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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>,
	Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>,
	Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>,
	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 22:43:06 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130405204306.GA14092@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKyRK=iEXpq9KnG_VJMYW-tpBxU_2TGaO_hZRkNY=J+7SNoQkA@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Apr 05, 2013 at 01:19:39PM -0700, Julien Tinnes wrote:
> I think it'd be perfectly ok for OOPS to print out the kernel base.

Yeah, ok, this still would need some massaging of the oops output per
script, but it shouldn't be a big problem.

Also, you probably need to make clear in the oops itself that the
addresses have been randomized. Or, is the mere presence of kernel base
going to imply that?

> Restricting access to these oopses becomes a different problem
> (privilege separation). Some existing sandboxes (Chromium, vsftpd,
> openssh..) are already defending against it.

Ok.

Thanks.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Sent from a fat crate under my desk. Formatting is fine.
--

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg@redhat.com>,
	Matt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>,
	Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>,
	Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2013 22:43:06 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130405204306.GA14092@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKyRK=iEXpq9KnG_VJMYW-tpBxU_2TGaO_hZRkNY=J+7SNoQkA@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Apr 05, 2013 at 01:19:39PM -0700, Julien Tinnes wrote:
> I think it'd be perfectly ok for OOPS to print out the kernel base.

Yeah, ok, this still would need some massaging of the oops output per
script, but it shouldn't be a big problem.

Also, you probably need to make clear in the oops itself that the
addresses have been randomized. Or, is the mere presence of kernel base
going to imply that?

> Restricting access to these oopses becomes a different problem
> (privilege separation). Some existing sandboxes (Chromium, vsftpd,
> openssh..) are already defending against it.

Ok.

Thanks.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Sent from a fat crate under my desk. Formatting is fine.
--

  reply	other threads:[~2013-04-05 20:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-04-04 20:07 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/3] kernel ASLR Kees Cook
2013-04-04 20:07 ` Kees Cook
2013-04-04 20:07 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/3] x86: routines to choose random kernel base offset Kees Cook
2013-04-04 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2013-04-05  7:24   ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05  7:24     ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05  7:36     ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05  7:36       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05 18:15       ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05 18:15         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-08  5:35         ` [kernel-hardening] " Hasinoliva MIARIMANJATO
2013-04-08  5:35           ` Hasinoliva MIARIMANJATO
2013-04-04 20:07 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/3] x86: build reloc tool for both 64 and 32 bit Kees Cook
2013-04-04 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2013-04-05  7:13   ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05  7:13     ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-04 20:07 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/3] x86: kernel base offset ASLR Kees Cook
2013-04-04 20:07   ` Kees Cook
2013-04-04 20:12   ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-04 20:12     ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-04 20:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Tinnes
2013-04-04 20:19       ` Julien Tinnes
2013-04-04 20:23       ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Tinnes
2013-04-04 20:23         ` Julien Tinnes
2013-04-04 20:27         ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-04 20:27           ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-04 20:48           ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Tinnes
2013-04-04 20:48             ` Julien Tinnes
2013-04-05  7:05             ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05  7:05               ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-04 20:54     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-04-04 20:54       ` Kees Cook
2013-04-04 20:58       ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-04 20:58         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-04 21:00         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-04-04 21:00           ` Kees Cook
2013-04-04 21:01           ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-04 21:01             ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-04 21:04             ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Northup
2013-04-04 21:04               ` Eric Northup
2013-04-04 21:06             ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-04-04 21:06               ` Kees Cook
2013-04-04 21:00         ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Tinnes
2013-04-04 21:00           ` Julien Tinnes
2013-04-04 21:01         ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Northup
2013-04-04 21:01           ` Eric Northup
2013-04-05  7:55           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05  7:55             ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-04 20:21   ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-04 20:21     ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-04 20:47     ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric Northup
2013-04-04 20:47       ` Eric Northup
2013-04-05  1:08       ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05  1:08         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05  8:04     ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05  8:04       ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05 15:30       ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05 15:30         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-08 11:58         ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-04-08 11:58           ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-08 14:58           ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-08 14:58             ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05 18:17       ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05 18:17         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05 20:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Yinghai Lu
2013-04-05 20:01       ` Yinghai Lu
2013-04-05 20:05       ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05 20:05         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05 20:19         ` [kernel-hardening] " Yinghai Lu
2013-04-05 20:19           ` Yinghai Lu
2013-04-05 20:29           ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05 20:29             ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05  7:11   ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05  7:11     ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05 22:06     ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Tinnes
2013-04-05 22:06       ` Julien Tinnes
2013-04-05 22:08       ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05 22:08         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-05 22:13         ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Tinnes
2013-04-05 22:13           ` Julien Tinnes
2013-04-05  7:34   ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05  7:34     ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-05 12:12   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jiri Kosina
2013-04-05 12:12     ` Jiri Kosina
2013-04-05 14:49   ` [kernel-hardening] " Borislav Petkov
2013-04-05 14:49     ` Borislav Petkov
2013-04-05 20:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " Julien Tinnes
2013-04-05 20:19       ` Julien Tinnes
2013-04-05 20:43       ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2013-04-05 20:43         ` Borislav Petkov
2013-04-05 23:18         ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-04-05 23:18           ` Kees Cook
2013-04-06 10:10           ` [kernel-hardening] " Borislav Petkov
2013-04-06 10:10             ` Borislav Petkov
2013-04-08  5:34             ` [kernel-hardening] " Hasinoliva MIARIMANJATO
2013-04-08 12:13         ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-08 12:13           ` Ingo Molnar
2013-04-08  5:34 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/3] kernel ASLR Hasinoliva MIARIMANJATO
2013-04-11 20:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-11 20:52   ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-04-11 21:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2013-04-11 21:28     ` Kees Cook

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