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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/meminfo
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2011 23:38:10 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110927193810.GA5416@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110927175642.GA3432@albatros>

On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 21:56 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> /proc/meminfo stores information related to memory pages usage, which
> may be used to monitor the number of objects in specific caches (and/or
> the changes of these numbers).  This might reveal private information
> similar to /proc/slabinfo infoleaks.  To remove the infoleak, just
> restrict meminfo to root.  If it is used by unprivileged daemons,
> meminfo permissions can be altered the same way as slabinfo:
> 
>     groupadd meminfo
>     usermod -a -G meminfo $MONITOR_USER
>     chmod g+r /proc/meminfo
>     chgrp meminfo /proc/meminfo

Just to make it clear: since this patch breaks "free", I don't propose
it anymore.


> Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
> CC: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
> CC: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> CC: Christoph Lameter <cl@gentwo.org>
> CC: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
> CC: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
> CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> CC: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
> CC: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  fs/proc/meminfo.c |    2 +-
>  1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> 
> --
> diff --git a/fs/proc/meminfo.c b/fs/proc/meminfo.c
> index 5861741..949bdee 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/meminfo.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/meminfo.c
> @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static const struct file_operations meminfo_proc_fops = {
>  
>  static int __init proc_meminfo_init(void)
>  {
> -	proc_create("meminfo", 0, NULL, &meminfo_proc_fops);
> +	proc_create("meminfo", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, NULL, &meminfo_proc_fops);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  module_init(proc_meminfo_init);

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/meminfo
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2011 23:38:10 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110927193810.GA5416@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110927175642.GA3432@albatros>

On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 21:56 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> /proc/meminfo stores information related to memory pages usage, which
> may be used to monitor the number of objects in specific caches (and/or
> the changes of these numbers).  This might reveal private information
> similar to /proc/slabinfo infoleaks.  To remove the infoleak, just
> restrict meminfo to root.  If it is used by unprivileged daemons,
> meminfo permissions can be altered the same way as slabinfo:
> 
>     groupadd meminfo
>     usermod -a -G meminfo $MONITOR_USER
>     chmod g+r /proc/meminfo
>     chgrp meminfo /proc/meminfo

Just to make it clear: since this patch breaks "free", I don't propose
it anymore.


> Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
> CC: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
> CC: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> CC: Christoph Lameter <cl@gentwo.org>
> CC: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
> CC: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
> CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> CC: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
> CC: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  fs/proc/meminfo.c |    2 +-
>  1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> 
> --
> diff --git a/fs/proc/meminfo.c b/fs/proc/meminfo.c
> index 5861741..949bdee 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/meminfo.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/meminfo.c
> @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static const struct file_operations meminfo_proc_fops = {
>  
>  static int __init proc_meminfo_init(void)
>  {
> -	proc_create("meminfo", 0, NULL, &meminfo_proc_fops);
> +	proc_create("meminfo", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, NULL, &meminfo_proc_fops);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  module_init(proc_meminfo_init);

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/meminfo
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2011 23:38:10 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20110927193810.GA5416@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20110927175642.GA3432@albatros>

On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 21:56 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> /proc/meminfo stores information related to memory pages usage, which
> may be used to monitor the number of objects in specific caches (and/or
> the changes of these numbers).  This might reveal private information
> similar to /proc/slabinfo infoleaks.  To remove the infoleak, just
> restrict meminfo to root.  If it is used by unprivileged daemons,
> meminfo permissions can be altered the same way as slabinfo:
> 
>     groupadd meminfo
>     usermod -a -G meminfo $MONITOR_USER
>     chmod g+r /proc/meminfo
>     chgrp meminfo /proc/meminfo

Just to make it clear: since this patch breaks "free", I don't propose
it anymore.


> Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
> CC: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
> CC: Dave Hansen <dave@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> CC: Christoph Lameter <cl@gentwo.org>
> CC: Pekka Enberg <penberg@cs.helsinki.fi>
> CC: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
> CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> CC: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
> CC: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  fs/proc/meminfo.c |    2 +-
>  1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> 
> --
> diff --git a/fs/proc/meminfo.c b/fs/proc/meminfo.c
> index 5861741..949bdee 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/meminfo.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/meminfo.c
> @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static const struct file_operations meminfo_proc_fops = {
>  
>  static int __init proc_meminfo_init(void)
>  {
> -	proc_create("meminfo", 0, NULL, &meminfo_proc_fops);
> +	proc_create("meminfo", S_IFREG | S_IRUSR, NULL, &meminfo_proc_fops);
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  module_init(proc_meminfo_init);

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2011-09-27 19:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-09-27 17:54 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] mm: restrict access to slab files under procfs and sysfs Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 17:54 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 17:54 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 17:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/meminfo Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 17:56   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 17:56   ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 18:27   ` [kernel-hardening] " David Rientjes
2011-09-27 18:27     ` David Rientjes
2011-09-27 18:27     ` David Rientjes
2011-09-27 19:14     ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 19:14       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 19:14       ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 19:38   ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-09-27 19:38     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 19:38     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 20:03     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2011-09-27 20:03       ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-27 20:03       ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-27 20:33       ` [kernel-hardening] " David Rientjes
2011-09-27 20:33         ` David Rientjes
2011-09-27 20:33         ` David Rientjes
2011-09-27 20:47         ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2011-09-27 20:47           ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-27 20:47           ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-28 20:31           ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2011-09-28 20:31             ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-28 20:31             ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-28 20:52             ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2011-09-28 20:52               ` Alan Cox
2011-09-28 20:52               ` Alan Cox
2011-09-29  0:43             ` [kernel-hardening] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-29  0:43               ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-29 14:11               ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2011-09-29 14:11                 ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-29 14:11                 ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-29 16:18         ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-29 16:18           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-29 16:18           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-29 16:30           ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2011-09-29 16:30             ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-29 16:30             ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-29 16:43             ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-29 16:43               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-29 16:57           ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-29 16:57             ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-09-29 17:25             ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-29 17:25               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-29 17:28           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-29 17:28             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-29 17:28             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-28 21:46     ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2011-09-28 21:46       ` Andrew Morton
2011-09-28 21:46       ` Andrew Morton
2011-09-30 19:53       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-30 19:53         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-30 19:53         ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-30 20:03         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2011-09-30 20:03           ` Andrew Morton
2011-09-30 20:03           ` Andrew Morton
2011-09-30 20:12           ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-30 20:12             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-30 20:12             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-30 20:15           ` [kernel-hardening] " Dave Hansen
2011-09-30 20:15             ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-30 20:15             ` Dave Hansen
2011-09-27 18:08 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] mm: restrict access to slab files under procfs and sysfs Christoph Lameter
2011-09-27 18:08   ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-27 18:08   ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-27 19:16   ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 19:16     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 19:16     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-09-27 19:35     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Lameter
2011-09-27 19:35       ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-27 19:35       ` Christoph Lameter
2011-09-27 18:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Rientjes
2011-09-27 18:21   ` David Rientjes
2011-09-27 18:21   ` David Rientjes
2011-09-27 20:00   ` [kernel-hardening] " Pekka Enberg
2011-09-27 20:00     ` Pekka Enberg
2011-09-27 20:00     ` Pekka Enberg

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