From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Anvin, H Peter" <h.peter.anvin@intel.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>,
David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v4 PATCH 12/13] x86: implementation for HARDENED_ATOMIC
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 11:29:13 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161111102913.GE3117@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612B41BFF727@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com>
On Fri, Nov 11, 2016 at 09:32:45AM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> It is covered in the documentation file (Documentation/security/
> hardened-atomic.txt) included in the first patch.
> There are just so many details that including them all in commit
> messages will produce pages long commit messages, so some
> things are moved to the documentation only.
No, never skimp on Changelogs. Nobody reads documentation.
Also, this really should also have a very explicit code comment,
non-atomic constructs in atomic.h are 'surprising' at the very least.
> >Now is this harmless? If you have two increments racing like:
>
> inc
> jno 1 // overflow
>
> inc
> jno 1 // !overflow
>
> dec
> 1: 1:
>
> >The second thread will still affect your wrap and not BUG.
This still wants an answer, because attackers never exploit races?
> >I have a benchmark somewhere, I can run numbers tomorrow, but it
> >really shows once you get a bit of contention going. Once you hit 4
> >nodes contending on a variable its completely out there IIRC.
> This would help to get more numbers on this, thank you.
LOCK addl LOCK cmpxchg-addl
1-node 1: 22.038250 1: 41.572270
2: 174.019700 2: 198.965635
3: 185.852060 3: 274.293927
4: 389.169783 4: 266.738485
6: 347.827897 6: 454.785715
8: 369.649510 8: 463.125426
2-nodes 2: 428.448130 2: 1422.221850
4: 616.203497 4: 1166.427205
6: 855.639025 6: 1424.131080
8: 1083.613291 8: 1402.484560
4-nodes 4: 1180.591315 4: 1830.301125
8: 1480.023056 8: 2043.418720
16: 2602.128429 16: 2611.188079
Results are in cycles:u, average of 100000 loops.
As measured on a 4 socket IVB-EX (E7-4890 v2).
> >The unconditional atomic ops really are loads faster than cmpxchg
> >loops.
>
> Yes, and this is what we saw when doing performance measurements. So,
> as a result we went with a faster method, which we believed still has
> a low risk of getting into race. If you numbers prove otherwise, then
> we have to reconsider.
Its fundamentally a question of semantics though. These are _atomic_
ops, they really should be, well, atomic. No exceptions.
If you want to play funny games, don't call them atomic.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-11 10:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 98+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-10 20:24 [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 00/13] HARDENED_ATOMIC Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 01/13] Add architecture independent hardened atomic base Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Windsor
2016-11-10 21:09 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:35 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 9:06 ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 02/13] percpu-refcount: leave atomic counter unprotected Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 03/13] kernel: identify wrapping atomic usage Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 21:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 8:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-19 13:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Paul E. McKenney
2016-11-19 21:39 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-21 20:13 ` Paul E. McKenney
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 04/13] mm: " Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 05/13] fs: " Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 06/13] net: " Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 07/13] net: atm: " Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 08/13] security: " Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 09/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 1/2) Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 21:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2016-11-11 8:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-11 12:35 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 10/13] drivers: identify wrapping atomic usage (part 2/2) Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 11/13] x86: identify wrapping atomic usage Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 12/13] x86: implementation for HARDENED_ATOMIC Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:32 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 22:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 23:07 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 23:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 9:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-11 10:29 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2016-11-11 18:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-11-11 20:19 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:33 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 9:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-10 20:24 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 PATCH 13/13] lkdtm: add tests for atomic over-/underflow Elena Reshetova
2016-11-10 20:37 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v4 PATCH 00/13] HARDENED_ATOMIC Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 20:37 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 20:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2016-11-10 20:48 ` Will Deacon
2016-11-10 21:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Windsor
2016-11-10 21:27 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:39 ` David Windsor
2016-11-10 21:39 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:13 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-10 21:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-11-10 21:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-11 4:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2016-11-10 22:27 ` Greg KH
2016-11-10 23:15 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 23:38 ` Greg KH
2016-11-11 7:50 ` David Windsor
2016-11-11 17:43 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-11 17:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 18:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-11 20:17 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-14 20:31 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-15 8:01 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 16:50 ` Rik van Riel
2016-11-15 17:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-16 17:09 ` Rik van Riel
2016-11-16 17:32 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-16 17:41 ` Rik van Riel
2016-11-16 17:34 ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-17 8:37 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 9:04 ` Reshetova, Elena
2016-11-17 9:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 9:36 ` Julia Lawall
2016-11-17 10:16 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-17 11:19 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-17 11:32 ` Julia Lawall
2016-11-17 12:59 ` Julia Lawall
2016-11-11 18:47 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-11 19:39 ` Will Deacon
2016-11-11 18:31 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-11 20:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 10:36 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-15 11:21 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-15 18:02 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-10 23:57 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 0:29 ` Colin Vidal
2016-11-11 12:41 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-11 12:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 13:00 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 14:39 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-11-11 14:48 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-11 23:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2016-11-13 11:03 ` Greg KH
2016-11-10 20:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-10 20:56 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-11 3:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Windsor
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