From: Matt Fleming <matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,
linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
sai.praneeth.prakhya-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org,
leif.lindholm-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
mark.rutland-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org,
pjones-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org,
linux-lFZ/pmaqli7XmaaqVzeoHQ@public.gmane.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/5] arm64: efi: apply strict permissons for UEFI Runtime Services regions
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2016 12:10:36 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160302121036.GD2649@codeblueprint.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1456151158-25849-3-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
On Mon, 22 Feb, at 03:25:55PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Recent UEFI versions expose permission attributes for runtime services
> memory regions, either in the UEFI memory map or in the separate memory
> attributes table. This allows the kernel to map these regions with
> stricter permissions, rather than the RWX permissions that are used by
> default. So wire this up in our mapping routine.
>
> Note that in the absence of permission attributes, we still only map
> regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICE_CODE with the executable bit set.
> Also, we base the mapping attributes of EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO on the
> type directly rather than on the absence of the EFI_MEMORY_WB attribute.
> This is more correct, but is also required for compatibility with the
> upcoming support for the Memory Attributes Table, which only carries
> permission attributes, not memory type attributes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
> index b6abc852f2a1..3364408c154f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
> @@ -24,15 +24,32 @@ int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
> /*
> * Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
> * executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
> - * set.
> + * set. Also take the new (optional) RO/XP bits into account.
> */
> - if ((md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB) == 0)
> + if (md->type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
> prot_val = PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
> - else if (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE ||
> - !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr))
> + else if (WARN_ONCE(!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr),
> + "UEFI Runtime regions are not aligned to 64 KB -- buggy firmware?"))
> + /*
> + * If the region is not aligned to the page size of the OS, we
> + * can not use strict permissions, since that would also affect
> + * the mapping attributes of the adjacent regions.
> + */
> prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
> - else
> + else if ((md->attribute & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
> + (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO))
> + /* R-- */
> + prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
> + else if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
> + /* R-X */
> + prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_ROX);
> + else if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP ||
> + md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)
> + /* RW- */
> prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
> + else
> + /* RWX */
> + prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
>
> create_pgd_mapping(mm, md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr,
> md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
The actual logic looks fine but it seems like there's quite a lot
going on in this function which is fairly difficult to decipher with
the if/else if clauses.
Would you be open to splitting this out a little? It's just a
suggestion, but maybe something like this,
---
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
index 3364408c154f..33a6da160a50 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
@@ -17,39 +17,48 @@
#include <asm/efi.h>
-int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+/*
+ * Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
+ * executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
+ * set. Also take the new (optional) RO/XP bits into account.
+ */
+static __init pteval_t create_mapping_protection(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
- pteval_t prot_val;
+ u64 attr = md->attribute;
+ u32 type = md->type;
- /*
- * Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
- * executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
- * set. Also take the new (optional) RO/XP bits into account.
- */
- if (md->type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
- prot_val = PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
- else if (WARN_ONCE(!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr),
- "UEFI Runtime regions are not aligned to 64 KB -- buggy firmware?"))
+ if (type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
+ return PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
+
+ if (WARN_ONCE(!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr),
+ "UEFI Runtime regions are not aligned to 64 KB -- buggy firmware?"))
/*
* If the region is not aligned to the page size of the OS, we
* can not use strict permissions, since that would also affect
* the mapping attributes of the adjacent regions.
*/
- prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
- else if ((md->attribute & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
- (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO))
- /* R-- */
- prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
- else if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
- /* R-X */
- prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_ROX);
- else if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP ||
- md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)
- /* RW- */
- prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
- else
- /* RWX */
- prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
+ return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
+
+ /* R-- */
+ if ((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
+ (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO))
+ return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+
+ /* R-X */
+ if (attr & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
+ return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_ROX);
+
+ /* RW- */
+ if (attr & EFI_MEMORY_XP || type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)
+ return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
+
+ /* RWX */
+ return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
+}
+
+int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+{
+ pteval_t prot_val = create_mapping_protection(md);
create_pgd_mapping(mm, md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr,
md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: matt@codeblueprint.co.uk (Matt Fleming)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] arm64: efi: apply strict permissons for UEFI Runtime Services regions
Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2016 12:10:36 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160302121036.GD2649@codeblueprint.co.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1456151158-25849-3-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
On Mon, 22 Feb, at 03:25:55PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> Recent UEFI versions expose permission attributes for runtime services
> memory regions, either in the UEFI memory map or in the separate memory
> attributes table. This allows the kernel to map these regions with
> stricter permissions, rather than the RWX permissions that are used by
> default. So wire this up in our mapping routine.
>
> Note that in the absence of permission attributes, we still only map
> regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICE_CODE with the executable bit set.
> Also, we base the mapping attributes of EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO on the
> type directly rather than on the absence of the EFI_MEMORY_WB attribute.
