_state(lvm_t)
>   # Read system variables in /proc/sys
>   kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(lvm_t)


-- 
Chris PeBenito
Tresys Technology, LLC
www.tresys.com | oss.tresys.com