* + userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container.patch added to -mm tree
@ 2011-02-19 0:00 akpm
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: akpm @ 2011-02-19 0:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mm-commits
Cc: serge, adobriyan, ebiederm, jmorris, kees.cook, mtk.manpages,
serge.hallyn
The patch titled
userns: allow sethostname in a container
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container.patch
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***
See http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/stuff/added-to-mm.txt to find
out what to do about this
The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: userns: allow sethostname in a container
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---
kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff -puN kernel/sys.c~userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container kernel/sys.c
--- a/kernel/sys.c~userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container
+++ a/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1177,7 +1177,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user
int errno;
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from serge@hallyn.com are
lib-hexdumpc-make-hex2bin-return-the-updated-src-address.patch
fs-binfmt_miscc-use-kernels-hex_to_bin-method.patch
fs-binfmt_miscc-use-kernels-hex_to_bin-method-fix.patch
fs-binfmt_miscc-use-kernels-hex_to_bin-method-fix-fix.patch
pid-remove-the-child_reaper-special-case-in-init-mainc.patch
pidns-call-pid_ns_prepare_proc-from-create_pid_namespace.patch
procfs-kill-the-global-proc_mnt-variable.patch
userns-add-a-user_namespace-as-creator-owner-of-uts_namespace.patch
userns-security-make-capabilities-relative-to-the-user-namespace.patch
userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container.patch
userns-allow-killing-tasks-in-your-own-or-child-userns.patch
userns-allow-ptrace-from-non-init-user-namespaces.patch
userns-user-namespaces-convert-all-capable-checks-in-kernel-sysc.patch
userns-add-a-user-namespace-owner-of-ipc-ns.patch
userns-user-namespaces-convert-several-capable-calls.patch
userns-userns-check-user-namespace-for-task-file-uid-equivalence-checks.patch
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* + userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container.patch added to -mm tree
@ 2011-03-01 0:29 akpm
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: akpm @ 2011-03-01 0:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mm-commits
Cc: serge, daniel.lezcano, dhowells, ebiederm, jmorris, serge.hallyn
The patch titled
userns: allow sethostname in a container
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container.patch
Before you just go and hit "reply", please:
a) Consider who else should be cc'ed
b) Prefer to cc a suitable mailing list as well
c) Ideally: find the original patch on the mailing list and do a
reply-to-all to that, adding suitable additional cc's
*** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***
See http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/stuff/added-to-mm.txt to find
out what to do about this
The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: userns: allow sethostname in a container
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Changelog:
Feb 23: let clone_uts_ns() handle setting uts->user_ns
To do so we need to pass in the task_struct who'll
get the utsname, so we can get its user_ns.
Feb 23: As per Oleg's coment, just pass in tsk, instead of two
of its members.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---
include/linux/utsname.h | 6 +++---
kernel/nsproxy.c | 7 +------
kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
kernel/utsname.c | 12 +++++++-----
4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff -puN include/linux/utsname.h~userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container include/linux/utsname.h
--- a/include/linux/utsname.h~userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container
+++ a/include/linux/utsname.h
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static inline void get_uts_ns(struct uts
}
extern struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(unsigned long flags,
- struct uts_namespace *ns);
+ struct task_struct *tsk);
extern void free_uts_ns(struct kref *kref);
static inline void put_uts_ns(struct uts_namespace *ns)
@@ -71,12 +71,12 @@ static inline void put_uts_ns(struct uts
}
static inline struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(unsigned long flags,
- struct uts_namespace *ns)
+ struct task_struct *tsk)
{
if (flags & CLONE_NEWUTS)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- return ns;
