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From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more "safe"
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2016 11:48:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161220104846.GA18702@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LSU.2.20.1612201129320.19203@cbobk.fhfr.pm>

On Tue, Dec 20, 2016 at 11:31:57AM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Tue, 20 Dec 2016, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> 
> > I stay totally unconvinced that such kind of countermeasure brings any 
> > value whatsoever. Could you please bring up a particular usecase, where 
> > you have complete control over kernel memory, and still the only 
> > possible exploit factor is redirecting usermodhelper? It feels like 
> > rather random shot into darkness.
> 
> If we want to make usermod helper really secure, perhaps the best way to 
> go would be to completely nuke it and handle everyhting in udev; that'd be 
> quite some work though, especially so that we don't break all the corner 
> cases of module autoloading (request_module() and such).

In talking about this with others, I like Neil's approach of just
calling out to a statically-defined single binary to handle all of the
specifics.  Using something like busybox/toybox to handle any usermode
helper issues would be a very simple way to deal with this on a large
number of systems (i.e. embedded devices / phones / chromebooks).

After I return from vacation, I'll respin this series based on that idea
and repost it.

thanks,

greg k-h

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more "safe"
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2016 11:48:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20161220104846.GA18702@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LSU.2.20.1612201129320.19203@cbobk.fhfr.pm>

On Tue, Dec 20, 2016 at 11:31:57AM +0100, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Tue, 20 Dec 2016, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> 
> > I stay totally unconvinced that such kind of countermeasure brings any 
> > value whatsoever. Could you please bring up a particular usecase, where 
> > you have complete control over kernel memory, and still the only 
> > possible exploit factor is redirecting usermodhelper? It feels like 
> > rather random shot into darkness.
> 
> If we want to make usermod helper really secure, perhaps the best way to 
> go would be to completely nuke it and handle everyhting in udev; that'd be 
> quite some work though, especially so that we don't break all the corner 
> cases of module autoloading (request_module() and such).

In talking about this with others, I like Neil's approach of just
calling out to a statically-defined single binary to handle all of the
specifics.  Using something like busybox/toybox to handle any usermode
helper issues would be a very simple way to deal with this on a large
number of systems (i.e. embedded devices / phones / chromebooks).

After I return from vacation, I'll respin this series based on that idea
and repost it.

thanks,

greg k-h

  reply	other threads:[~2016-12-20 10:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-12-14 18:50 [kernel-hardening] [RFC 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more "safe" Greg KH
2016-12-14 18:50 ` Greg KH
2016-12-14 18:50 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/4] kmod: make usermodehelper path a const string Greg KH
2016-12-14 18:50   ` Greg KH
2016-12-14 18:50 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/4] drbd: rename "usermode_helper" to "drbd_usermode_helper" Greg KH
2016-12-14 18:50   ` Greg KH
2016-12-14 18:50 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/4] Make static usermode helper binaries constant Greg KH
2016-12-14 18:50   ` Greg KH
2016-12-14 19:11   ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2016-12-14 20:29   ` Rich Felker
2016-12-14 20:54     ` Greg KH
2016-12-15 17:54       ` Greg KH
2016-12-15 20:51         ` Daniel Micay
2016-12-15 21:18           ` Greg KH
2016-12-16  0:05             ` Daniel Micay
2016-12-16  0:14               ` Daniel Micay
2016-12-14 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 4/4] Introduce CONFIG_READONLY_USERMODEHELPER Greg KH
2016-12-14 18:51   ` Greg KH
2016-12-14 20:31   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-12-14 20:31     ` Kees Cook
2016-12-14 20:57     ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2016-12-14 20:57       ` Greg KH
2016-12-14 19:25 ` [kernel-hardening] [RFC 0/4] make call_usermodehelper a bit more "safe" Mark Rutland
2016-12-14 20:16   ` Kees Cook
2016-12-14 21:28 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2016-12-14 23:16   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2016-12-16  1:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " NeilBrown
2016-12-16  1:02   ` NeilBrown
2016-12-16 12:49   ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2016-12-16 12:49     ` Greg KH
2016-12-19 13:34     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jiri Kosina
2016-12-19 13:34       ` Jiri Kosina
2016-12-20  9:27       ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2016-12-20  9:27         ` Greg KH
2016-12-20 10:27         ` [kernel-hardening] " Jiri Kosina
2016-12-20 10:27           ` Jiri Kosina
2016-12-20 10:31           ` [kernel-hardening] " Jiri Kosina
2016-12-20 10:31             ` Jiri Kosina
2016-12-20 10:48             ` Greg KH [this message]
2016-12-20 10:48               ` Greg KH

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