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From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Federica Teodori <federica.teodori@googlemail.com>,
	Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>,
	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2012.1] fs: symlink restrictions on sticky directories
Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2012 08:36:35 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120106073635.GC14188@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJ=D1pKCZ8=1-WGkm0witNEH9Ux01+1BJyZKC_DAX00aA@mail.gmail.com>


* Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 5, 2012 at 1:17 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> wrote:
> > * Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> >> @@ -1495,6 +1496,15 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
> >>  #endif
> >>  #endif
> >>       {
> >> +             .procname       = "protected_sticky_symlinks",
> >> +             .data           = &protected_sticky_symlinks,
> >> +             .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
> >> +             .mode           = 0644,
> >> +             .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> >> +             .extra1         = &zero,
> >> +             .extra2         = &one,
> >> +     },
> >
> > Small detail:
> >
> > Might make sense to change the .mode to 0600, to make it 
> > harder for unprivileged attack code to guess whether this 
> > protection (and the resulting audit warning to the 
> > administrator) is enabled on a system or not.
> 
> Sure, I have no problem with that. In addition to this change, 
> what's the best next step for this patch?

Al and Linus's call I guess. Maybe ask Andrew whether he'd put 
it into -mm?

Thanks,

	Ingo

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Federica Teodori <federica.teodori@googlemail.com>,
	Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>,
	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2012.1] fs: symlink restrictions on sticky directories
Date: Fri, 6 Jan 2012 08:36:35 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120106073635.GC14188@elte.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jJ=D1pKCZ8=1-WGkm0witNEH9Ux01+1BJyZKC_DAX00aA@mail.gmail.com>


* Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 5, 2012 at 1:17 AM, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> wrote:
> > * Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> >> @@ -1495,6 +1496,15 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
> >>  #endif
> >>  #endif
> >>       {
> >> +             .procname       = "protected_sticky_symlinks",
> >> +             .data           = &protected_sticky_symlinks,
> >> +             .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
> >> +             .mode           = 0644,
> >> +             .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
> >> +             .extra1         = &zero,
> >> +             .extra2         = &one,
> >> +     },
> >
> > Small detail:
> >
> > Might make sense to change the .mode to 0600, to make it 
> > harder for unprivileged attack code to guess whether this 
> > protection (and the resulting audit warning to the 
> > administrator) is enabled on a system or not.
> 
> Sure, I have no problem with that. In addition to this change, 
> what's the best next step for this patch?

Al and Linus's call I guess. Maybe ask Andrew whether he'd put 
it into -mm?

Thanks,

	Ingo

  reply	other threads:[~2012-01-06  7:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-01-04 20:18 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2012.1] fs: symlink restrictions on sticky directories Kees Cook
2012-01-04 20:18 ` Kees Cook
2012-01-05  9:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2012-01-05  9:17   ` Ingo Molnar
2012-01-05 19:36   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-01-05 19:36     ` Kees Cook
2012-01-06  7:36     ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2012-01-06  7:36       ` Ingo Molnar
2012-01-06  9:21       ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-01-06  9:21         ` Andrew Morton
2012-01-06  9:43         ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2012-01-06  9:43           ` Ingo Molnar
2012-01-06  9:58           ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-01-06  9:58             ` Andrew Morton
2012-01-06 10:05             ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2012-01-06 10:05               ` Ingo Molnar
2012-01-06 10:33               ` [kernel-hardening] " Andrew Morton
2012-01-06 10:33                 ` Andrew Morton
2012-01-06 11:16                 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2012-01-06 11:16                   ` Ingo Molnar
2012-01-06 18:34             ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-01-06 18:34               ` Kees Cook
2012-01-06 18:44         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-01-06 18:44           ` Kees Cook
2012-01-05 14:30 ` [kernel-hardening] " Nick Bowler
2012-01-05 14:30   ` Nick Bowler
2012-01-05 19:34   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-01-05 19:34     ` Kees Cook
2012-01-05 19:34     ` Kees Cook
2012-01-05 20:08     ` [kernel-hardening] " Nick Bowler
2012-01-05 20:08       ` Nick Bowler
2012-01-05 20:08       ` Nick Bowler
2012-01-05 20:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-01-05 20:55         ` Kees Cook
2012-01-05 22:18         ` [kernel-hardening] " Nick Bowler
2012-01-05 22:18           ` Nick Bowler
2012-01-06  0:08           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2012-01-06  0:08             ` Kees Cook
2012-01-06  2:05         ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2012-01-06  2:05           ` Rik van Riel
2012-01-06  7:34           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2012-01-06  7:34             ` Ingo Molnar
2012-01-06  7:10       ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2012-01-06  7:10         ` Ingo Molnar

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