From: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
To: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfries@google.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2017 14:44:31 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171018054431.GA597@jagdpanzerIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1508300515-28824-1-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc>
On (10/18/17 15:21), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
[..]
> diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> index 86c3385b9eb3..4609738cd2cd 100644
> --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
> #include <linux/uuid.h>
> #include <linux/of.h>
> #include <net/addrconf.h>
> +#include <linux/siphash.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
> #include <linux/blkdev.h>
> #endif
> @@ -1591,6 +1593,70 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
> return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
> }
>
> +/* protects ptr_secret and have_key */
> +DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_lock);
> +static siphash_key_t ptr_secret __read_mostly;
> +static atomic_t have_key = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
> +
> +static int initialize_ptr_secret(void)
> +{
> + spin_lock(&key_lock);
> + if (atomic_read(&have_key) == 1)
> + goto unlock;
> +
> + get_random_bytes(&ptr_secret, sizeof(ptr_secret));
> + atomic_set(&have_key, 1);
> +
> +unlock:
> + spin_unlock(&key_lock);
> + return 0;
> +}
is this spinlock legal? what happens if we are getting interrupted by NMI?
printk()
vprintk_emit()
vscnprintf()
pointer()
ptr_to_id()
initialize_ptr_secret()
spin_lock(&key_lock)
----> NMI
printk()
printk_safe_log_store()
vscnprintf()
pointer()
ptr_to_id()
initialize_ptr_secret()
spin_lock(&key_lock) <<<<
or am I completely misreading the patch? sorry if so.
-ss
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com>
To: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfries@google.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2017 14:44:31 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171018054431.GA597@jagdpanzerIV> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1508300515-28824-1-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc>
On (10/18/17 15:21), Tobin C. Harding wrote:
[..]
> diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> index 86c3385b9eb3..4609738cd2cd 100644
> --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
> #include <linux/uuid.h>
> #include <linux/of.h>
> #include <net/addrconf.h>
> +#include <linux/siphash.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
> #include <linux/blkdev.h>
> #endif
> @@ -1591,6 +1593,70 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
> return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
> }
>
> +/* protects ptr_secret and have_key */
> +DEFINE_SPINLOCK(key_lock);
> +static siphash_key_t ptr_secret __read_mostly;
> +static atomic_t have_key = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
> +
> +static int initialize_ptr_secret(void)
> +{
> + spin_lock(&key_lock);
> + if (atomic_read(&have_key) == 1)
> + goto unlock;
> +
> + get_random_bytes(&ptr_secret, sizeof(ptr_secret));
> + atomic_set(&have_key, 1);
> +
> +unlock:
> + spin_unlock(&key_lock);
> + return 0;
> +}
is this spinlock legal? what happens if we are getting interrupted by NMI?
printk()
vprintk_emit()
vscnprintf()
pointer()
ptr_to_id()
initialize_ptr_secret()
spin_lock(&key_lock)
----> NMI
printk()
printk_safe_log_store()
vscnprintf()
pointer()
ptr_to_id()
initialize_ptr_secret()
spin_lock(&key_lock) <<<<
or am I completely misreading the patch? sorry if so.
-ss
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-18 5:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-10-18 4:21 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4] printk: hash addresses printed with %p Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-18 4:21 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-18 5:44 ` Sergey Senozhatsky [this message]
2017-10-18 5:44 ` Sergey Senozhatsky
2017-10-18 6:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-18 6:04 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-10-19 0:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Sergey Senozhatsky
2017-10-19 0:00 ` Sergey Senozhatsky
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