From: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 15:39:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161115143943.GC2185@potion> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161110003723.3280.62636.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
2016-11-09 18:37-0600, Tom Lendacky:
> Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the
> memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the
> device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be
> initialized to create un-encrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
> @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static dma_addr_t nommu_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
> enum dma_data_direction dir,
> unsigned long attrs)
> {
> - dma_addr_t bus = page_to_phys(page) + offset;
> + dma_addr_t bus = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page)) + offset;
> WARN_ON(size == 0);
> if (!check_addr("map_single", dev, bus, size))
> return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
> int swiotlb __read_mostly;
>
> void *x86_swiotlb_alloc_coherent(struct device *hwdev, size_t size,
> @@ -64,13 +66,15 @@ static struct dma_map_ops swiotlb_dma_ops = {
> * pci_swiotlb_detect_override - set swiotlb to 1 if necessary
> *
> * This returns non-zero if we are forced to use swiotlb (by the boot
> - * option).
> + * option). If memory encryption is enabled then swiotlb will be set
> + * to 1 so that bounce buffers are allocated and used for devices that
> + * do not support the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
> */
> int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_override(void)
> {
> int use_swiotlb = swiotlb | swiotlb_force;
>
> - if (swiotlb_force)
> + if (swiotlb_force || sme_me_mask)
> swiotlb = 1;
>
> return use_swiotlb;
We want to return 1 even if only sme_me_mask is 1, because the return
value is used for detection. The following would be less obscure, IMO:
if (swiotlb_force || sme_me_mask)
swiotlb = 1;
return swiotlb;
> diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
> @@ -598,6 +602,15 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
> */
> locking_selftest();
>
> + /*
> + * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
> + * operations that might use the swiotlb bounce buffers.
> + * This call will mark the bounce buffers as un-encrypted so
> + * that their usage will not cause "plain-text" data to be
> + * decrypted when accessed.
> + */
> + mem_encrypt_init();
(Comments below are connected to the reason why we call this.)
> diff --git a/lib/swiotlb.c b/lib/swiotlb.c
> @@ -159,6 +171,31 @@ void swiotlb_print_info(void)
> +/*
> + * If memory encryption is active, the DMA address for an encrypted page may
> + * be beyond the range of the device. If bounce buffers are required be sure
> + * that they are not on an encrypted page. This should be called before the
> + * iotlb area is used.
> + */
> +void __init swiotlb_clear_encryption(void)
> +{
> + void *vaddr;
> + unsigned long bytes;
> +
> + if (no_iotlb_memory || !io_tlb_start || late_alloc)
io_tlb_start seems redundant -- when can !no_iotlb_memory &&
!io_tlb_start happen?
Is the order of calls
1) swiotlb init
2) SME init
3) swiotlb late init
?
We setup encrypted swiotlb and then decrypt it, but sometimes set it up
decrypted (late_alloc) ... why isn't the swiotlb set up decrypted
directly?
> + return;
> +
> + vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_start);
> + bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
> + swiotlb_set_mem_unenc(vaddr, bytes);
> + memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
> +
> + vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
> + bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_overflow);
> + swiotlb_set_mem_unenc(vaddr, bytes);
> + memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
> +}
> +
> @@ -541,7 +583,7 @@ static phys_addr_t
> map_single(struct device *hwdev, phys_addr_t phys, size_t size,
> enum dma_data_direction dir)
> {
> - dma_addr_t start_dma_addr = phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
> + dma_addr_t start_dma_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
We have decrypted io_tlb_start before, so shouldn't its physical address
be saved without the sme bit? (Which changes a lot ...)
Thanks.
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 15:39:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161115143943.GC2185@potion> (raw)
Message-ID: <20161115143944.CFhsxXPUxFWH9Ar6pGJtkJacjEalNoxEYrnGj3Z56Lc@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161110003723.3280.62636.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
2016-11-09 18:37-0600, Tom Lendacky:
> Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the
> memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the
> device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be
> initialized to create un-encrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
> @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static dma_addr_t nommu_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
> enum dma_data_direction dir,
> unsigned long attrs)
> {
> - dma_addr_t bus = page_to_phys(page) + offset;
> + dma_addr_t bus = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page)) + offset;
> WARN_ON(size == 0);
> if (!check_addr("map_single", dev, bus, size))
> return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
> int swiotlb __read_mostly;
>
> void *x86_swiotlb_alloc_coherent(struct device *hwdev, size_t size,
> @@ -64,13 +66,15 @@ static struct dma_map_ops swiotlb_dma_ops = {
> * pci_swiotlb_detect_override - set swiotlb to 1 if necessary
> *
> * This returns non-zero if we are forced to use swiotlb (by the boot
> - * option).
