Re: [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/$PID/{sched,schedstat}

Re: [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/$PID/{sched,schedstat}

[Vasiliy Kulikov]

(CC'ed l-k)

On Sat, Nov 05, 2011 at 14:48 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> /proc/$PID/{sched,schedstat} contain debugging scheduler counters, which
> should not be world readable.  They may be used to gather private information
> about processes' activity.  E.g. it can be used to count the number of
> characters typed in gksu dialog:
> 
> http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3
> 
> This infoleak is similar to io (1d1221f375c) and stat's eip/esp (f83ce3e6b02d)
> infoleaks.  Probably other 0644/0444 procfs files are vulnerable to
> similar infoleaks.
> 
> Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
> ---
>  fs/proc/base.c |   32 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------
>  1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index 6278ef1..8b67eec 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -410,10 +410,16 @@ static int proc_pid_stack(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
>   */
>  static int proc_pid_schedstat(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
>  {
> -	return sprintf(buffer, "%llu %llu %lu\n",
> -			(unsigned long long)task->se.sum_exec_runtime,
> -			(unsigned long long)task->sched_info.run_delay,
> -			task->sched_info.pcount);
> +	int ret;
> +	ret = lock_trace(task);
> +	if (!ret) {
> +		ret = sprintf(buffer, "%llu %llu %lu\n",
> +				(unsigned long long)task->se.sum_exec_runtime,
> +				(unsigned long long)task->sched_info.run_delay,
> +				task->sched_info.pcount);
> +		unlock_trace(task);
> +	}
> +	return ret;
>  }
>  #endif
>  
> @@ -1390,15 +1396,21 @@ static int sched_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
>  {
>  	struct inode *inode = m->private;
>  	struct task_struct *p;
> +	int ret;
>  
>  	p = get_proc_task(inode);
>  	if (!p)
>  		return -ESRCH;
> -	proc_sched_show_task(p, m);
> +	ret = lock_trace(p);
> +	if (!ret) {
> +		proc_sched_show_task(p, m);
> +		ret = 0;
> +		unlock_trace(p);
> +	}
>  
>  	put_task_struct(p);
>  
> -	return 0;
> +	return ret;
>  }
>  
>  static ssize_t
> @@ -2813,7 +2825,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
>  	ONE("personality", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_personality),
>  	INF("limits",	  S_IRUGO, proc_pid_limits),
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
> -	REG("sched",      S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_sched_operations),
> +	REG("sched",      S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_sched_operations),
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP
>  	REG("autogroup",  S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_sched_autogroup_operations),
> @@ -2851,7 +2863,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {
>  	ONE("stack",      S_IRUGO, proc_pid_stack),
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
> -	INF("schedstat",  S_IRUGO, proc_pid_schedstat),
> +	INF("schedstat",  S_IRUSR, proc_pid_schedstat),
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_LATENCYTOP
>  	REG("latency",  S_IRUGO, proc_lstats_operations),
> @@ -3162,7 +3174,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
>  	ONE("personality", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_personality),
>  	INF("limits",	 S_IRUGO, proc_pid_limits),
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
> -	REG("sched",     S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_sched_operations),
> +	REG("sched",     S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_sched_operations),
>  #endif
>  	REG("comm",      S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_pid_set_comm_operations),
>  #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
> @@ -3196,7 +3208,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {
>  	ONE("stack",      S_IRUGO, proc_pid_stack),
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
> -	INF("schedstat", S_IRUGO, proc_pid_schedstat),
> +	INF("schedstat", S_IRUSR, proc_pid_schedstat),
>  #endif
>  #ifdef CONFIG_LATENCYTOP
>  	REG("latency",  S_IRUGO, proc_lstats_operations),
> -- 
> 1.7.0.4
> 

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

Re: [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/$PID/{sched,schedstat}

[Andrew Morton]

On Tue, 8 Nov 2011 15:59:00 +0400
Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> wrote:

> (CC'ed l-k)

security@kernel.org isn't working, btw.

> On Sat, Nov 05, 2011 at 14:48 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > /proc/$PID/{sched,schedstat} contain debugging scheduler counters, which
> > should not be world readable.  They may be used to gather private information
> > about processes' activity.  E.g. it can be used to count the number of
> > characters typed in gksu dialog:
> > 
> > http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3
> > 
> > This infoleak is similar to io (1d1221f375c) and stat's eip/esp (f83ce3e6b02d)
> > infoleaks.  Probably other 0644/0444 procfs files are vulnerable to
> > similar infoleaks.

Grumble.

The obvious issue with this patch is its non-back-compatibility.  What
existing code will break, in what manner and what is the seriousness of
the breakage?

