From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <wilal.deacon@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfries@google.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4] scripts: add leaking_addresses.pl
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 07:58:20 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171107205820.GX18478@eros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD00B3BD1@AcuExch.aculab.com>
On Tue, Nov 07, 2017 at 01:56:05PM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Tobin C. Harding
> > Sent: 07 November 2017 10:32
> >
> > Currently we are leaking addresses from the kernel to user space. This
> > script is an attempt to find some of those leakages. Script parses
> > `dmesg` output and /proc and /sys files for hex strings that look like
> > kernel addresses.
> ...
>
> Maybe the %p that end up in dmesg (via the kernel message buffer) should
> be converted to text in a form that allows the code that reads them to
> substitute alternate text for non-root users?
>
> Then the actual addresses will be available to root (who can probably
> get most by other means) but not to the casual observer.
Interesting idea. Isn't the same outcome already achieved with
dmesg_restrict. I appreciate that this does beg the question 'why are we
scanning dmesg then?'
There has not been much discussion on dmesg_restrict. Is dmesg_restrict
good enough that we needn't bother scanning it?
thanks for your input,
Tobin.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <wilal.deacon@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfries@google.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@google.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] scripts: add leaking_addresses.pl
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 07:58:20 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171107205820.GX18478@eros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD00B3BD1@AcuExch.aculab.com>
On Tue, Nov 07, 2017 at 01:56:05PM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Tobin C. Harding
> > Sent: 07 November 2017 10:32
> >
> > Currently we are leaking addresses from the kernel to user space. This
> > script is an attempt to find some of those leakages. Script parses
> > `dmesg` output and /proc and /sys files for hex strings that look like
> > kernel addresses.
> ...
>
> Maybe the %p that end up in dmesg (via the kernel message buffer) should
> be converted to text in a form that allows the code that reads them to
> substitute alternate text for non-root users?
>
> Then the actual addresses will be available to root (who can probably
> get most by other means) but not to the casual observer.
Interesting idea. Isn't the same outcome already achieved with
dmesg_restrict. I appreciate that this does beg the question 'why are we
scanning dmesg then?'
There has not been much discussion on dmesg_restrict. Is dmesg_restrict
good enough that we needn't bother scanning it?
thanks for your input,
Tobin.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@tobin.cc>
To: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@docker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@hellion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <wilal.deacon@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfrie
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] scripts: add leaking_addresses.pl
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2017 07:58:20 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171107205820.GX18478@eros> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <063D6719AE5E284EB5DD2968C1650D6DD00B3BD1@AcuExch.aculab.com>
On Tue, Nov 07, 2017 at 01:56:05PM +0000, David Laight wrote:
> From: Tobin C. Harding
> > Sent: 07 November 2017 10:32
> >
> > Currently we are leaking addresses from the kernel to user space. This
> > script is an attempt to find some of those leakages. Script parses
> > `dmesg` output and /proc and /sys files for hex strings that look like
> > kernel addresses.
> ...
>
> Maybe the %p that end up in dmesg (via the kernel message buffer) should
> be converted to text in a form that allows the code that reads them to
> substitute alternate text for non-root users?
>
> Then the actual addresses will be available to root (who can probably
> get most by other means) but not to the casual observer.
Interesting idea. Isn't the same outcome already achieved with
dmesg_restrict. I appreciate that this does beg the question 'why are we
scanning dmesg then?'
There has not been much discussion on dmesg_restrict. Is dmesg_restrict
good enough that we needn't bother scanning it?
thanks for your input,
Tobin.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-07 20:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 92+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-07 10:32 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4] scripts: add leaking_addresses.pl Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-07 10:32 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-07 10:32 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-07 10:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2017-11-07 10:50 ` Greg KH
2017-11-07 10:50 ` Greg KH
2017-11-07 20:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-07 20:51 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-07 20:51 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-07 13:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Laight
2017-11-07 13:56 ` David Laight
2017-11-07 13:56 ` David Laight
2017-11-07 20:58 ` Tobin C. Harding [this message]
2017-11-07 20:58 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-07 20:58 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-07 21:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2017-11-07 21:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-07 21:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-07 15:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Petr Mladek
2017-11-07 15:51 ` Petr Mladek
2017-11-07 15:51 ` Petr Mladek
2017-11-07 20:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-07 20:39 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-07 20:39 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-07 23:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2017-11-07 23:36 ` Laura Abbott
2017-11-08 0:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-08 0:59 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-08 20:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-08 20:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-09 4:43 ` Kaiwan N Billimoria
2017-11-09 4:43 ` Kaiwan N Billimoria
2017-11-09 4:54 ` Kaiwan N Billimoria
2017-11-09 4:54 ` Kaiwan N Billimoria
2017-11-09 18:11 ` Steven Rostedt
2017-11-09 18:11 ` Steven Rostedt
2017-11-10 3:03 ` Kaiwan N Billimoria
2017-11-10 3:03 ` Kaiwan N Billimoria
2017-11-08 1:13 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-08 1:13 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-08 12:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2017-11-08 12:10 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-11-08 12:10 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-11-08 21:16 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-08 21:16 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-08 22:48 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-08 22:48 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-09 0:49 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-11-09 0:49 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-11-09 0:49 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-11-09 2:08 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-09 2:08 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-10 22:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Frank Rowand
2017-11-10 22:12 ` Frank Rowand
2017-11-12 11:49 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-11-12 11:49 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-11-12 11:49 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-11-12 18:02 ` Frank Rowand
2017-11-12 18:02 ` Frank Rowand
2017-11-12 21:18 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-12 21:18 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-13 1:06 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-11-13 1:06 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-11-13 1:06 ` Michael Ellerman
2017-11-10 13:56 ` kaiwan.billimoria
2017-11-10 13:56 ` kaiwan.billimoria
2017-11-12 22:21 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-12 22:21 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-13 5:46 ` kaiwan.billimoria
2017-11-13 5:46 ` kaiwan.billimoria
2017-11-13 6:08 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-13 6:08 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-13 6:52 ` Kaiwan N Billimoria
2017-11-13 6:52 ` Kaiwan N Billimoria
2017-11-20 15:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Petr Mladek
2017-11-20 15:39 ` Petr Mladek
2017-11-19 23:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-19 23:56 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-11 23:10 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-11-11 23:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-11-11 23:10 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-11-12 23:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-12 23:06 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-12 23:06 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-13 3:37 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-11-13 3:37 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-11-13 3:37 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2017-11-13 4:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-13 4:35 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-13 4:35 ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-11-13 5:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kaiwan N Billimoria
2017-11-13 5:27 ` Kaiwan N Billimoria
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