> + * option). If memory encryption is enabled then swiotlb will be set
> + * to 1 so that bounce buffers are allocated and used for devices that
> + * do not support the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
> */
> int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_override(void)
> {
> int use_swiotlb = swiotlb | swiotlb_force;
>
> - if (swiotlb_force)
> + if (swiotlb_force || sme_me_mask)
> swiotlb = 1;
>
> return use_swiotlb;
We want to return 1 even if only sme_me_mask is 1, because the return
value is used for detection. The following would be less obscure, IMO:
if (swiotlb_force || sme_me_mask)
swiotlb = 1;
return swiotlb;
> diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
> @@ -598,6 +602,15 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
> */
> locking_selftest();
>
> + /*
> + * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
> + * operations that might use the swiotlb bounce buffers.
> + * This call will mark the bounce buffers as un-encrypted so
> + * that their usage will not cause "plain-text" data to be
> + * decrypted when accessed.
> + */
> + mem_encrypt_init();
(Comments below are connected to the reason why we call this.)
> diff --git a/lib/swiotlb.c b/lib/swiotlb.c
> @@ -159,6 +171,31 @@ void swiotlb_print_info(void)
> +/*
> + * If memory encryption is active, the DMA address for an encrypted page may
> + * be beyond the range of the device. If bounce buffers are required be sure
> + * that they are not on an encrypted page. This should be called before the
> + * iotlb area is used.
> + */
> +void __init swiotlb_clear_encryption(void)
> +{
> + void *vaddr;
> + unsigned long bytes;
> +
> + if (no_iotlb_memory || !io_tlb_start || late_alloc)
io_tlb_start seems redundant -- when can !no_iotlb_memory &&
!io_tlb_start happen?
Is the order of calls
1) swiotlb init
2) SME init
3) swiotlb late init
?
We setup encrypted swiotlb and then decrypt it, but sometimes set it up
decrypted (late_alloc) ... why isn't the swiotlb set up decrypted
directly?
> + return;
> +
> + vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_start);
> + bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
> + swiotlb_set_mem_unenc(vaddr, bytes);
> + memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
> +
> + vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
> + bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_overflow);
> + swiotlb_set_mem_unenc(vaddr, bytes);
> + memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
> +}
> +
> @@ -541,7 +583,7 @@ static phys_addr_t
> map_single(struct device *hwdev, phys_addr_t phys, size_t size,
> enum dma_data_direction dir)
> {
> - dma_addr_t start_dma_addr = phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
> + dma_addr_t start_dma_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
We have decrypted io_tlb_start before, so shouldn't its physical address
be saved without the sme bit? (Which changes a lot ...)
Thanks.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption
Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2016 15:39:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161115143943.GC2185@potion> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161110003723.3280.62636.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
2016-11-09 18:37-0600, Tom Lendacky:
> Since DMA addresses will effectively look like 48-bit addresses when the
> memory encryption mask is set, SWIOTLB is needed if the DMA mask of the
> device performing the DMA does not support 48-bits. SWIOTLB will be
> initialized to create un-encrypted bounce buffers for use by these devices.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-nommu.c
> @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static dma_addr_t nommu_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
> enum dma_data_direction dir,
> unsigned long attrs)
> {
> - dma_addr_t bus = page_to_phys(page) + offset;
> + dma_addr_t bus = phys_to_dma(dev, page_to_phys(page)) + offset;
> WARN_ON(size == 0);
> if (!check_addr("map_single", dev, bus, size))
> return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/pci-swiotlb.c
> @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
> int swiotlb __read_mostly;
>
> void *x86_swiotlb_alloc_coherent(struct device *hwdev, size_t size,
> @@ -64,13 +66,15 @@ static struct dma_map_ops swiotlb_dma_ops = {
> * pci_swiotlb_detect_override - set swiotlb to 1 if necessary
> *
> * This returns non-zero if we are forced to use swiotlb (by the boot
> - * option).
> + * option). If memory encryption is enabled then swiotlb will be set
> + * to 1 so that bounce buffers are allocated and used for devices that
> + * do not support the addressing range required for the encryption mask.
> */
> int __init pci_swiotlb_detect_override(void)
> {
> int use_swiotlb = swiotlb | swiotlb_force;
>
> - if (swiotlb_force)
> + if (swiotlb_force || sme_me_mask)
> swiotlb = 1;
>
> return use_swiotlb;
We want to return 1 even if only sme_me_mask is 1, because the return
value is used for detection. The following would be less obscure, IMO:
if (swiotlb_force || sme_me_mask)
swiotlb = 1;
return swiotlb;
> diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
> @@ -598,6 +602,15 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
> */
> locking_selftest();
>
> + /*
> + * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
> + * operations that might use the swiotlb bounce buffers.
> + * This call will mark the bounce buffers as un-encrypted so
> + * that their usage will not cause "plain-text" data to be
> + * decrypted when accessed.
> + */
> + mem_encrypt_init();
(Comments below are connected to the reason why we call this.)
> diff --git a/lib/swiotlb.c b/lib/swiotlb.c
> @@ -159,6 +171,31 @@ void swiotlb_print_info(void)
> +/*
> + * If memory encryption is active, the DMA address for an encrypted page may
> + * be beyond the range of the device. If bounce buffers are required be sure
> + * that they are not on an encrypted page. This should be called before the
> + * iotlb area is used.
