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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/interrupts
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 00:19:08 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20111107201908.GA5827@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <14202.1320696659@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>

On Mon, Nov 07, 2011 at 15:10 -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> On Mon, 07 Nov 2011 11:18:32 PST, "H. Peter Anvin" said:
> 
> > I would like to propose that we add a mount option to procfs, and
> > possibly sysfs, called, say, admingrp.  These kinds of files then get
> > restricted to the admingrp (defaulting to gid 0 if no admingrp is
> > provided).  Historically on Unix there has been a group of people
> > (usually "adm", but sometimes "log") who are allowed to read (but not
> > write) the log files, which also contains potentially sensitive information.
> 
> Probably should be a two part - mount with 'gid=NNN', and then a
> perm=027 or whatever, to be treated similar to a umask.  So 027
> would allow root to do anything, would disable write for the gid= group,
> and turn it off completely for others.  Less paranoid sites could mount
> it with perm=002.
> 
> Does that cover most of the use cases?

At the time of Linux 2.0-2.4 in Owl patch there was a plain on/off
configure option - 022 / 066 umask.  Currently procfs restriction is
implemented in Grsecurity with the same all-or-nothing approach.
Brad Spengler told me that there were no user complains about the lack of
flexibility :-)   So, I agree that we don't need anything more complex.


Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/interrupts
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 00:19:08 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20111107201908.GA5827@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <14202.1320696659@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>

On Mon, Nov 07, 2011 at 15:10 -0500, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> On Mon, 07 Nov 2011 11:18:32 PST, "H. Peter Anvin" said:
> 
> > I would like to propose that we add a mount option to procfs, and
> > possibly sysfs, called, say, admingrp.  These kinds of files then get
> > restricted to the admingrp (defaulting to gid 0 if no admingrp is
> > provided).  Historically on Unix there has been a group of people
> > (usually "adm", but sometimes "log") who are allowed to read (but not
> > write) the log files, which also contains potentially sensitive information.
> 
> Probably should be a two part - mount with 'gid=NNN', and then a
> perm=027 or whatever, to be treated similar to a umask.  So 027
> would allow root to do anything, would disable write for the gid= group,
> and turn it off completely for others.  Less paranoid sites could mount
> it with perm=002.
> 
> Does that cover most of the use cases?

At the time of Linux 2.0-2.4 in Owl patch there was a plain on/off
configure option - 022 / 066 umask.  Currently procfs restriction is
implemented in Grsecurity with the same all-or-nothing approach.
Brad Spengler told me that there were no user complains about the lack of
flexibility :-)   So, I agree that we don't need anything more complex.


Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

  reply	other threads:[~2011-11-07 20:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2011-11-07 17:45 [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/interrupts Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 18:06 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-11-07 19:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 19:01     ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 19:18     ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 19:18       ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 19:29       ` [kernel-hardening] " Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 19:48         ` Eric Paris
2011-11-07 19:50           ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 20:11             ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 20:47               ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 21:23                 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-11-07 21:35                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-11-07 23:07                     ` Linus Torvalds
2011-11-07 23:21                       ` Alan Cox
2011-11-07 23:27                         ` Greg KH
2011-11-07 23:40                           ` Theodore Tso
2011-11-07 23:45                             ` Alan Cox
2011-11-07 23:45                             ` Greg KH
2011-11-08 20:07                               ` Ted Ts'o
2011-11-09 16:14                                 ` Greg KH
2011-11-08  9:11                           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-08 13:23                             ` Alan Cox
2011-11-08 17:41                               ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-08 17:06                   ` John Stoffel
2011-11-07 19:54           ` Vasiliy Kulikov
2011-11-07 20:10       ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-11-07 20:10         ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2011-11-07 20:19         ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2011-11-07 20:19           ` Vasiliy Kulikov

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