From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount options
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2011 15:31:02 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110621153102.762557f3.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1308163895-5963-1-git-send-email-segoon@openwall.com>
Plese cc Alexey on procfs things.
On Wed, 15 Jun 2011 22:51:35 +0400
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
> This patch series adds support of procfs mount options and adds
> mount options to restrict /proc/<pid>/ directories to owners and
> /proc/<pid>/net/* to root. Additional group may be defined via
> gid=, and this group will be privileged to study others /proc/<pid>/
> and networking information.
>
> Similar features are implemented for old kernels in -ow patches (for
> Linux 2.2 and 2.4) and for Linux 2.6 in -grsecurity, but both of them
> are implemented as configure options, not cofigurable in runtime, with
> changes of gid of /proc/<pid>/, and without backward-compatible
> /proc/<pid>/net/* handling.
This all seems highly specific to one particular set of requirements.
We have one set of access permission rules and then dive into procfs
and hard-wire those rules into the implementation? What happens if
someone else has a similar but slightly different set of requirements?
More kernel patches?
IOW is there some more general way of doing all this? <handwaving>Like
better permissions/chmod support in procfs and an inherited-across-fork
per-process procfs permissions mask.</handwaving>
Does all this code support `mount -o remount' as expected?
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount options
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2011 15:31:02 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110621153102.762557f3.akpm@linux-foundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1308163895-5963-1-git-send-email-segoon@openwall.com>
Plese cc Alexey on procfs things.
On Wed, 15 Jun 2011 22:51:35 +0400
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
> This patch series adds support of procfs mount options and adds
> mount options to restrict /proc/<pid>/ directories to owners and
> /proc/<pid>/net/* to root. Additional group may be defined via
> gid=, and this group will be privileged to study others /proc/<pid>/
> and networking information.
>
> Similar features are implemented for old kernels in -ow patches (for
> Linux 2.2 and 2.4) and for Linux 2.6 in -grsecurity, but both of them
> are implemented as configure options, not cofigurable in runtime, with
> changes of gid of /proc/<pid>/, and without backward-compatible
> /proc/<pid>/net/* handling.
This all seems highly specific to one particular set of requirements.
We have one set of access permission rules and then dive into procfs
and hard-wire those rules into the implementation? What happens if
someone else has a similar but slightly different set of requirements?
More kernel patches?
IOW is there some more general way of doing all this? <handwaving>Like
better permissions/chmod support in procfs and an inherited-across-fork
per-process procfs permissions mask.</handwaving>
Does all this code support `mount -o remount' as expected?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-06-21 22:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-06-15 18:51 [kernel-hardening] [RFC 0/5 v4] procfs: introduce hidepid=, hidenet=, gid= mount options Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-15 18:51 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16 8:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16 8:50 ` Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16 8:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16 8:58 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16 11:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16 11:40 ` Arnd Bergmann
2011-06-16 13:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-16 13:33 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-10-30 17:09 ` [kernel-hardening] " richard -rw- weinberger
2011-10-30 17:09 ` richard -rw- weinberger
2011-06-21 22:31 ` Andrew Morton [this message]
2011-06-21 22:31 ` Andrew Morton
2011-06-22 6:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-22 6:45 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-22 10:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-22 10:17 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 19:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-06-29 19:16 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-06 11:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexey Dobriyan
2011-07-06 11:25 ` Alexey Dobriyan
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