> + */
> +void __init swiotlb_clear_encryption(void)
> +{
> + void *vaddr;
> + unsigned long bytes;
> +
> + if (no_iotlb_memory || !io_tlb_start || late_alloc)
io_tlb_start seems redundant -- when can !no_iotlb_memory &&
!io_tlb_start happen?
Is the order of calls
1) swiotlb init
2) SME init
3) swiotlb late init
?
We setup encrypted swiotlb and then decrypt it, but sometimes set it up
decrypted (late_alloc) ... why isn't the swiotlb set up decrypted
directly?
> + return;
> +
> + vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_start);
> + bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs << IO_TLB_SHIFT);
> + swiotlb_set_mem_unenc(vaddr, bytes);
> + memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
> +
> + vaddr = phys_to_virt(io_tlb_overflow_buffer);
> + bytes = PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_overflow);
> + swiotlb_set_mem_unenc(vaddr, bytes);
> + memset(vaddr, 0, bytes);
> +}
> +
> @@ -541,7 +583,7 @@ static phys_addr_t
> map_single(struct device *hwdev, phys_addr_t phys, size_t size,
> enum dma_data_direction dir)
> {
> - dma_addr_t start_dma_addr = phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
> + dma_addr_t start_dma_addr = swiotlb_phys_to_dma(hwdev, io_tlb_start);
We have decrypted io_tlb_start before, so shouldn't its physical address
be saved without the sme bit? (Which changes a lot ...)
Thanks.
--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-15 14:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 244+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-10 0:34 [RFC PATCH v3 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 10:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 17:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 17:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 17:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 13:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 13:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-11 1:26 ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-11 1:26 ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-11 1:26 ` Kani, Toshimitsu
[not found] ` <1478827480.20881.142.camel-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-14 16:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003610.3280.22043.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-16 10:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-16 10:46 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161116104656.qz5wp33zzyja373r-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-16 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-16 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-16 19:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/20] x86: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003620.3280.20613.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 12:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-17 12:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:39 ` Radim Krčmář [this message]
2016-11-15 14:39 ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 14:39 ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 17:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:02 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <d5ebd13d-1278-8714-3f03-8ee7f04a2b38-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 18:17 ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 18:17 ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 18:17 ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 18:17 ` Radim Krčmář
2016-11-15 20:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 20:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 20:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 20:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 15:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 15:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 15:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
[not found] ` <20161115171443-mutt-send-email-mst-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 18:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 18:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 18:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 19:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 19:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-15 19:16 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 11:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 11:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 11:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 15:22 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 15:22 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 15:22 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 15:41 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161122154137.z5vp3xcl5cpesuiz-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 20:41 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 20:41 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-22 20:41 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-22 19:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 19:25 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161122192526.vg63jjhwsbjwex7i-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-29 18:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 18:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 18:00 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003426.3280.2999.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-10 0:34 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-11 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003513.3280.12104.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 12:10 ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-15 12:10 ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-15 12:10 ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-15 12:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 12:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 14:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:40 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <a4cc5b07-89e1-aaa0-1977-1de95883ba62-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 15:33 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161115153338.a2cxmatnpqcgiaiy-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 16:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 16:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 16:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 16:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 16:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161115121456.f4slpk4i2jl3e2ke-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 21:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 21:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 21:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 21:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-15 22:01 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 22:01 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161115121035.GD24857-zLv9SwRftAIdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-15 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-15 14:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/20] x86: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/20] x86: Add support to enable SME during early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:35 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003543.3280.99623.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-14 17:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 17:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 18:18 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 18:18 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 18:18 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 20:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-14 20:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/20] Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-11 16:17 ` Kani, Toshimitsu
2016-11-11 16:17 ` Kani, Toshimitsu
[not found] ` <1478880929.20881.148.camel-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-14 16:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:24 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-17 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-17 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161117155543.vg3domfqm3bhp4f7-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-19 18:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-20 23:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-20 23:04 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20161110003631.3280.73292.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-12-07 13:19 ` Matt Fleming
2016-12-07 13:19 ` Matt Fleming
2016-12-07 13:19 ` Matt Fleming
2016-12-09 14:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-12-09 14:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-12-09 14:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:36 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003655.3280.57333.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 17:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-17 17:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:48 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <6f1a16e4-5a84-20c0-4bd3-3be5ed933800-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-21 8:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-21 8:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003708.3280.29934.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-17 18:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-17 18:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-19 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-19 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/20] iommu/amd: Disable AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:32 ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-14 16:32 ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-14 16:32 ` Joerg Roedel
2016-11-14 16:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-14 16:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003826.3280.5546.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-24 12:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-24 12:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-24 12:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 18:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/20] " Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-10 0:38 ` Tom Lendacky
[not found] ` <20161110003838.3280.23327.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>
2016-11-22 18:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 18:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-22 18:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-26 20:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-26 20:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 18:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 18:48 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-11-29 19:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-11-29 19:56 ` Borislav Petkov
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