From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
To: Tejun Heo <tj-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Containers
<containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org>,
Serge Hallyn
<serge.hallyn-GeWIH/nMZzLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman"
<ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] devices cgroup: allow can_attach() if ns_capable
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 00:41:30 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131023004130.GA12788@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAOS58YPynQ-QBx5nZEnYrP5kGTVvv9VAj0cV0aYeikTitvTQbA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
Quoting Tejun Heo (tj-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org):
> On Tue, Jul 23, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn-GeWIH/nMZzLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> > This doesn't delegate it into the container. It allows me, on the host,
> > to set the cgroup for a container.
>
> Hmmm? I'm a bit confused. Isn't the description saying that the patch
> allows pseudo-root in userns to change cgroup membership even if it
> isn't actually root?
>
> Besides, I find the whole check rather bogus and would actually much
> prefer just nuking the check and just follow the standard permission
> checks.
Can we please nuke it like this then?
From b840083ec8fa1f0645ae925c79db3dc51edd019c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn-GeWIH/nMZzLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 01:34:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] device_cgroup: remove can_attach
It is really only wanting to duplicate a check which is already done by the
cgroup subsystem.
With this patch, user jdoe still cannot move pid 1 into a devices cgroup
he owns, but now he can move his own other tasks into devices cgroups.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn-GeWIH/nMZzLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
---
security/device_cgroup.c | 11 -----------
1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index efc6f68..a37c054 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -64,16 +64,6 @@ static inline struct dev_cgroup *task_devcgroup(struct task_struct *task)
struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys;
-static int devcgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys_state *new_css,
- struct cgroup_taskset *set)
-{
- struct task_struct *task = cgroup_taskset_first(set);
-
- if (current != task && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
-}
-
/*
* called under devcgroup_mutex
*/
@@ -698,7 +688,6 @@ static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = {
struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = {
.name = "devices",
- .can_attach = devcgroup_can_attach,
.css_alloc = devcgroup_css_alloc,
.css_free = devcgroup_css_free,
.css_online = devcgroup_online,
--
1.8.3.2
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/2] devices cgroup: allow can_attach() if ns_capable
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 00:41:30 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20131023004130.GA12788@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAOS58YPynQ-QBx5nZEnYrP5kGTVvv9VAj0cV0aYeikTitvTQbA@mail.gmail.com>
Quoting Tejun Heo (tj@kernel.org):
> On Tue, Jul 23, 2013 at 2:38 PM, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> wrote:
> > This doesn't delegate it into the container. It allows me, on the host,
> > to set the cgroup for a container.
>
> Hmmm? I'm a bit confused. Isn't the description saying that the patch
> allows pseudo-root in userns to change cgroup membership even if it
> isn't actually root?
>
> Besides, I find the whole check rather bogus and would actually much
> prefer just nuking the check and just follow the standard permission
> checks.
Can we please nuke it like this then?
>From b840083ec8fa1f0645ae925c79db3dc51edd019c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 01:34:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] device_cgroup: remove can_attach
It is really only wanting to duplicate a check which is already done by the
cgroup subsystem.
With this patch, user jdoe still cannot move pid 1 into a devices cgroup
he owns, but now he can move his own other tasks into devices cgroups.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
---
security/device_cgroup.c | 11 -----------
1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index efc6f68..a37c054 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -64,16 +64,6 @@ static inline struct dev_cgroup *task_devcgroup(struct task_struct *task)
struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys;
-static int devcgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys_state *new_css,
- struct cgroup_taskset *set)
-{
- struct task_struct *task = cgroup_taskset_first(set);
-
- if (current != task && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
-}
-
/*
* called under devcgroup_mutex
*/
@@ -698,7 +688,6 @@ static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = {
struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = {
.name = "devices",
- .can_attach = devcgroup_can_attach,
.css_alloc = devcgroup_css_alloc,
.css_free = devcgroup_css_free,
.css_online = devcgroup_online,
--
1.8.3.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-10-23 0:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-07-23 18:16 [RFC PATCH 1/2] devices cgroup: allow can_attach() if ns_capable Serge Hallyn
2013-07-23 18:16 ` Serge Hallyn
2013-07-23 18:18 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] capabilities: allow nice if we are privileged Serge Hallyn
2013-07-23 18:18 ` Serge Hallyn
2013-07-24 8:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-07-24 8:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2013-07-23 18:30 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] devices cgroup: allow can_attach() if ns_capable Tejun Heo
2013-07-23 18:30 ` Tejun Heo
[not found] ` <20130723183018.GF21100-9pTldWuhBndy/B6EtB590w@public.gmane.org>
2013-07-23 18:38 ` Serge Hallyn
2013-07-23 18:38 ` Serge Hallyn
2013-07-23 18:50 ` Tejun Heo
2013-07-23 18:50 ` Tejun Heo
[not found] ` <CAOS58YPynQ-QBx5nZEnYrP5kGTVvv9VAj0cV0aYeikTitvTQbA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2013-07-23 19:04 ` Serge Hallyn
2013-07-23 19:04 ` Serge Hallyn
2013-07-23 19:12 ` Tejun Heo
2013-07-23 19:12 ` Tejun Heo
[not found] ` <20130723191245.GI21100-9pTldWuhBndy/B6EtB590w@public.gmane.org>
2013-07-23 19:28 ` Serge Hallyn
2013-07-23 19:28 ` Serge Hallyn
2013-07-23 19:39 ` Tejun Heo
2013-07-23 19:39 ` Tejun Heo
[not found] ` <CAOS58YPEKtEiZWsn-8u6OPr-UsyQp=XR+ecGmXyOdT0JnYAmsA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2013-11-04 21:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2013-11-04 21:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20131104215135.GA26190-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2013-11-04 22:06 ` Tejun Heo
2013-11-04 22:06 ` Tejun Heo
2013-10-23 0:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2013-10-23 0:41 ` Serge E. Hallyn
[not found] ` <20131023004130.GA12788-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
2013-10-24 10:57 ` Tejun Heo
2013-10-24 10:57 ` Tejun Heo
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20131023004130.GA12788@mail.hallyn.com \
--to=serge-a9i7lubdfnhqt0dzr+alfa@public.gmane.org \
--cc=containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org \
--cc=linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=serge.hallyn-GeWIH/nMZzLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org \
--cc=tj-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.