From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
james.morse@arm.com, labbott@redhat.com, luto@amacapital.net,
matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, will.deacon@arm.com,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] lkdtm: Test VMAP_STACK allocates leading/trailing guard pages
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 13:39:48 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170807203948.GA22298@beast> (raw)
Two new tests STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING and STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING
attempt to read the byte before and after, respectively, of the current
stack frame, which should fault under VMAP_STACK.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Do these tests both trip with the new arm64 VMAP_STACK code?
---
drivers/misc/lkdtm.h | 2 ++
drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
index 063f5d651076..3c8627ca5f42 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ void lkdtm_HUNG_TASK(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void);
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING(void);
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING(void);
/* lkdtm_heap.c */
void lkdtm_OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION(void);
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
index ef3d06f901fc..041fe6e9532a 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
struct lkdtm_list {
@@ -199,6 +200,7 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void)
pr_err("list_del() corruption not detected!\n");
}
+/* Test if unbalanced set_fs(KERNEL_DS)/set_fs(USER_DS) check exists. */
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
{
pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n");
@@ -207,3 +209,31 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
/* Make sure we do not keep running with a KERNEL_DS! */
force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
}
+
+/* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a leading guard page */
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING(void)
+{
+ const unsigned char *stack = task_stack_page(current);
+ const unsigned char *ptr = stack - 1;
+ volatile unsigned char byte;
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad read from page below current stack\n");
+
+ byte = *ptr;
+
+ pr_err("FAIL: accessed page before stack!\n");
+}
+
+/* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a trailing guard page */
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING(void)
+{
+ const unsigned char *stack = task_stack_page(current);
+ const unsigned char *ptr = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
+ volatile unsigned char byte;
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad read from page above current stack\n");
+
+ byte = *ptr;
+
+ pr_err("FAIL: accessed page after stack!\n");
+}
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
index 51decc07eeda..9e98d7ef5503 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_DEL),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_USER_DS),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_STACK),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING),
CRASHTYPE(UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE),
CRASHTYPE(OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION),
CRASHTYPE(WRITE_AFTER_FREE),
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH] lkdtm: Test VMAP_STACK allocates leading/trailing guard pages
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 13:39:48 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170807203948.GA22298@beast> (raw)
Two new tests STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING and STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING
attempt to read the byte before and after, respectively, of the current
stack frame, which should fault under VMAP_STACK.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Do these tests both trip with the new arm64 VMAP_STACK code?
---
drivers/misc/lkdtm.h | 2 ++
drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
index 063f5d651076..3c8627ca5f42 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ void lkdtm_HUNG_TASK(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void);
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING(void);
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING(void);
/* lkdtm_heap.c */
void lkdtm_OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION(void);
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
index ef3d06f901fc..041fe6e9532a 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
struct lkdtm_list {
@@ -199,6 +200,7 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void)
pr_err("list_del() corruption not detected!\n");
}
+/* Test if unbalanced set_fs(KERNEL_DS)/set_fs(USER_DS) check exists. */
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
{
pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n");
@@ -207,3 +209,31 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
/* Make sure we do not keep running with a KERNEL_DS! */
force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
}
+
+/* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a leading guard page */
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING(void)
+{
+ const unsigned char *stack = task_stack_page(current);
+ const unsigned char *ptr = stack - 1;
+ volatile unsigned char byte;
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad read from page below current stack\n");
+
+ byte = *ptr;
+
+ pr_err("FAIL: accessed page before stack!\n");
+}
+
+/* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a trailing guard page */
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING(void)
+{
+ const unsigned char *stack = task_stack_page(current);
+ const unsigned char *ptr = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
+ volatile unsigned char byte;
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad read from page above current stack\n");
+
+ byte = *ptr;
+
+ pr_err("FAIL: accessed page after stack!\n");
+}
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
index 51decc07eeda..9e98d7ef5503 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_DEL),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_USER_DS),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_STACK),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING),
CRASHTYPE(UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE),
CRASHTYPE(OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION),
CRASHTYPE(WRITE_AFTER_FREE),
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com,
james.morse@arm.com, labbott@redhat.com, luto@amacapital.net,
matt@codeblueprint.co.uk, will.deacon@arm.com,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH] lkdtm: Test VMAP_STACK allocates leading/trailing guard pages
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2017 13:39:48 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170807203948.GA22298@beast> (raw)
Two new tests STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING and STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING
attempt to read the byte before and after, respectively, of the current
stack frame, which should fault under VMAP_STACK.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Do these tests both trip with the new arm64 VMAP_STACK code?
---
drivers/misc/lkdtm.h | 2 ++
drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c | 2 ++
3 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
index 063f5d651076..3c8627ca5f42 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm.h
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ void lkdtm_HUNG_TASK(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_ADD(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void);
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void);
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING(void);
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING(void);
/* lkdtm_heap.c */
void lkdtm_OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION(void);
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
index ef3d06f901fc..041fe6e9532a 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_bugs.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
struct lkdtm_list {
@@ -199,6 +200,7 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_LIST_DEL(void)
pr_err("list_del() corruption not detected!\n");
}
+/* Test if unbalanced set_fs(KERNEL_DS)/set_fs(USER_DS) check exists. */
void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
{
pr_info("setting bad task size limit\n");
@@ -207,3 +209,31 @@ void lkdtm_CORRUPT_USER_DS(void)
/* Make sure we do not keep running with a KERNEL_DS! */
force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
}
+
+/* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a leading guard page */
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING(void)
+{
+ const unsigned char *stack = task_stack_page(current);
+ const unsigned char *ptr = stack - 1;
+ volatile unsigned char byte;
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad read from page below current stack\n");
+
+ byte = *ptr;
+
+ pr_err("FAIL: accessed page before stack!\n");
+}
+
+/* Test that VMAP_STACK is actually allocating with a trailing guard page */
+void lkdtm_STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING(void)
+{
+ const unsigned char *stack = task_stack_page(current);
+ const unsigned char *ptr = stack + THREAD_SIZE;
+ volatile unsigned char byte;
+
+ pr_info("attempting bad read from page above current stack\n");
+
+ byte = *ptr;
+
+ pr_err("FAIL: accessed page after stack!\n");
+}
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
index 51decc07eeda..9e98d7ef5503 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm_core.c
@@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_LIST_DEL),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_USER_DS),
CRASHTYPE(CORRUPT_STACK),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACK_GUARD_PAGE_LEADING),
+ CRASHTYPE(STACK_GUARD_PAGE_TRAILING),
CRASHTYPE(UNALIGNED_LOAD_STORE_WRITE),
CRASHTYPE(OVERWRITE_ALLOCATION),
CRASHTYPE(WRITE_AFTER_FREE),
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next reply other threads:[~2017-08-07 20:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-08-07 20:39 Kees Cook [this message]
2017-08-07 20:39 ` [PATCH] lkdtm: Test VMAP_STACK allocates leading/trailing guard pages Kees Cook
2017-08-07 20:39 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 21:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2017-08-07 21:27 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-08-07 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 21:46 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-08-07 21:46 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-08-07 21:47 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 21:47 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 22:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-08-07 22:00 ` Mark Rutland
2017-08-07 22:00 ` Mark Rutland
2017-08-07 22:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2017-08-07 22:55 ` Laura Abbott
2017-08-07 22:55 ` Laura Abbott
2017-08-07 23:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-08-07 23:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-07 23:34 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-08 9:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-08-08 9:23 ` Mark Rutland
2017-08-08 9:23 ` Mark Rutland
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