+ return tsk->nsproxy->uts_ns;
}
#endif
diff -puN kernel/nsproxy.c~userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container kernel/nsproxy.c
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c~userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container
+++ a/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -69,16 +69,11 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namesp
goto out_ns;
}
- new_nsp->uts_ns = copy_utsname(flags, tsk->nsproxy->uts_ns);
+ new_nsp->uts_ns = copy_utsname(flags, tsk);
if (IS_ERR(new_nsp->uts_ns)) {
err = PTR_ERR(new_nsp->uts_ns);
goto out_uts;
}
- if (new_nsp->uts_ns != tsk->nsproxy->uts_ns) {
- put_user_ns(new_nsp->uts_ns->user_ns);
- new_nsp->uts_ns->user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user)->user_ns;
- get_user_ns(new_nsp->uts_ns->user_ns);
- }
new_nsp->ipc_ns = copy_ipcs(flags, tsk->nsproxy->ipc_ns);
if (IS_ERR(new_nsp->ipc_ns)) {
diff -puN kernel/sys.c~userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container kernel/sys.c
--- a/kernel/sys.c~userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container
+++ a/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1177,7 +1177,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(sethostname, char __user
int errno;
char tmp[__NEW_UTS_LEN];
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!ns_capable(current->nsproxy->uts_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (len < 0 || len > __NEW_UTS_LEN)
return -EINVAL;
diff -puN kernel/utsname.c~userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container kernel/utsname.c
--- a/kernel/utsname.c~userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container
+++ a/kernel/utsname.c
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ static struct uts_namespace *create_uts_
* @old_ns: namespace to clone
* Return NULL on error (failure to kmalloc), new ns otherwise
*/
-static struct uts_namespace *clone_uts_ns(struct uts_namespace *old_ns)
+static struct uts_namespace *clone_uts_ns(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct uts_namespace *old_ns)
{
struct uts_namespace *ns;
@@ -41,8 +42,7 @@ static struct uts_namespace *clone_uts_n
down_read(&uts_sem);
memcpy(&ns->name, &old_ns->name, sizeof(ns->name));
- ns->user_ns = old_ns->user_ns;
- get_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
+ ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(task_cred_xxx(tsk, user)->user_ns);
up_read(&uts_sem);
return ns;
}
@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ static struct uts_namespace *clone_uts_n
* utsname of this process won't be seen by parent, and vice
* versa.
*/
-struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(unsigned long flags, struct uts_namespace *old_ns)
+struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(unsigned long flags,
+ struct task_struct *tsk)
{
+ struct uts_namespace *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy->uts_ns;
struct uts_namespace *new_ns;
BUG_ON(!old_ns);
@@ -63,7 +65,7 @@ struct uts_namespace *copy_utsname(unsig
if (!(flags & CLONE_NEWUTS))
return old_ns;
- new_ns = clone_uts_ns(old_ns);
+ new_ns = clone_uts_ns(tsk, old_ns);
put_uts_ns(old_ns);
return new_ns;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from serge@hallyn.com are
lib-hexdumpc-make-hex2bin-return-the-updated-src-address.patch
fs-binfmt_miscc-use-kernels-hex_to_bin-method.patch
fs-binfmt_miscc-use-kernels-hex_to_bin-method-fix.patch
fs-binfmt_miscc-use-kernels-hex_to_bin-method-fix-fix.patch
pid-remove-the-child_reaper-special-case-in-init-mainc.patch
pidns-call-pid_ns_prepare_proc-from-create_pid_namespace.patch
procfs-kill-the-global-proc_mnt-variable.patch
userns-add-a-user_namespace-as-creator-owner-of-uts_namespace.patch
userns-security-make-capabilities-relative-to-the-user-namespace.patch
userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container.patch
userns-allow-killing-tasks-in-your-own-or-child-userns.patch
userns-allow-ptrace-from-non-init-user-namespaces.patch
userns-user-namespaces-convert-all-capable-checks-in-kernel-sysc.patch
userns-add-a-user-namespace-owner-of-ipc-ns.patch
userns-user-namespaces-convert-several-capable-calls.patch
userns-userns-check-user-namespace-for-task-file-uid-equivalence-checks.patch
userns-rename-is_owner_or_cap-to-inode_owner_or_capable.patch
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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2011-03-01 0:29 + userns-allow-sethostname-in-a-container.patch added to -mm tree akpm
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2011-02-19 0:00 akpm
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