From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, rientjes@google.com, wilsons@start.ca,
security@kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] proc: fix a race in do_io_accounting()
Date: Mon, 4 Jul 2011 00:01:06 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110703200106.GB9714@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFwfr-oAa-2L9O_rd9iZDyVr0b+gFQS=_R5PUxmhh3JEsg@mail.gmail.com>
On Sun, Jul 03, 2011 at 12:24 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 3:39 AM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
> >
> > The order of locking is similar to the one inside of
> > ptrace_attach(): first goes cred_guard_mutex, then lock_task_sighand().
>
> Hmm. mm_for_maps() uses mutex_lock_killable(), as does lock_trace.
Killable/interruptable here makes sense.
> And neither proc_pid_wchan() nor the fd following ones
> (proc_pid_follow_link etc) use anything at all.
>
> So I'm not sure. And do we really even care about the theoretical
> race? Even if we do hit the race window and happen to get it just as a
> process turns setuid, it would seem to be totally harmless (we're not
> going to see any of the sensitive IO anyway).
I consider this as a theoretical race too unless there is a crazy bug in
scheduler/timer. But IMO it's better to just fully remove the risk
(even purely theoretical) given the lock is simple and it doesn't cost
much.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, rientjes@google.com, wilsons@start.ca,
security@kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: fix a race in do_io_accounting()
Date: Mon, 4 Jul 2011 00:01:06 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110703200106.GB9714@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFwfr-oAa-2L9O_rd9iZDyVr0b+gFQS=_R5PUxmhh3JEsg@mail.gmail.com>
On Sun, Jul 03, 2011 at 12:24 -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 3:39 AM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:
> >
> > The order of locking is similar to the one inside of
> > ptrace_attach(): first goes cred_guard_mutex, then lock_task_sighand().
>
> Hmm. mm_for_maps() uses mutex_lock_killable(), as does lock_trace.
Killable/interruptable here makes sense.
> And neither proc_pid_wchan() nor the fd following ones
> (proc_pid_follow_link etc) use anything at all.
>
> So I'm not sure. And do we really even care about the theoretical
> race? Even if we do hit the race window and happen to get it just as a
> process turns setuid, it would seem to be totally harmless (we're not
> going to see any of the sensitive IO anyway).
I consider this as a theoretical race too unless there is a crazy bug in
scheduler/timer. But IMO it's better to just fully remove the risk
(even purely theoretical) given the lock is simple and it doesn't cost
much.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-07-03 20:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-07-03 10:39 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] proc: fix a race in do_io_accounting() Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 10:39 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 19:24 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 19:24 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 20:01 ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-07-03 20:01 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-04 20:13 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-04 20:13 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-05 21:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2011-07-05 21:13 ` Andrew Morton
2011-07-06 16:34 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v3] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-06 16:34 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-15 6:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-15 6:38 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-15 16:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-07-15 16:14 ` Linus Torvalds
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