> This is more correct, but is also required for compatibility with the
> upcoming support for the Memory Attributes Table, which only carries
> permission attributes, not memory type attributes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> ---
> arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
> index b6abc852f2a1..3364408c154f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
> @@ -24,15 +24,32 @@ int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
> /*
> * Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
> * executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
> - * set.
> + * set. Also take the new (optional) RO/XP bits into account.
> */
> - if ((md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_WB) == 0)
> + if (md->type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
> prot_val = PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
> - else if (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE ||
> - !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr))
> + else if (WARN_ONCE(!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr),
> + "UEFI Runtime regions are not aligned to 64 KB -- buggy firmware?"))
> + /*
> + * If the region is not aligned to the page size of the OS, we
> + * can not use strict permissions, since that would also affect
> + * the mapping attributes of the adjacent regions.
> + */
> prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
> - else
> + else if ((md->attribute & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
> + (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO))
> + /* R-- */
> + prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
> + else if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
> + /* R-X */
> + prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_ROX);
> + else if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP ||
> + md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)
> + /* RW- */
> prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
> + else
> + /* RWX */
> + prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
>
> create_pgd_mapping(mm, md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr,
> md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
The actual logic looks fine but it seems like there's quite a lot
going on in this function which is fairly difficult to decipher with
the if/else if clauses.
Would you be open to splitting this out a little? It's just a
suggestion, but maybe something like this,
---
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
index 3364408c154f..33a6da160a50 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
@@ -17,39 +17,48 @@
#include <asm/efi.h>
-int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+/*
+ * Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
+ * executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
+ * set. Also take the new (optional) RO/XP bits into account.
+ */
+static __init pteval_t create_mapping_protection(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
{
- pteval_t prot_val;
+ u64 attr = md->attribute;
+ u32 type = md->type;
- /*
- * Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
- * executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
- * set. Also take the new (optional) RO/XP bits into account.
- */
- if (md->type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
- prot_val = PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
- else if (WARN_ONCE(!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr),
- "UEFI Runtime regions are not aligned to 64 KB -- buggy firmware?"))
+ if (type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
+ return PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
+
+ if (WARN_ONCE(!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr),
+ "UEFI Runtime regions are not aligned to 64 KB -- buggy firmware?"))
/*
* If the region is not aligned to the page size of the OS, we
* can not use strict permissions, since that would also affect
* the mapping attributes of the adjacent regions.
*/
- prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
- else if ((md->attribute & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
- (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO))
- /* R-- */
- prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
- else if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
- /* R-X */
- prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_ROX);
- else if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_XP ||
- md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)
- /* RW- */
- prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
- else
- /* RWX */
- prot_val = pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
+ return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
+
+ /* R-- */
+ if ((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
+ (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO))
+ return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+
+ /* R-X */
+ if (attr & EFI_MEMORY_RO)
+ return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_ROX);
+
+ /* RW- */
+ if (attr & EFI_MEMORY_XP || type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)
+ return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
+
+ /* RWX */
+ return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
+}
+
+int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+{
+ pteval_t prot_val = create_mapping_protection(md);
create_pgd_mapping(mm, md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr,
md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-02 12:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-02-22 14:25 [PATCH 0/5] memory attribute table support Ard Biesheuvel
2016-02-22 14:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <1456151158-25849-1-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-02-22 14:25 ` [PATCH 1/5] ARM: efi: apply strict permissons for UEFI Runtime Services regions Ard Biesheuvel
2016-02-22 14:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <1456151158-25849-2-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-02 11:49 ` Matt Fleming
2016-03-02 11:49 ` Matt Fleming
[not found] ` <20160302114901.GC2649-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-02 13:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-03-02 13:07 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <CAKv+Gu81V9TjhjikmQd=4ahWeqry8U1w5Fa+BTcY+S=2xYJmrA-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-02 13:14 ` Matt Fleming
2016-03-02 13:14 ` Matt Fleming
2016-02-22 14:25 ` [PATCH 2/5] arm64: " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-02-22 14:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <1456151158-25849-3-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-02 12:10 ` Matt Fleming [this message]
2016-03-02 12:10 ` Matt Fleming
[not found] ` <20160302121036.GD2649-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>
2016-03-02 13:09 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-03-02 13:09 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-02-22 14:25 ` [PATCH 3/5] efi: add support for the EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE config table Ard Biesheuvel
2016-02-22 14:25 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <1456151158-25849-4-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-02-22 14:29 ` [PATCH 4/5] efi: implement generic support for the Memory Attributes table Ard Biesheuvel
2016-02-22 14:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel
[not found] ` <1456151355-25943-1-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel-QSEj5FYQhm4dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-02-22 14:29 ` [PATCH 5/5] arm*: efi: take the Memory Attributes table into account Ard Biesheuvel
2016-02-22 14:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-03-02 13:10 ` [PATCH 4/5] efi: implement generic support for the Memory Attributes table Matt Fleming
2016-03-02 13:10 ` Matt Fleming
2016-03-02 12:22 ` [PATCH 3/5] efi: add support for the EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE config table Matt Fleming
2016-03-02 12:22 ` Matt Fleming
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