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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <h.peter.anvin@intel.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>,
	David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v4 PATCH 12/13] x86: implementation for HARDENED_ATOMIC
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 00:30:04 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161110233004.GQ3568@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+yy8Y=_bDhsTgEugJnN5=u8_XMSOAnqJBab-1+9v8+CA@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 03:07:37PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 2:50 PM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
> > On Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 09:40:46PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> >> On Thu, Nov 10, 2016 at 10:24:47PM +0200, Elena Reshetova wrote:
> >> >  static __always_inline void atomic_add(int i, atomic_t *v)
> >> >  {
> >> > +   asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "addl %1,%0\n"
> >> > +
> >> > +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_ATOMIC
> >> > +                "jno 0f\n"
> >> > +                LOCK_PREFIX "subl %1,%0\n"
> >> > +                "int $4\n0:\n"
> >> > +                _ASM_EXTABLE(0b, 0b)
> >>
> >>
> >> This is unreadable gunk.
> >
> > Worse, this is fundamentally racy and therefore not a proper atomic at
> > all.
> 
> The race was discussed earlier as well 

Which is useless, since nobody was listening etc..

> (and some of that should
> already have been covered in the commit message)

it does not.

> , but basically this
> is a race in the overflow protection, so it's not operationally a
> problem. The process that caused the overflow still gets killed, and
> if the system isn't already set up to panic on oops, this becomes a
> resource leak instead of an exploitable condition.

Now is this harmless? If you have two increments racing like:

	  inc
	  jno 1 // overflow

			  inc
			  jno 1 // !overflow

	  dec
	1:		1:

The second thread will still affect your wrap and not BUG.

> 
> > The only way to do this is a cmpxchg loop and not issue the result on
> > overflow. Of course, that would completely suck performance wise, but
> > having a non atomic atomic blows more.
> 
> There was some work to examine this performance impact, and it didn't
> look terrible, but this race-on-overflow isn't viewed as a meaningful
> risk in the refcount situation.

I have a benchmark somewhere, I can run numbers tomorrow, but it really
shows once you get a bit of contention going. Once you hit 4 nodes
contending on a variable its completely out there IIRC.

The unconditional atomic ops really are loads faster than cmpxchg loops.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-11-10 23:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 98+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-11-10 20:24 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 00/13] HARDENED_ATOMIC Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 01/13] Add architecture independent hardened atomic base Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:41   ` [kernel-hardening] " David Windsor
2016-11-10 21:09     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:35   ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11  9:06     ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 02/13] percpu-refcount: leave atomic counter unprotected Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 03/13] kernel: identify wrapping atomic usage Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 21:58   ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11  8:49     ` [kernel-hardening] " Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-19 13:28   ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul E. McKenney
2016-11-19 21:39     ` Kees Cook
2016-11-21 20:13       ` Paul E. McKenney
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 04/13] mm: " Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 05/13] fs: " Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 06/13] net: " Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 07/13] net: atm: " Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 08/13] security: " Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 09/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 1/2) Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 21:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2016-11-11  8:57     ` [kernel-hardening] " Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-11 12:35       ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 10/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 2/2) Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 11/13] x86: identify wrapping atomic usage Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 12/13] x86: implementation for HARDENED_ATOMIC Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:40   ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:04     ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:16       ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:32         ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:46           ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 22:50     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 23:07       ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 23:30         ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2016-11-11  9:32           ` [kernel-hardening] " Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-11 10:29             ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 18:00           ` Kees Cook
2016-11-11 20:19             ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:33   ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11  9:20     ` [kernel-hardening] " Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 13/13] lkdtm: add tests for atomic over-/underflow Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:37 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v4 PATCH 00/13] HARDENED_ATOMIC Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 20:37   ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 20:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2016-11-10 20:48     ` Will Deacon
2016-11-10 21:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:01       ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:23       ` [kernel-hardening] " David Windsor
2016-11-10 21:27         ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:39           ` David Windsor
2016-11-10 21:39         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:13     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:13       ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:23       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:23         ` Kees Cook
2016-11-11  4:25         ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-11-10 22:27       ` Greg KH
2016-11-10 23:15         ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 23:38           ` Greg KH
2016-11-11  7:50             ` David Windsor
2016-11-11 17:43               ` Kees Cook
2016-11-11 17:46                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 18:04                   ` Kees Cook
2016-11-11 20:17                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 20:31                       ` Kees Cook
2016-11-15  8:01                         ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 16:50                         ` Rik van Riel
2016-11-15 17:23                           ` Kees Cook
2016-11-16 17:09                             ` Rik van Riel
2016-11-16 17:32                               ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-16 17:41                                 ` Rik van Riel
2016-11-16 17:34                               ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-17  8:37                                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17  9:04                                   ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-17  9:36                                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17  9:36                                   ` Julia Lawall
2016-11-17 10:16                                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 11:19                                       ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-17 11:32                                         ` Julia Lawall
2016-11-17 12:59                                       ` Julia Lawall
2016-11-11 18:47                   ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-11 19:39                     ` Will Deacon
2016-11-11 18:31                 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-11 20:05                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 10:36                     ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-15 11:21                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 18:02                         ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-10 23:57           ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11  0:29             ` Colin Vidal
2016-11-11 12:41               ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-11 12:47                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 13:00                   ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 14:39                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-11-11 14:48                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 23:07                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-13 11:03             ` Greg KH
2016-11-10 20:56   ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 20:56     ` Kees Cook
2016-11-11  3:20     ` [kernel-hardening] " David Windsor

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