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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Thiago Rafael Becker <thiago.becker@gmail.com>,
	Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>,
	NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>,
	"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 08/22] kernel: make groups_sort calling a responsibility group_info allocators
Date: Mon,  8 Jan 2018 13:59:35 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180108125925.953788356@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180108125925.601688333@linuxfoundation.org>

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thiago Rafael Becker <thiago.becker@gmail.com>

commit bdcf0a423ea1c40bbb40e7ee483b50fc8aa3d758 upstream.

In testing, we found that nfsd threads may call set_groups in parallel
for the same entry cached in auth.unix.gid, racing in the call of
groups_sort, corrupting the groups for that entry and leading to
permission denials for the client.

This patch:
 - Make groups_sort globally visible.
 - Move the call to groups_sort to the modifiers of group_info
 - Remove the call to groups_sort from set_groups

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171211151420.18655-1-thiago.becker@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thiago Rafael Becker <thiago.becker@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Acked-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c   |    1 +
 fs/nfsd/auth.c                    |    3 +++
 include/linux/cred.h              |    1 +
 kernel/groups.c                   |    5 +++--
 kernel/uid16.c                    |    1 +
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c |    1 +
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c |    1 +
 net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c         |    2 ++
 8 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/compat_linux.c
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE2(s390_setgroups16,
 		return retval;
 	}
 
+	groups_sort(group_info);
 	retval = set_current_groups(group_info);
 	put_group_info(group_info);
 
--- a/fs/nfsd/auth.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/auth.c
@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
 				GROUP_AT(gi, i) = exp->ex_anon_gid;
 			else
 				GROUP_AT(gi, i) = GROUP_AT(rqgi, i);
+
+			/* Each thread allocates its own gi, no race */
+			groups_sort(gi);
 		}
 	} else {
 		gi = get_group_info(rqgi);
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ extern int set_current_groups(struct gro
 extern void set_groups(struct cred *, struct group_info *);
 extern int groups_search(const struct group_info *, kgid_t);
 extern bool may_setgroups(void);
+extern void groups_sort(struct group_info *);
 
 /* access the groups "array" with this macro */
 #define GROUP_AT(gi, i) \
--- a/kernel/groups.c
+++ b/kernel/groups.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int groups_from_user(struct group
 }
 
 /* a simple Shell sort */
-static void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info)
+void groups_sort(struct group_info *group_info)
 {
 	int base, max, stride;
 	int gidsetsize = group_info->ngroups;
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static void groups_sort(struct group_inf
 		stride /= 3;
 	}
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(groups_sort);
 
 /* a simple bsearch */
 int groups_search(const struct group_info *group_info, kgid_t grp)
@@ -159,7 +160,6 @@ int groups_search(const struct group_inf
 void set_groups(struct cred *new, struct group_info *group_info)
 {
 	put_group_info(new->group_info);
-	groups_sort(group_info);
 	get_group_info(group_info);
 	new->group_info = group_info;
 }
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups, int, gidsetsi
 		return retval;
 	}
 
+	groups_sort(group_info);
 	retval = set_current_groups(group_info);
 	put_group_info(group_info);
 
--- a/kernel/uid16.c
+++ b/kernel/uid16.c
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(setgroups16, int, gidset
 		return retval;
 	}
 
+	groups_sort(group_info);
 	retval = set_current_groups(group_info);
 	put_group_info(group_info);
 
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_rpc_xdr.c
@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ static int gssx_dec_linux_creds(struct x
 			goto out_free_groups;
 		GROUP_AT(creds->cr_group_info, i) = kgid;
 	}
+	groups_sort(creds->cr_group_info);
 
 	return 0;
 out_free_groups:
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail
 				goto out;
 			GROUP_AT(rsci.cred.cr_group_info, i) = kgid;
 		}
+		groups_sort(rsci.cred.cr_group_info);
 
 		/* mech name */
 		len = qword_get(&mesg, buf, mlen);
--- a/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c
@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ static int unix_gid_parse(struct cache_d
 		GROUP_AT(ug.gi, i) = kgid;
 	}
 
+	groups_sort(ug.gi);
 	ugp = unix_gid_lookup(cd, uid);
 	if (ugp) {
 		struct cache_head *ch;
@@ -827,6 +828,7 @@ svcauth_unix_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqs
 		kgid_t kgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, svc_getnl(argv));
 		GROUP_AT(cred->cr_group_info, i) = kgid;
 	}
+	groups_sort(cred->cr_group_info);
 	if (svc_getu32(argv) != htonl(RPC_AUTH_NULL) || svc_getu32(argv) != 0) {
 		*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
 		return SVC_DENIED;

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-08 13:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-08 12:59 [PATCH 4.4 00/22] 4.4.111-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 01/22] x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/22] kernel/acct.c: fix the acct->needcheck check in check_free_space() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/22] crypto: n2 - cure use after free Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/22] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - validate the digest size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 05/22] crypto: pcrypt - fix freeing pcrypt instances Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/22] sunxi-rsb: Include OF based modalias in device uevent Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/22] fscache: Fix the default for fscache_maybe_release_page() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/22] kernel/signal.c: protect the traced SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE tasks from SIGKILL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/22] kernel/signal.c: protect the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE tasks from !sig_kernel_only() signals Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/22] kernel/signal.c: remove the no longer needed SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE check in complete_signal() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 12/22] ARC: uaccess: dont use "l" gcc inline asm constraint modifier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/22] Input: elantech - add new icbody type 15 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/22] x86/microcode/AMD: Add support for fam17h microcode loading Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 15/22] parisc: Fix alignment of pa_tlb_lock in assembly on 32-bit SMP kernel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 16/22] mtd: nand: pxa3xx: Fix READOOB implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/22] x86/tlb: Drop the _GPL from the cpu_tlbstate export Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/22] genksyms: Handle string literals with spaces in reference files Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/22] module: keep percpu symbols in modules symtab Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 20/22] module: Issue warnings when tainting kernel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 21/22] proc: much faster /proc/vmstat Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 22/22] Map the vsyscall page with _PAGE_USER Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 14:25 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/22] 4.4.111-stable review Nathan Chancellor
2018-01-08 14:25   ` Nathan Chancellor
2018-01-08 16:32   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 15:21 ` 王金浦
2018-01-08 16:32   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 17:29 ` Christoph Biedl
2018-01-08 17:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-08 17:47 ` kernelci.org bot
2018-01-08 21:00 ` Shuah Khan
2018-01-08 23:29 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-09  9:13   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-09  9:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-09 13:50     ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-09  9:51 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-01-09 10:50   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-09 16:16 ` Guenter Roeck

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