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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 4/4] crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES for CTR/CCM/GCM
Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2017 23:38:24 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170202073824.GC582@zzz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1485646413-17491-5-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>

Hi Ard,

On Sat, Jan 28, 2017 at 11:33:33PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> 
> Note that this only implements AES encryption, which is all we need
> for CTR and CBC-MAC. AES decryption can easily be implemented in a
> similar way, but is significantly more costly.

Is the expectation of decryption being more costly the only reason why "aes-ti"
couldn't be a "cipher" algorithm, allowing it to automatically be used by the
existing templates for CTR, CBC-MAC, CBC, ECB, XTS, CMAC, etc.?  It doesn't seem
to do anything expensive on a per-block basis like loading SSE registers, so it
seems it would fit better as a "cipher" algorithm if at all possible.  Then
there would be no need to implement all these modes yet again.

Also, what would be the feasibility of simply replacing aes-generic with the
time-invariant implementation, rather than offering two implementations and
requiring users to choose one, usually without the needed expertise?

> +
> +/*
> + * Emit the sbox as __weak with external linkage to prevent the compiler
> + * from doing constant folding on sbox references involving fixed indexes.
> + */
> +__weak const u8 __cacheline_aligned __aesti_sbox[] = {

Did you consider marking it 'volatile' instead?

> +static int aesti_set_key(struct aes_ti_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
> +			 unsigned int key_len)
> +{
> +	struct crypto_aes_ctx rk;
> +	int err;
> +
> +	err = crypto_aes_expand_key(&rk, in_key, key_len);
> +	if (err)
> +		return err;

crypto_aes_expand_key() assumes that the key is u32-aligned; I don't think
that's guaranteed here.

Eric

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: ebiggers3@gmail.com (Eric Biggers)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 4/4] crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES for CTR/CCM/GCM
Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2017 23:38:24 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170202073824.GC582@zzz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1485646413-17491-5-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>

Hi Ard,

On Sat, Jan 28, 2017 at 11:33:33PM +0000, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> 
> Note that this only implements AES encryption, which is all we need
> for CTR and CBC-MAC. AES decryption can easily be implemented in a
> similar way, but is significantly more costly.

Is the expectation of decryption being more costly the only reason why "aes-ti"
couldn't be a "cipher" algorithm, allowing it to automatically be used by the
existing templates for CTR, CBC-MAC, CBC, ECB, XTS, CMAC, etc.?  It doesn't seem
to do anything expensive on a per-block basis like loading SSE registers, so it
seems it would fit better as a "cipher" algorithm if at all possible.  Then
there would be no need to implement all these modes yet again.

Also, what would be the feasibility of simply replacing aes-generic with the
time-invariant implementation, rather than offering two implementations and
requiring users to choose one, usually without the needed expertise?

> +
> +/*
> + * Emit the sbox as __weak with external linkage to prevent the compiler
> + * from doing constant folding on sbox references involving fixed indexes.
> + */
> +__weak const u8 __cacheline_aligned __aesti_sbox[] = {

Did you consider marking it 'volatile' instead?

> +static int aesti_set_key(struct aes_ti_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key,
> +			 unsigned int key_len)
> +{
> +	struct crypto_aes_ctx rk;
> +	int err;
> +
> +	err = crypto_aes_expand_key(&rk, in_key, key_len);
> +	if (err)
> +		return err;

crypto_aes_expand_key() assumes that the key is u32-aligned; I don't think
that's guaranteed here.

Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2017-02-02  7:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-01-28 23:33 [PATCH v2 0/4] crypto: time invariant AES for CCM (and GCM/CTR) Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-28 23:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-28 23:33 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] crypto: testmgr - add test cases for cbcmac(aes) Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-28 23:33   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-28 23:33 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-28 23:33   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-02 18:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-02 18:56     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-28 23:33 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] crypto: arm64/aes - add NEON and Crypto Extension CBC-MAC driver Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-28 23:33   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-28 23:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 4/4] crypto: aes - add generic time invariant AES for CTR/CCM/GCM Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-28 23:33   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-02  7:38   ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2017-02-02  7:38     ` Eric Biggers
2017-02-02  7:48     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-02  7:48       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-02  7:55       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-02-02  7:55         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-31 18:30 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] crypto: time invariant AES for CCM (and GCM/CTR) Ard Biesheuvel
2017-01-31 18:30   ` Ard Biesheuvel

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