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From: Eli Cohen <eli@dev.mellanox.co.il>
To: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>, Roland Dreier <roland@kernel.org>,
	Sean Hefty <sean.hefty@intel.com>,
	Hal Rosenstock <hal.rosenstock@gmail.com>,
	linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org, kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch] IB/mlx5: stack info leak in mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext()
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2013 12:02:28 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130729120228.GA20064@mtldesk30> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130728202323.GA5053@mwanda>

On Sun, Jul 28, 2013 at 11:24:43PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> 
> First let me say that I don't know how this code is called, it may
> be root only, but even in that case I think it's still worth
> applying my patch.

It can be called by non root users as well.

> 
> These info leak problems are a well known security problem so I
> didn't put a long explanation.  What you do is you fill the stack
> with function pointers, then you call the function that leaks.  Then
> you have a potentially useful pointer which was supposed to be
> secret.  Something like that anyway.
> 
> There are probably lots of other easier ways to defeat address space
> randomization.  There may be other ways you can use info leaks as
> well...
> 
> Anyway, regardless, static checkers and code auditors look for these
> leaks so applying the patch makes sense just to silence a warning.
> 

OK, I am convinced that it's worth applying.

Acked by Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Eli Cohen <eli@dev.mellanox.co.il>
To: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>, Roland Dreier <roland@kernel.org>,
	Sean Hefty <sean.hefty@intel.com>,
	Hal Rosenstock <hal.rosenstock@gmail.com>,
	linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org, kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [patch] IB/mlx5: stack info leak in mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext()
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2013 15:02:28 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130729120228.GA20064@mtldesk30> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130728202323.GA5053@mwanda>

On Sun, Jul 28, 2013 at 11:24:43PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> 
> First let me say that I don't know how this code is called, it may
> be root only, but even in that case I think it's still worth
> applying my patch.

It can be called by non root users as well.

> 
> These info leak problems are a well known security problem so I
> didn't put a long explanation.  What you do is you fill the stack
> with function pointers, then you call the function that leaks.  Then
> you have a potentially useful pointer which was supposed to be
> secret.  Something like that anyway.
> 
> There are probably lots of other easier ways to defeat address space
> randomization.  There may be other ways you can use info leaks as
> well...
> 
> Anyway, regardless, static checkers and code auditors look for these
> leaks so applying the patch makes sense just to silence a warning.
> 

OK, I am convinced that it's worth applying.

Acked by Eli Cohen <eli@mellanox.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2013-07-29 12:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-07-25 17:04 [patch] IB/mlx5: stack info leak in mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext() Dan Carpenter
2013-07-25 17:04 ` Dan Carpenter
2013-07-28  7:23 ` Eli Cohen
2013-07-28  7:23   ` Eli Cohen
2013-07-28 20:24   ` Dan Carpenter
2013-07-28 20:24     ` Dan Carpenter
2013-07-29 12:02     ` Eli Cohen [this message]
2013-07-29 12:02       ` Eli Cohen

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