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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@suse.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 01/22] x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow
Date: Mon,  8 Jan 2018 13:59:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180108125925.665331563@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180108125925.601688333@linuxfoundation.org>

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>

commit 063fb3e56f6dd29b2633b678b837e1d904200e6f upstream.

After kasan_init() executed, no one is allowed to write to kasan_zero_page,
so write protect it.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452516679-32040-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -126,10 +126,16 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * kasan_zero_page has been used as early shadow memory, thus it may
-	 * contain some garbage. Now we can clear it, since after the TLB flush
-	 * no one should write to it.
+	 * contain some garbage. Now we can clear and write protect it, since
+	 * after the TLB flush no one should write to it.
 	 */
 	memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
+		pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+		set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i], pte);
+	}
+	/* Flush TLBs again to be sure that write protection applied. */
+	__flush_tlb_all();
 
 	init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
 	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");


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WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@suse.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 01/22] x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow
Date: Mon,  8 Jan 2018 13:59:28 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180108125925.665331563@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180108125925.601688333@linuxfoundation.org>

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>

commit 063fb3e56f6dd29b2633b678b837e1d904200e6f upstream.

After kasan_init() executed, no one is allowed to write to kasan_zero_page,
so write protect it.

Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1452516679-32040-3-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c |   10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -126,10 +126,16 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * kasan_zero_page has been used as early shadow memory, thus it may
-	 * contain some garbage. Now we can clear it, since after the TLB flush
-	 * no one should write to it.
+	 * contain some garbage. Now we can clear and write protect it, since
+	 * after the TLB flush no one should write to it.
 	 */
 	memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+	for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
+		pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+		set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i], pte);
+	}
+	/* Flush TLBs again to be sure that write protection applied. */
+	__flush_tlb_all();
 
 	init_task.kasan_depth = 0;
 	pr_info("KernelAddressSanitizer initialized\n");

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-08 13:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-08 12:59 [PATCH 4.4 00/22] 4.4.111-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-01-08 12:59   ` [PATCH 4.4 01/22] x86/kasan: Write protect kasan zero shadow Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 02/22] kernel/acct.c: fix the acct->needcheck check in check_free_space() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 03/22] crypto: n2 - cure use after free Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 04/22] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - validate the digest size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 05/22] crypto: pcrypt - fix freeing pcrypt instances Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 06/22] sunxi-rsb: Include OF based modalias in device uevent Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 07/22] fscache: Fix the default for fscache_maybe_release_page() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 08/22] kernel: make groups_sort calling a responsibility group_info allocators Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 09/22] kernel/signal.c: protect the traced SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE tasks from SIGKILL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 10/22] kernel/signal.c: protect the SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE tasks from !sig_kernel_only() signals Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 11/22] kernel/signal.c: remove the no longer needed SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE check in complete_signal() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 12/22] ARC: uaccess: dont use "l" gcc inline asm constraint modifier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 13/22] Input: elantech - add new icbody type 15 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 14/22] x86/microcode/AMD: Add support for fam17h microcode loading Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 15/22] parisc: Fix alignment of pa_tlb_lock in assembly on 32-bit SMP kernel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 16/22] mtd: nand: pxa3xx: Fix READOOB implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 17/22] x86/tlb: Drop the _GPL from the cpu_tlbstate export Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 18/22] genksyms: Handle string literals with spaces in reference files Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 19/22] module: keep percpu symbols in modules symtab Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 20/22] module: Issue warnings when tainting kernel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 21/22] proc: much faster /proc/vmstat Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 12:59 ` [PATCH 4.4 22/22] Map the vsyscall page with _PAGE_USER Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 14:25 ` [PATCH 4.4 00/22] 4.4.111-stable review Nathan Chancellor
2018-01-08 14:25   ` Nathan Chancellor
2018-01-08 16:32   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 15:21 ` 王金浦
2018-01-08 16:32   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-08 17:29 ` Christoph Biedl
2018-01-08 17:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-08 17:47 ` kernelci.org bot
2018-01-08 21:00 ` Shuah Khan
2018-01-08 23:29 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-09  9:13   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-09  9:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-09 13:50     ` Guenter Roeck
2018-01-09  9:51 ` Naresh Kamboju
2018-01-09 10:50   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-09 16:16 ` Guenter Roeck

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