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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v2] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2011 11:40:43 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110719074043.GA3942@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110718115237.14d96c03.akpm@linux-foundation.org>

On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 11:52 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > +noinline bool __kernel_access_ok(const void *ptr, unsigned long len)
> 
> noinline seems unneeded

Ah, understood what you mean.  It is .c, and users are in other .c, so
it is indeed redundant.

Thanks!

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v2] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2011 11:40:43 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110719074043.GA3942@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110718115237.14d96c03.akpm@linux-foundation.org>

On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 11:52 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > +noinline bool __kernel_access_ok(const void *ptr, unsigned long len)
> 
> noinline seems unneeded

Ah, understood what you mean.  It is .c, and users are in other .c, so
it is indeed redundant.

Thanks!

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-07-19  7:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-07-03 11:10 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1] implement SL*B and stack usercopy runtime checks Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 11:10 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 11:10 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 18:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 18:27   ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 18:27   ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 18:57   ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 18:57     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 18:57     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 19:10     ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 19:10       ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 19:10       ` Linus Torvalds
2011-07-03 19:24       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 19:24         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 19:37         ` Joe Perches
2011-07-03 19:37           ` Joe Perches
2011-07-03 19:53           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-03 19:53             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-06  3:39   ` Jonathan Hawthorne
2011-07-06  3:39     ` Jonathan Hawthorne
2011-07-18 18:39   ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v2] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 18:39     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 18:39     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 18:52     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2011-07-18 18:52       ` Andrew Morton
2011-07-18 18:52       ` Andrew Morton
2011-07-18 19:33       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 19:33         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-19  7:40       ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-07-19  7:40         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 19:08     ` Matt Mackall
2011-07-18 19:08       ` Matt Mackall
2011-07-18 19:08       ` Matt Mackall
2011-07-18 19:24       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 19:24         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 19:24         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-18 21:18     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2011-07-18 21:18       ` Christoph Lameter
2011-07-18 21:18       ` Christoph Lameter
2011-07-19  6:53       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-19  6:53         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-07-19  6:53         ` Vasiliy Kulikov

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