All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: jinqian@android.com (Jin Qian)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()
Date: Tue,  6 Feb 2018 13:19:00 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180206211900.3565-1-jinqian@android.com> (raw)

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream

With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a
data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected,
e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'.  When validating such a
master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end
of the buffer.  Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp().  [Also
clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.]

Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.18.y
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
---
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 89d5695c51cd..20251ee5c491 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc)
  */
 static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
 {
-	if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
-		if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)
-			goto out;
-		if (orig_desc)
-			if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
-				goto out;
-	} else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
-		if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)
-			goto out;
-		if (orig_desc)
-			if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
-				goto out;
-	} else
-		goto out;
+	int prefix_len;
+
+	if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!new_desc[prefix_len])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return 0;
-out:
-	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Jin Qian <jinqian@android.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@linux-nfs.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()
Date: Tue,  6 Feb 2018 13:19:00 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180206211900.3565-1-jinqian@android.com> (raw)

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream

With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a
data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected,
e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'.  When validating such a
master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end
of the buffer.  Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp().  [Also
clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.]

Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.18.y
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jin Qian <jinqian@google.com>
---
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 89d5695c51cd..20251ee5c491 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc)
  */
 static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
 {
-	if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
-		if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)
-			goto out;
-		if (orig_desc)
-			if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
-				goto out;
-	} else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
-		if (strlen(new_desc) == KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)
-			goto out;
-		if (orig_desc)
-			if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
-				goto out;
-	} else
-		goto out;
+	int prefix_len;
+
+	if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!new_desc[prefix_len])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return 0;
-out:
-	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog

             reply	other threads:[~2018-02-06 21:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-06 21:19 Jin Qian [this message]
2018-02-06 21:19 ` [PATCH 1/1] KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc() Jin Qian
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-02-05 20:02 Jin Qian
2018-02-05 20:02 ` Jin Qian
2018-02-05 20:02 ` Jin Qian
2018-02-06  1:54 ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-06  1:54   ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-06  1:54   ` Eric Biggers
2018-02-06 21:22 ` Jin Qian
2018-02-06 21:22   ` Jin Qian
2018-02-06 21:22   ` Jin Qian

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20180206211900.3565-1-jinqian@android.com \
    --to=jinqian@android.com \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.