[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] lkdtm: add bad USER_DS test

[Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>]

On Thu, Mar 23, 2017 at 01:34:19PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> This adds CORRUPT_USER_DS to check that the get_fs() test on syscall return
> still sees USER_DS during the new VERIFY_PRE_USERMODE_STATE checks.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

...

> +void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Test that USER_DS has been set correctly on exiting a syscall.
> +	 * Since setting this higher than USER_DS (TASK_SIZE) would introduce
> +	 * an exploitable condition, we lower it instead, since that should
> +	 * not create as large a problem on an unprotected system.
> +	 */
> +	mm_segment_t lowfs;
> +#ifdef MAKE_MM_SEG
> +	lowfs = MAKE_MM_SEG(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE);
> +#else
> +	lowfs = TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE;
> +#endif
> +
> +	pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n");
> +	set_fs(lowfs);
> +}

This won't work on architectures where the set_fs() argument does not
contain an address but an address space identifier. This is true e.g. for
s390 and as far as I know also for sparc.
On s390 we have complete distinct address spaces for kernel and user space
that each start at address zero.