From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
To: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Chris Fries <cfries@google.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 20:35:16 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171017203516.3746395e@vmware.local.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171017231559.GD8001@eros>
On Wed, 18 Oct 2017 10:15:59 +1100
"Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc> wrote:
> > Does %p[FfSs] leak addresses? Well, I guess it does if they are not
> > found in kallsyms, but otherwise you have:
> >
> > function+0x<offset>
>
> You are correct %pF and %pS print an offset. Does this provide an attack vector,
> I didn't think so but I'm no security expert. If they do then we need to amend
> those calls also.
Hopefully not. We changed stack dumps to use them only instead of
showing addresses because of the location leak.
-- Steve
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
To: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Chris Fries <cfries@google.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 20:35:16 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171017203516.3746395e@vmware.local.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171017231559.GD8001@eros>
On Wed, 18 Oct 2017 10:15:59 +1100
"Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc> wrote:
> > Does %p[FfSs] leak addresses? Well, I guess it does if they are not
> > found in kallsyms, but otherwise you have:
> >
> > function+0x<offset>
>
> You are correct %pF and %pS print an offset. Does this provide an attack vector,
> I didn't think so but I'm no security expert. If they do then we need to amend
> those calls also.
Hopefully not. We changed stack dumps to use them only instead of
showing addresses because of the location leak.
-- Steve
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-18 0:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-17 4:52 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] printk: hash addresses printed with %p Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-17 4:52 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-17 5:20 ` [kernel-hardening] " Joe Perches
2017-10-17 5:20 ` Joe Perches
2017-10-17 13:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Steven Rostedt
2017-10-17 13:31 ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-17 23:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-17 23:15 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-18 0:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-10-18 0:13 ` Kees Cook
2017-10-18 2:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-18 2:28 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-18 15:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-10-18 0:35 ` Steven Rostedt [this message]
2017-10-18 0:35 ` Steven Rostedt
2017-10-17 17:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Roberts, William C
2017-10-17 17:27 ` Roberts, William C
2017-10-17 22:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-17 22:11 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-18 0:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-10-18 0:27 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2017-10-18 2:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-18 2:27 ` Tobin C. Harding
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