From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>, David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, keescook@chromium.org,
mcgrof@kernel.org, tixxdz@gmail.com, luto@kernel.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, james.l.morris@oracle.com,
ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk, solar@openwall.com,
serge@hallyn.com, jeyu@kernel.org, rusty@rustcorp.com.au,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, corbet@lwn.net,
mingo@kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add request_module_cap()
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 11:28:52 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171129172852.GA14545@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171129155406.i2lyclquj75lvtn4@thunk.org>
Quoting Theodore Ts'o (tytso@mit.edu):
> Half the problem here is that with containers, people are changing the
> security model, because they want to let untrusted users have "root",
> without really having "root". Part of the fundamental problem is that
> there are some well-meaning, but fundamentally misguided people, who
> have been asserting: "Containers are just as secure as VM's".
>
> Well, they are not. And the sooner people get past this, the better
> off they'll be....
Just to be clear, module loading requires - and must always continue to
require - CAP_SYS_MODULE against the initial user namespace. Containers
in user namespaces do not have that.
I don't believe anyone has ever claimed that containers which are not in
a user namespace are in any way secure.
(And as for the other claim, I'd prefer to stick to "VMs are in most
cases as insecure as properly configured containers" :)
-serge
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: serge@hallyn.com (Serge E. Hallyn)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add request_module_cap()
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 11:28:52 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171129172852.GA14545@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171129155406.i2lyclquj75lvtn4@thunk.org>
Quoting Theodore Ts'o (tytso at mit.edu):
> Half the problem here is that with containers, people are changing the
> security model, because they want to let untrusted users have "root",
> without really having "root". Part of the fundamental problem is that
> there are some well-meaning, but fundamentally misguided people, who
> have been asserting: "Containers are just as secure as VM's".
>
> Well, they are not. And the sooner people get past this, the better
> off they'll be....
Just to be clear, module loading requires - and must always continue to
require - CAP_SYS_MODULE against the initial user namespace. Containers
in user namespaces do not have that.
I don't believe anyone has ever claimed that containers which are not in
a user namespace are in any way secure.
(And as for the other claim, I'd prefer to stick to "VMs are in most
cases as insecure as properly configured containers" :)
-serge
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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, keescook@chromium.org,
mcgrof@kernel.org, tixxdz@gmail.com, luto@kernel.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, james.l.morris@oracle.com,
ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk, solar@openwall.com,
serge@hallyn.com, jeyu@kernel.org, rusty@rustcorp.com.au,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, corbet@lwn.net,
mingo@kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add request_module_cap()
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 11:28:52 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171129172852.GA14545@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171129155406.i2lyclquj75lvtn4@thunk.org>
Quoting Theodore Ts'o (tytso@mit.edu):
> Half the problem here is that with containers, people are changing the
> security model, because they want to let untrusted users have "root",
> without really having "root". Part of the fundamental problem is that
> there are some well-meaning, but fundamentally misguided people, who
> have been asserting: "Containers are just as secure as VM's".
>
> Well, they are not. And the sooner people get past this, the better
> off they'll be....
Just to be clear, module loading requires - and must always continue to
require - CAP_SYS_MODULE against the initial user namespace. Containers
in user namespaces do not have that.
I don't believe anyone has ever claimed that containers which are not in
a user namespace are in any way secure.
