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From: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
To: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Paul Moore <aul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@google.com>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	"Eric . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>,
	Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 8/8] Documentation: add security/ptrace_checks.txt
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2016 20:16:00 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161002031600.GC2635@templeofstupid.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1474663238-22134-9-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net>

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:40:38PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> +=====================
> +FILESYSTEM DEBUG APIS
> +=====================
> +
> +The pid / tgid entries in procfs contain various entries that allow debugging
> +access to a process. Interesting entries are:
> +
> + - auxv permits an ASLR bypass
> + - cwd can permit bypassing filesystem restrictions in some cases
> + - environ can leak secret tokens
> + - fd can permit bypassing filesystem restrictions or leak access to things like
> +   pipes
> + - maps permits an ASLR bypass
> + - mem grants R+W access to process memory
> + - stat permits an ASLR bypass
> +
> +Of these, all use both a normal filesystem DAC check (where the file owner is
> +the process owner for a dumpable process, root for a nondumpable process) and a
> +ptrace_may_access() check; however, the DAC check may be modified, and the
> +ptrace_may_access() is performed under PTRACE_FSCREDS, meaning that instead of
> +the caller's ruid, rgid and permitted capabilities, the fsuid, fsgid and
> +effective capabilities are used, causing the case where a daemon drops its euid
> +prior to accessing a file for the user to be treated correctly for this check.

Thanks for writing this up.

Is it worth mentioning some of the less obvious aspects of how user
namespaces interact with the filesystem debug APIs?  Of particular note:
a nondumpable process will always be assigned the global root ids.
Checks against capabilities for procfs require that the uid and gid have
a mapping in the current namepsace.   That's enforced through
capable_wrt_inode_uidgid().

By way of example, if you enter a user namespace that doesn't have a
mapping for the global root id, then non-dumpable processes are off
limits from /proc.  The global root ids get mapped to a special id for
unresolved mappings.  If the process that entered the namespace has
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE/CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, these don't suffice to grant any
access to the non-dumpable process because the inode has no [ug]id
mapping in the particular namespace.

-K

  reply	other threads:[~2016-10-02  3:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-23 20:40 [PATCH v2 0/8] Various fixes related to ptrace_may_access() Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] exec: introduce cred_guard_light Jann Horn
2016-09-30 15:35   ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-30 18:27     ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-03 16:02       ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-10-30 21:12     ` Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 2/8] exec: turn self_exec_id into self_privunit Jann Horn
2016-09-23 21:04   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-23 21:33     ` Jann Horn
2016-09-30 13:20   ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-30 13:44     ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-30 18:30       ` Kees Cook
2016-09-30 18:59         ` Jann Horn
2016-09-30 19:05           ` Kees Cook
2016-10-03 16:37         ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] proc: use open()-time creds for ptrace checks Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] futex: don't leak robust_list pointer Jann Horn
2016-09-30 14:52   ` Oleg Nesterov
2016-10-30 17:16     ` Jann Horn
2016-11-02 21:39       ` Jann Horn
2016-11-02 22:47         ` Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] proc: lock properly in ptrace_may_access callers Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] ptrace: warn on ptrace_may_access without proper locking Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] fs/proc: fix attr access check Jann Horn
2016-09-23 20:40 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] Documentation: add security/ptrace_checks.txt Jann Horn
2016-10-02  3:16   ` Krister Johansen [this message]
2016-10-30 19:09     ` Jann Horn
2016-10-31  4:14       ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-10-31 13:39         ` Jann Horn
2016-11-03 20:43         ` Krister Johansen

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