All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Arno Wagner <arno@wagner.name>
To: dm-crypt@saout.de
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] No key available for this passphrase
Date: Sun, 9 Sep 2012 00:47:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20120908224739.GB3630@tansi.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d3ab01d24791ac5db88dc3a434024018@tenak.net>

On Sat, Sep 08, 2012 at 09:51:29PM +0100, Marcos wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> On 08.09.2012 21:02, Arno Wagner wrote:
> >Hmm. Ok. Next thing is to look at the key-slot areas with
> >a hex dumper. For now placement is described in FAQ item
> >6.12.
> >
> >As fiorst step, look at the output of
> >
> >  cryptsetup luksDump <encrypted partition>
> >
> >to determine your pasphrase is indeed in slot 0.
> 
> It is:
> 
> # cryptsetup luksDump /dev/sdb2
> LUKS header information for /dev/sdb2
> 
> Version:       	1
> Cipher name:   	aes
> Cipher mode:   	lrw-benbi


Wups, what is that? Quite non-standard. Did you select that yourself?


> Hash spec:     	sha1
> Payload offset:	3016
> MK bits:       	384


With that your first keyslot should be from 0x1000 to 0x2ee00.


> MK digest:     	31 14 46 75 66 60 2d a0 30 b3 c6 8a df 5b 72 7b ee
> c4 ed 66
> MK salt:       	a3 6e 85 75 7b 4a 04 a7 30 8a 58 f9 db b9 36 1c
>                	cd d8 c0 85 75 83 81 0a 8f c3 35 ec 3c f9 bd e6
> MK iterations: 	10


That likely means it is the old header. Newer versions of cryptsetup
use some larger number here, based on timing.


> UUID:          	ac6dbe7f-30ab-4fe6-8ddc-f7cec045a791
> 
> Key Slot 0: ENABLED
> 	Iterations:         	254001

Pretty large. Unless you have a liquid-nitrogen cooled
CPU, did you increase the iteration time?

> 	Salt:               	63 d8 01 44 98 40 ef 15 12 b2 cc fe 2d f4 6f f5
> 	                      	f2 e7 f2 d8 6c d5 5a af 3e ba 6c 1c e5 1e e6 e5
> 	Key material offset:	8
> 	AF stripes:            	4000
> Key Slot 1: DISABLED
> Key Slot 2: DISABLED
> Key Slot 3: DISABLED
> Key Slot 4: DISABLED
> Key Slot 5: DISABLED
> Key Slot 6: DISABLED
> Key Slot 7: DISABLED
> 
> 
> >then look at that slow. One way is to use something like
> >
> >  hd <encrypted partition> | less
> >
> >At the very beginning you find the LUKS header (with the magic
> >string "LUKS" 0xBA 0xBE and some plain0-text cipher and hash
> >specs) .
> 
> So far, so good:
> 
> 00000000  4c 55 4b 53 ba be 00 01  61 65 73 00 00 00 00 00
> |LUKS....aes.....|
> 00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
> |................|
> 00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  6c 72 77 2d 62 65 6e 62
> |........lrw-benb|
> 00000030  69 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
> |i...............|
> 00000040  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  73 68 61 31 00 00 00 00
> |........sha1....|
> 00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
> |................|
> 00000060  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  00 00 0b c8 00 00 00 30
> |...............0|
> 
> 
> >Then look at keyslot 0 (at 0x1000-0x20400 with default
> >parameters). If there is anything appearing non-random in there,
> >then it has been destroyed. The nature of that non-random data points
> >to the source.
> 
> Seems quite random to me:

Have you looked at the whole keyslot up to 0x2ee00?
 
