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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct
Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 23:42:06 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170504044206.GA18463@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jK=_jS4hmCt90nLUbic6v+gEqm7kF+KLzOLVfSTBJrEuw@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, May 03, 2017 at 01:19:41PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 1:02 PM, Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> wrote:
> > On 05/03/2017 03:45 PM, Greg KH wrote:
> >>
> >> On Wed, May 03, 2017 at 12:32:07PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 6:57 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> Quoting Matt Brown (matt@nmatt.com):
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This patch adds struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns to the tty_struct.
> >>>>> Then it is set to current_user_ns() in the alloc_tty_struct function.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This is done to facilitate capability checks against the original user
> >>>>> namespace that allocated the tty.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> E.g. ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This combined with the use of user namespace's will allow hardening
> >>>>> protections to be built to mitigate container escapes that utilize TTY
> >>>>> ioctls such as TIOCSTI.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> See: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> This Ack didn't end up in the v5, but I think it stands, yes?
> >>>
> >>> Greg, is the v5 okay to pull for you or would a v6 with Acks/Reviews
> >>> included be preferred?
> >>
> >>
> >> v6 would be great, and we are dropping patch 2 from the series, right?
> >> I was expecting this to be resent.  I'll start looking at new patches
> >> like this after 4.12-rc1 is out.
> >>
> >
> > I will create a v6 with the Acks/Reviews. I'd like to keep patch 2 in
> > since that got acked by at least Serge. (Kees also? or just patch 1?)
> 
> Sorry, I meant that patch 2's ack from serge got dropped accidentally.
> i.e. he Acked v4, but it wasn't in v5.
> 
> Serge, just to double-check, does your Ack stand?

Yes.

thanks,
-serge

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: serge@hallyn.com (Serge E. Hallyn)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct
Date: Wed, 3 May 2017 23:42:06 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170504044206.GA18463@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jK=_jS4hmCt90nLUbic6v+gEqm7kF+KLzOLVfSTBJrEuw@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, May 03, 2017 at 01:19:41PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, May 3, 2017 at 1:02 PM, Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com> wrote:
> > On 05/03/2017 03:45 PM, Greg KH wrote:
> >>
> >> On Wed, May 03, 2017 at 12:32:07PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 6:57 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> >>> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> Quoting Matt Brown (matt at nmatt.com):
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This patch adds struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns to the tty_struct.
> >>>>> Then it is set to current_user_ns() in the alloc_tty_struct function.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This is done to facilitate capability checks against the original user
> >>>>> namespace that allocated the tty.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> E.g. ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns,CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
> >>>>>
> >>>>> This combined with the use of user namespace's will allow hardening
> >>>>> protections to be built to mitigate container escapes that utilize TTY
> >>>>> ioctls such as TIOCSTI.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> See: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1411256
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Signed-off-by: Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> This Ack didn't end up in the v5, but I think it stands, yes?
> >>>
> >>> Greg, is the v5 okay to pull for you or would a v6 with Acks/Reviews
> >>> included be preferred?
> >>
> >>
> >> v6 would be great, and we are dropping patch 2 from the series, right?
> >> I was expecting this to be resent.  I'll start looking at new patches
> >> like this after 4.12-rc1 is out.
> >>
> >
> > I will create a v6 with the Acks/Reviews. I'd like to keep patch 2 in
> > since that got acked by at least Serge. (Kees also? or just patch 1?)
> 
> Sorry, I meant that patch 2's ack from serge got dropped accidentally.
> i.e. he Acked v4, but it wasn't in v5.
> 
> Serge, just to double-check, does your Ack stand?

Yes.

thanks,
-serge
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  reply	other threads:[~2017-05-04  4:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-24  5:15 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN Matt Brown
2017-04-24  5:15 ` Matt Brown
2017-04-24  5:15 ` Matt Brown
2017-04-24  5:15 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 1/2] tiocsti-restrict : Add owner user namespace to tty_struct Matt Brown
2017-04-24  5:15   ` Matt Brown
2017-04-24  5:15   ` Matt Brown
2017-04-24 13:57   ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2017-04-24 13:57     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-04-24 13:57     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-03 19:32     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-03 19:32       ` Kees Cook
2017-05-03 19:32       ` Kees Cook
2017-05-03 19:45       ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2017-05-03 19:45         ` Greg KH
2017-05-03 19:45         ` Greg KH
2017-05-03 20:02         ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-05-03 20:02           ` Matt Brown
2017-05-03 20:02           ` Matt Brown
2017-05-03 20:19           ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-03 20:19             ` Kees Cook
2017-05-03 20:19             ` Kees Cook
2017-05-04  4:42             ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2017-05-04  4:42               ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2017-04-25 14:55   ` Alan Cox
2017-04-25 14:55     ` Alan Cox
2017-04-25 14:55     ` Alan Cox
2017-04-24  5:15 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 2/2] tiocsti-restrict : make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN Matt Brown
2017-04-24  5:15   ` Matt Brown
2017-04-24  5:15   ` Matt Brown
2017-04-24 13:59   ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2017-04-24 13:59     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-04-24 13:59     ` Serge E. Hallyn

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