Re: [oe-commits] [openembedded-core] 02/20: openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177

[Martin Jansa <martin.jansa@gmail.com>]

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On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:22:26PM +0000, git@git.openembedded.org wrote:
> rpurdie pushed a commit to branch jethro
> in repository openembedded-core.

This change and CVE-2016-8610.patch seems to be missing in krogoth branch.

OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro  origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | grep CVE
-            file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
-            file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
+           file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \
+            file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-2180.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-6303.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \
             file://CVE-2016-6306.patch \
-            file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \
-            file://CVE-2016-8610.patch \

Is there some pending pull request for krogoth? There is also that tzdata version lower in krogoth than jethro I've reported a while ago:

OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro  origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb
similarity index 94%
rename from meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb
rename to meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb

> commit 5781eb9a6e6bf8984b090a488d2a326bf9fafcf8
> Author: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
> AuthorDate: Sat Jul 16 16:04:11 2016 -0700
> 
>     openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177
>     
>     Affects openssl <= 1.0.2h
>     CVSS v2 Base Score: 7.5 HIGH
>     
>     Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
>     Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
>     (cherry picked from commit 2848c7d3e454cbc84cba9183f23ccdf3e9200ec9)
>     Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
> ---
>  .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch            | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb |   1 +
>  2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..df36d5f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@
> +From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
> +Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100
> +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic
> +
> +A common idiom in the codebase is:
> +
> +if (p + len > limit)
> +{
> +    return; /* Too long */
> +}
> +
> +Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and
> +limit == p + SIZE
> +
> +"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS
> +message).
> +
> +The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well
> +defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually
> +undefined behaviour.
> +
> +For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation
> +provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for
> +values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit!
> +
> +Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
> +
> +CVE-2016-2177
> +
> +Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport
> +CVE: CVE-2016-2177
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
> +
> +
> +---
> + ssl/s3_srvr.c  | 14 +++++++-------
> + ssl/ssl_sess.c |  2 +-
> + ssl/t1_lib.c   | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
> + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
> +index ab28702..ab7f690 100644
> +--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
> ++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
> +@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> + 
> +         session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
> + 
> +-        if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
> ++        if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
> +             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> +             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
> +             goto f_err;
> +@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> +     /* get the session-id */
> +     j = *(p++);
> + 
> +-    if (p + j > d + n) {
> ++    if ((d + n) - p < j) {
> +         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> +         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
> +         goto f_err;
> +@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> + 
> +     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
> +         /* cookie stuff */
> +-        if (p + 1 > d + n) {
> ++        if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
> +             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> +             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
> +             goto f_err;
> +         }
> +         cookie_len = *(p++);
> + 
> +-        if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
> ++        if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
> +             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> +             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
> +             goto f_err;
> +@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> +         }
> +     }
> + 
> +-    if (p + 2 > d + n) {
> ++    if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
> +         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> +         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
> +         goto f_err;
> +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> +     }
> + 
> +     /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
> +-    if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
> ++    if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
> +         /* not enough data */
> +         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> +         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
> +@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
> + 
> +     /* compression */
> +     i = *(p++);
> +-    if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
> ++    if ((d + n) - p < i) {
> +         /* not enough data */
> +         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> +         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
> +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
> +index b182998..54ee783 100644
> +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c
> ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c
> +@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
> +     int r;
> + #endif
> + 
> +-    if (session_id + len > limit) {
> ++    if (limit - session_id < len) {
> +         fatal = 1;
> +         goto err;
> +     }
> +diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
> +index fb64607..cdac011 100644
> +--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
> ++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
> +@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
> +         0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
> +     };
> + 
> +-    if (data >= (limit - 2))
> ++    if (limit - data <= 2)
> +         return;
> +     data += 2;
> + 
> +-    if (data > (limit - 4))
> ++    if (limit - data < 4)
> +         return;
> +     n2s(data, type);
> +     n2s(data, size);
> +@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
> +     if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
> +         return;
> + 
> +-    if (data + size > limit)
> ++    if (limit - data < size)
> +         return;
> +     data += size;
> + 
> +@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
> +         const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
> +         const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
> + 
> +-        if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
> ++        if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
> +             return;
> +         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
> +             return;
> +@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
> +     } else {
> +         const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
> + 
> +-        if (data + len != limit)
> ++        if (limit - data != (int)(len))
> +             return;
> +         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
> +             return;
> +@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
> +     if (data == limit)
> +         goto ri_check;
> + 
> +-    if (data > (limit - 2))
> ++    if (limit - data < 2)
> +         goto err;
> + 
> +     n2s(data, len);
> + 
> +-    if (data + len != limit)
> ++    if (limit - data != len)
> +         goto err;
> + 
> +-    while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
> ++    while (limit - data >= 4) {
> +         n2s(data, type);
> +         n2s(data, size);
> + 
> +-        if (data + size > (limit))
> ++        if (limit - data < size)
> +             goto err;
> + # if 0
> +         fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
> +@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
> +     if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
> +         return 1;
> + 
> +-    if (data >= limit - 2)
> ++    if (limit - data <= 2)
> +         return 1;
> +     n2s(data, len);
> + 
> +-    if (data > limit - len)
> ++    if (limit - data < len)
> +         return 1;
> + 
> +-    while (data <= limit - 4) {
> ++    while (limit - data >= 4) {
> +         n2s(data, type);
> +         n2s(data, size);
> + 
> +-        if (data + size > limit)
> ++        if (limit - data < size)
> +             return 1;
> +         if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
> +             return 0;
> +@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
> +                              SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
> + # endif
> + 
> +-    if (data >= (d + n - 2))
> ++    if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
> +         goto ri_check;
> + 
> +     n2s(data, length);
> +-    if (data + length != d + n) {
> ++    if ((d + n) - data != length) {
> +         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
> +         return 0;
> +     }
> + 
> +-    while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
> ++    while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
> +         n2s(data, type);
> +         n2s(data, size);
> + 
> +-        if (data + size > (d + n))
> ++        if ((d + n) - data < size)
> +             goto ri_check;
> + 
> +         if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
> +@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
> +     /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
> +     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
> +         i = *(p++);
> +-        p += i;
> +-        if (p >= limit)
> ++
> ++        if (limit - p <= i)
> +             return -1;
> ++
> ++        p += i;
> +     }
> +     /* Skip past cipher list */
> +     n2s(p, i);
> +-    p += i;
> +-    if (p >= limit)
> ++    if (limit - p <= i)
> +         return -1;
> ++    p += i;
> ++
> +     /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
> +     i = *(p++);
> +-    p += i;
> +-    if (p > limit)
> ++    if (limit - p < i)
> +         return -1;
> ++    p += i;
> ++
> +     /* Now at start of extensions */
> +-    if ((p + 2) >= limit)
> ++    if (limit - p <= 2)
> +         return 0;
> +     n2s(p, i);
> +-    while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
> ++    while (limit - p >= 4) {
> +         unsigned short type, size;
> +         n2s(p, type);
> +         n2s(p, size);
> +-        if (p + size > limit)
> ++        if (limit - p < size)
> +             return 0;
> +         if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
> +             int r;
> +-- 
> +2.3.5
> +
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
> index ea40275..4135a31 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb
> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
>              file://openssl-1.0.2a-x32-asm.patch \
>              file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch  \
>              file://parallel.patch \
> +            file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \
>             "
>  
>  SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0"
> 
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-- 
Martin 'JaMa' Jansa     jabber: Martin.Jansa@gmail.com

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