From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>,
keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
serge.hallyn@canonical.com, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, djm@mindrot.org,
jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com,
penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com,
borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de,
dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2012 13:35:04 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120209093504.GA19507@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrX6xRCvkHBz0TKVxffgOFRfvnb7ZbmyiN3zruwgBXjhKw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 14:51 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> That's neat! CLONE_NEWPID might be safe with no_new_privs, too.
> Unprivileged CLONE_NEWPID would also be a nice, straightforward way to
> start up a process hierarchy and then reliably kill the whole thing
> when you're done with it.
It worth checking whether creating HUGE number or pid namespaces is
able to lock down the system for a significant period of time. E.g.
triggering thousands of pid_ns enumeration under a spinlock.
The same with every "enable this privileged feature to unprivileged
users under certain circumstances" step.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Jamie Lokier <jamie@shareable.org>,
keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
serge.hallyn@canonical.com, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, djm@mindrot.org,
jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com,
penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com,
borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com,
ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de,
dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org,
mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com, corbet@lwn.net,
alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2012 13:35:04 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120209093504.GA19507@albatros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrX6xRCvkHBz0TKVxffgOFRfvnb7ZbmyiN3zruwgBXjhKw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Jan 30, 2012 at 14:51 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> That's neat! CLONE_NEWPID might be safe with no_new_privs, too.
> Unprivileged CLONE_NEWPID would also be a nice, straightforward way to
> start up a process hierarchy and then reliably kill the whole thing
> when you're done with it.
It worth checking whether creating HUGE number or pid namespaces is
able to lock down the system for a significant period of time. E.g.
triggering thousands of pid_ns enumeration under a spinlock.
The same with every "enable this privileged feature to unprivileged
users under certain circumstances" step.
Thanks,
--
Vasiliy Kulikov
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-02-09 9:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-01-30 16:17 [PATCH v3 0/4] PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, unshare, and chroot Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-02-01 18:14 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-01 18:14 ` Kees Cook
2012-01-30 16:17 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] Fix apparmor for PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] Allow unprivileged CLONE_NEWUTS and CLONE_NEWIPC with no_new_privs Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-02-01 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-01 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2012-02-01 20:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-02-01 20:35 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] Allow unprivileged chroot when safe Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 16:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 21:58 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 21:58 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 22:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:41 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 22:41 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 22:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 23:10 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 23:10 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 23:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 23:55 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 23:55 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-31 0:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-31 0:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:18 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-30 22:18 ` Steven Rostedt
2012-01-30 22:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:38 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 22:38 ` Will Drewry
2012-01-30 22:48 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 22:48 ` Colin Walters
2012-01-30 22:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-01-30 22:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2012-02-09 9:35 ` Vasiliy Kulikov [this message]
2012-02-09 9:35 ` Vasiliy Kulikov
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