From: riel@redhat.com
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
mingo@kernel.org, oleg@redhat.com, lwoodman@redhat.com,
mhocko@suse.de, danielmicay@gmail.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
benh@kernel.crashing.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 6/6] powerpc,mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2017 11:20:10 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170602152010.2064-7-riel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170602152010.2064-1-riel@redhat.com>
From: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
When RLIMIT_STACK is, for example, 256MB, the current code results in
a gap between the top of the task and mmap_base of 256MB, failing to
take into account the amount by which the stack address was randomized.
In other words, the stack gets less than RLIMIT_STACK space.
Ensure that the gap between the stack and mmap_base always takes stack
randomization into account.
Inspired by Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
---
arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
index 9dbd2a733d6b..354cfa22e5d4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
@@ -34,16 +34,9 @@
/*
* Top of mmap area (just below the process stack).
*
- * Leave at least a ~128 MB hole on 32bit applications.
- *
- * On 64bit applications we randomise the stack by 1GB so we need to
- * space our mmap start address by a further 1GB, otherwise there is a
- * chance the mmap area will end up closer to the stack than our ulimit
- * requires.
+ * Leave at least a ~128 MB hole.
*/
-#define MIN_GAP32 (128*1024*1024)
-#define MIN_GAP64 ((128 + 1024)*1024*1024UL)
-#define MIN_GAP ((is_32bit_task()) ? MIN_GAP32 : MIN_GAP64)
+#define MIN_GAP (128*1024*1024)
#define MAX_GAP (TASK_SIZE/6*5)
static inline int mmap_is_legacy(void)
@@ -71,9 +64,26 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
+static inline unsigned long stack_maxrandom_size(void)
+{
+ if (!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* 8MB for 32bit, 1GB for 64bit */
+ if (is_32bit_task())
+ return (1<<23);
+ else
+ return (1<<30);
+}
+
static inline unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd)
{
unsigned long gap = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
+ unsigned long pad = stack_maxrandom_size();
+
+ /* Values close to RLIM_INFINITY can overflow. */
+ if (gap + pad > gap)
+ gap += pad;
if (gap < MIN_GAP)
gap = MIN_GAP;
--
2.9.3
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: riel@redhat.com
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
mingo@kernel.org, oleg@redhat.com, lwoodman@redhat.com,
mhocko@suse.de, danielmicay@gmail.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
benh@kernel.crashing.org
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] powerpc,mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base
Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2017 11:20:10 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170602152010.2064-7-riel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170602152010.2064-1-riel@redhat.com>
From: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
When RLIMIT_STACK is, for example, 256MB, the current code results in
a gap between the top of the task and mmap_base of 256MB, failing to
take into account the amount by which the stack address was randomized.
In other words, the stack gets less than RLIMIT_STACK space.
Ensure that the gap between the stack and mmap_base always takes stack
randomization into account.
Inspired by Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
---
arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
index 9dbd2a733d6b..354cfa22e5d4 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c
@@ -34,16 +34,9 @@
/*
* Top of mmap area (just below the process stack).
*
- * Leave at least a ~128 MB hole on 32bit applications.
- *
- * On 64bit applications we randomise the stack by 1GB so we need to
- * space our mmap start address by a further 1GB, otherwise there is a
- * chance the mmap area will end up closer to the stack than our ulimit
- * requires.
+ * Leave at least a ~128 MB hole.
*/
-#define MIN_GAP32 (128*1024*1024)
-#define MIN_GAP64 ((128 + 1024)*1024*1024UL)
-#define MIN_GAP ((is_32bit_task()) ? MIN_GAP32 : MIN_GAP64)
+#define MIN_GAP (128*1024*1024)
#define MAX_GAP (TASK_SIZE/6*5)
static inline int mmap_is_legacy(void)
@@ -71,9 +64,26 @@ unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
+static inline unsigned long stack_maxrandom_size(void)
+{
+ if (!(current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* 8MB for 32bit, 1GB for 64bit */
+ if (is_32bit_task())
+ return (1<<23);
+ else
+ return (1<<30);
+}
+
static inline unsigned long mmap_base(unsigned long rnd)
{
unsigned long gap = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
+ unsigned long pad = stack_maxrandom_size();
+
+ /* Values close to RLIM_INFINITY can overflow. */
+ if (gap + pad > gap)
+ gap += pad;
if (gap < MIN_GAP)
gap = MIN_GAP;
--
2.9.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-02 15:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-06-02 15:20 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/6] move mmap_area and PIE binaries away from the stack riel
2017-06-02 15:20 ` riel
2017-06-02 15:20 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/6] binfmt_elf: document load_bias a little bit riel
2017-06-02 15:20 ` riel
2017-06-02 19:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-02 15:20 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/6] x86/elf: move 32 bit ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 256MB riel
2017-06-02 15:20 ` riel
2017-06-03 4:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-03 4:22 ` Kees Cook
2017-06-03 11:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-06-03 11:57 ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-05 13:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Rik van Riel
2017-06-05 13:54 ` Rik van Riel
2017-06-02 15:20 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 3/6] x86/mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base riel
2017-06-02 15:20 ` riel
2017-06-03 4:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-03 12:16 ` Daniel Micay
2017-06-02 15:20 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 4/6] arm64/mmap: " riel
2017-06-02 15:20 ` riel
2017-06-02 15:20 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 5/6] arm64: move COMPAT_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE lower in the address space riel
2017-06-02 15:20 ` riel
2017-06-02 15:20 ` riel [this message]
2017-06-02 15:20 ` [PATCH 6/6] powerpc,mmap: properly account for stack randomization in mmap_base riel
2017-06-03 4:37 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/6] move mmap_area and PIE binaries away from the stack Kees Cook
2017-06-03 12:14 ` Daniel Micay
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