From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
x86@kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 05/12] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec
Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 10:19:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180128091948.q4d5oolkpuw4cbts@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151703974000.26578.2874964402485950653.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
* Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> Quoting Linus:
>
> I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
> the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
> agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
> because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
> but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
> that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
> space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
> accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
>
> '__uaccess_begin_nospec' covers '__get_user' and 'copy_from_iter' where
> the limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those
> cases an 'lfence' prevents speculation with a potential pointer to
> privileged memory.
(Same style comments as for the previous patches)
>
> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: x86@kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 +++---
> arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 6 +++---
> arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 12 ++++++------
> arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 8 ++++----
> 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 626caf58183a..a930585fa3b5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ do { \
> ({ \
> int __gu_err; \
> __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \
> - __uaccess_begin(); \
> + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
> __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \
> __uaccess_end(); \
> (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
> @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
> * get_user_ex(...);
> * } get_user_catch(err)
> */
> -#define get_user_try uaccess_try
> +#define get_user_try uaccess_try_nospec
> #define get_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err)
>
> #define get_user_ex(x, ptr) do { \
> @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void)
> __typeof__(ptr) __uval = (uval); \
> __typeof__(*(ptr)) __old = (old); \
> __typeof__(*(ptr)) __new = (new); \
> - __uaccess_begin(); \
> + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
> else
> n = __copy_user_intel(to, from, n);
> - clac();
> + __uaccess_end();
> return n;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll);
> @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll);
> unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from,
> unsigned long n)
> {
> - stac();
> + __uaccess_begin_nospec();
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
> if (n > 64 && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
> n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n);
> @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *fr
> #else
> __copy_user(to, from, n);
> #endif
> - clac();
> + __uaccess_end();
> return n;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero);
>
These three chunks appears to be unrelated changes changing open-coded clac()s to
__uaccess_end() calls correctly: please split these out into a separate patch.
Thanks,
Ingo
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
x86@kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 05/12] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec
Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 10:19:48 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180128091948.q4d5oolkpuw4cbts@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151703974000.26578.2874964402485950653.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
* Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> Quoting Linus:
>
> I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
> the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
> agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
> because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
> but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
> that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
> space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
> accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
>
> '__uaccess_begin_nospec' covers '__get_user' and 'copy_from_iter' where
> the limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those
> cases an 'lfence' prevents speculation with a potential pointer to
> privileged memory.
(Same style comments as for the previous patches)
>
> Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: x86@kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 +++---
> arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 6 +++---
> arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 12 ++++++------
> arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 8 ++++----
> 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 626caf58183a..a930585fa3b5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ do { \
> ({ \
> int __gu_err; \
> __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \
> - __uaccess_begin(); \
> + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
> __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \
> __uaccess_end(); \
> (x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
> @@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long buf[100]; };
> * get_user_ex(...);
> * } get_user_catch(err)
> */
> -#define get_user_try uaccess_try
> +#define get_user_try uaccess_try_nospec
> #define get_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err)
>
> #define get_user_ex(x, ptr) do { \
> @@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void)
> __typeof__(ptr) __uval = (uval); \
> __typeof__(*(ptr)) __old = (old); \
> __typeof__(*(ptr)) __new = (new); \
> - __uaccess_begin(); \
> + __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
> else
> n = __copy_user_intel(to, from, n);
> - clac();
> + __uaccess_end();
> return n;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll);
> @@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll);
> unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from,
> unsigned long n)
> {
> - stac();
> + __uaccess_begin_nospec();
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
> if (n > 64 && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
> n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n);
> @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *fr
> #else
> __copy_user(to, from, n);
> #endif
> - clac();
> + __uaccess_end();
> return n;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero);
>
These three chunks appears to be unrelated changes changing open-coded clac()s to
__uaccess_end() calls correctly: please split these out into a separate patch.
Thanks,
Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-28 9:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-27 7:55 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 01/12] Documentation: document array_idx Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 8:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 8:55 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 11:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-28 11:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-28 16:28 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-28 16:28 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 18:33 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 18:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-29 16:45 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 18:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-28 18:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30 6:29 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 19:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-30 20:13 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 20:27 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-31 8:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-31 14:13 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-31 14:21 ` Greg KH
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 03/12] x86: implement array_idx_mask Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:02 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:06 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:14 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-29 20:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 6:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 05/12] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:19 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2018-01-28 9:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 06/12] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:25 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:25 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 07/12] x86: remove the syscall_64 fast-path Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:29 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:29 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 15:22 ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-28 15:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 08/12] x86: sanitize sycall table de-references under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:36 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:36 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-27 7:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 09/12] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:56 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 10/12] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:56 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 11/12] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:56 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:56 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:56 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:56 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:50 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:50 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-29 22:05 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-31 8:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-01 20:23 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 18:52 ` [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Linus Torvalds
2018-01-27 18:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-27 18:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-27 19:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-27 19:26 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 19:26 ` Dan Williams
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