From: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Joey Lee <jlee@suse.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:26:57 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171207142657.52e1363a@alans-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171205100148.5757-1-glin@suse.com>
On Tue, 5 Dec 2017 18:01:46 +0800
Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> wrote:
> The series of patches introduce Security Version to EFI stub.
>
> Security Version is a monotonically increasing number and designed to
> prevent the user from loading an insecure kernel accidentally. The
> bootloader maintains a list of security versions corresponding to
> different distributions. After fixing a critical vulnerability, the
> distribution kernel maintainer bumps the "version", and the bootloader
> updates the list automatically.
This seems a mindbogglingly complicated way to implement something you
could do with a trivial script in the package that updates the list of
iffy kernels and when generating the new grub.conf puts them in a menu
of 'old insecure' kernels.
Why do you even need this in the EFI stub ?
What happens if you want to invalidate an old kernel but not push a new
one ? Today if you've got a package that maintains the list of 'iffy'
kernels you can push a tiny package, under your scheme you've got to push
new kernels which is an un-necessary and high risk OS change.
It just feels like an attempt to solve the problem in completely the
wrong place.
Alan
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk (Alan Cox)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:26:57 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171207142657.52e1363a@alans-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171205100148.5757-1-glin@suse.com>
On Tue, 5 Dec 2017 18:01:46 +0800
Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> wrote:
> The series of patches introduce Security Version to EFI stub.
>
> Security Version is a monotonically increasing number and designed to
> prevent the user from loading an insecure kernel accidentally. The
> bootloader maintains a list of security versions corresponding to
> different distributions. After fixing a critical vulnerability, the
> distribution kernel maintainer bumps the "version", and the bootloader
> updates the list automatically.
This seems a mindbogglingly complicated way to implement something you
could do with a trivial script in the package that updates the list of
iffy kernels and when generating the new grub.conf puts them in a menu
of 'old insecure' kernels.
Why do you even need this in the EFI stub ?
What happens if you want to invalidate an old kernel but not push a new
one ? Today if you've got a package that maintains the list of 'iffy'
kernels you can push a tiny package, under your scheme you've got to push
new kernels which is an un-necessary and high risk OS change.
It just feels like an attempt to solve the problem in completely the
wrong place.
Alan
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Joey Lee <jlee@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:26:57 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171207142657.52e1363a@alans-desktop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171205100148.5757-1-glin@suse.com>
On Tue, 5 Dec 2017 18:01:46 +0800
Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> wrote:
> The series of patches introduce Security Version to EFI stub.
>
> Security Version is a monotonically increasing number and designed to
> prevent the user from loading an insecure kernel accidentally. The
> bootloader maintains a list of security versions corresponding to
> different distributions. After fixing a critical vulnerability, the
> distribution kernel maintainer bumps the "version", and the bootloader
> updates the list automatically.
This seems a mindbogglingly complicated way to implement something you
could do with a trivial script in the package that updates the list of
iffy kernels and when generating the new grub.conf puts them in a menu
of 'old insecure' kernels.
Why do you even need this in the EFI stub ?
What happens if you want to invalidate an old kernel but not push a new
one ? Today if you've got a package that maintains the list of 'iffy'
kernels you can push a tiny package, under your scheme you've got to push
new kernels which is an un-necessary and high risk OS change.
It just feels like an attempt to solve the problem in completely the
wrong place.
Alan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-12-07 14:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-12-05 10:01 [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub Gary Lin
2017-12-05 10:01 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-05 10:01 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-05 10:01 ` [RFC v3 PATCH 1/2] x86/efi: Introduce Security Version to x86 Gary Lin
2017-12-05 10:01 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-05 10:01 ` [RFC v3 PATCH 2/2] arm64/efi: Introduce Security Version to ARM64 Gary Lin
2017-12-05 10:01 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-05 10:01 ` Gary Lin
[not found] ` <20171205100148.5757-1-glin-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>
2017-12-05 21:14 ` [RFC v3 PATCH 0/2] Introduce Security Version to EFI Stub Josh Boyer
2017-12-05 21:14 ` Josh Boyer
2017-12-05 21:14 ` Josh Boyer
[not found] ` <CA+5PVA4k9RN22i2d=4GCPnm9bwi5KUgp8PiV=9X1pBZxN1xPmg-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2017-12-06 3:24 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-06 3:24 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-06 3:24 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-06 18:37 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-06 18:37 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-06 18:37 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-07 1:59 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-07 1:59 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-07 6:09 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-07 6:09 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-07 7:52 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-07 7:52 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-07 8:18 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-07 8:18 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-07 8:18 ` Ingo Molnar
[not found] ` <20171207081816.jy2rw5y5iyxeqw6n-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2017-12-07 10:27 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-07 10:27 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-07 10:27 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-07 10:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-07 10:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-07 10:35 ` Ingo Molnar
2017-12-08 9:00 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-08 9:00 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-07 14:26 ` Alan Cox [this message]
2017-12-07 14:26 ` Alan Cox
2017-12-07 14:26 ` Alan Cox
2017-12-08 10:03 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-08 10:03 ` Gary Lin
2017-12-08 10:03 ` Gary Lin
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