From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Peter Dolding <oiaohm@gmail.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
Matt Brown <matt@nmatt.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 09:33:44 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170519143344.GA15983@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANA3KFWF-=6AWZKAc1ijyoL5vRAwPnwngZZEP9=5+AFgnMv1rg@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 12:48:17PM +1000, Peter Dolding wrote:
> Using cap_sys_admin as fix is like removing car windsheld because
> vision is being blocked by a rock hitting it.
Nonsense. If the application has cap_sys_admin then it is less contained and
more trusted anyway. If I went to the trouble to run an application in a
private user namespace (where it can have cap_sys_admin, but not targeted
at my tty) then it should be more contained. That's the point of targeted
capabilities.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: serge@hallyn.com (Serge E. Hallyn)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
Date: Fri, 19 May 2017 09:33:44 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170519143344.GA15983@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANA3KFWF-=6AWZKAc1ijyoL5vRAwPnwngZZEP9=5+AFgnMv1rg@mail.gmail.com>
On Fri, May 19, 2017 at 12:48:17PM +1000, Peter Dolding wrote:
> Using cap_sys_admin as fix is like removing car windsheld because
> vision is being blocked by a rock hitting it.
Nonsense. If the application has cap_sys_admin then it is less contained and
more trusted anyway. If I went to the trouble to run an application in a
private user namespace (where it can have cap_sys_admin, but not targeted
at my tty) then it should be more contained. That's the point of targeted
capabilities.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-19 14:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 77+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-05 23:20 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 0/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN Matt Brown
2017-05-05 23:20 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-05 23:20 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-05 23:20 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 1/2] security: tty: Add owner user namespace to tty_struct Matt Brown
2017-05-05 23:20 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-05 23:20 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-05 23:20 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v6 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN Matt Brown
2017-05-05 23:20 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-05 23:20 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-18 13:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2017-05-18 13:31 ` Greg KH
2017-05-18 13:31 ` Greg KH
2017-05-19 4:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-05-19 4:51 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-19 4:51 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-10 20:29 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v6 0/2] " Alan Cox
2017-05-10 20:29 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-10 20:29 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-10 21:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-05-10 21:02 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-13 19:52 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-13 19:52 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-13 19:52 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-15 4:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Nicolas Belouin
2017-05-15 20:57 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-15 20:57 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-15 20:57 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-15 23:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Dolding
2017-05-15 23:10 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-15 23:10 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 4:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-05-16 4:15 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-16 4:15 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-16 9:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 9:01 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 9:01 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 12:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-05-16 12:22 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-16 12:22 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-16 14:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-16 14:28 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-16 14:28 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-16 15:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-16 15:48 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-16 22:05 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 22:05 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 21:43 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 21:43 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 21:43 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-16 21:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Matt Brown
2017-05-16 21:54 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-16 21:54 ` Matt Brown
2017-05-17 16:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-05-17 16:41 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-17 16:41 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-17 18:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-05-17 18:25 ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-17 23:04 ` Boris Lukashev
2017-05-18 3:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-18 3:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-19 2:48 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-19 2:48 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-19 4:08 ` Boris Lukashev
2017-05-19 14:33 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2017-05-19 14:33 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-29 10:42 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-29 10:42 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-30 15:52 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-30 15:52 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-30 21:52 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-30 21:52 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 11:27 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-31 11:27 ` Peter Dolding
2017-05-31 14:36 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 14:36 ` Alan Cox
2017-05-31 15:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-31 15:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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