Re: [capabilities] Allow normal inheritance for a configurable set of capabilities

[Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>]

Quoting Andy Lutomirski (luto@amacapital.net):
> On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 9:12 AM, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> wrote:
> > A key concept behind posix capabilities is that the privilege comes from
> > both the person and the file being executed.  As you say below basically
> > anything can be executed by the program so that is completely violated.
> >
> > Still, it's not that different from mmapping some arbitrary code and
> > jumping into it whlie retaining caps.
> >
> > If we were to support such a feature, I'm thinking I'd prefer we do
> > it somewhat analogously to the capability bounding set.  Perhaps add a
> > ambient_inh_caps set or something.  Empty by default.  To add caps to it you
> > must have the cap in your permitted set already.  (Ok to do in a user
> > namespace).  Then at exec,
> >
> >         pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | (pI & pA)
> >
> > pA being your ambient_inh set
> >
> > Not saying this is a good idea necessarily, but worth thinking about.
> 
> This isn't obviously a bad formulation.  We could control pA using some syscall.

My first thought was prctl (since we have PR_CAPBSET_DROP)

> Another formulation would be a single per-user-ns or
> inherited-per-process bit that sets fI to the full set regardless of
> file caps.  Dealing with the file effective bit will be an added
> complication, as will dealing with setuid binaries.
> 
> How many of you will be at LSF/MM?  This might be a decent topic.

I'm not scheduled to be there.