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From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	jwboyer-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org,
	keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org,
	Matthew Garrett
	<matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 14:10:52 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130829181052.GA8697@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1376933171-9854-9-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>

On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 01:26:09PM -0400, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
> is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes
> sense to disable kexec in this situation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
> ---
>  kernel/kexec.c | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
> index 59f7b55..1a7690f 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
>  #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>  #include <linux/swap.h>
>  #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
> +#include <linux/module.h>
>  
>  #include <asm/page.h>
>  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
> @@ -1645,6 +1646,9 @@ int kernel_kexec(void)
>  		goto Unlock;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (secure_modules())
> +		return -EPERM;
> +

Hi Matthew, 

Why do disallow this at run time. To me denying this at kexec_load() time
sounds better. Otherwise a user will think that I loaded crash kernel
successfully and when crash actually happens, we never capture the
crash dump.

Thanks
Vivek

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	jwboyer@redhat.com, keescook@chromium.org,
	Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions
Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 14:10:52 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20130829181052.GA8697@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1376933171-9854-9-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com>

On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 01:26:09PM -0400, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> kexec permits the loading and execution of arbitrary code in ring 0, which
> is something that module signing enforcement is meant to prevent. It makes
> sense to disable kexec in this situation.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com>
> ---
>  kernel/kexec.c | 4 ++++
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
> index 59f7b55..1a7690f 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
>  #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
>  #include <linux/swap.h>
>  #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
> +#include <linux/module.h>
>  
>  #include <asm/page.h>
>  #include <asm/uaccess.h>
> @@ -1645,6 +1646,9 @@ int kernel_kexec(void)
>  		goto Unlock;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (secure_modules())
> +		return -EPERM;
> +

Hi Matthew, 

Why do disallow this at run time. To me denying this at kexec_load() time
sounds better. Otherwise a user will think that I loaded crash kernel
successfully and when crash actually happens, we never capture the
crash dump.

Thanks
Vivek

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-08-29 18:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-08-19 17:26 [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 01/10] Add secure_modules() call Matthew Garrett
     [not found]   ` <1376933171-9854-2-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-29 15:01     ` Josh Boyer
2013-08-29 15:01       ` Josh Boyer
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 03/10] x86: Lock down IO port access when module security is enabled Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 04/10] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 05/10] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 07/10] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel parameter " Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 08/10] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel enforces module loading restrictions Matthew Garrett
     [not found]   ` <1376933171-9854-9-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-29 15:57     ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-29 15:57       ` Lenny Szubowicz
     [not found]       ` <410604531.9664777.1377791856786.JavaMail.root-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-29 18:14         ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-29 18:14           ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-29 18:10     ` Vivek Goyal [this message]
2013-08-29 18:10       ` Vivek Goyal
2013-08-19 17:26 ` [PATCH V2 09/10] x86: Restrict MSR access when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
     [not found] ` <1376933171-9854-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett-05XSO3Yj/JvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-19 17:26   ` [PATCH V2 02/10] PCI: Lock down BAR access when module security is enabled Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26   ` [PATCH V2 06/10] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when module loading is restricted Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26   ` [PATCH V2 10/10] Add option to automatically enforce module signatures when in Secure Boot mode Matthew Garrett
2013-08-19 17:26     ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-29 18:37     ` Josh Boyer
     [not found]       ` <20130829183713.GT20828-dHPIJuKSOV01V+h/cAXI7w8O6CCKKCg3HZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-30 20:46         ` H. Peter Anvin
2013-08-30 20:46           ` H. Peter Anvin
     [not found]           ` <522104A6.5000700-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-30 23:41             ` Josh Boyer
2013-08-30 23:41               ` Josh Boyer
     [not found]               ` <20130830234133.GR20828-dHPIJuKSOV01V+h/cAXI7w8O6CCKKCg3HZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org>
2013-09-04 10:51                 ` joeyli
2013-09-04 10:51                   ` joeyli
     [not found]                   ` <1378291877.6380.74.camel-ONCj+Eqt86TasUa73XJKwA@public.gmane.org>
2013-09-04 12:01                     ` Josh Boyer
2013-09-04 12:01                       ` Josh Boyer
     [not found]                       ` <CA+5PVA4J1mL0o=MHM-D81rcViR+E3JUyGChvHe8P+3+yt3v_qA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2013-09-04 13:13                         ` joeyli
2013-09-04 13:13                           ` joeyli
2013-08-28 22:37   ` [PATCH 0/10] Add additional security checks when module loading is restricted Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-28 22:37     ` Lenny Szubowicz
     [not found]     ` <1241952070.8587861.1377729463830.JavaMail.root-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-28 22:41       ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-28 22:41         ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-28 22:58         ` Lenny Szubowicz
2013-08-28 22:58           ` Lenny Szubowicz
     [not found]           ` <761791749.8594444.1377730692707.JavaMail.root-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
2013-08-28 23:05             ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-28 23:05               ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-28 23:07             ` Kees Cook
2013-08-28 23:07               ` Kees Cook
2013-08-28 23:12               ` Matthew Garrett
2013-08-28 23:12                 ` Matthew Garrett
     [not found]               ` <CAGXu5jKQtx1OEn8qT8+LgHL+xFgK_pHGrxtdwFfKT1q3FHhaNg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2013-09-02  5:22                 ` joeyli
2013-09-02  5:22                   ` joeyli
2013-08-19 17:34 ` Kees Cook

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