(And as for the other claim, I'd prefer to stick to "VMs are in most
cases as insecure as properly configured containers" :)
-serge
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-11-29 17:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 218+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-11-27 17:18 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 next 0/5] Improve Module autoloading infrastructure Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add request_module_cap() Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 18:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Randy Dunlap
2017-11-27 18:48 ` Randy Dunlap
2017-11-27 18:48 ` Randy Dunlap
2017-11-27 21:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 21:35 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 21:35 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 19:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 19:14 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 19:14 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 20:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-11-28 20:11 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 20:11 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 21:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 21:16 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 21:16 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 21:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 21:33 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 21:33 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 22:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 22:18 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 22:18 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 22:52 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 22:52 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 22:52 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 21:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-11-28 21:39 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 21:39 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 22:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 22:12 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 22:12 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 22:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-11-28 22:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 22:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 22:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 22:48 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-28 22:48 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-29 7:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Michal Kubecek
2017-11-29 7:49 ` Michal Kubecek
2017-11-29 7:49 ` Michal Kubecek
2017-11-29 13:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Alan Cox
2017-11-29 13:46 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-29 13:46 ` Alan Cox
2017-11-29 14:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Miller
2017-11-29 14:50 ` David Miller
2017-11-29 14:50 ` David Miller
2017-11-29 15:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 15:54 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 15:54 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 15:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Miller
2017-11-29 15:58 ` David Miller
2017-11-29 15:58 ` David Miller
2017-11-29 16:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 16:29 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 16:29 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 22:45 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 22:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 22:45 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-30 0:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-11-30 0:06 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-30 0:06 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 17:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2017-11-29 17:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-29 17:28 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-30 0:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-30 0:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-30 0:35 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-30 17:17 ` [kernel-hardening] " Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-30 17:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-30 17:17 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-11-28 20:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 20:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 20:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 next 2/5] modules:capabilities: add cap_kernel_module_request() permission check Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-30 2:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-30 2:05 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-30 2:05 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-27 17:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 next 3/5] modules:capabilities: automatic module loading restriction Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-30 1:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-30 1:23 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-30 1:23 ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2017-11-30 12:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2017-11-30 12:22 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-30 12:22 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 next 4/5] modules:capabilities: add a per-task modules auto-load mode Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 next 5/5] net: modules: use request_module_cap() to load 'netdev-%s' modules Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 17:18 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 18:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 18:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 18:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 21:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 21:41 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 21:41 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 22:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 22:04 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 22:04 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 22:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-11-27 22:59 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-27 22:59 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-27 23:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 23:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 23:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 23:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-11-27 23:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-27 23:19 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-27 23:35 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 23:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 23:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-28 1:23 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-11-28 1:23 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 1:23 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 12:16 ` [kernel-hardening] " Geo Kozey
2017-11-28 12:16 ` Geo Kozey
2017-11-28 19:32 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-28 19:32 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-28 20:08 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 20:08 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 20:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-28 20:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-28 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 20:20 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 20:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-28 20:33 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-28 21:10 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 21:10 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 21:33 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 21:33 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 23:23 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-28 23:23 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-28 23:29 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 23:29 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-28 23:49 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-28 23:49 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 0:18 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 6:36 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 6:36 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-29 14:46 ` Geo Kozey
2017-11-29 14:46 ` Geo Kozey
2017-12-01 15:22 ` Marcus Meissner
2017-12-01 15:22 ` Marcus Meissner
2017-11-28 23:53 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 23:53 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-28 21:51 ` Geo Kozey
2017-11-28 21:51 ` Geo Kozey
2017-11-28 23:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-28 23:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 0:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 0:17 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 0:26 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 0:26 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 0:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 0:50 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 4:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-11-29 4:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-11-29 4:26 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-11-29 18:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 18:30 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 18:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 18:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 18:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 18:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 21:17 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-29 22:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-29 22:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-30 0:44 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-30 0:44 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-30 2:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-30 2:08 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-30 6:51 ` Daniel Micay
2017-11-30 6:51 ` Daniel Micay
2017-11-30 8:50 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-30 8:50 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-30 14:16 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-30 14:16 ` Theodore Ts'o
2017-11-30 14:51 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-30 14:51 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-12-01 6:39 ` Daniel Micay
2017-12-01 6:39 ` Daniel Micay
2017-11-29 15:28 ` Geo Kozey
2017-11-29 15:28 ` Geo Kozey
2017-11-27 18:41 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 next 0/5] Improve Module autoloading infrastructure Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 18:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 18:41 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 19:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 19:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 19:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 19:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 19:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 19:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-11-27 21:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 21:31 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 21:31 ` Djalal Harouni
2017-11-27 19:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Miller
2017-11-27 19:14 ` David Miller
2017-11-27 19:14 ` David Miller
2017-11-27 22:31 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-11-27 22:31 ` James Morris
2017-11-27 22:31 ` James Morris
2017-11-27 23:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-11-27 23:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-27 23:04 ` Kees Cook
2017-11-27 23:44 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Morris
2017-11-27 23:44 ` James Morris
2017-11-27 23:44 ` James Morris
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