From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
To: Andrew Elble <aweits@rit.edu>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, dros@primarydata.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] nfsd: implement machine credential support for some operations
Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2016 10:40:45 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160122154045.GB9082@fieldses.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1453147702-42961-4-git-send-email-aweits@rit.edu>
On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 03:08:22PM -0500, Andrew Elble wrote:
> Add server support for properly decoding and using spo_must_enforce
> and spo_must_allow bits. Add support for machine credentials to be
> used for CLOSE, OPEN_DOWNGRADE, LOCKU, DELEGRETURN,
> and TEST/FREE STATEID.
> Implement a check so as to not throw WRONGSEC errors when these
> operations are used if integrity/privacy isn't turned on.
By the way, is the only problem is that the client is trying to do
krb5i/krb5p on an export exported only with sec=sys or sec=krb5?
We could almost just decide to allow krb5i/krb5p in such cases, would
anyone really mind?
The only reasons I can think of that a user would object to "stronger"
security levels:
- they don't trust the more complicated krb5i/krb5p code, and
want to avoid exposing possible bugs there to malicious
clients--but clients can already send EXCHANGE_ID and other
non-filehandle-based operations with krb5i/krb5p, so stopping
this at the export level seems too late.
- perhaps they want to turn off krb5i/krb5p at the server for
performance reasons.
So we're not making the first problem any worse here. For the second
problem, as long as the sec= option is correctly enforced on some subset
of the operations, the client will negotiate down quickly.
So for example we could allow krb5i/krb5p on any compound containing an
so_must_allow op?
--b.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble <aweits@rit.edu>
> ---
> fs/nfsd/export.c | 4 ++++
> fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 18 ++++++++++++++
> fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++---------------------
> fs/nfsd/nfsd.h | 5 ++++
> fs/nfsd/state.h | 1 +
> fs/nfsd/xdr4.h | 3 +++
> 7 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/export.c b/fs/nfsd/export.c
> index b4d84b579f20..0395e3e8fc3e 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/export.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/export.c
> @@ -954,6 +954,10 @@ __be32 check_nfsd_access(struct svc_export *exp, struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
> rqstp->rq_cred.cr_flavor == RPC_AUTH_UNIX)
> return 0;
> }
> +
> + if (nfsd4_spo_must_allow(rqstp))
> + return 0;
> +
> return nfserr_wrongsec;
> }
>
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
> index a9f096c7e99f..047d6662010b 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c
> @@ -2285,6 +2285,75 @@ static struct nfsd4_operation nfsd4_ops[] = {
> },
> };
>
> +/**
> + * nfsd4_spo_must_allow - Determine if the compound op contains an
> + * operation that is allowed to be sent with machine credentials
> + *
> + * @rqstp: a pointer to the struct svc_rqst
> + *
> + * nfsd4_spo_must_allow() allows check_nfsd_access() to succeed
> + * when the operation and/or the FH+operation(s) is part of what the
> + * client negotiated to be able to send with machine credentials.
> + * We keep some state so that FH+operation(s) can succeed despite
> + * check_nfsd_access() being called from fh_verify() as well as
> + * nfsd4_proc_compound().
> + */
> +
> +bool nfsd4_spo_must_allow(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
> +{
> + struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
> + struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp = rqstp->rq_argp;
> + struct nfsd4_op *this = &argp->ops[resp->opcnt - 1];
> + struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate = &resp->cstate;
> + struct nfsd4_operation *thisd;
> + struct nfs4_op_map *allow = &cstate->clp->cl_spo_must_allow;
> + u32 opiter;
> +
> + if (!cstate->minorversion)
> + return false;
> +
> + thisd = OPDESC(this);
> +
> + if (!(thisd->op_flags & OP_IS_PUTFH_LIKE)) {
> + if (cstate->spo_must_allowed == true)
> + /*
> + * a prior putfh + op has set
> + * spo_must_allow conditions
> + */
> + return true;
> + /* evaluate op against spo_must_allow with no prior putfh */
> + if (test_bit(this->opnum, allow->u.longs) &&
> + cstate->clp->cl_mach_cred &&
> + nfsd4_mach_creds_match(cstate->clp, rqstp))
> + return true;
> + else
> + return false;
> + }
> + /*
> + * this->opnum has PUTFH ramifications
> + * scan forward to next putfh or end of compound op
> + */
> + opiter = resp->opcnt;
> + while (opiter < argp->opcnt) {
> + this = &argp->ops[opiter++];
> + thisd = OPDESC(this);
> + if (thisd->op_flags & OP_IS_PUTFH_LIKE)
> + break;
> + if (test_bit(this->opnum, allow->u.longs) &&
> + cstate->clp->cl_mach_cred &&
> + nfsd4_mach_creds_match(cstate->clp, rqstp)) {
> + /*
> + * the op covered by the fh is a
> + * spo_must_allow operation
> + */
> + cstate->spo_must_allowed = true;
> + return true;
> + }
> + }
> + cstate->spo_must_allowed = false;
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> int nfsd4_max_reply(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_op *op)
> {
> struct nfsd4_operation *opdesc;
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> index 65efc900e97e..b28805519725 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> @@ -2367,6 +2367,22 @@ nfsd4_exchange_id(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
>
> switch (exid->spa_how) {
> case SP4_MACH_CRED:
> + exid->spo_must_enforce[0] = 0;
> + exid->spo_must_enforce[1] = (
> + 1 << (OP_BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION - 32) |
> + 1 << (OP_EXCHANGE_ID - 32) |
> + 1 << (OP_CREATE_SESSION - 32) |
> + 1 << (OP_DESTROY_SESSION - 32) |
> + 1 << (OP_DESTROY_CLIENTID - 32));
> +
> + exid->spo_must_allow[0] &= (1 << (OP_CLOSE) |
> + 1 << (OP_OPEN_DOWNGRADE) |
> + 1 << (OP_LOCKU) |
> + 1 << (OP_DELEGRETURN));
> +
> + exid->spo_must_allow[1] &= (
> + 1 << (OP_TEST_STATEID - 32) |
> + 1 << (OP_FREE_STATEID - 32));
> if (!svc_rqst_integrity_protected(rqstp))
> return nfserr_inval;
> case SP4_NONE:
> @@ -2443,6 +2459,8 @@ out_new:
> }
> new->cl_minorversion = cstate->minorversion;
> new->cl_mach_cred = (exid->spa_how == SP4_MACH_CRED);
> + new->cl_spo_must_allow.u.words[0] = exid->spo_must_allow[0];
> + new->cl_spo_must_allow.u.words[1] = exid->spo_must_allow[1];
>
> gen_clid(new, nn);
> add_to_unconfirmed(new);
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> index 51c9e9ca39a4..e2043aa95e27 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
> @@ -1297,16 +1297,14 @@ nfsd4_decode_exchange_id(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp,
> break;
> case SP4_MACH_CRED:
> /* spo_must_enforce */
> - READ_BUF(4);
> - dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
> - READ_BUF(dummy * 4);
> - p += dummy;
> -
> + status = nfsd4_decode_bitmap(argp,
> + exid->spo_must_enforce);
> + if (status)
> + goto out;
> /* spo_must_allow */
> - READ_BUF(4);
> - dummy = be32_to_cpup(p++);
> - READ_BUF(dummy * 4);
> - p += dummy;
> + status = nfsd4_decode_bitmap(argp, exid->spo_must_allow);
> + if (status)
> + goto out;
> break;
> case SP4_SSV:
> /* ssp_ops */
> @@ -3841,14 +3839,6 @@ nfsd4_encode_write(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr, struct nfsd4_w
> return nfserr;
> }
>
> -static const u32 nfs4_minimal_spo_must_enforce[2] = {
> - [1] = 1 << (OP_BIND_CONN_TO_SESSION - 32) |
> - 1 << (OP_EXCHANGE_ID - 32) |
> - 1 << (OP_CREATE_SESSION - 32) |
> - 1 << (OP_DESTROY_SESSION - 32) |
> - 1 << (OP_DESTROY_CLIENTID - 32)
> -};
> -
> static __be32
> nfsd4_encode_exchange_id(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
> struct nfsd4_exchange_id *exid)
> @@ -3859,6 +3849,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_exchange_id(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
> char *server_scope;
> int major_id_sz;
> int server_scope_sz;
> + int status = 0;
> uint64_t minor_id = 0;
>
> if (nfserr)
> @@ -3887,18 +3878,20 @@ nfsd4_encode_exchange_id(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
> case SP4_NONE:
> break;
> case SP4_MACH_CRED:
> - /* spo_must_enforce, spo_must_allow */
> - p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 16);
> - if (!p)
> - return nfserr_resource;
> -
> /* spo_must_enforce bitmap: */
> - *p++ = cpu_to_be32(2);
> - *p++ = cpu_to_be32(nfs4_minimal_spo_must_enforce[0]);
> - *p++ = cpu_to_be32(nfs4_minimal_spo_must_enforce[1]);
> - /* empty spo_must_allow bitmap: */
> - *p++ = cpu_to_be32(0);
> -
> + status = nfsd4_encode_bitmap(xdr,
> + exid->spo_must_enforce[0],
> + exid->spo_must_enforce[1],
> + exid->spo_must_enforce[2]);
> + if (status)
> + goto out;
> + /* spo_must_allow bitmap: */
> + status = nfsd4_encode_bitmap(xdr,
> + exid->spo_must_allow[0],
> + exid->spo_must_allow[1],
> + exid->spo_must_allow[2]);
> + if (status)
> + goto out;
> break;
> default:
> WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> @@ -3925,6 +3918,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_exchange_id(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
> /* Implementation id */
> *p++ = cpu_to_be32(0); /* zero length nfs_impl_id4 array */
> return 0;
> +out:
> + return status;
> }
>
> static __be32
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h b/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h
> index cf980523898b..9446849888d5 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsd.h
> @@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ void nfs4_state_shutdown_net(struct net *net);
> void nfs4_reset_lease(time_t leasetime);
> int nfs4_reset_recoverydir(char *recdir);
> char * nfs4_recoverydir(void);
> +bool nfsd4_spo_must_allow(struct svc_rqst *rqstp);
> #else
> static inline int nfsd4_init_slabs(void) { return 0; }
> static inline void nfsd4_free_slabs(void) { }
> @@ -134,6 +135,10 @@ static inline void nfs4_state_shutdown_net(struct net *net) { }
> static inline void nfs4_reset_lease(time_t leasetime) { }
> static inline int nfs4_reset_recoverydir(char *recdir) { return 0; }
> static inline char * nfs4_recoverydir(void) {return NULL; }
> +static inline bool nfsd4_spo_must_allow(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> #endif
>
> /*
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/state.h b/fs/nfsd/state.h
> index 77fdf4de91ba..2b59c74f098c 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/state.h
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/state.h
> @@ -345,6 +345,7 @@ struct nfs4_client {
> u32 cl_exchange_flags;
> /* number of rpc's in progress over an associated session: */
> atomic_t cl_refcount;
> + struct nfs4_op_map cl_spo_must_allow;
>
> /* for nfs41 callbacks */
> /* We currently support a single back channel with a single slot */
> diff --git a/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h b/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h
> index 25c9c79460f9..c88aca9c42d7 100644
> --- a/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h
> +++ b/fs/nfsd/xdr4.h
> @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct nfsd4_compound_state {
> struct nfsd4_session *session;
> struct nfsd4_slot *slot;
> int data_offset;
> + bool spo_must_allowed;
> size_t iovlen;
> u32 minorversion;
> __be32 status;
> @@ -403,6 +404,8 @@ struct nfsd4_exchange_id {
> clientid_t clientid;
> u32 seqid;
> int spa_how;
> + u32 spo_must_enforce[3];
> + u32 spo_must_allow[3];
> };
>
> struct nfsd4_sequence {
> --
> 2.6.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-01-22 15:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-18 20:08 [PATCH v2 0/3] Deal with lost delegations and EKEYEXPIRED Andrew Elble
2016-01-18 20:08 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] nfs/nfsd: Move useful bitfield ops to a commonly accessible place Andrew Elble
2016-01-18 20:08 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] nfsd: allow mach_creds_match to be used more broadly Andrew Elble
2016-01-18 20:08 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] nfsd: implement machine credential support for some operations Andrew Elble
2016-01-20 22:53 ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-01-21 16:07 ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-01-21 19:01 ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-01-21 19:30 ` Andrew W Elble
2016-01-21 19:50 ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-01-22 0:01 ` Andrew W Elble
2016-01-22 15:24 ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-01-22 16:06 ` Trond Myklebust
2016-01-22 15:40 ` J. Bruce Fields [this message]
2016-01-22 16:09 ` Andrew W Elble
2016-01-22 16:36 ` J. Bruce Fields
2016-01-20 22:34 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] Deal with lost delegations and EKEYEXPIRED J. Bruce Fields
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-01-05 18:55 Andrew Elble
2016-01-05 18:55 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] nfsd: implement machine credential support for some operations Andrew Elble
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