* Re: [oe-commits] [openembedded-core] 02/20: openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 [not found] ` <20160923222225.E2A2A50174@opal.openembedded.org> @ 2016-12-22 15:21 ` Martin Jansa 2017-01-02 17:43 ` akuster808 0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread From: Martin Jansa @ 2016-12-22 15:21 UTC (permalink / raw) To: openembedded-core, Armin Kuster; +Cc: openembedded-commits [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 12784 bytes --] On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:22:26PM +0000, git@git.openembedded.org wrote: > rpurdie pushed a commit to branch jethro > in repository openembedded-core. This change and CVE-2016-8610.patch seems to be missing in krogoth branch. OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | grep CVE - file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \ - file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \ + file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \ + file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \ file://CVE-2016-2180.patch \ file://CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch \ file://CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch \ file://CVE-2016-6303.patch \ file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \ file://CVE-2016-6306.patch \ - file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \ - file://CVE-2016-8610.patch \ Is there some pending pull request for krogoth? There is also that tzdata version lower in krogoth than jethro I've reported a while ago: OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/ diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb similarity index 94% rename from meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb rename to meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb > commit 5781eb9a6e6bf8984b090a488d2a326bf9fafcf8 > Author: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> > AuthorDate: Sat Jul 16 16:04:11 2016 -0700 > > openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 > > Affects openssl <= 1.0.2h > CVSS v2 Base Score: 7.5 HIGH > > Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> > Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> > (cherry picked from commit 2848c7d3e454cbc84cba9183f23ccdf3e9200ec9) > Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com> > --- > .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++ > .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | 1 + > 2 files changed, 287 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..df36d5f > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch > @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ > +From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> > +Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100 > +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic > + > +A common idiom in the codebase is: > + > +if (p + len > limit) > +{ > + return; /* Too long */ > +} > + > +Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and > +limit == p + SIZE > + > +"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS > +message). > + > +The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well > +defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually > +undefined behaviour. > + > +For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation > +provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for > +values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit! > + > +Issue reported by Guido Vranken. > + > +CVE-2016-2177 > + > +Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport > +CVE: CVE-2016-2177 > + > +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> > + > + > +--- > + ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++------- > + ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +- > + ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- > + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c > +index ab28702..ab7f690 100644 > +--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c > ++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c > +@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) > + > + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); > + > +- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { > ++ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) { > + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; > + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); > + goto f_err; > +@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) > + /* get the session-id */ > + j = *(p++); > + > +- if (p + j > d + n) { > ++ if ((d + n) - p < j) { > + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; > + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); > + goto f_err; > +@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) > + > + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { > + /* cookie stuff */ > +- if (p + 1 > d + n) { > ++ if ((d + n) - p < 1) { > + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; > + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); > + goto f_err; > + } > + cookie_len = *(p++); > + > +- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { > ++ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) { > + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; > + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); > + goto f_err; > +@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) > + } > + } > + > +- if (p + 2 > d + n) { > ++ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { > + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; > + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); > + goto f_err; > +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) > + } > + > + /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ > +- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { > ++ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { > + /* not enough data */ > + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; > + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); > +@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) > + > + /* compression */ > + i = *(p++); > +- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { > ++ if ((d + n) - p < i) { > + /* not enough data */ > + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; > + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); > +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c > +index b182998..54ee783 100644 > +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c > ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c > +@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, > + int r; > + #endif > + > +- if (session_id + len > limit) { > ++ if (limit - session_id < len) { > + fatal = 1; > + goto err; > + } > +diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c > +index fb64607..cdac011 100644 > +--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c > ++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c > +@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, > + 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ > + }; > + > +- if (data >= (limit - 2)) > ++ if (limit - data <= 2) > + return; > + data += 2; > + > +- if (data > (limit - 4)) > ++ if (limit - data < 4) > + return; > + n2s(data, type); > + n2s(data, size); > +@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, > + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) > + return; > + > +- if (data + size > limit) > ++ if (limit - data < size) > + return; > + data += size; > + > +@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, > + const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); > + const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); > + > +- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) > ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) > + return; > + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) > + return; > +@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, > + } else { > + const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); > + > +- if (data + len != limit) > ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len)) > + return; > + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) > + return; > +@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, > + if (data == limit) > + goto ri_check; > + > +- if (data > (limit - 2)) > ++ if (limit - data < 2) > + goto err; > + > + n2s(data, len); > + > +- if (data + len != limit) > ++ if (limit - data != len) > + goto err; > + > +- while (data <= (limit - 4)) { > ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { > + n2s(data, type); > + n2s(data, size); > + > +- if (data + size > (limit)) > ++ if (limit - data < size) > + goto err; > + # if 0 > + fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); > +@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, > + if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) > + return 1; > + > +- if (data >= limit - 2) > ++ if (limit - data <= 2) > + return 1; > + n2s(data, len); > + > +- if (data > limit - len) > ++ if (limit - data < len) > + return 1; > + > +- while (data <= limit - 4) { > ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { > + n2s(data, type); > + n2s(data, size); > + > +- if (data + size > limit) > ++ if (limit - data < size) > + return 1; > + if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) > + return 0; > +@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, > + SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); > + # endif > + > +- if (data >= (d + n - 2)) > ++ if ((d + n) - data <= 2) > + goto ri_check; > + > + n2s(data, length); > +- if (data + length != d + n) { > ++ if ((d + n) - data != length) { > + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; > + return 0; > + } > + > +- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { > ++ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { > + n2s(data, type); > + n2s(data, size); > + > +- if (data + size > (d + n)) > ++ if ((d + n) - data < size) > + goto ri_check; > + > + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) > +@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, > + /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ > + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { > + i = *(p++); > +- p += i; > +- if (p >= limit) > ++ > ++ if (limit - p <= i) > + return -1; > ++ > ++ p += i; > + } > + /* Skip past cipher list */ > + n2s(p, i); > +- p += i; > +- if (p >= limit) > ++ if (limit - p <= i) > + return -1; > ++ p += i; > ++ > + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ > + i = *(p++); > +- p += i; > +- if (p > limit) > ++ if (limit - p < i) > + return -1; > ++ p += i; > ++ > + /* Now at start of extensions */ > +- if ((p + 2) >= limit) > ++ if (limit - p <= 2) > + return 0; > + n2s(p, i); > +- while ((p + 4) <= limit) { > ++ while (limit - p >= 4) { > + unsigned short type, size; > + n2s(p, type); > + n2s(p, size); > +- if (p + size > limit) > ++ if (limit - p < size) > + return 0; > + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { > + int r; > +-- > +2.3.5 > + > diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb > index ea40275..4135a31 100644 > --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb > +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb > @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \ > file://openssl-1.0.2a-x32-asm.patch \ > file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch \ > file://parallel.patch \ > + file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \ > " > > SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0" > > -- > To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact > the administrator of this repository. > -- > _______________________________________________ > Openembedded-commits mailing list > Openembedded-commits@lists.openembedded.org > http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-commits -- Martin 'JaMa' Jansa jabber: Martin.Jansa@gmail.com [-- Attachment #2: Digital signature --] [-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 201 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [oe-commits] [openembedded-core] 02/20: openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 2016-12-22 15:21 ` [oe-commits] [openembedded-core] 02/20: openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 Martin Jansa @ 2017-01-02 17:43 ` akuster808 0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread From: akuster808 @ 2017-01-02 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Martin Jansa, openembedded-core, Armin Kuster; +Cc: openembedded-commits [-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 13260 bytes --] On 12/22/2016 07:21 AM, Martin Jansa wrote: > On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 10:22:26PM +0000, git@git.openembedded.org wrote: >> rpurdie pushed a commit to branch jethro >> in repository openembedded-core. > This change and CVE-2016-8610.patch seems to be missing in krogoth branch. got them now. > > OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | grep CVE > - file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \ > - file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \ > + file://CVE-2016-2178.patch \ > + file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-2180.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-2181_p1.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-2181_p2.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-6303.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-6304.patch \ > file://CVE-2016-6306.patch \ > - file://CVE-2016-2179.patch \ > - file://CVE-2016-8610.patch \ > > Is there some pending pull request for krogoth? There is also that tzdata version lower in krogoth than jethro I've reported a while ago: Yes there was a pull request but it did not contain that change. got this too now. Armin > > OE @ ~/openembedded-core $ git diff origin/jethro origin/krogoth -- meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/ > diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb > similarity index 94% > rename from meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016i.bb > rename to meta/recipes-extended/tzdata/tzdata_2016g.bb > >> commit 5781eb9a6e6bf8984b090a488d2a326bf9fafcf8 >> Author: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> >> AuthorDate: Sat Jul 16 16:04:11 2016 -0700 >> >> openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 >> >> Affects openssl <= 1.0.2h >> CVSS v2 Base Score: 7.5 HIGH >> >> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> >> Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com> >> (cherry picked from commit 2848c7d3e454cbc84cba9183f23ccdf3e9200ec9) >> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com> >> --- >> .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch | 286 +++++++++++++++++++++ >> .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb | 1 + >> 2 files changed, 287 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch >> new file mode 100644 >> index 0000000..df36d5f >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-2177.patch >> @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ >> +From a004e72b95835136d3f1ea90517f706c24c03da7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> >> +Date: Thu, 5 May 2016 11:10:26 +0100 >> +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid some undefined pointer arithmetic >> + >> +A common idiom in the codebase is: >> + >> +if (p + len > limit) >> +{ >> + return; /* Too long */ >> +} >> + >> +Where "p" points to some malloc'd data of SIZE bytes and >> +limit == p + SIZE >> + >> +"len" here could be from some externally supplied data (e.g. from a TLS >> +message). >> + >> +The rules of C pointer arithmetic are such that "p + len" is only well >> +defined where len <= SIZE. Therefore the above idiom is actually >> +undefined behaviour. >> + >> +For example this could cause problems if some malloc implementation >> +provides an address for "p" such that "p + len" actually overflows for >> +values of len that are too big and therefore p + len < limit! >> + >> +Issue reported by Guido Vranken. >> + >> +CVE-2016-2177 >> + >> +Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> >> + >> +Upstream-Status: Backport >> +CVE: CVE-2016-2177 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com> >> + >> + >> +--- >> + ssl/s3_srvr.c | 14 +++++++------- >> + ssl/ssl_sess.c | 2 +- >> + ssl/t1_lib.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- >> + 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) >> + >> +diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c >> +index ab28702..ab7f690 100644 >> +--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c >> ++++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c >> +@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + >> + session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); >> + >> +- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) { >> ++ if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) { >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); >> + goto f_err; >> +@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + /* get the session-id */ >> + j = *(p++); >> + >> +- if (p + j > d + n) { >> ++ if ((d + n) - p < j) { >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); >> + goto f_err; >> +@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + >> + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { >> + /* cookie stuff */ >> +- if (p + 1 > d + n) { >> ++ if ((d + n) - p < 1) { >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); >> + goto f_err; >> + } >> + cookie_len = *(p++); >> + >> +- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) { >> ++ if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) { >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); >> + goto f_err; >> +@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + } >> + } >> + >> +- if (p + 2 > d + n) { >> ++ if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); >> + goto f_err; >> +@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + } >> + >> + /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ >> +- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) { >> ++ if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { >> + /* not enough data */ >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); >> +@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) >> + >> + /* compression */ >> + i = *(p++); >> +- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) { >> ++ if ((d + n) - p < i) { >> + /* not enough data */ >> + al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); >> +diff --git a/ssl/ssl_sess.c b/ssl/ssl_sess.c >> +index b182998..54ee783 100644 >> +--- a/ssl/ssl_sess.c >> ++++ b/ssl/ssl_sess.c >> +@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, >> + int r; >> + #endif >> + >> +- if (session_id + len > limit) { >> ++ if (limit - session_id < len) { >> + fatal = 1; >> + goto err; >> + } >> +diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c >> +index fb64607..cdac011 100644 >> +--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c >> ++++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c >> +@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, >> + 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ >> + }; >> + >> +- if (data >= (limit - 2)) >> ++ if (limit - data <= 2) >> + return; >> + data += 2; >> + >> +- if (data > (limit - 4)) >> ++ if (limit - data < 4) >> + return; >> + n2s(data, type); >> + n2s(data, size); >> +@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, >> + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) >> + return; >> + >> +- if (data + size > limit) >> ++ if (limit - data < size) >> + return; >> + data += size; >> + >> +@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, >> + const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); >> + const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); >> + >> +- if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) >> ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2)) >> + return; >> + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) >> + return; >> +@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, >> + } else { >> + const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); >> + >> +- if (data + len != limit) >> ++ if (limit - data != (int)(len)) >> + return; >> + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) >> + return; >> +@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, >> + if (data == limit) >> + goto ri_check; >> + >> +- if (data > (limit - 2)) >> ++ if (limit - data < 2) >> + goto err; >> + >> + n2s(data, len); >> + >> +- if (data + len != limit) >> ++ if (limit - data != len) >> + goto err; >> + >> +- while (data <= (limit - 4)) { >> ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { >> + n2s(data, type); >> + n2s(data, size); >> + >> +- if (data + size > (limit)) >> ++ if (limit - data < size) >> + goto err; >> + # if 0 >> + fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); >> +@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, >> + if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0) >> + return 1; >> + >> +- if (data >= limit - 2) >> ++ if (limit - data <= 2) >> + return 1; >> + n2s(data, len); >> + >> +- if (data > limit - len) >> ++ if (limit - data < len) >> + return 1; >> + >> +- while (data <= limit - 4) { >> ++ while (limit - data >= 4) { >> + n2s(data, type); >> + n2s(data, size); >> + >> +- if (data + size > limit) >> ++ if (limit - data < size) >> + return 1; >> + if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0) >> + return 0; >> +@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, >> + SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); >> + # endif >> + >> +- if (data >= (d + n - 2)) >> ++ if ((d + n) - data <= 2) >> + goto ri_check; >> + >> + n2s(data, length); >> +- if (data + length != d + n) { >> ++ if ((d + n) - data != length) { >> + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; >> + return 0; >> + } >> + >> +- while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { >> ++ while ((d + n) - data >= 4) { >> + n2s(data, type); >> + n2s(data, size); >> + >> +- if (data + size > (d + n)) >> ++ if ((d + n) - data < size) >> + goto ri_check; >> + >> + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) >> +@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, >> + /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ >> + if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { >> + i = *(p++); >> +- p += i; >> +- if (p >= limit) >> ++ >> ++ if (limit - p <= i) >> + return -1; >> ++ >> ++ p += i; >> + } >> + /* Skip past cipher list */ >> + n2s(p, i); >> +- p += i; >> +- if (p >= limit) >> ++ if (limit - p <= i) >> + return -1; >> ++ p += i; >> ++ >> + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ >> + i = *(p++); >> +- p += i; >> +- if (p > limit) >> ++ if (limit - p < i) >> + return -1; >> ++ p += i; >> ++ >> + /* Now at start of extensions */ >> +- if ((p + 2) >= limit) >> ++ if (limit - p <= 2) >> + return 0; >> + n2s(p, i); >> +- while ((p + 4) <= limit) { >> ++ while (limit - p >= 4) { >> + unsigned short type, size; >> + n2s(p, type); >> + n2s(p, size); >> +- if (p + size > limit) >> ++ if (limit - p < size) >> + return 0; >> + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { >> + int r; >> +-- >> +2.3.5 >> + >> diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb >> index ea40275..4135a31 100644 >> --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb >> +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2h.bb >> @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \ >> file://openssl-1.0.2a-x32-asm.patch \ >> file://ptest_makefile_deps.patch \ >> file://parallel.patch \ >> + file://CVE-2016-2177.patch \ >> " >> >> SRC_URI[md5sum] = "9392e65072ce4b614c1392eefc1f23d0" >> >> -- >> To stop receiving notification emails like this one, please contact >> the administrator of this repository. >> -- >> _______________________________________________ >> Openembedded-commits mailing list >> Openembedded-commits@lists.openembedded.org >> http://lists.openembedded.org/mailman/listinfo/openembedded-commits > > [-- Attachment #2: Type: text/html, Size: 15252 bytes --] ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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[not found] <20160923222224.3285.13563@opal.openembedded.org>
[not found] ` <20160923222225.E2A2A50174@opal.openembedded.org>
2016-12-22 15:21 ` [oe-commits] [openembedded-core] 02/20: openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-2177 Martin Jansa
2017-01-02 17:43 ` akuster808
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