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From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2016 06:56:12 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161006135612.GA21342@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <476DC76E7D1DF2438D32BFADF679FC561CD14651@ORSMSX103.amr.corp.intel.com>

On Thu, Oct 06, 2016 at 01:47:47PM +0000, Roberts, William C wrote:
> Out of tree modules still affect core kernel security.

So don't use them.

> I would also bet money, that somewhere
> In-tree someone has put a %p when they wanted a %pK.

So fix them.

> So this method is just quite error
> prone. We currently have a blacklist approach versus whitelist.

Or fix the entire thing, get rid of %pK and always protect %p if you
can show that it doesn't break anything.

But stop posting patches with bullshit arguments like out of tree
modules.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
To: "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" 
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3
Date: Thu, 6 Oct 2016 06:56:12 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161006135612.GA21342@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <476DC76E7D1DF2438D32BFADF679FC561CD14651@ORSMSX103.amr.corp.intel.com>

On Thu, Oct 06, 2016 at 01:47:47PM +0000, Roberts, William C wrote:
> Out of tree modules still affect core kernel security.

So don't use them.

> I would also bet money, that somewhere
> In-tree someone has put a %p when they wanted a %pK.

So fix them.

> So this method is just quite error
> prone. We currently have a blacklist approach versus whitelist.

Or fix the entire thing, get rid of %pK and always protect %p if you
can show that it doesn't break anything.

But stop posting patches with bullshit arguments like out of tree
modules.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-10-06 13:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-10-05 18:04 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 william.c.roberts
2016-10-05 18:04 ` william.c.roberts
2016-10-05 19:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-05 19:34   ` Kees Cook
2016-10-06 13:17   ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-10-06 13:17     ` Roberts, William C
2016-10-06 15:18   ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-10-06 21:04     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-07 14:19       ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-10-07 14:29         ` Jann Horn
2016-10-07 15:05           ` Roberts, William C
2016-10-07 15:15             ` Jann Horn
2016-10-07 19:12           ` Kees Cook
2016-10-11 18:11             ` Roberts, William C
2016-10-05 20:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rasmus Villemoes
2016-10-05 20:52   ` Rasmus Villemoes
2016-10-06 13:23   ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-10-06 13:23     ` Roberts, William C
2016-10-06 13:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christoph Hellwig
2016-10-06 13:31   ` Christoph Hellwig
2016-10-06 13:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-10-06 13:47     ` Roberts, William C
2016-10-06 13:56     ` Christoph Hellwig [this message]
2016-10-06 13:56       ` Christoph Hellwig
2016-10-06 14:59       ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-10-06 14:59         ` Roberts, William C
2016-10-06 21:00       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-06 21:00         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-06 21:19         ` [kernel-hardening] " Joe Perches
2016-10-06 21:19           ` Joe Perches
2016-10-06 21:25           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-06 21:25             ` Kees Cook
2016-10-07 14:21         ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2016-10-07 14:21           ` Roberts, William C
2016-10-06 14:05     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-10-06 14:46       ` Jann Horn
2016-10-07 11:52       ` Jann Horn

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