You *know* this is the main issue, yet you didn't address it at all! 
You just leave the issue out there for other people to work out, and to
ask the obvious questions.

This happens over and over and I'm getting rather tired of the charade.

So I'm going to ignore this patch and I ask that you and other security
people never do this again.

If you're going to submit a patch which you know will change kernel
interfaces in a non-backward-compatible fashion then don't just pretend
that it didn't happen!  Please provide us with a complete description
of the breakage and at least some analysis of the downstream
implications of the change.  So that we are better able to decide
whether the security improvements justify the disruption.

[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/$PID/{sched,schedstat}

[Vasiliy Kulikov]

On Tue, Nov 08, 2011 at 15:17 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > On Sat, Nov 05, 2011 at 14:48 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > > /proc/$PID/{sched,schedstat} contain debugging scheduler counters, which
> > > should not be world readable.  They may be used to gather private information
> > > about processes' activity.  E.g. it can be used to count the number of
> > > characters typed in gksu dialog:
> > > 
> > > http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3
> > > 
> > > This infoleak is similar to io (1d1221f375c) and stat's eip/esp (f83ce3e6b02d)
> > > infoleaks.  Probably other 0644/0444 procfs files are vulnerable to
> > > similar infoleaks.
> 
> Grumble.
> 
> The obvious issue with this patch is its non-back-compatibility.  What
> existing code will break, in what manner and what is the seriousness of
> the breakage?
> 
> You *know* this is the main issue, yet you didn't address it at all! 
> You just leave the issue out there for other people to work out, and to
> ask the obvious questions.
> 
> This happens over and over and I'm getting rather tired of the charade.
> 
> So I'm going to ignore this patch and I ask that you and other security
> people never do this again.
> 
> If you're going to submit a patch which you know will change kernel
> interfaces in a non-backward-compatible fashion then don't just pretend
> that it didn't happen!  Please provide us with a complete description
> of the breakage and at least some analysis of the downstream
> implications of the change.  So that we are better able to decide
> whether the security improvements justify the disruption.

I'm sorry it looked like I didn't test the patch, but I really didn't
face to any breakage (top, ps, gnome monitor).  The actual problem is
that the patch is still incomplete - all proc monitoring tools watch for
/proc/$PID/stat file content changes, not /proc/$PID/sched.
/proc/$PID/stat contains the same sched information, which I've missed.
Restricting "stat" does break these tools.

/proc/$PID/stat already has "fake" fields like KSTK_EIP() and KSTK_ESP().
We can continue to do such sort of force fields zeroing, which doesn't
break ABI.


Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments

Re: [PATCH] proc: restrict access to /proc/$PID/{sched,schedstat}

[Vasiliy Kulikov]

On Tue, Nov 08, 2011 at 15:17 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > On Sat, Nov 05, 2011 at 14:48 +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > > /proc/$PID/{sched,schedstat} contain debugging scheduler counters, which
> > > should not be world readable.  They may be used to gather private information
> > > about processes' activity.  E.g. it can be used to count the number of
> > > characters typed in gksu dialog:
> > > 
> > > http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/11/05/3
> > > 
> > > This infoleak is similar to io (1d1221f375c) and stat's eip/esp (f83ce3e6b02d)
> > > infoleaks.  Probably other 0644/0444 procfs files are vulnerable to
> > > similar infoleaks.
> 
> Grumble.
> 
> The obvious issue with this patch is its non-back-compatibility.  What
> existing code will break, in what manner and what is the seriousness of
> the breakage?
> 
> You *know* this is the main issue, yet you didn't address it at all! 
> You just leave the issue out there for other people to work out, and to
> ask the obvious questions.
> 
> This happens over and over and I'm getting rather tired of the charade.
> 
> So I'm going to ignore this patch and I ask that you and other security
> people never do this again.
> 
> If you're going to submit a patch which you know will change kernel
> interfaces in a non-backward-compatible fashion then don't just pretend
> that it didn't happen!  Please provide us with a complete description
> of the breakage and at least some analysis of the downstream
> implications of the change.  So that we are better able to decide
> whether the security improvements justify the disruption.

I'm sorry it looked like I didn't test the patch, but I really didn't
face to any breakage (top, ps, gnome monitor).  The actual problem is
that the patch is still incomplete - all proc monitoring tools watch for
/proc/$PID/stat file content changes, not /proc/$PID/sched.
/proc/$PID/stat contains the same sched information, which I've missed.
Restricting "stat" does break these tools.

/proc/$PID/stat already has "fake" fields like KSTK_EIP() and KSTK_ESP().
We can continue to do such sort of force fields zeroing, which doesn't
break ABI.


Thanks,

-- 
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments