From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH RESEND] fix MSI injection on Xen
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2016 20:16:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160204201552-mutt-send-email-mst@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.02.1602041704470.16539@kaball.uk.xensource.com>
On Thu, Feb 04, 2016 at 05:05:46PM +0000, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> Hi Michael,
>
> do you have any comments on this?
I dislike how it spreads xen specific stuff around,
but I don't have a better idea at the moment, so
I applied this.
> On Wed, 13 Jan 2016, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > On Xen MSIs can be remapped into pirqs, which are a type of event
> > channels. It's mostly for the benefit of PCI passthrough devices, to
> > avoid the overhead of interacting with the emulated lapic.
> >
> > However remapping interrupts and MSIs is also supported for emulated
> > devices, such as the e1000 and virtio-net.
> >
> > When an interrupt or an MSI is remapped into a pirq, masking and
> > unmasking is done by masking and unmasking the event channel. The
> > masking bit on the PCI config space or MSI-X table should be ignored,
> > but it isn't at the moment.
> >
> > As a consequence emulated devices which use MSI or MSI-X, such as
> > virtio-net, don't work properly (the guest doesn't receive any
> > notifications). The mechanism was working properly when xen_apic was
> > introduced, but I haven't narrowed down which commit in particular is
> > causing the regression.
> >
> > Fix the issue by ignoring the masking bit for MSI and MSI-X which have
> > been remapped into pirqs.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
> >
> >
> > diff --git a/hw/pci/msi.c b/hw/pci/msi.c
> > index f9c0484..3998725 100644
> > --- a/hw/pci/msi.c
> > +++ b/hw/pci/msi.c
> > @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
> > */
> >
> > #include "hw/pci/msi.h"
> > +#include "hw/xen/xen.h"
> > #include "qemu/range.h"
> >
> > /* PCI_MSI_ADDRESS_LO */
> > @@ -253,13 +254,19 @@ void msi_reset(PCIDevice *dev)
> > static bool msi_is_masked(const PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector)
> > {
> > uint16_t flags = pci_get_word(dev->config + msi_flags_off(dev));
> > - uint32_t mask;
> > + uint32_t mask, data;
> > + bool msi64bit = flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT;
> > assert(vector < PCI_MSI_VECTORS_MAX);
> >
> > if (!(flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT)) {
> > return false;
> > }
> >
> > + data = pci_get_word(dev->config + msi_data_off(dev, msi64bit));
> > + if (xen_is_pirq_msi(data)) {
> > + return false;
> > + }
> > +
> > mask = pci_get_long(dev->config +
> > msi_mask_off(dev, flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT));
> > return mask & (1U << vector);
> > diff --git a/hw/pci/msix.c b/hw/pci/msix.c
> > index 7716bf3..96281c2 100644
> > --- a/hw/pci/msix.c
> > +++ b/hw/pci/msix.c
> > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> > #include "hw/pci/msi.h"
> > #include "hw/pci/msix.h"
> > #include "hw/pci/pci.h"
> > +#include "hw/xen/xen.h"
> > #include "qemu/range.h"
> >
> > #define MSIX_CAP_LENGTH 12
> > @@ -77,8 +78,15 @@ static void msix_clr_pending(PCIDevice *dev, int vector)
> >
> > static bool msix_vector_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector, bool fmask)
> > {
> > - unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL;
> > - return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset] & PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_CTRL_MASKBIT;
> > + unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
> > + uint32_t *data = (uint32_t *)&dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
> > + /* MSIs on Xen can be remapped into pirqs. In those cases, masking
> > + * and unmasking go through the PV evtchn path. */
> > + if (xen_is_pirq_msi(*data)) {
> > + return false;
> > + }
> > + return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL] &
> > + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_CTRL_MASKBIT;
> > }
> >
> > bool msix_is_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector)
> > diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
> > index 82de2bc..375707e 100644
> > --- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
> > +++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
> > @@ -113,9 +113,7 @@ static int msi_msix_setup(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
> >
> > assert((!is_msix && msix_entry == 0) || is_msix);
> >
> > - if (gvec == 0) {
> > - /* if gvec is 0, the guest is asking for a particular pirq that
> > - * is passed as dest_id */
> > + if (xen_is_pirq_msi(data)) {
> > *ppirq = msi_ext_dest_id(addr >> 32) | msi_dest_id(addr);
> > if (!*ppirq) {
> > /* this probably identifies an misconfiguration of the guest,
> > diff --git a/include/hw/xen/xen.h b/include/hw/xen/xen.h
> > index 4356af4..b15b2f5 100644
> > --- a/include/hw/xen/xen.h
> > +++ b/include/hw/xen/xen.h
> > @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ int xen_pci_slot_get_pirq(PCIDevice *pci_dev, int irq_num);
> > void xen_piix3_set_irq(void *opaque, int irq_num, int level);
> > void xen_piix_pci_write_config_client(uint32_t address, uint32_t val, int len);
> > void xen_hvm_inject_msi(uint64_t addr, uint32_t data);
> > +int xen_is_pirq_msi(uint32_t msi_data);
> >
> > qemu_irq *xen_interrupt_controller_init(void);
> >
> > diff --git a/xen-hvm-stub.c b/xen-hvm-stub.c
> > index 46867d8..ce22a82 100644
> > --- a/xen-hvm-stub.c
> > +++ b/xen-hvm-stub.c
> > @@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ void xen_hvm_inject_msi(uint64_t addr, uint32_t data)
> > {
> > }
> >
> > +int xen_is_pirq_msi(uint32_t msi_data)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > void xen_ram_alloc(ram_addr_t ram_addr, ram_addr_t size, MemoryRegion *mr)
> > {
> > }
> > diff --git a/xen-hvm.c b/xen-hvm.c
> > index 3371c4e..21dd301 100644
> > --- a/xen-hvm.c
> > +++ b/xen-hvm.c
> > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> >
> > #include "hw/pci/pci.h"
> > #include "hw/i386/pc.h"
> > +#include "hw/i386/apic-msidef.h"
> > #include "hw/xen/xen_common.h"
> > #include "hw/xen/xen_backend.h"
> > #include "qmp-commands.h"
> > @@ -156,6 +157,14 @@ void xen_piix_pci_write_config_client(uint32_t address, uint32_t val, int len)
> > }
> > }
> >
> > +int xen_is_pirq_msi(uint32_t msi_data)
> > +{
> > + /* If vector is 0, the msi is remapped into a pirq, passed as
> > + * dest_id.
> > + */
> > + return ((msi_data & MSI_DATA_VECTOR_MASK) >> MSI_DATA_VECTOR_SHIFT) == 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > void xen_hvm_inject_msi(uint64_t addr, uint32_t data)
> > {
> > xen_xc_hvm_inject_msi(xen_xc, xen_domid, addr, data);
> >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND] fix MSI injection on Xen
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2016 20:16:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160204201552-mutt-send-email-mst@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.02.1602041704470.16539@kaball.uk.xensource.com>
On Thu, Feb 04, 2016 at 05:05:46PM +0000, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> Hi Michael,
>
> do you have any comments on this?
I dislike how it spreads xen specific stuff around,
but I don't have a better idea at the moment, so
I applied this.
> On Wed, 13 Jan 2016, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
> > On Xen MSIs can be remapped into pirqs, which are a type of event
> > channels. It's mostly for the benefit of PCI passthrough devices, to
> > avoid the overhead of interacting with the emulated lapic.
> >
> > However remapping interrupts and MSIs is also supported for emulated
> > devices, such as the e1000 and virtio-net.
> >
> > When an interrupt or an MSI is remapped into a pirq, masking and
> > unmasking is done by masking and unmasking the event channel. The
> > masking bit on the PCI config space or MSI-X table should be ignored,
> > but it isn't at the moment.
> >
> > As a consequence emulated devices which use MSI or MSI-X, such as
> > virtio-net, don't work properly (the guest doesn't receive any
> > notifications). The mechanism was working properly when xen_apic was
> > introduced, but I haven't narrowed down which commit in particular is
> > causing the regression.
> >
> > Fix the issue by ignoring the masking bit for MSI and MSI-X which have
> > been remapped into pirqs.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
> >
> >
> > diff --git a/hw/pci/msi.c b/hw/pci/msi.c
> > index f9c0484..3998725 100644
> > --- a/hw/pci/msi.c
> > +++ b/hw/pci/msi.c
> > @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
> > */
> >
> > #include "hw/pci/msi.h"
> > +#include "hw/xen/xen.h"
> > #include "qemu/range.h"
> >
> > /* PCI_MSI_ADDRESS_LO */
> > @@ -253,13 +254,19 @@ void msi_reset(PCIDevice *dev)
> > static bool msi_is_masked(const PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector)
> > {
> > uint16_t flags = pci_get_word(dev->config + msi_flags_off(dev));
> > - uint32_t mask;
> > + uint32_t mask, data;
> > + bool msi64bit = flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT;
> > assert(vector < PCI_MSI_VECTORS_MAX);
> >
> > if (!(flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT)) {
> > return false;
> > }
> >
> > + data = pci_get_word(dev->config + msi_data_off(dev, msi64bit));
> > + if (xen_is_pirq_msi(data)) {
> > + return false;
> > + }
> > +
> > mask = pci_get_long(dev->config +
> > msi_mask_off(dev, flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT));
> > return mask & (1U << vector);
> > diff --git a/hw/pci/msix.c b/hw/pci/msix.c
> > index 7716bf3..96281c2 100644
> > --- a/hw/pci/msix.c
> > +++ b/hw/pci/msix.c
> > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> > #include "hw/pci/msi.h"
> > #include "hw/pci/msix.h"
> > #include "hw/pci/pci.h"
> > +#include "hw/xen/xen.h"
> > #include "qemu/range.h"
> >
> > #define MSIX_CAP_LENGTH 12
> > @@ -77,8 +78,15 @@ static void msix_clr_pending(PCIDevice *dev, int vector)
> >
> > static bool msix_vector_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector, bool fmask)
> > {
> > - unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL;
> > - return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset] & PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_CTRL_MASKBIT;
> > + unsigned offset = vector * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
> > + uint32_t *data = (uint32_t *)&dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_DATA];
> > + /* MSIs on Xen can be remapped into pirqs. In those cases, masking
> > + * and unmasking go through the PV evtchn path. */
> > + if (xen_is_pirq_msi(*data)) {
> > + return false;
> > + }
> > + return fmask || dev->msix_table[offset + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL] &
> > + PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_CTRL_MASKBIT;
> > }
> >
> > bool msix_is_masked(PCIDevice *dev, unsigned int vector)
> > diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
> > index 82de2bc..375707e 100644
> > --- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
> > +++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
> > @@ -113,9 +113,7 @@ static int msi_msix_setup(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
> >
> > assert((!is_msix && msix_entry == 0) || is_msix);
> >
> > - if (gvec == 0) {
> > - /* if gvec is 0, the guest is asking for a particular pirq that
> > - * is passed as dest_id */
> > + if (xen_is_pirq_msi(data)) {
> > *ppirq = msi_ext_dest_id(addr >> 32) | msi_dest_id(addr);
> > if (!*ppirq) {
> > /* this probably identifies an misconfiguration of the guest,
> > diff --git a/include/hw/xen/xen.h b/include/hw/xen/xen.h
> > index 4356af4..b15b2f5 100644
> > --- a/include/hw/xen/xen.h
> > +++ b/include/hw/xen/xen.h
> > @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ int xen_pci_slot_get_pirq(PCIDevice *pci_dev, int irq_num);
> > void xen_piix3_set_irq(void *opaque, int irq_num, int level);
> > void xen_piix_pci_write_config_client(uint32_t address, uint32_t val, int len);
> > void xen_hvm_inject_msi(uint64_t addr, uint32_t data);
> > +int xen_is_pirq_msi(uint32_t msi_data);
> >
> > qemu_irq *xen_interrupt_controller_init(void);
> >
> > diff --git a/xen-hvm-stub.c b/xen-hvm-stub.c
> > index 46867d8..ce22a82 100644
> > --- a/xen-hvm-stub.c
> > +++ b/xen-hvm-stub.c
> > @@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ void xen_hvm_inject_msi(uint64_t addr, uint32_t data)
> > {
> > }
> >
> > +int xen_is_pirq_msi(uint32_t msi_data)
> > +{
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > void xen_ram_alloc(ram_addr_t ram_addr, ram_addr_t size, MemoryRegion *mr)
> > {
> > }
> > diff --git a/xen-hvm.c b/xen-hvm.c
> > index 3371c4e..21dd301 100644
> > --- a/xen-hvm.c
> > +++ b/xen-hvm.c
> > @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
> >
> > #include "hw/pci/pci.h"
> > #include "hw/i386/pc.h"
> > +#include "hw/i386/apic-msidef.h"
> > #include "hw/xen/xen_common.h"
> > #include "hw/xen/xen_backend.h"
> > #include "qmp-commands.h"
> > @@ -156,6 +157,14 @@ void xen_piix_pci_write_config_client(uint32_t address, uint32_t val, int len)
> > }
> > }
> >
> > +int xen_is_pirq_msi(uint32_t msi_data)
> > +{
> > + /* If vector is 0, the msi is remapped into a pirq, passed as
> > + * dest_id.
> > + */
> > + return ((msi_data & MSI_DATA_VECTOR_MASK) >> MSI_DATA_VECTOR_SHIFT) == 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > void xen_hvm_inject_msi(uint64_t addr, uint32_t data)
> > {
> > xen_xc_hvm_inject_msi(xen_xc, xen_domid, addr, data);
> >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-02-04 18:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-13 14:59 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH RESEND] fix MSI injection on Xen Stefano Stabellini
2016-01-13 14:59 ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-01-27 17:41 ` [Qemu-devel] [Xen-devel] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-01-27 17:41 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-01-28 10:32 ` [Qemu-devel] " Stefano Stabellini
2016-01-28 10:32 ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-02-04 17:05 ` [Qemu-devel] " Stefano Stabellini
2016-02-04 17:05 ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-02-04 18:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2016-02-04 18:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-02-08 11:18 ` [Qemu-devel] " Stefano Stabellini
2016-02-08 11:18 ` Stefano Stabellini
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