> 00001000  d3 33 50 4a ca d2 2f 3f  f3 9b 96 5b fd 6c 1e 2e
> |.3PJ../?...[.l..|
> 00001010  91 33 97 fc 49 39 57 43  55 45 50 47 a9 7c c3 49
> |.3..I9WCUEPG.|.I|
> 00001020  f0 75 9b 54 15 74 34 13  50 34 c9 84 b4 95 df 57
> |.u.T.t4.P4.....W|
> 00001030  15 6d 5a 34 12 6d ab 0d  04 94 19 f4 c2 72 bb b0
> |.mZ4.m.......r..|
> 00001040  dc 26 83 59 5f 6c 80 29  84 1a df b4 76 92 4c 61
> |.&.Y_l.)....v.La|
> 00001050  96 1c 5f df d7 69 21 28  d0 c7 5a 4c 08 18 90 85
> |.._..i!(..ZL....|
> 00001060  94 01 48 d7 d3 31 f0 b6  19 39 a5 62 92 f2 73 19
> |..H..1...9.b..s.|
> 00001070  2d d6 6c 4a fe e7 49 ee  ff f2 f5 33 1f 4f 7d 1e
> |-.lJ..I....3.O}.|
> 00001080  1f 79 fd aa 4a a7 26 8d  22 bb 64 44 de d4 ba 6d
> |.y..J.&.".dD...m|
> 00001090  4f 99 13 38 c8 58 00 35  ab b7 d7 b2 af f9 80 1e
> |O..8.X.5........|
> 000010a0  d4 7b de f2 a3 fc 98 ee  1e 11 ab 7e dd 4c b5 c1
> |.{.........~.L..|
> 000010b0  9c 6d f4 ed fd fe dc 44  1f 8f 4f 2f f3 3e fd 81
> |.m.....D..O/.>..|
> 000010c0  98 0c bb d5 36 79 c8 d8  b4 39 a1 74 eb 43 d5 44
> |....6y...9.t.C.D|
> 000010d0  7b c6 91 11 c0 6e dd 44  32 23 df 7c eb af d9 63
> |{....n.D2#.|...c|
> 000010e0  59 fc b9 ba d1 15 ca 9b  64 0e b8 a5 28 69 b0 86
> |Y.......d...(i..|
> 000010f0  6d db d5 47 15 4d fb 74  bf 45 04 45 54 3b fc ce
> |m..G.M.t.E.ET;..|
> 00001100  31 62 6b 92 61 31 25 1e  9b bf 4c 7f 70 7f 87 77
> |1bk.a1%...L.p..w|
> 00001110  bf 72 d1 d6 8f 8f f9 e9  07 1f 8e 4f 91 39 25 00
> |.r.........O.9%.|
> 00001120  8a fb 5b 1d 88 08 18 f2  ca 73 47 0a 23 33 02 ae
> |..[......sG.#3..|
> 00001130  81 c9 64 8a d7 c0 87 5c  15 d1 cc ac 3a 3e e1 6a
> |..d....\....:>.j|
> 00001140  ee 11 42 ac 9b 34 52 72  4c 22 18 13 64 c2 fd 98
> |..B..4RrL"..d...|
> 00001150  e3 3e c6 dd 2b aa 5f 7a  6d e6 2a 37 35 95 6d 7f
> |.>..+._zm.*75.m.|
> 00001160  ea db 53 1c 87 35 e9 ed  da ba cb 5b 52 54 ab 1e
> |..S..5.....[RT..|
> 00001170  48 d3 b5 85 5a 58 03 37  01 a9 ad 49 13 6b 7b 7d
> |H...ZX.7...I.k{}|
> 00001180  80 12 a1 c5 44 3a 38 2a  d0 a1 fa 46 4b a9 55 ad
> |....D:8*...FK.U.|
> 00001190  c8 6a ad 5c d2 81 35 c5  82 31 31 e1 99 89 47 bb
> |.j.\..5..11...G.|
> 000011a0  c8 fe 7c b5 7e 8d 9b c7  e3 a0 6b 1c 3e 67 da 33
> |..|.~.....k.>g.3|
> 
> And it follows similarly... BUT: Just before 0x1000 I have:
> 
> 00000ff0  00 00 00 00 00 00 53 57  41 50 53 50 41 43 45 32
> |......SWAPSPACE2|


That is not a problem. There is some free space between header
and first keyslot. Older versions of cryptsetup do not wipe 
that area if I remember correctly.


> I don't know if it's relevant or not, but (being the first time I
> look at a block
> device with an hex dumper) I find suspicious to have such "tag"
> there...
> 
> >I have meant to write a LUKS keyslot-checker for some time
> >now, but never got around to it. Hmm. Maybe something to
> >pass the time this weekend.
> 
> ;-)
> 
> >Anyways, don't do anything rash. Somethinges things can be
> >fixed but careful diagnosis is the key to that.
> 
> Will be patient then.

Most people are hosed in your situations, but there have been
some miraculous recoveries. So really knowing what happened
is the key.

Arno
-- 
Arno Wagner,    Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform.,   Email: arno@wagner.name 
GnuPG:  ID: 1E25338F  FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C  0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F
----
One of the painful things about our time is that those who feel certainty 
are stupid, and those with any imagination and understanding are filled 
with doubt and indecision. -- Bertrand Russell 

  reply	other threads:[~2012-09-08 22:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-09-08  9:03 [dm-crypt] No key available for this passphrase Marcos
2012-09-08 13:35 ` Arno Wagner
2012-09-08 18:47   ` Marcos
2012-09-08 20:02     ` Arno Wagner
2012-09-08 20:51       ` Marcos
2012-09-08 22:47         ` Arno Wagner [this message]
2012-09-09 12:53           ` Marcos
2012-09-09 13:49             ` Arno Wagner
2012-09-09 14:06               ` Marcos
2012-09-08 23:16         ` [dm-crypt] Re2: " Arno Wagner
2012-09-09 12:58           ` Marcos
2012-09-08 22:45       ` [dm-crypt] " Matthias Schniedermeyer
2012-09-09  8:45         ` Milan Broz
2012-09-09 13:42           ` Arno Wagner
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2013-01-25 17:53 Sebastian
2013-01-25 19:40 ` Arno Wagner
2013-01-25 19:57   ` Sebastian
2013-01-25 21:50     ` Arno Wagner
2013-01-26 10:15       ` Sebastian
2013-01-26 17:41         ` Arno Wagner
2013-01-27  8:42           ` Sebastian
2013-01-28 23:46             ` .. ink ..
2013-01-29  2:39               ` Arno Wagner
2013-01-31 13:43                 ` Sebastian
2013-01-31 17:48                   ` .. ink ..

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20120908224739.GB3630@tansi.org \
    --to=arno@wagner.name \
    --cc=dm-crypt@saout.de \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.